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THESE  notions  concerning  coinage  having,  for the 
main, as you know, been put into writing above twelve 
months  since;  as  those  other,  concerning  interest,  a 
great deal above so many years : I put them now again 
into your hands, with a liberty (since you will have it 
so) to communicate them farther, as you please.  If, 
upon a review, you continue your favourable opinion of 
them, and nothing less than publishing will satisfy you, 
I must desire you to remember,  that you must be an- 
swerabIe to the world for the style, which is such as a 
man writes carelessly to his friend, when he seeks truth, 
not ornament ;  and studies only to be in the right, and 
to be understood.  I have, since you saw them last year, 
met with some new objections  in  print, which  I have 
endeavoured to remove; and particularly I have taken 
into consideration a printed sheet, entitled, "  Remarks 
upon a Paper given in to the Lords, &c."  Because one 
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may naturally suppose,  that he,  that was  so much  a 
patron of  that cause, would omit nothing that could be 
said in favour of  it.  To this I must  here add,  that I 
am just  now  told  from  Holland, " That the States, 
findin?  themselves  abused, by coining a vast quantity 
of  thew  base  [schillings]  money,  made  of  their  own 
ducatoons, and other  finer  silver,  melted  down,  have 
put a stop to the minting of  any but fine  silver coin, 
till they should settle a mint upon a new foot." 
I know the sincere  love  and  concern  you  have  for 
your country puts you constantly upon casting about, 
on  all hands,  for any means to serve it ; and will  not 
suffer you to overlook  any thing you conceive may be 
of  any  the  least  use,  though  offered  you  from  the 
meanest capacities : you  coulrl  not else  have  put me 
upon  looking  out my  old  papers,  concerning the re- 
ducing of  interest  to 4  per cent. which  have so long 
lain  by forgotten.  Upon  this new  survey of  them,  I 
find  not my thoughts now to differ from those I had 
near twenty years since:  they have to me still the ap- 
pearance  of  truth;  nor  should I  otherwise  venture 
them so  much  as to your  sight.  If my  notions  are 
wrong, my intention I am sure is right; and whatever 
I have failed in, I shall at least let you see with what 
obedience I am, 
Sir, 
Your most humble servant. 
SIR, 
I HAVE  so little eoncern in paying  or  receiving  of 
'' interest,"  that were I in no more danger to be misled 
by inability and ignorance, than I am to be biassed by 
~nterest  and inclination,  I  might hope  to give you  a 
very  perfect  and  clear  account  of  the  consequences 
of  a law to reduce interest to 4  per cent.  But, since 
you are pleased  to ask  my opinion, I shall endeavour 
fairly to state this matter of  use, with  the best of  my 
skill. 
The first thing to be  considered  is, '' Whether the 
price of the hire of  money can be regulated  by law ?" 
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And to that I think, generally speaking, one may say, 
it is manifest it cannot.  For since it is impossible  to 
make a law, that shall hinder a rnan from giving away 
his money or estate to whom  he pleases, it will  be im- 
possible,  by  any  contrivance  of  law,  to hinder  men, 
skilled in  the power they have over  their own goods, 
and the ways of conveying them to others, to purchase 
money to be lent them, at what rate soever their oc- 
casions shall make it necessary for them to have it; for 
it is to be remembered, that no man borrows money, 
or pays use,  out of mere  pleasure :  it is the want of 
money drives men  to that trouble and charge of  bor- 
rowing ;  and proportionably to this want, so will every 
one have it, whatever price it cost him.  Wherein the 
skilful, I say, will always so manage it, as to avoid the 
prohibition of  your  law,  and keep out of  its penalty, 
do what you can.  What then will be the unavoidable 
consequences of such a law ? 
I. It will make the difficulty of borrowing and lend- 
ing much  greater,  whereby trade (the  foundation  of 
riches) will be obstructed. 
2. It will  be  a  prejudice  to none,  but those  who 
most  need  assistance  and help; I mean widows  and 
orphans,  and others uninstructed  in the arts and ma- 
nagement of  more skilful men,  whose estates lying in 
money, they will be sure, especially orphans, to have 
no more profit of  their money,  than what interest the 
law barely allows. 
3. It  will mightily increase the advantage of bankers 
and  scriveners,  and other such  expert brokers,  who, 
skilled in the arts of putting out money,  according to 
the true and natural value, which  the present state of 
trade, money, and debts, shall always raise interest to, 
they will infallibly get what the true ralue of  interest 
shall be  above  the legal;  for  men,  finding  the con- 
venience of  lodging their money in hands, where they 
can  be  sure of  it, at short warning, the ignorant and 
lazy will be forwardest to put it into these men's hands, 
who are known willingly to receive it, and where they 
can readily have the whole,  or part, upon  any sudden 
occasion, that may call for it. 6  Considerations of fhe lowering of  Interest, 
4.  I fear I may reckon it as one of the probable con- 
sequences of such a law, that it is likely to cause great 
perjury in the nation ; a crime, than which nothing is 
more carefully to be prevented by law-makers, not only 
by  penalties, that shall  attend  apparent  and proved 
perjury,  but by  avoiding  and  lessening,  as  much  as 
may be,  the temptations  to it; for  where  those  are 
strong, (as they are, where men shall swear for  their 
own advantage) there  the fear of penalties  to follow 
will have little restraint, especially if the crime be hard 
to  be proved :  all which, I suppose, will happen in this 
case,  where ways will  be found out to receive money 
upon  other pretences than for  use,  to evade the rule 
and rigour of  the law:  and there will  be secret trusts 
and collusions amongst men, that though they may be 
suspected, can never be proved, without their own con- 
fession.  I have heard very sober  and observing per- 
sons complain of the danger men's  lives and properties 
are in, by the frequency and fashionableness of perjury 
amongst us.  Faith  and truth, especially in  all occa- 
sions of attesting it, upon the solemn appeal to heaven 
by an oath, is the great bond of  society.  This it be- 
comes the wisdom of magistrates carefully to support, 
and render as sacred  and awful,  in  the minds of  the 
people,  as they can.  But,  if  ever frequency of oaths 
shall make them be looked on as formalities of  law, or 
the custom of  straining of  truth, (which  men's  swear- 
ing in their own cases is apt to lead them to) has once 
dipped men in perjury, and the guilt, with the tempta- 
tion, has spread itself very wide,  and  made it almost 
fashionable in some cases, it will  be impossible for the 
society (these  bonds being  dissolved) to subsist.  All 
must  break  in  pieces,  and  run to confusion.  That 
swearing in  their own cases  is apt by degrees to lend 
men into as little regard of such oaths, as they have of 
their ordinary talk, I think there is reason to suspect, 
from  what  has  been  observed,  in  something  of  that 
kind.  Masters of ships are a sort of men generally in- 
dustrious and sober, and I suppose may be thought, for 
their number  and  rank,  to be  equally honest  ta any 
other sort of men;  and yet,  by  the discourse I have 
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had with  in other countries, I find that they 
think, in those parts, they take a great liberty in their 
cu,tnm-houae  oaths,  to that degree,  that 1 remember 
I was once  told,  in a trading town beyond  sea,  of  n 
master of a vessel, there esteemed a sober and fair man, 
who yet could  not  hold  saying, "  God forbid  that a 
,Ustom-house  oath should  be  a  sin."  I say not this 
to  any reflection upon a sort of  men, that I think 
as uncorrupt as any other, and who, I am sure, ought 
in England to be cherished  and esteemed, as the most 
industrious  and most beneficial of any of its subjects : 
but I could not forbear to give this here, as an instance 
how dangerous a temptation it is  to bring men cus- 
tomarily to swear, where they may have  any concern- 
ment of their own.  And it will always be worthy the 
care and consideration of  law-makers  to keep up the 
opinion  of an oath high  and sacred, as it ought to be, 
in the minds of  the people:  which can never be done, 
where  frequency  of  oaths,  biassed  by  interest,  has 
established a neglect  of  them ;  and fashion  (which  it 
seldom fails to do) has given countenance to what profit 
rewards. 
But that law cannot keep men from taking more use 
than you set (the want of money being that alone which 
regulates its price) will perhaps appear, if we consider 
how  hard it is to set a price upon wine,  or silks, or 
other unnecessary commodities :  but how impossible it 
is to set a rate upon victuals, in a time of  famine ;  for 
money being an universal commodity, and as necessary 
to trade as food is to life,  every body must have it, at 
what rate they can get it; and unavoidably pay dear, 
when it is scarce ;  and debts, no less  than trade, have 
made borrowing in fashion.  The bankers are a clear 
instance of  this :  for some years  since,  the scarcity of 
money having made it in  England worth really more 
than six per cent.  most  of  those that had not the skill 
to let it for more  than  six  per  cent. and secure them- 
selves from the penalty of the law, put it in the bankers' 
hands, where it was ready at their call, when they had 
an opportunity of  greater improvement;  so  that the S  .  Considerations of the lowering of Interest, 
rate you  set, profits not the lenders;  and very few of 
the  borrowers,  who  are  fain  to  pay  the  price  for 
money, that conlmodity would  bear, were it left free ; 
and the gain is  only to the  banker:  and  should you 
lessen the use to four per cent., the merchant or trades- 
man that borrows would not have it  one  jot cheaper than 
he has now; but probably  these two  ill effects  would 
follow : first, that he would pay dearer; and, secondly, 
that  there  would  be  less money  left  in the  country 
to drive the trade :  for the bankers, paying at most but 
four per cent.  and receiving  from  SIX  to ten per cent. 
or more, at that low rate could be content to have more 
money lie dead by them,  than now, when it is higher: 
by which means there would  be less money stirring in 
trade, and a greater scarcity, which would raise it upon 
the borrower  by this  monoply;  and what  a  part of 
our treasure  their skill  and management, joined  with 
others'  laziness,  or want of  skill,  is  apt to draw into 
their  hands,  is  to be  known  by  those vast  sums  of 
money  they  were  found to  owe,  at shutting up of 
the Exchequer: and though  it be very true, yet  it is 
almost beyond belief, that one private goldsmith of Lon- 
don should have credit, upon his single security, (being 
usually nothing but a note, under one of  his servants' 
hands) for above eleven  hundred  thousand pounds at 
once.  The same reasons, I suppose, will still keep on 
the same trade ; and when you have taken it down by 
law to that rate, nobody will think of having more than 
four per cent. of  the banker ;  though those who have 
need  of  money,  to employ it in trade,  will  not  then, 
any more than now, get it under five or six,or as some 
pay, seven  or eight.  And if they had  then, when the 
law permitted men to make more profit of their money, 
so lar;~  a proportion of the cash of the nation in their 
hands, who can think  but that,  by this law, it should 
be inore driven into Lombard-street now ?  there being 
many now, who lend them at  four or five per cent. who 
would  not lend to others at six.  It would therefore, 
perhaps,  bring  down  the rate of  money  to the bor- 
rower,  and certainly distribute it better to the advan- 
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tsge of trade ie the country, if the legal use were kept 
pretty near  to the natural;  (by natural  use,  I mean 
rate of  money,  which  the  present  scarcity  of it 
makes it naturally at, upon an equal distribution of it) 
for then men,  being  licensed  by the law to take near 
the full natural use, will not be forward to carry it to 
London, to put it into the  banker's  hands; but will 
lend it to their neighbours  in  the country, where it is 
convenient for trade it should be.  But, if you  lessen 
the rate of  use, the lender, whose interest it is to keep 
up the rate of money, will rather lend it to the banker, 
at the legal interest, than to the tradesman, or gentle- 
man, who, when the law is broken, shall be sure to pay 
the full natural interest, or more ; because  of the en- 
grossing by the banker, as well  as the risque in trans- 
gressing the law:  whereas, were the natukal use, sup- 
pose seven per cent. and the legal six ;  first, the owner 
would not venture the penalty of  the law, for the gain- 
ing one in seven, that being the utmost his money would 
yield :  nor would the banker venture to borrow, where 
his gains would be but one per cent.,  nor the monied 
man  lend  him what he  could  make better profit  of 
legally at home.  All the danger lies in this; that your 
trade should suffer, if your being behind hand has made 
the natural use so high, that your tradesman cannot live 
upon his labour, but that your rich neighbours will so 
undersell you, that the return you makewill not amount 
to pay the use, and afford a livelihood.  There is no way 
to recover from this, but by a general frugality and in- 
dustry; or by being masters of  the trade of some corn- 
modity, which  the world  must have from you at your 
rate, because it cannot be otherwhere supplied. 
Now, I think, the natural interest of mouey is raised 
two ways:  first,  When the money of a country is but 
little, in proportion to the debts of the inhabitants, one 
amongst another.  For, suppose ten thousand pounds 
were sufficient to manage the trade of  Bermudas, and 
that the ten first planters carried over twenty thousand 
pounds, which  they lent to the several tradesmen and 
inhabitants of the country, who living above their gains, 
had spent ten thousand  pounds  of this  money,  and it 10  Considerations of  the lowering of  Interest, 
were gone out of the island ;  it is evident, that, should 
all the creditors at once call in their money, there would 
be a great scarcity of money, when that,  employed in 
trade, must be taken out of  the tradesmen's  hands to 
pay debts ;  or else the debtors want money, and be ex- 
posed  to their creditors,  and  so interest will  be high. 
But  this seldom happening, that all, or the greatest part, 
of the creditors do at once call for their money, unless it 
be in somegreat and general danger, is less andseldomer 
felt than the following,  unless where the debts of the 
people  are grown  to a  greater proportion;  for that, 
constantly causing more  borrowers  than there can be 
lenders,  will  make  money  scarce,  and  consequently 
interest high.  Secondly, That, which constantly raises 
the natural interest of money, is,  when money is little, 
in proportion to the trade of  a  country.  For in trade 
every body calls for money, according as he wants it, 
and this disproportion is always felt.  For, if English- 
men owed in all but one million,  and there were a mil- 
lion  of  money in  England, the money would  be well 
enough proportioned to the debts: but, if two millions 
were  necessary to carry on the trade,  there would be 
a  million wanting,  and the price  of  money would be 
raised,  as  it is  of  any other commodity in a market, 
where the merchandize will not serve half the customers, 
and there are two buyers for one seller. 
It is  in  vain,  therefore,  to go about effectually to 
reduce the price of  interest by a law ;  and you may as 
rationally hope  to set a  fixed  rate upon  the  hire of 
houses, or ships, as of money.  He that wants a vessel, 
rather than lose his  market, will not stick to have it at 
the market-rate, and find ways to do it with security to 
the owner, though the rate were limited by law : and 
he that wants money, rather than lose his voyage, or his 
trade, will pay the natural interest for it ;  and submit 
to such ways  of conveyance, as  shall  keep the lender 
out of the reach of the law.  So that your act, at best, 
will serve only to increase  the arts of lending, but not 
at all lessen the charge of the borrower :  he, it is likely, 
shall, with more trouble, and going farther about, pay 
also the more for his money ;  unless you intend to break 
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in  only upon  mortgages and contracts already made, 
and (which is not to be supposed) by a law,postfactum, 
bargains lawfully made, and give to Richard what 
is Peter's  due, for no other reason, but because one was 
borrower, and the other lender. 
But, supposing the law reached the intention of the 
promoters of it ;  and that this act be so contrived, that 
it fixed the natural price  of  money,  and hindered its 
being, by any body, lent at a higher use than four per 
cent., which is plain it cannot :  let us, in the next place, 
see what will be the consequences of it. 
1. It  will be a loss to widows, orphans, and all those 
who  have  their  estates  in money,  one-third  of  their 
estates ;  which will be a very hard case upon agreat  num- 
ber of people :  and it is warily to be considered, by the 
wisdom  of  the nation,  whether they will thus,  at one 
blow, fine and impoverish a great and innocent part of 
the people, who having their estates in money, have as 
much  right to make as much  of  the  money  as  it is 
worth,  (for  more they cannot) as the landlord has to 
let his land for as much as it will yield.  To fine  men 
one-third  of their estates, without any crime, or offence 
committed, seems very hard. 
2. As it will be a considerable loss and injury to the 
moneyed  man, so it will be no advantage at all to the 
kingdom.  For, so trade be not cramped, and exporta- 
tion of  our native commodities  and manufactures  not 
hindered, it will  be  no  matter to the kingdom, who 
amongst ourselves gets or loses :  only common charity 
teaches, that those should be most taken care of by the 
law,  who  are least capable  of  taking  care for them- 
selves. 
3. It will be a gain to the borrowing merchant.  For 
if he borrow at four per cent., and his returns be twelve 
per cent.,  he will  have eight per cent., and the lender 
four ;  whereas now they divide the profit equally at  six 
per cent.  But this neither gets, nor loses, to the king- 
dom, in your trade, supposing the merchant and lender 
to be  both  Englishmen;  only it will,  as I have  said, 
transfer a third part of the moneyed man's  estate, who 
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and that without any merit in the one, or transgression 
in the other.  Private men's  interests  ought not thus 
to be  neglected,  nor  sacrificed  to  any thing, but the 
manifest  advantage of  the public.  But,  in this case, 
it will be quite the contrary.  This loss to the moneyed 
men will  be a prejudice to trade : since  it will discou- 
rage lending at  such a disproportion of profit to risque ; 
as we shall see more by and by, when we come to con- 
sider of what consequence  it is to encourage  lending, 
that so none of  the money of  the nation may lie dead, 
and thereby prejudice trade. 
4 It will  hinder trade.  For,  there being a certain 
proportion of  money necessary for driving such a pro- 
portion of  trade,  so  much  money of  this  as lies  still, 
lessens so much of the trade.  Now it cannot  be  rati- 
onally expected, but that, where  the venture  is  great 
and the gains small, (as  it is  in lending  in  England, 
upon low interest) many will choose rather to hbard up 
their  money,  than venture it abroad,  on  such  terms. 
This will be a loss to the kingdom, and such a loss, as, 
here in England, ought chiefly to be looked after :  for, 
we  having no mines, nor any other way  ~f~getting,  or 
keeping of  riches  amongst  us, but by trade ;  so much 
of our trade as is lost, so much of our riches  must  ne- 
cessarily go with  it; and the over-balancing  of  trade, 
between us  and our neighbours, must inevitably carry 
away our money,  and quickly leave us poor  and  ex- 
posed.  Gold and silver, though they serve for few, yet 
they command all the conveniencies of  life, and there- 
fore in a plenty of them consist riches. 
Every one knows that mines alone furnish these :  but 
withal it is observable, that most countries, stored with 
them by nature, are poor :  the digging and refining of 
these metals taking up the labour, and wasting the num- 
ber of the people.  For which reason the wise policy of 
the Chinese will  not suffer the mines  they have to be 
wrought.  Nor  indeed,  things rightly considered,  do 
gold and silver, drawn out of the mine, equally enrich, 
with what is got by  trade.  He that would make the 
lighter scale  preponderate to the opposite, will not so 
soon  do it, by  adding increase of  new  weight to the 
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emptier, as if he took out of the heavier what he  adds 
to the lighter, for then half so much will do it.  Riches 
do not consist  in  having  more  gold and silver, but in 
having  more  in proportion than the rest of the world, 
or than our neighbours, whereby we are enabled to pro- 
cure to ourselves a greater plenty of  the conveniencies 
of  life,  than comes within  the reach  of  neighbouring 
kingdoms  and states, who, sharing the gold and silver 
of  the world  in a less  proportion, want  the means of 
ty and power, and so are poorer.  Nor would they 
be one jot the richer, if, by the discovery of new mines, 
the quantity of  gold and silver in the world becoming 
twice as much as it is, their shares of  them  should  be 
doubled.  By gold  and silver in the world,  I must be 
understood to mean, not what lies hid in the earth, but 
what is already out of the mine, in the hands and pos- 
sessions  of  men.  This,  if  well  considered,  would  be' 
no small encouragement to trade, which is a surer and 
shorter way to riches than  any other, where  it is ma- 
naged with skill and industry. 
In a country not f~ir~iished  with mines,  there are but 
two  ways  of  growing  rich,  either conquest  or  com- 
merce.  By the first the Romans made themselves ma- 
sters  of  the riches  of  the world;  but I think that, in 
our  present  circumstances,  nobody is  vain  enough  to 
entertain a thought  of  our reaping the profits of  the 
world with our swords,  and making the spoil and tri- 
bute of  vanquished  nations the fund for the supply of 
the charges of the government, with an overplus for the 
wants, and equally craving luxury, and fashionable va- 
nity of the people. 
Commerce, therefore, is the only way left to us, either 
for  riches,  or  subsistence: for this  the advantages  of 
our situation as well as the industry and inclination of 
our people, bold and skilful at sea, do naturally fit us : 
by this the nation of England  has been hitherto supported, 
and trade left almost to itself, and assisted only by the 
natural  advantages  above-mentioned,  brought  us  in 
plenty of riches,  and always set this kingdom in a rank 
equal,  if not  superior  to any of  its neighbours;  and 
would no doubt, without any difficulty, have continued 14  Considerations of  the lowering of  Interest, 
it  so, if the more enlarged and better understood interest 
of trade, since the improvement of navigation, had not 
raised us many rivals ;  and the amazing politics of some 
late reigns let in other competitors with us for the sea, 
who will  be sure to seize to themselves whatever parts 
of  trade our mismanagement, or want of money, shall 
let slip out of  our hands : and when it is once lost, it 
will be too late to hope, by a mistimed care,  easily to 
retrieve it again.  For the currents of trade, like those 
of waters, make themselves channels, out of which they 
are afterwards as hard to be diverted, as rivers that have 
worn themselves deep within their banks. 
Trade, then, is necessary to the producing of riches, 
and money necessary to  the carrying on of trade.  This 
is principally to be  looked  after,  and taken care of. 
For if  this  be  neglected,  we  shall in vain  by  contri- 
vances amongst ourselves, and shuffling the little money 
we have, from one another's  hands, endeavour to pre- 
vent our wants:  decay of  trade will  quickly waste all 
the remainder ; and then the landed-man,  who thinks, 
perhaps, by the fall of interest to raise the value of his 
land, will find himself cruelly mistaken ;  when the mo- 
ney being gone, (as it will be, if our trade be not kept 
up) he can get neither farmer to rent, nor purchaser to 
buy his land.  Whatsoever, therefore, hinders the lend- 
ing of  money,  injures  trade:  and  so the reducing of 
money  to  four  per  cent.  which  will  discourage  men 
from lending, will  be a loss to the  kingdom,  in  stop- 
ping so  much  of  the current money, which turns the 
wheels of trade.  But a11 this upon a supposition, that 
the lender and borrower are both Englishmen. 
If  the lender be a foreigner, by lessening interest from 
six to four, you get to the kingdom  one-third  part of 
the interest we pay yearly to foreigners, which let any 
one,  if  he please, think  considerable ;  but then, upon 
lessening  interest  to four per cent.  it is likely one of 
these things will happen :  that either you fall the price 
of  your  native  commodities,  or lessen  your  trade, or 
else prevent not the high use, as you  intended ;  for at 
the time of lessening your interest, you want money for 
your trade, or  you do not.  If you do not, there is no 
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need to prevent borrowing at a high rate of your neigh- 
hours.  For no country borrows of its neighbours, but 
where there is  need of  money for trade: nobody will 
borrow money of a foreigner to let it lie still.  And, if 
you do want money, necessity will still make  you bor- 
row where you can, and at  the rates your necessity, not 
your  laws,  shall set : or  else, if there be a scarcity of 
money, it must hinder the  merchant's  buying and ex- 
portation,  and  the artisan's  manufacture.  Now  the 
kingdom  gets or loses by this (for no question the mer- 
&ant,  by low interest, gets all the while) only propor- 
tionably (allowing the consumption of foreign commo- 
dities to be still the same) as the paying  of  use to fo- 
reigners carries away more, or less, of our money, than 
want of  money,  and  stopping our trade keeps us from 
bringing in,  by hindering our gains, which can be only 
estimated by those who know how much money we bor- 
row of foreigners, and at  what rate ;  and too, what pro- 
fit in trade we  make of that money. 
Borrowing of foreigners upon interest, it is true, car- 
ries away some of our gain :  but yet, upon examination 
it will be found, that our growing rich or poor depends 
not at all upon our borrowing upon interest, or not ;  but 
only, which is  greater  or less,  our importation or ex- 
portation of consumable commodities.  For, supposing 
two millions of money will drive the trade of England, 
and that we  have  money enough of our own to do it ; 
if we consume of  our own  product  and manufacture, 
and what we purchase by it of foreign commodities, one 
million, but of the other million consume nothing,  but 
make a return of ten per cent. per annum, we must then 
every year be one hundred thousand pounds richer, and 
our stock  be  so  much  increased:  but,  if  we  import 
more  consumable  commodities  than  we  export,  our 
money  must  go out to pay  for  them,  and  we  grow 
poorer.  Suppose, therefore, ill husbandry hath brought 
US to one million stock, and we  borrow the other mil- 
lion (as we must, or lose half our trade) at six per cent. 
If we consume one moiety, and make still ten per cent. 
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forty thousand pounds per ann. though it pay sixty thou- 
sand  pounds per ann. use.  So that, if the merchant's 
return be  more  than his use,  (which it is certain it is, 
or else he will not trade), and all that is so traded for, 
on borrowed  money,  be  but the over-balance  of  our 
exportation to our importation ;  the kingdom gets, by 
this borrowing, so much as the merchant's  gain is above 
his use.  But, if we borrow only for our own expenses, 
we  grow doubly poor, by paying  money for  the com- 
modity we consume,  and use for that money ;  though 
the merchant gets all  this while,  by making returns 
greater than his use.  And therefore, borrowing of fo- 
reigners, in itself, makes not the kingdom rich or poor ; 
for it may do either :  but spending more than our fruits, 
or manufactures, will  pay for,  brings  in poverty, and 
poverty borrowing. 
For money, as necessary to trade, may be doubly con- 
sidered.  First, as in his hands that pays the labourer 
and landholder, (for  here its motion  terminates,  and 
through whose hands soever it  passes between these, he 
is but a broker) and if  this  man want money, (as for 
example, the clothier) the manufacture is not made ; 
and so the trade stops, and is lost.  Or, secondly, mo- 
ney may be considered as in the hands of the consumer, 
under which name I here reckon the merchant who buys 
the commodity,  when  made,  to export:  and,  if  he 
want money, the value of the commodity, when made, 
is lessened, and so the kingdom loses in the price.  If, 
therefore, use be lessened, and you cannot tie foreigners 
to your terms, then the ill effects fall only upon  your 
landholders  and artisans : if foreigners can be forced, 
by your law, to lend you money, only at your own rate, 
or not lend at all, is it not more likely they will rather 
take it home, and think it safer in their own country at 
four per cent. than abroad, in a decaying country ?  Nor 
can their overplus of money bring them to lend to you, 
on your terms :  for, when your merchants, want of ma- 
ney shall have sunk the price of your market, a Dutchd 
man  will  find  it more  gain to buy  your  commodity 
himself,  than lend  his  money at four  per cent. to an 
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English rnerchant  to trade with.  Nor will the act of 
navigation hinder their coming, by  making them come 
empty,  since even  already there are those who  think 
that many who go for English merchants are but Dutch 
factors, and trade for others in their own names.  The 
kingdom,  therefore,  will  lose  by  this  lowering  of 
interest, if  it mskes foreigners withdraw any of their 
money, ns well as if it hinders any of your people from 
lending theirs, where trade hls need of it. 
In a treatise, writ on purpose for the bringing down 
of  interest, I find  this  argument  of  foreigners  calling 
away their money to tho prejudice of  our trade,  thus 
" That  the  nlnney  of  foreigners  is  not 
brought into the land  by ready coin,  or  bullion,  but 
by  goods,  or bills  of  exchange, and, when  it is  paid, 
must be returned by goods,  or bills of exchange ;  ant1 
there will not be the less money in the land."  I could 
not but wonder to see a  man, who undertook to write 
of  ninney  and.  interest,  talk  so  directly  besides  the 
matter, in the business of trade. "  Foreigners'  money," 
he says,  is not brought  into the land by ready coin, 
or bullion, but by goods, or bills  of  exchange."  How 
then do we come by bullion or money ?  For gold grows 
not, that I know,  in our country,  and  silver so  little, 
that one hundred thousandth part of the  silver we have 
now  in England was  not  drawn  out of  any  mines in 
this island.  If he means that the monied man in FId- 
land, who puts out his money at interest here, did not 
send it over in bullion,  or specie  hither : that may be 
true ur false; but either wayhelps not that author's pur- 
pose.  For,  if  he paid  his  money to a  merchant,  his 
neighbour, and took his bills for it here in England, he 
did the same thing as if he had  sent over that money; 
since he does but make that merchant leave in England 
the money, which he has due to him there, and other- 
wise would carry away.  " No,"  says our author, "  he 
cannot carry it away; for,"  says he, "  when it is paid, 
it must be  returned  by goods,  or  bills  of  exchange." 
It  must not be paid and exported in ready money;  sg 
says our law indeed,  but that is a law to hedge in the 
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not goods for which our merchants have money due to 
them in  Holland,  how  can it be  paid  by bills  of ex- 
change  ?  And for  goods,  one  hundred  pounds  worth 
of  goods  can  nowhere  pay  two  hundred  pounds  in 
money.  This  being  that which I find  many met1  de- 
ceive themselves with in trade,  it may be worth while 
to make it a little plainer. 
Let us suppose England peopled,  as it is now;  and 
its  woollen manufacture in the same state and perfection 
that it is at present ;  and that we, having no money ac 
all,  trade with  this  our woollen  manufacture, for the 
value of two hundred thousand pounds yearly to Spain, 
where there actually is a million in money : farther, let 
us suppose that we bring back from Spain yearly in oil, 
wine, and fruit,  to the value of  one hundred thousand 
pounds, and continue to do this ten years together: it 
is plain that we have had for our two millions value in 
woollen  manufacture,  carried  thither,  one  million 
returned in wine,  oil,  and fruit: but what  is  become 
of the other million ?  Will the merchants be content to 
lose it  ?  That you may be sure they woulcl not, nor have 
traded on,  if they had  not,  every year,  returns made, 
answering their exportation. How then were the returns 
made? In  money, it is evident ;  for the Spaniards having, 
in such  a trade,  no  debts,  nor  the possibility of  any 
debts in  England, cannot  pay  one  farthing  of  that 
other  million  by  bills  of  exchange : and  having  no 
commodities, that we will take off,  above  the value of 
one hundred thousand pounds per ann. they cannot pay 
us in commodities.  From whence it necessarily follows, 
that  the hundred thousand pounds per. ann wherein we 
overbalance them in trade,  must be paid us in money ; 
and so,  at the  ten years'end,  their million  of  money, 
(though  their law make it  death to export it) will be 
all brought into England; as,  in  truth, by this over- 
balance of trade, the greatest part of  our money hath 
been brought into England out of Spain. 
Let us  suppose ourselves  now possessed of  this mil- 
lion of  money,  and exporting yearly out of  England, 
to the several  arts of  the world. consumable commo- 
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in commodities, which we  consume amongst us, to the 
value of  eleven  hundred  thousand pounds.  If  such a 
trade as this be managed amongst us, and continue ten 
years, it is evident that our million  of  money sill, at 
the end of  the ten years, be inevitably all gone from us 
to them,  by the same way that it came to us ;  that is, 
by their overbalance of trade : for we, importing every 
year one hundred thousand pounds worth of commodi- 
ties more than we export, and there being no foreigners 
that will give us one  hundred  thousand pounds every 
year for nothing,  it is  unavoidable  that one  hundred 
thousand pounds of  our money must go out every year, 
to pay for that overplus, which our commodities do not 
pay for.  It  is ridiculous  to say, that bills of exchange 
shall pay our debts abroad:  that cannot be, till scrips 
of paper can he made current coin.  The English mer- 
chant who  has  no  money  owing  him  abroad,  cannot 
expect to have his bills paid there ; or, if he has credit 
enough with a correspondent to have his bills answered, 
this pays none of  the debt of  England, but only changes 
the creditor; and if,  upon the general balance of trade, 
English merchants owe to foreigners one hundred thou- 
sand pounds,  or a  million;  if  conlmodities do not, our 
money must go out to pay it, or else our credit be lost, 
and our trade stop, and be lost too. 
A  kingdom  grows  rich  or  poor  just  as a  farmer 
doth, and no otherwise.  Let us suppose the whole isle 
of  Portland  one  farm:  and  that  the owner,  besides 
what serves his family, carries to market to Weymovth 
and Dorchester, &c. cattle,  corn,  butter,  cheese, wool 
or cloth,  lead and tin,  all commodities,  produced and 
wrought within his farm of Portland, to the value of a 
thousand pounds yearly ;  and  for  t!lis  brings home in 
salt,  wine,  oil,  spice,  linen,  and silks,  to the value of 
nine  hundred  pounds,  and  the  remaining  hundred 
pounds in money.  It is  evident lie grows every year 
a hundred pounds richer, and so at the end of ten years 
will have clearly got a thoasand pounds.  If the owner 
be a better husband,  and,  contenting himself with his 
native  commodities,  buy less wine,  spice,  and silk,  at 
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market,  and  so  bring home  five  hundred  pounds  in 
money yearly; instead of  a thousand pounds, at the end 
of ten years he will have five thousand pounds by him, 
and be so much richer.  He  dies, and his son succeeds, 
a  fashionable  young  gentleman,  that  cannot  dine 
without  rhampagne  and  burgundy,  nor  sleep  but in 
a damask bed;  \vhosb wife  must  spread  a long train 
of brocade, and his  children  be  always in the newest 
French  cut and  stuff;  he,  being  come  to the estate, 
keeps on a very busy family;  the markets are weekly 
frequented, and  the commodities  of  his  farm  carried 
out,  and sold  as  formerly,  but  the  returns  are made 
something different ; the  fashionable way  of  eating, 
drinking,  furniture,  and  clothing,  for  himself  and 
family, requires more sugar and  spice, wine  and fruit, 
silk  and  ribbons,  than  in  his  father's  time;  so  that, . 
instead of nine hundred pounds per aan., he now brings 
home of consumable commodities to the value of eleven 
hundred  pounds  yearly.  What  comes  of  this?  He 
lives in splendor, it is true ;  but this unavoidably carries 
away  the  money  his  father  got,  and  he is  every 
year  a  hundred  pounds  poorer.  To  his  expenses, 
beyond  his  income,  add  debauchery,  idleness,  and 
quarrels amongst  his servants,  whereby  his  manufac- 
tures are disturbed, and  his  business  neglected, and a 
general disorder and corlfusion through his whole family 
and  farm.  This  will  tumble  him  down  the hill  the 
faster,  and  the stock,  which  the  industry, frugality, 
and good order of his father had laid up, will be quickly 
brought to an end, and he fast in prison.  A farm and 
o kingdom in this respect differ 110 more, than as greater 
or less.  We may trade, and be busy, and grow poor by 
it, unless we  regulate our expenses; if  to this we  are 
idle,  negligent,  dishonest,  malicious,  and  disturb the 
sober and industrious in their business, let it be upon 
what pretence it will, we shall ruin the faster. 
So that,  whatever this author,  or any one  else may 
say, money  is  brought into England by nothing  but 
spending here  less  of fbreign commodities  than  what 
we carry to market can pay for; nor can debts, we owe 
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to foreigners,  be  paid  by  bills  of  exchange,  till our 
commodities exported, and sold beyond sea, have pro- 
duced money, or debts, due there to some of our mer- 
chants;  for  nothing  will  pay  debts  but  money,  or 
money's worth, which three or four lines writ in paper 
cannot  be.  If  such bills  have an intrinsic value,  and 
can serve instead of  money, why do we not send them 
to market, instead of our cloth, lead, and tin, and at an 
easier rate purchase the commodities we want?  All that 
a bill of exchange can do is  to direct to whom  money 
due, or  taken  up upon  credit,  in  a  foreign  country, 
shall be  paid;  and if we  trace it, we  shall find,  that 
what is owing already,  became so for commodities, or 
money  carried  from hence:  and, if  it be taken  upon 
credit, it must (let the debt be  shifted  from one cre- 
ditor to another as often as you will) at  last be paid by 
money, or goods, carried from hence,  or else the mer- 
chant here must turn bankrupt. 
We have seen how riches and money are got, kept, 
or lost, in any country ;  and that is, by  consuming less 
of  foreip commodities  than what by commodities, or 
labour,  1s  paid  for.  This is in  the ordinary course of 
things :  but where great armies and alliances are to be 
maintained abroad, by supplies sent out of any country, 
there often,  by a  shorter and  more  sensible way, the 
treasure is diminished.  But this,  since  the holy war, 
or  at least since  the improvement  of  navigation  and 
trade,  seldom  happening to England,  whose  princes 
have found the enlttrging their power by sea,  and the 
securing our navigation and tratle, more the interest of 
this kingdom than wars, or conquests, on the continent : 
expenses in arms beyond  sea have had little influence 
on  our riches or poverty.  The next thing to be con- 
sidered is, how money is necessary to trade. 
The necessity of  a certain  proportion  of  money to 
trade (I conceive)  lies in  this,  that money,  in its cir- 
culation, driving the several wheels of  tratle,  whilst it 
keeps in that channel (for some of it will unavoidably 
be drained  into standing pools)  is all shared between 
the landholder, whose  land affords the materials;  the 
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chant and shopkeeper, who distributes them  to those 
that want them ; and the consumer who spetids them. 
Now money is  necessary to all these sorts of  men,  as 
serving both for counters and for pledges, and so carry- 
ing with it even  reckoning, and security, that he that 
receives it shall have the same value  for it again,  of 
other things that lie wants, whenever he pleases.  The 
one  of  these it does  by its stamp and denomination; 
the other by its intrinsic value, which is its quantity. 
For mankind, having consented to put an imaginary 
value upon gold and silver, by reason of their durable- 
ness, scarcity, and not being very liable to be counter- 
feited,  have made them, by general consent,  the com- 
mon pledges, whereby men are assured, in exchange for 
them, to receive equally valuable things, to those they 
parted with, for any quantity of these metals ;  by which 
means  it comes  to pass,  that the intrinsic value,  re- 
garded in these metals,  made  the common barter,  is 
nothing but the quantity which men give or receive of 
them ; for they having, as money,  no other value,  but 
as pledges to procure what one wants  or desires, and 
they procuring what we  want or desire only  by their 
quantity, it is evident that the intrinsic value of  silver 
and  gold,  used  in  commerce,  is  nothing  but  their 
quantity. 
The necessity,  therefore, of  a proportion of  money 
to trade,  depends on  money,  not  as counters, for the 
reckoning  may be kept or transferred by writing, but 
on money as a pledge, which writing cannot supply the 
place of:  since the bill, bond,  or other note of  debt, I 
receive from one man, will not be accepted as security 
by another, he not knowing that the bill or bond is true 
or legal, or that the man bound to me is honest or re- 
sponsible, and so is  not valuable enough to become a 
current pledge,  nor  can  by  public authority be well 
made so, as in the case of  assigning of bills ; because a 
law caniiot  give to bills that intrinsic value which the 
universal consent of mankind has annexed to silver and 
gold; and hence  foreigners can never  be  brought  to 
take your  bills  or  writings for  any part of  payment, 
though perhaps they might pass as valuable coasidern- 
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tions among your own people,  did not this very much 
hinder it, viz. that they are liable to unavoidable doubt, 
dispute, and counterfeiting, and require other proofs to 
assure us that they are true and good security than our 
eyes,  or  a  touchstone.  And,  at best,  this  course,  if 
practicable, will  not hinder  us from  being poor;  but 
may be suspected to help to make us so, by keeping us 
from feeling our poverty, which, in distress, will be sure 
to find us with greater disadvantage.  Though it be cer- 
tain it is better than letting any part of our trade fall 
for want of current pledges;  and better too than bor- 
rowing money of  our neighbours upon use, if this way 
of assigning bills can be made so easy, safe,and universal 
at home, as to hinder it. 
To return to the business in hand, and show the ne- 
cessity of  a proportion of money to trade.  Every man 
must have at  least so much money, or so timely recruits, 
as may in hand, or in  a  short distance of time, satisfy 
his creditor whosupplies him with the necessaries of life, 
or of his trade.  For nobody has any longer  these ne- 
cessary supplies than he has money, or credit, which is 
nothing else but an assurance of money,  in some short 
time.  So that it  is requisite to trade, that there should 
be so much money as to keep up the landholder's, la- 
bourer's,  and broker's, credit: and therefore ready mo- 
ney must be  constantly exchanged  for wares  and la- 
bour, or follow within a short time after. 
This shows the necessity of some proportion ofmoney 
to trade :  but what proportion that is, is hard to deter- 
mine ;  because it depends not barely on the quantity of 
money, but the quickness of  its circulation.  The very 
same  shilling  may, at one  time,  pay twenty men  in 
twenty days : at another, rest in the  same hands  one 
hundred days together.  This makes  it impossible ex- 
actly  to estimate  the quantity  of  money  needful in 
trade ; but, to make  some probable  guess, we are to 
consider  how much  money it is  necessary to suppose 
must rest constantly in  each man's hands, as requisite 
to the carrying on of trade. 
First,  therefore, the labourers, living generally but from hand  to mouth;  and, indeed,  considered  as  la- 
bourers in  order to trade, may well  enough carry on 
their part,  if they have but money enough to buy vic- 
tuals,  clothes, and tools : all which may  very  well  be 
provided,  without  any great sum  of money lying still 
in their hands.  The labourers, therefore, being usually 
paid once a week,  (if the times of payment be seldomer 
there must be more money for the carrying on this part 
of trade) we may suppose there is constantly amongst 
them, one with another, or those who are to pay them, 
always one week's wages in ready money; for it cannot 
be thought that all or most  of the labourers pay away 
all their wages constantly,as soon as they receive it, and 
live upon trust till next pay-day.  This the farmer and 
tradesman could not well bear, were it every labourer's 
case, and every one to be trusted :  and, therefore, they 
must of necessity keep  some  money in their hands, to 
go to market for victuals,  and  to other tradesmen as 
poor as themselves, for  tools;  and lay up  money too 
to  buy  clothes,  or  pay  for  those  they  bought  upon 
credit;  which money, thus  necessarily resting in their 
hands,  we  cannot imagine  to be,  one  with  another, 
much  less  than  a  week's  wages,  that  must  be  in 
their  pockets,  or  ready  in  the  farmer's  hands;  for 
he,  who  employs  a  labourer  at  a  shilling per  day, 
and pays him on Saturday nights, cannot be supposed 
constantly to receive  that six  shillings just  the same 
Saturday:  it must  ordinarily  be  in  his  hands  one 
time  with  another,  if  nut  a whole  week,  yet several 
days before. 
This was the ordinary course, whilst we had money 
running in the several channels of commerce: but that 
now very much failing, and the farmer, not having mo- 
ney to pay the labourer, supplies him with corn, which, 
in this great plenty,  the labourer will have at h'  is own 
rate, or else not take it off his hands for wages.  And 
as for the workmen, who are employed in our manufac- 
tures,especially the woollen one, these the clothier, not 
having ready money to pay, filrnishes with the neces- 
saries  of  life,  and  so  trucks  cornmoilities  for  work; 
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which, such as they are, good or bad, the workman must 
take at his master's  rate, or sit still and starve: whilst 
by  this means this new sort of engrossers, or forestallers, 
having the feeding and  supplying this numerous body 
of  workmen  out of  their  warehouses,  (for they  have 
now  magazines of all sorts of wares) set the price upon 
the poor landholder.  So that the markets, now being 
destroyed, anil the farmer not finding vent there for his 
butter, cheese,  bacon,  snd corn,  &c. for which  he was 
wont to bring home ready money, must sell it to these 
engrossers on their own terms of tirne and rate, and al- 
low it to their own day-labourers  under the true mar- 
ket price.  What kind of influence this is like to have 
upon land, and how this way rents are like to be paid 
at quarter-day, is easy to apprehend :  and it is no won- 
der to hear every day of farmers breaking and running 
away; for if they cannot receive money for their goods 
at market, it will be  impossible  for them to pay their 
landlord's  rent.  If any one doubt whether this be so, 
I desire him to inquire how many farmers in the west 
are broke, and gone, since Michaelmas last.  Want of 
money, being to this degree, works both ways upon the 
landholder.  For, first, the engrossing forestaller lets 
not the money come to  market, but supplying the work- 
man, who  is  employed  by  him  in  manufacture, with 
necessaries, imposes his  price  and forbearance on  the 
farmer, who cannot sell to the others ;  and the labourer 
who is e~nplojed  by the  landholder in  husbandry im- 
poses also his rate on him, for the commodities he takes; 
for there being a want of  day-labourers in the country, 
they must be humoured, or else they will neither work 
for you,  nor take your commodities for their labour. 
Secondly, as  for  the  landholder,  since  his  tenants 
cannot coin  their  rent just  at quarter-day,  but must 
gather it up by degrees, and lodge it with them till pay- 
day ;  or borrow it of those who have it lying by them, 
or do gather it up by degrees, which is the same thing, 
and must be necessarily so much money for some time 
lying still; for all that is paid in great sums must some- 
where be  gathered up by the retail incomes of a trade, 
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of money, or a greater.  Add  to this,  that to pay the 
creditor that lent him his rent, he must gather up mo- 
ney  by degrees,  as  the sale  of  his  commodities  shall 
bring it in, and so  makes  a  greater stop, and greater 
want of money:  since the borrowed  money, that paid 
the landholder the 25th of March, must be supposed to 
lie still some time in the creditor's  hand, before he lent 
it the  tenant;  and the money that pays the creditor 
three months after, must  lie  still some time in the te- 
nant's.  Nor does the landlord pay away his rent usually 
as soon as he receives it, hut by degrees, as his occasions 
call for it.  All this considered, we cannot but suppose 
that between the landlord and tenant there must neces- 
sarily be at  least a quarter of the yearly revenue of the 
land constantly in their hands. Indeed, considering that 
most part of the rents of England are paid at  Lady-day 
and Michaelmas, and that the same money which pays 
me  my  rent from  my tenant the 25th  of  March,  or 
thereabouts,  cannot  pay  my  next neighbour his rent 
from his tenant at the same time,  much  less one more 
remote in another country,  it might seem requisite  to 
suppose half the yearly revenue of  the land to be  ne- 
cessarily employed in  paying of  rent ;  for to say that 
some tenants break, and pay not  their rent at all, and 
others pay not till two, three, four, five, six, &c. months 
after quarter-day, and so the rent is not all paid at one 
time,is  no more than to say, that there is money want- 
ing to the trade; for if the tenant fail the landlord, he 
must fail his creditor,  and he his, and so on, till some- 
body break,  and so  trade decay  for  want  of  money. 
But since a considerable part of the land of England is 
in the owners' hands, who neither pay nor receive great 
sums for it at a certain day; because too, (which is the 
chief reason) we  are not  to consider  here  how much 
money is  in  any one  man's,  or  any one  sort of men's 
hands, at one time; for that at other times may be dis- 
tributed into other  hands, and serve other parts oftrade; 
but how much money is necessary to be In each man's 
hands all the year round, taking one time with another, 
i.  e. having three hundred pounds in his hand one month, 
is to be  reckoned as one  hundred  pounds  in his hand 
and raising the  Value of  Moncy.  27 
three months, (and so proportionably) I think we may 
well suppose a quarter of  the yearly revenue to be con- 
stantly in the landlord's  or tenant's  hands. 
Here,  by  the  by,  we  may  observe,  that  it were 
better for trade, and consequently for every body, for 
more money would  be stirring, and less would do the 
business) if  rents were paid by shorter intervals than 
six months;  for, supposing  I  let a farm at fifty-two 
pounds per ann.  if my rent be paid half-yearly,  there 
are twenty-six pounds to be employed in the payment 
of it in one entire sum, (if it be paid well, and if it be 
not paid well, for want of so much money to be spared 
to that purpose, there is so much want of  money, and 
trade is still endamaged by it) a  great part whereof 
must necessarily lie still,  before it come out of  my te- 
nant's chest to my hands ; if it be paid once a quarter, 
thirteen pounds alone would  do it,  and less money is 
laid up for it, and stopped a less while  in its course : 
but should  it be paid  every week,  one  single twenty 
shillings will pay the rent of fifty-two pounds per ann. 
whence  would  follow this double benefit;  first, that a 
great deal less money would  serve for the trade of  a 
country; and, secondly, that less of  the money would 
lie  still;  the  contrary  whereof  must  needs  happen, 
where  growing  debts  are to be  paid  at larger  di- 
stances, and in greater sums. 
Thirdly,  As  for  the brokers,  since  they  too  must 
lay up the money, coming in by retail,  either to go to 
market, and buy wares,  or to pay at the day appointed, 
which is often  six months,  for those wares which they 
have already ;  we cannot suppose them to have less by 
them,  one  with  another,  than  one-twentieth  part  of 
their yearly returns.  Whether the money be their own, 
or they he  indebted  so much,  or more, it n~atters  not, 
if it be necessary they should have constantly by them, 
comparing one time with another, at  least one-twentieth 
part of their yearly return. 
Indeed, in some great towns, where the bankers are 
ready  at hand to buy bills,  or any other way to lend 
money for a short time at great interest, there perhaps 
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him  as in  other places,  where  they have  not such a 
supply:  but if  you  consider  what  money  to do this 
must necessarily be  constantly lodged in the banker's 
hands, the case will be much the same. 
To these  sums, if you  add what part of  the money 
of  a country scholars of  all sorts,  women,  gamesters, 
and great men's  menial servants, and all such that do 
not  contribute  at all to trade,  either as landholders, 
labourers, or brokers, will unavoidably have constantly 
in  their  hands;  it cannot  well  be  thought  that less 
than  one-fiftieth  part of  the  labourer's  wages,  one- 
fourth  part of  the  landholder's  yearly  revenue,  and 
one-twentieth  part of  the broker's  yearly  returns  in 
ready money, will be enough to drive the trade of any 
country.  At  least  to  put  it  beyond  exception  low 
enough,  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  less  than  one 
moiety  of  this,  i.  e. less  than one-hundredth  part of 
the labourer's  yearly  wages,  one-eighth  part of  the 
landholder's  yearly  revenue,  and one-fortieth  part of 
the  broker's  yearly  returns,  in  ready money,  can  be 
enough to move the several wheels of trade, and keep 
up commeree, in that life and thriving posture it should 
be; and how  much  the ready cash of  any country is 
short of  this  proportion,  so  much  must the trade be 
impaired and hindered for want of money. 
But however these measures may be  mistaken,  this 
is evident, that the multiplying of  brokers hinders the 
trade of ally country, by  making the circuit, which the 
money goes, larger; and in that circuit more stops, so 
that the returns must necessarily be slower and scantier, 
to the prejudice of trade :  besides that, they eat up too 
great a  share of  the gains of trade:  by  that means 
starving  the  labourer,  ant1  impoverishing  the  land- 
holder,  whose  interest is  chiefly  to be taken care of, 
it  being  a  settled,  unmoveable  concernment  in  the 
commonwealth. 
If this be so, it is past question that all encourage- 
ment should  be given  to artificers ;  and things so or- 
dered,  as  much  as  might be,  that those  who  make 
should also vend and retail out their own commodities, 
ar~d  they be hindered, as much as possible,  from pass- 
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ixlg  here at home  through divers  hands  to the  last 
buyer.  Lazy and unworking shopkeepers in this being 
worse than gamesters,  that they do not only keep so 
much of  the money of  a  country  corqtantly in their 
hands,  but also  make the public  pay  them for  their 
keeping of it.  Though gaming too, upon the account 
of trade (as well as other reasons) may well deserve to 
be restrained ;  since gamesters, in order to their play, 
keep great sums of  money by them,  which  there lies 
dead;  for  though  gamester's  money  shifts  masters 
oftener than any, and is tumbled  up and down  with 
every cast of  the die,  yet as to the public it lies  per- 
fectly  still,  and no more of  it comes into trade  than 
they spend in eating or wearing. 
Here too we  may observe,  how  much  manufacture 
deserves to be encouraged;  since that part of  trade, 
though the most considerable, is driven with the least 
money,  especially if  the workmanship be  more worth 
than the materials;  for to the trade that is driven  by 
labour and handicraftsmen, one t wo-and-fiftieth part of 
the yearly money paid them will be sufficient :  but to a 
trade of  our commodities, of  our bare,  native  growth, 
much greater proportion of money is required. 
Perhaps  it will  be  wondered  why,  having  given 
some  estimate (how wide  I  know not) of  the money, 
necessary  in  the hands  of  the  landholder,  labourer, 
and broker,  to carry on  trade, I have  said nothing of 
the consumer, whom I had mentioned before.  To this 
I  answer,  there are so  few  consumers,  who  are not 
either  labourers,  brokers,  or  landholders,  that  they 
make a very  inconsiderable  part in  the account; for 
those who  immediately depend on the landholder,  as 
his  children  and servants,  come  in under  that title, 
being maintained by the rent of his lands;  and so of 
the rest. 
By what has been said, we may see what injury the 
lowering of interest is like to do us,  by hindering trade, 
when it shall either make the foreigner call home his 
money, or your own people  backward to lend, the re- 
ward not being judged proportionable to the risque. 30  Considerations of the lowering of Interest, 
There is  another  seeming  consequence  of  the re- 
ducing  of money to a low  price,  which  at first sight 
has such an appearance  of  truth in  it,  that I have 
known it to impose upon very able men, and I guess it 
has no small influence,  at this time, in the promoting 
this alteration;  and that is,  that the lowering  of in- 
terest  will  raise the value of  all other things in pro- 
portion.  For money being  the counter-balance  to all 
other things purchaseable by it,  and lying,  as it were, 
in the opposite scale of  commerce,  it looks like a na- 
tural consequence, that as much  as you  take off from 
the value of  money,  so much you  add to the price of 
other things which are exchanged for  it; the raising 
of the price of any thing being no more but the addition 
to its value in respect of  money, or, which  is all one, 
lessening the value of  money.  For example :  should 
the value  of  gold be brought  down  to that of  silver, 
one hundred guineas would  purchase little more corn, 
wool, or land, than one hundred shillings ;  and so, the 
value of moliey being brought lower, say they, the price 
of other things will rise, and the falling of interest from 
six pounds to four pounds per cent.  is taking away so 
much of  the price of  money,  and so consequently the 
lessening its value. 
The mistake of this plausible way of  reasoning will 
be easily discovered,  when we  consider  that the mea- 
sure of the value of money, in proportion to any thing 
purchaseable by it, is the quantity of the ready money 
we have in comparison with the quantity of that thing, 
and its vent;  or,  which  amounts  to the same thing, 
the price of  any commodity rises or falls,  by the pro- 
portion of  the number of buyers and sellers : this rule 
holds universally in all things that are to be bought and 
sold, bating now and then an extravagant fancy of some 
particular person, which never amounts to so consider- 
able a part of trade, as to make any thing in the account 
worthy to be thought an exception to this rule. 
The vent of  any  thing depends upon its necessity 
or  usefulness;  as convenience,  or opinion,  guided by 
fancy, or fashion, shall determine. 
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The vent of  any commodity comes to be increased, 
or decreased, as a  greater part of  the running cash of 
the nation is designed to be laid out, by several people 
at the same time,  rather in that than another;  as we 
see in the change of fashions. 
I  shall  begin  first  with  the  necessaries,  or  con- 
veniencies  of  life,  and  the  consumable  commodities 
subservient  thereunto;  and  show,  that  the value  of 
money, in respect of those, depends only on the plenty 
or scarcity of  money,  in proportion to the plenty and 
scarcity of those things ;  and not on what interest shall, 
by necessity, law, or contract, be at that time laid  on 
the borrowing  of money ;  and then afterwards I shall 
show that the same holds in land. 
There is nothing more confirmed, by daily experience, 
than that men  give any portion of  money, for whatso- 
ever is absolutely necessary, rather than go without it. 
And in such things, the scarcity of them alone makes 
their prices.  As  for example : let us  suppose half  an 
ounce  of  silver,  or  half  a crown now  in  England,  is 
worth  a  bushel  of  wheat :  but should  there  be nest 
year a great scarcity of wheat in England, and a pro- 
portionable want of all other food, five ounces of silver 
would, perhaps,  in exchange purchase but one bushel 
of  wheat:  so  that money  would  be  then nine-tenths 
less worth in respect of  food, though at the same value 
it was before, in respect of other things, that kept their 
former proportion, in their quantity and consu~nption. 
By  the like proportions,  of  increase  and decrease, 
does the value of  things, more or less convenient, rise 
and fall, in respect of money; only with this difference, 
that things absolutely necessary for life must be had at 
any rate; but things  convenient will  be  had  only  as 
they stand in preference with other conveniencies : and 
therefore in any one  of  these  commodities,  the value 
rises only as its quantity is less, and vent greater, which 
depends upon  its being  preferred to other things,  in 
its consumption.  For supposing that, at the same time 
that there is a great scarcity of wheat, and other grain, 
there were a  considerable quantity of  oats,  men,  no 
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being  the healthier,  pleasanter,  and more convenient 
food:  but,  since oats would serve to supply that abso- 
lute necessity  of  sustaining life,  met,  ~rould  not rob 
themselves  of  all other conveniencies of  life,  by pay- 
ing  all  their  money  for  wheat,  when  oats,  that  are 
cheaper,  though with some inconvenience, would  sup- 
ply that defect.  It may then so happen at the same 
time, that half an ounce of  silver, that the year before 
would buy one bushel of wheat, will this year buy but 
one tenth of a bushel ;  half an ounce of silver, that the 
year before would  have  bought three bushels of  oats, 
will this year still buy one ;  and at the same time half 
an  ounce  of  silver,  that would  the year  before  have 
bought  fifteen pounds of  lead, will still buy the same 
quantity.  So that at the same time silver,  in respect 
of wheat,  is nine-tenths  less worth than  it was, in te- 
spect of oats two-thirds  less worth,  and in  respect of 
lead as much worth as before. 
The fall,  therefore,  or rise of  interest,  making im. 
mecliately,  by  its change,  neither  more nor less land, 
money,  or  any  sort of  comlnodity  in  England,  them 
there was before,  alters not at all the value of  money, 
in reference  to commodities.  Because the measure of 
that is only the quantity and vent, which  are not ills- 
mediately changed  by the change of  interest.  So  fa^ 
as the change of  interest conduces,  in  trade,  to the 
bringing  in,  or  carrying out money,  or  commodities, 
and so in time to the varying their proportions here in 
England,  from what it was before ;  so far the change 
of  interest, as all other things that promote or hinder 
trade, may alter the valhe of money, in  reference  to 
commodities.  But that is not in  this place to be con- 
sidered. 
This is  perfectly the vslue of  money,  in respect af 
consumable commodities :  but the better to  understand 
it,  in its full latitude,  in respect  both  of  cot~sumable 
commodities,  and  land  too,  we  must  consider,  first, 
That the value  of  land consists  in  this,  that,  by  its 
constant production of saleable commodities,  it brings 
in a certain yearly income.  Secondly,  The value  of 
commodities consists in this, that, as portable and use- 
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ful things,  they,  by  their  exchange or  consumption, 
supply the necessaries, or conveniencies of life.  Thirdly, 
In money there is a double value, answering to  both of 
these, first, as it is  capable, by  its interest, to yield us 
such a yearly income:  and in this it has  the nnture of 
land,  (the  income  of  one  being  called  rent,  of  the 
other use) only with  this  difference, that the land, in 
its soil  being  different,  as some  fertile,  some barren, 
and the products of it very various, both in their sorts, 
goodness,  and  vent, is not  capable  of  any fixed  esti- 
mate by its quantity: but money being constantly the 
same, and by its interest giving the same sort of pro- 
duct through the whole  country, is capable of having 
a fired yearly rate set upon it by the magistrate ;  but 
land is not.  But though, in the uniformity of its legal 
worth,  one  hundred  pounds  of  lawful  money  being 
all through England equal in  its current value to any 
other one hundred  pounds  of  lawful money,  (because 
by  virtue  of  the law it will  every where  pass  for  as 
much ware, or debt, as  any other hundred pounds)  is 
capable to have its yearly hire valued better than land: 
yet in  respect  of  the varying  need  and necessity of 
money, (which  changes with the increase  or decay of 
money, or  trade, in a  country) it is as little  capable 
to have its yearly hire fixed by law as land itself.  For 
were  all the  land  in Rumney-marsh,  acre  for  acre, 
equally good, that is, did coilstantly produce the same 
quantity of equally good hay, or grass, one as another, 
the rent of it, under  that consideration,  of every acre 
being  of  an equal wort,h, would  be  capable of being 
regulated by law; and one might as well enact, that no 
acre of  land in Rumney-marsh  shall be let for  above 
forty shillings per annum, as  that no hundred pounds 
shall be  let for above four  pounds  per annum.  But 
llobody can  think it fit (since  by reason  of the equal 
value of that land it can) that therefore the rent of the 
land in Rumney-marsh should be regulated by law.  For 
supposing all the land  in Rumney-marsh, or  in Eng- 
land, were all of so equal a worth, that any one acre, 
compared at  the same  time to any one other, were equally 
good,  in  respect  of its product;  yet  the same  acre, 
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comparcd with  itself  in  different  times,  would not, in 
respect  of rent,  be of  equal value.  Acd therefore it 
would have been an  unreasonable thing, if in the time 
of Henry VII. the rent  of land in Run~ney-marsh  had 
been settled by  a law, according to the judged value of 
it at that time,  and the  same  law,  limiting  the rent 
perhaps to 5s. per acre, have continued still.  The ab- 
surdity and impracticableness of this every one sees, at 
the first  proposal,  and  readily  concludes within  him- 
self, that things must be  left  to find their own price ; 
and it is  impossible,  in this their  constant  mutability, 
for  human foresight to set rules and bounds  to their 
constantly varying proportion  and  use, which will al- 
ways regulate their value. 
They who  consider things beyond their  names will 
find  that money,  as well  as all other  commodities,  is 
liable  to the  same  changes and inequalities;  nay,  in 
this respect  of  the variety of  its value, brought in  by 
time, in the succession  of  affairs,  the rate of money is 
less capable of  being regulated by a law ,  i  n any coun- 
try,  than  the  rent  of  land.  Because,  to the quick 
changes that happen in trade, this too must be 'added, 
that money may he  brought in  or  carried out ' of  the 
kingdom,  which  land  cannot;  and so  that  be  truly 
worth  six  or  eight  per  cent.  this  year,  which would 
~ield  but four the last. 
2. Money has a value,  as it is capable, by exchange,: 
to procure us  the necessaries or conveniencies  of  life, j 
and in this it has the nature of a commodity; only with  " 
this difference,  that it serves  us commonly  by its ex- 
change, never almost by its consumption.  But though 
the use men make of money be riot in its consumption, 
yet it has not at all a  more  standing, settled value, in 
exchange with  any other thing, than  any other com- 
modity has ;  but a  more  known  one, and better fixed 
by name, number,  and weight, to enable us to reckon 
what the proportion  of scarcity and vent  of one com- 
modity is to another.  For supposing, as  before, that 
half an ounce of silver would last year exchange for one 
bushel  of wheat,  or  for 151b. weight  of  lead;  if this 
year wheat be ten times scarcer, and lead in the same 
quantity to its vent as it was, is it  not evident, that half 
an ounce of silver will still exchange for 151b. of lead, 
though it will exchange but for  one-tenth of a bushel 
of wheat? and he that has use of  lead will as soon take 
151b. weight of  lead  as half  an  ounce  of  silver,  for 
one-tenth of a bushel of wheat, and no more.  So that 
if  you  say,  that money now is  nine-tenths less worth 
than it was the former year,  you  must say so of lead 
too, and all other things, that keep the same propor- 
tion to money which  they had before.  The variation, 
indeed, is  first and  most  taken notice  of  in money : 
because that is the universal measure by which people 
reckon, and used  by every body in  the valuing of all 
things.  For calling that half an ounce of silver half a 
crown, they speak properly, and are readily understood, 
when they say,  half a crown, or two shillings and six- 
pence, will  now buy one-tenth  of  a bushel  of wheat, 
but do not say, that 151b. of  lead will  now buy  one- 
tenth of a bushel of  wheat,  because it is not generally 
used to this sort of reckoning: nor do they say, lead is 
less worth  than it was,  though,  in  respect  of  wheat, 
lead be nine-tenths  worse than it was, as well as silver; 
only by the tale of  shillings we are better enabled to 
judge of it :  because these are measures, whose ideas by 
constant use are settled in every Englishman's  mind. 
This, I  suppose, is  the true value  of  money, when 
it passes from one  to another, in  buying  and selling ; 
where it runs the same changes of higher, or lower, as 
any  other  commodity  doth:  for  one  equal quantity 
whereof  you shall receive in exchange more or less of 
another commodity, at one  time,  than  you do  at an- 
other.  For a farmer that carries a bushel of wheat to 
market, and a labourer that carries half a crown, shall 
find that the money of one, as well as corn of the other, 
shall at  some times purchase him more or less leather, or 
salt, according as they are in greater plenty, and scar- 
city, one  to another.  So that in exchanging coined 
silver for any other commodity, (which is  buying and 
selling) the same measure governs the proportion  you 
receive,  as if  you exchanged  lead,  or wheat,  or  any 
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i.  e. the quantity given for money (which is called buy 
ing and selling) for another commodity, (which is called 
bartering) is  nothing else but their  quantity in pro- 
portion to their vent.  If then lowering  of use makes 
not your silver more in specie, or your wheat or other 
commodities less, it will  not have  any influence at all 
to make it exchange for  less  of  wheat  or  any other 
commodity, than  it will  have  on  lead, to make it ex- 
change for less wheat, or any other commodity. 
Money therefore,  in  buying  and selling, being per- 
fectly in  the same  condition  with other commodities, 
and subject to all the same  laws of value, let us next 
see how it comes  to be of  the same nature with land, 
by yielding a certain yearly income, which we call use, 
or interest.  For  land produces  naturally something 
new  and profitable,  and  of  value  to mankind;  but 
money is  a  barren  thing, and  produces nothing;  but 
by compact transfers that profit, that was the reward of 
one man's  labour,  into another man's  pocket.  That 
which  occasions  this  is  the unequal  distribution  of 
money; which inequality has the same  effect too upon 
land  that it has  upon  money.  For my having more 
money in my hand than I can or am disposed to use in 
buying and  selling,  makes  me able to lend :  and an- 
other's  want of so much money as he could employ in 
trade makes  him willing  to borrow.  But why then, 
and  for what consideration, doth he pay use ?  For the 
same reason,  and upon as good  consideration,  as the 
tenant pays rent for  your  land.  For  as the unequal 
distribution of  land,  (you  having  more  than you can 
or will manure, and another less) brings you a tenant 
for your land ; and the same unequal  distribution of 
money, (I having more than I can or will employ, and 
another less) brings me a tenant for my money: so my 
money is apt in trade, by the industry of the borrower, 
to produce more than six per cent. to the borrower, as 
well as your  land,  by the labour of  the tenant, is apt 
to produce  more fruits than his  rent comes to; and 
therefore deserves to be paid for, as well as land, by a 
yearly  rent.  For though the usurer's  money  would 
bring him  in  no yearly profit,  if he  did not  lend  it, 
(supposing he employs  it not himself)  and so  his six 
per cent. may seem to be the fruit of another man's  la- 
bour, yet he shares not  near  so much of the profit  of 
another man's  labour as he that lets land to a tenant. 
For, without the tenant's industry,(supposing,as  before, 
the owner would not manage it himself) his land would 
yield him little or no profit.  So that the rent he re- 
ceives is a greater portion  of the fruit of  his tenant's 
labour than the use is at six per cent.  For generally, 
he that borrows one thousand pounds  at six per cent., 
and so pays  sixty pounds  per  annum use, gets more 
above his use in one year, by his industry, than he that 
rents a farm of  sixty pounds per  annum gets in two, 
above his rent, though his labour be harder. 
It being evident therefore, that he that has skill in 
traffic,  but has not money enough to exercise  it,  has 
not only reason  to borrow money, to drive  his  trade 
and get a livelihood ;  but as much reason to pay use for 
that money as he, who having skill in husbandry, but 
no land of  his own  to employ it in, has  not only rea- 
son to rent  land,  but to pay money  for the use of it : 
it follows, that borrowing money upon use is not only, 
by the necessity of affairs,  and the  constitution of hu- 
man  society,  unavoidable to some men ;  but that also 
to receive profit from the loan of money is as equitable 
and lawful as receiving rent for land, and more toler- 
able to the borrower, notwithstanding the opinion  of 
some over-scrupulous men. 
This being  so, one would  expect,  that the rate of 
interest should be the measure  of the value of land in 
number of years'  purchase  for which  the fee  is sold; 
for 1001. per  annum beixg  equal to 1001. per annum, 
and so to perpetuity;  and 1001. per  annum being the 
product of 10001. when  interest is at 10 per  cent., of 
12501. when interest is at 8 per cent., of 16661. or there- 
abouts, when interest is at 6 per cent., of 20001. when 
money is at 5 r>er cent., of 25001. when  money is at 4 
per cent.  Onewould conclude, I say, that land should 
sell in proportion to use, according to these following 
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nut experience tells us, that neither in queen Eliza- 
beth nor king  James the  First's reigns, when interest was 
at ten per cent. was land sold for ten; or when it was 
at eight per cent. for twelve and a half years' purchase, 
or any thing near the Iotv rate that high use  required 
(if it were true, that the rate of interest governed the 
price of land) any more than land now yields twenty- 
five years' purchase, because a great part of the monied 
men will now let their money, upon good security, at 
four per cent.  Thus we see in fiact how little this rule 
has  held at home :  and he that will look into Holland 
will find,  that the purchase  of land was  raised  there 
when their interest fell.  This is certain, and past doubt, 
that the legal interest can  never regulate the price of 
land, since it is plain, that the price of land has never 
changed with it, in the several changes have been made 
in the rate of interest by law: nor now that the rate of 
interest is by law the same through all England, is the 
price of  land  every where  the same, it being in some 
parts constantly sold for  four  or  five years'  purchase 
more than in others.  Whether you, or I, can tell the 
reason of this,  it matters not  to the question in hand : 
but it being really so, this is plain demonstration against 
those who pretend to advance and regulate the price of 
land by a law concerning the interest of money. 
But yet I will give you some of my guesses, why the 
price of land is not regulated (as, at first sight, it seems 
it should be) by the interest of money.  Why it is not 
regulated by the legal use is manifest, because the rate 
of money does not  follow the standard of the law, but 
the price of the market : and men,  not observing  the 
legal and forced, but the natural  and current interest 
of money, regulate their affairs by that.  But why the 
rate  of  land  does  not  follow  the cwrren*  interest  of 
n~oney,  requires a farther consideration. 
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All things  that are bought and sold raise and  fall 
their  price,  in  proportion  as there  are  more  buyers 
or  sellers.  Where there are a great  many sellers to 
a  few buyers,  there, use what art you will,  the thing 
to be sold will be cheap.  On the other side,  turn the 
tables,  and  raise  up a great many  buyers  for  a few 
sellers,  and  the  same  thing  will  immediately  grow 
dear.  This rule holds in land as well as all other com- 
modities,  and  is  the reason  why  in  England,  at the 
same time that land in some places is at seventeen or 
eighteen years'  purchase,  it  is  about others,  where 
there are profitable manufactures, at  two or three-and- 
twenty years'  purchase;  because there (men  thriving 
and getting money,  by their  industry, and willing to 
leave  their  estates  to their  children  in land,  as  the 
surest and most lasting provision, and not so liable to 
casualties  as money  in untrading or unskilful hands) 
are many buyers  ready always to purchase,  but few 
sellers.  For, the land thereabout being already pos- 
sessed  by that sort  of  industrious  and thriving  men, 
they  have  neither  need,  nor  will,  to sell.  In  such 
places of manufacture, the riches of the one not arising 
from the  squandering  and  waste  of  another,  (as  it 
doth in other places,  where men live  lazily upon the 
product of the land) the industry of the people, bring- 
ing in increase  of  wealth  from  remote  parts,  makes 
plenty of  money  there, without the impoverishing of 
their neighbours.  And,  when the thriving tradesman 
has got more than he can well  employ in trade,  his 
next thoughts are to look out for a purchase;  but it 
must be a purchase in the neighbourhood, where the 
estate may be  under his  eye,  and  within  convenient 
distance,  thattthe care an6 pleasure of  his farm may 
not  take him  off  from  the engagements of  his  call- 
ing, nor remove his  children too far from him, or the 
trade he breeds  them up in.  This seems  to be  the 
reason, why in places wherein  thriving manufactures 
have  erected  themselves,  land  has  been  observed  to 
sell  quicker,  and  for  more  years'  purchase,  than  in 
other places,  as about Halifax in the north, Taunton 
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This is that then which makes land, as well as other 
things,  dear: plenty  of  buyers,  and but few  sellers : 
and so, by the rule of  contraries, plenty of  sellers and 
few buyers makes land cheap. 
He that will justly estimate the value of  any thing, 
must consider its quantity in proportion to its vent, for 
this alone regulates the price.  The value of any thing, 
compared  with  itself or  with  a  standing measure,  is 
greater, as its quantity is less in proportion to its vent: 
but, in comparing  it, or exchanging it with any other 
thing, the quantity and vent of  that thing too must be 
allowed for,  in the computation of  their value.  But, 
because the desire of money is constantly almost every 
where the same,  its vent varies very little, but as ,its 
greater  scarcity enhances its price,  and increases the 
scramble:  there  being  nothing  else  that does  easily 
supply the want of it :  the lessening its quantity, there- 
fore,  always increases its price,  and makes  an equal 
portion of it exchange for a greater of any other thing. 
Thus it comes to pass, that there is no manner of settled 
proportion between the value of an ounce of silver and 
any other commodity :  for, either varying its quantity 
in that country,  or the commodity changing its quan- 
tity in proportion  to its vent,  their  respective values 
change,  i.  e. less  of  one will  barter  for  more  of  the 
other :  though,  in the ordinary way of speaking, it is 
only said, that the price of the commodity,  not of  the 
money,  is  changed.  For  example,  half  an ounce  of 
silver in England will exchange sometimes for a whole 
bushel of  wheat,  sometimes for half,  sometimes but a 
quarter,  and this it does  equally,  whether  by  use  it 
be apt to bring in to the owner six in the hundred of 
its own weight per annum, or nothing  at all: it being 
only the change of  the quantity of  wheat to its vent, 
supposing we have still the same sum of  money in the 
kingdom ; or  else the change of  the quantity of  our 
money in the kingdom, supposing the quantity of wheat, 
in respect to its vent, be the same too, that makes the 
change  in  the price  of  wheat.  For if  you  alter the 
quantity,  or vent,  on either side,  you  presently  alter 
the price, but no other way in the world. 
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For it is not  the being,  adding,  increasing,  or di- 
minishing of any good quality in any commodity, that 
makes its price greater, or less ;  but only as it makes 
its quantity, or vent, greater, or less, in proportion one 
to another.  This will easily appear by two or three 
instances. 
1. The being of any good and useful quantity in any 
thing neither increases its price,  nor indeed makes it 
have any price at  all, but only as it lessens its quantity, 
or increases its vent ;  each of these in proportion to one 
another. What more useful or necessary things are  there 
to the being, or well-being of men, than air and water? 
and.yet these have generally no price at all,  nor yield 
any money :  because their quantity is immensely greater 
than their vent, in most places  of  the world.  But as 
soon as ever water (for air still offers itself every where, 
without  restraint  or  inclosure,  and therefore  is  no- 
where of any price) comes any where to  be reduced into 
any proportion to its consumption, it begins presently 
to  have a price, and is sometimes sold dearer than wine. 
Hence it is, that the best and most useful things are 
commonly  the cheapest;  because,  though their  con- 
sumption be great,. yet the bounty of  providence has 
made their production large, and suitable to it. 
2. Nor does the adding an excellency to any commo- 
dity raise its price,  unless  it increase its consumption. 
For, suppose there should be taught a may (which should 
be published to the knowledge of every one) to make a 
medicine of wheat alone, that should infallibly cure the 
stone :  it is certain the discovery of this quality in that 
grain would  give  it an  excellency very colisiderable: 
and yet this would not increase the price of it one far- 
thing in twenty bushels,  because its quantity, or vent, 
would not hereby, to any sensible degree, be altered. 
3. Neither does the increasing of  any good quality, 
in any sort of things, make it yield more.  For though 
teasels be much better this year than any were last, they 
are not one jot dearer, unless they be fewer too, or the 
consumption of them greater. 
4.  Nor does the lessening the good qualities of  any 
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hops, that are usually dearest those years they are worst. 
Hut, if it happen to be a species of  commodity whose 
defects may be supplied by some other, the making of 
it worse does lessen its price, because it hinders its vent. 
For, if rye should any year prove generally smutty, or 
grown, no question it would yield less money than other- 
wise, because the deficiency of that might be, in some 
measure, made up by wheat,  and other grain.  But if 
it be  a sort of  commodity whose use no other known 
thing can  supply, it is  not its being  better, or worse, 
but its quantity,  and vent,  is that alone which  regu- 
lates and determines its value. 
To apply it now to money,  as capable of  different 
rates of interest.  To  money,  considered  in its proper 
use  as a  commodity passing  in  exchange  from one to 
another, all that is done by interest, is but the adding 
to it by  agreement,  or  public  authority,  a  faculty, 
which naturally it has not, of increasing every year six 
per  cent.  Now  if  public  authority sink use  to four 
per cent. it is certain it diminishes this goad quality in 
money one-third.  But yet this making the money of 
England not one farthing more than it was,  it alters 
not the measures  upon which  all changeable commo- 
dities increase, or sink their price ;  and so makes not 
money  exchange  for  less  of  any  commodity  than it 
would without this alteration of its interest.  If lessen- 
ing use to four per cent. should at  all alter the quantity 
of money,  and make it less,  it would make money, as 
it has the nature of  a  commodity,  dearer, i. e.  a  less 
quantity  of  money  would  exchange  for  a  greater 
quantity of  another commodity,  than it would  before. 
This perhaps will  appear a little plainer by these fol- 
lowing particulars : 
1. That the intrinsic,  natural  worth of  any thing, 
consists in its ritness to supply the necessities, or serve 
the conveniencies  of  human  life;  and the more  ne- 
cessary it is to our being, or the more it contributes to 
our well-being, the greater is its worth.  But yet, 
2. That there is no such intrinsic,  natural,  settled 
value in any thing, as to make any assigned quantity of 
it constantly worth any assigned quantity of another. 
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3. The marketable value of  any assigned quantities 
of  two,  or  more  commodities,  are (PO  hic  et nunc) 
equal, when  they will exchange one for another.  As, 
supposing one bushel of wheat, two bushels of  barley, 
thirty pounds  of  lead,  and one  ounce  of  silver,  will 
now in the market be taken one for another, they are 
then  of  equal worth:  and,  our coin being  that which 
Englishmen  reckon  by,  an  Englishman  would  say, 
that now one bushel  of wheat, two bushels of  barley, 
thirty pounds  of  lead,  and  one  ounce of  silver,  were 
equally worth five shillings. 
4.  The change of this marketable value of any com- 
modity, in respect of  another commodity, or in respect 
of a standing,  common measure,  is not the altering of 
auy intrinsic value,  or quality,  in the commodity; (for 
musty  and  smutty corn will  sell dearer at one  tirne 
than the clean and sweet at another) but the alteration 
of  some  proportion  which  that  commodity  bears  to 
something else. 
5. This proportion in all commodities, whereof money 
is one,  is the proportion of their quantity to the vent. 
The vent is nothing else but the passing of commodities 
from one  owner to another in exchange;  and is then 
called quicker, when a greater quantity of any species 
of commodity is taken off from the owners of  it, in an 
equal space of time. 
6. This vent is  regulated,  i. e.  made  quicker  or 
slower,  as greater  or  less  quantities  oE  any  saleable 
commodity are removed  out of  the way and course of 
trade ;  separated from public commerce ;  and no longer 
lie within  the reach  of  exchange.  For,  though  any 
commodity should  shift hands ever so fast, and be ex- 
changed from  one  man  to another; yet,  if they were 
not  thereby,  exempted  from trade  and sale,  and did 
not cease to be any longer traffic, this would not at all 
make or quicken their vent.  But this,  seldom or never 
happening, makes very little or no alteration. 
7. Things are removed out, of  the market,  or hands 
of commerce,  and  so  their  vent  altered  three ways; 
1. By consumption, when  the commodity in ita use is 
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is so consumed is quite gone out of  the trade of  the 
world.  9. By exportation;  and all that is so carried 
away  is  gone out of  the trade of  England,  and con- 
cerns  Englishmen  no more  in the price of  their com- 
modities among themselves for their own use, than if it 
were out of the world.  3. By buying and laying up  for 
a man's private use.  For what is by any of these ways 
shut out of  the market,  and no longer moveable by 
the hand of  commerce,  makes no  longer any part of 
merchantable ware, and so, in respect of trade, and the 
quantity of  any commodity,  is not more  considerable 
than  if  it were  not  in  being.  All  these  three  ter- 
minating  at last in  consumption  of  all commodities, 
(excepting only jewels and plate, and some few others, 
which wear out but insensibly)  may properly enough 
pass under that name.  Engrossing too  has  some in- 
fluence  on the present vent:  but this inclosing some 
considerable part of  any commodity,  (for  if  the en- 
grossing be of all the commodity, and it be of  general 
use, the price is at the will of the engrosser) out of the 
free common of  trade, only for some time,  and after- 
wards returning again to sale,  makes  not  usually so 
sensible and general an alteration in the vent as the 
others do: but yet influences the price,  and the vent 
more, according as it extends itself to a larger portion 
of the commodity, and hoards it up longer. 
8.  Most  other  portable  commodities  (excepting 
jewels,  plate, kc.)  decaying quickly in their use,  but 
money  being  less  consumed,  or  increased,  i.  e.  by 
slower degrees removed from, or brought into the free 
commerce of  any country, than the greatest part of 
other merchandize ;  and so the proportion between its 
quantity and vent altering slower than in most other 
eommodities ; it is commonly looked on as a standing 
measure, to  judge of  the value of all things, especially 
being adapted to it by its weight and denomination in 
coinage. 
9.  Money, whilst the same quantity of  it is passing 
up  and down the kingdom in trade, is really a standing 
measure of the falling and rising value of other things, 
in reference to one another: and the alteration of price 
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is truly in them  only.  But if you  increase, or lessen, 
the quantity of money, current in traffic, in any place, 
then the alteration  of value  is  in the  money:  and if 
at the same time wheat  keep its proportion of vent to 
quantity, money, to speak  truly, alters its worth, and 
wheat does  not,  though it sell  for  a  greater or  less 
price  than  it did  before.  For  money,  being  looked 
upon as  the  standing  measure of other  commodities, 
men consider and speak of it still as if it were (I stand- 
ing measure, though, when it has varied its quantity, it 
is plain it is not. 
10. But  the  value  or  price  of  all  commodities, 
amongst  which  money    as sing in trade is truly one, 
consisting in  proportion, you  alter this, as you  do all 
other proportions, whether you increase one, or lessen 
the other. 
11. In all other commodities, the owners, when they 
design  them  for  traffic,  endeavour,  as much  as they 
can, to have  them vented  and gone, i. e. removed out 
of the reach  of  commerce,  by consumption,  exporta- 
tion, or laying up :  but money never  lying upon peo- 
ple's  hands,  or wanting vent,  (for  any one  may part 
with  it in exchange, when  he pleases)  the provident 
public and private  care is  to keep it from venting,  or 
consuming,  i. e. from exportation, which is its proper 
consumption ;  and from hoarding up by others, which 
is a sort of engrossing.  Hence it is that other commo- 
dities have  sometimes  a  quicker,  sometimes a slower 
vent:  for nobody lays out his  money in them, but ac- 
cording to the use he has of them, and that has bounds. 
But every body being ready to receive  money without 
bounds,  and keep it by  him,  because it answers  all 
things :  therefore thevent of money is always sufficient, 
or more than enough.  This being so, its quantity alone 
is enough to regulate and determine its value, without 
considering  any proportion  between  its quantity and 
vent, as in other commodities. 
12. Therefore the lessening of use, not bringing one 
penny of money more  into the trade or exchange  of 
anycountry, but rather drawing it awayfrom trade, md 
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make  it  buy  less  of  any  commodity,  but  rather 
more. 
13. That which raises the natural interest of money, 
is the same that raises the rent of land, i.  e.  its aptness 
to bring in yearly to him that manages it  a greater over- 
plus of income  above  his  rent, as  a reward  to his la- 
bour.  That which  causes this in  land, is the greater 
quantity of its product, in proportion  to the same vent 
to that particular fruit, or the same quantity of product, 
in proportion to a greater vent of that single commo- 
dity;  but that which  causes  increase  of  prdfit  to the 
borrower of  money,  is  the leqs  quantity of  money, in 
proportion to trade, or to the vent of all commodities, 
taken together, and vice versa. 
14. The natural value of money,  as it is apt to yield 
such a yearly income by interest, depends on the whole 
quantity of the then passing money of the kingdom, in 
proportion to the whole trade of the kingdom, i. e. the 
general vent of all the commodities.  But the natural 
value of money, in exchanging for any one commoclity, 
is the quantity of  the trading money of  the kingdom 
designed  for  that  commodity,  in proportion  to that 
single commodity and its vent.  For though any single 
man's  necessity and want, either of money, or any spe- 
cies of commodity,  being  known, may make  him pay 
dearer for money, or that commodity, yet this is but a 
particular case, that does  not at the same  time alter 
this constant and general rule. 
15. That supposing wheat a standing measure, that 
is, that there is  constantly the same  quantity of it, in 
proportion to its vent, we  shall find money to run  the 
same variety of changes in its value, as all other com- 
modities do.  Now that wheat in England does come 
nearest to a standing measure, is evident by comparing 
wheat with other commodities, money,  and the yearly 
income of land, in Henry the Seventh's  time, and now; 
for  supposiog  that  primo  Henry  VII.  N.  let  100 
acres of  land  to A. for Gd. per  annum per acre, rack- 
rent, and to B. another 100 acres of land, of the same 
soil and yearly worth with the  former, for  a bushel of 
wheat per acre, rack-rent, (a bushel of wheat about that 
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time being probably sold for about 6d)  it was then a11 
equal  rent.  If, therefore, these  leases were for years 
yet to come, it is certain that he that paid but 6d. per 
acre, would pay now 50s. per annum, and he that paid 
a bushel of wheat per acre, would  now pay about 25Z. 
per annum, which would be near about the yearly value 
of the land, were it to be let now.  The reason whereof 
is  this,  that  there  being  ten  times  as  much  silver 
now in  the world  (the  discovery  of  the West  Indies 
having made the plenty)  as there was  then, it is nine- 
tenths less worth now than it was at that time; that is, 
it will exchange for nine-tenths  less of any commodity 
now, which bears the same proportion to its vent, as it 
did 100 years  since, which,  of all other  commodities, 
wheat is likeliest to do ;  for in England, and this part 
of the world,  wheat being the constant and most  ge- 
neral food, not  altering with the fashion, not growing 
by chance ;  but as the farmers  sow more or less of it, 
which they endeavour to proportion,  as near as can be 
guessed, to the consumption,  abstracting the overplus 
of the precedent year, in  their  provision  for the next, 
and  ice versa; it  must needs fall out, that it keeps the 
nearest proportion to its consumption  (which is more 
studied  and designed in this than other commodities) 
of any thing, if you  take it for seven or  twenty years 
together: though pcrliaps the plenty or scarcity of one 
year, caused  by the accidents  of the season, may very 
much vary  it from the immediately precedent, or fol- 
lowing.  Wheat, therefore, inethis part of  the world, 
(and that grain, which is  the constant general food of 
any other country) is the fittest measure to  judge of tho 
altered value of things, in any long tract of time :  aod 
therefore, wheat here, rice in Turkey, kc. is the fittest 
thing to reserve a rent in, which is designed to be con- 
stantly the same for all future ages.  But money is thr 
best  measure of the altered value  of  things  in  a fe~v 
years: because  its vent  is  the same, and its quantity 
alters slowly.  But wheat,  or  any other grain, cannot 
serve instead of money,  because  of its bulkiness,  and 
too quick change of its quantity; for had I a bond,  to 48  Considerations of  the lowering of  Interest, 
pay me 100 bushels of wheat next year, it might be a 
fourth part loss or gain to me ;  too great an inequality 
and uncertainty to be ventured  in  trade :  besides the 
different goodness  of  several  parcels  of wheat in  the 
same year. 
16. That supposing  any island separate from  the 
commerce of the rest  of mankind; if gold  and silver, 
or whatever else,  (so it be lasting)  be their money, if 
they have but a certain quantity of it, and can give no 
more,  that will  be a  steady, standing measure of  the 
value of all other things. 
17. That, if in  any country they use for money any 
lasting material, whereof there is  not any more to be 
got, and so cannot be  increased,  or being of no other 
use, the rest of the world does not value it, and so it is 
not like to be diminished, this also would be a steady, 
standing measure of the value of other commodities. 
18. That in a country, where they had such a stand- 
ing measure, any quantity of that money (if it were but 
so much that every body might have some) would serve 
to drive any proportion of trade, whether more or less; 
there being counters enough to reckon by, and the va- 
lue of the pledges  being  still sufficient, as constantly 
increasing with the plenty of the commodity.  But these 
three last, being built on suppositions that are not like 
to be found in the practice of mankind, since navigation 
and commerce have brought all parts acquainted with 
one another, and introduced the use of  gold and silver 
money into all trading parts of the world ;  they serve 
rather to give us some light into the nature of money, 
than to teach here a new measure of traffic.  Though it 
be certain, that that part of  the world which bred most 
of  our gold  and  silver used  least  of  it in exchange, 
and used it not for money at all. 
19.  That therefore, in  any country, that hath com- 
rnerce with the rest  of the world, it is almost impossj- 
ble now to be without the use of silver coin ;  and having 
money of that, and  accounts kept in such  money,  it 
is ilnpossible  to have any standine, unalterable mea- 
sure of the value of  things ;  for whilst the mines  sup- 
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ply to mankind  more than wastes and consumes in its 
use, the quantity of it will daily grow greater, in respect 
of  other commodities, and its value less. 
20. That in a country, that hath open commerce with 
the  rest  of  the world,  and uses  money,  made of  the 
same materials with  their neighbours,  any quantity of 
that money will not serve to drive any quantity of trade ; 
but there must be  a  certain proportion  between their 
money and trade.  The reason whereof is this,  because 
to keep your trade going without loss, your commodi- 
ties amongst you must keep an  equal, or at least near 
the price of  the same  species  of  commodities  in  the 
neighbouring countries;  which  they cannot do if your 
money be far less than in other countries : for then either 
your commodities must be  sold very cheap, or a great 
part of your trade must stand  still,  there  not  being 
money enough in the country to pay for them (in their 
shifting of hands) at that high price, which the plenty, 
and consequently low value of  mcjney,  makes  them at 
in another country; for the value of money, in general, 
is the quantity of  all  the money in the world, in  pro- 
portion to all the trade: but the value of money in any 
one  country,  is the  present  quantity of  the  current 
money in that country, in proportion  to  the present 
trade.  Supposing then, that we had now in England 
but half as much money as we had seven years ago, and 
yet had still as much yearly product of commodities, as 
many hands to  work them, and as many brokers to dis- 
perse them, as before ;  and that the rest of the world we 
trade with had as much money as they had before, (for  it 
is likely they should  have  more by our moiety shared 
amongst  them)  it  is  certain,  that  either  half  our 
rents should  not  be  paid,  half  our commodities  not 
vented, and half  our labourers  not  employed, and so 
half the trade be clearly lost ;  or else, that every one of 
these must receive but half the money for their commo- 
dities and labour they did before, and but half so much 
as our neighbours do receive, for the same labour, and 
the  same  natural  product  at the same time.  Such 
a state  of  poverty  as  this,  though it  will  make  no 
scarcity of our native  commodities amongst us,  yet it 
will have these ill consequences. 
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1. It  will  make our  native  commodities vent very 
cheap. 
2. It will  make all  foreign  coinmodities very dear, 
both  which  will  make  us  poor;  for  the  merchant, 
making silver  and gold  his measure, and considering 
what the foreign conlnlodity costs him (i. e.  how many 
ounces of silver)  in  the country where money is more 
plenty, i. e. cheaper;  and considering too, how many 
ounces of  silver it will  yield  him  in another country, 
mill not part with it here, but for the same quantity of 
silver,  or as  much  as that silver will  buy here  of our 
commodity,  which  will  be  a  great  deal  more  than 
in another place;  so tliat, in all our exchange of native 
for foreign commodities, we shall pay double the value 
that any other country does, where money is in greater 
plenty.  This indeed will make a dearness,  and in time 
a  scarcity of  foreign  con~modities  ; wIlic11  is  not  the 
worst inconvenieilcy that it brings upon us, supposing 
them not absolutely necessary.  But, 
3.  It endangers the drawing away our people, both 
handicrafts,  mariners,  and  soldiers, who are apt to go 
where their pay is best,  which  will  always  be where 
there is greatest  plenty of money, and in time of war 
must needs bring great distress. 
21. Upon this measure too it is, that the variation of 
exchange of money between several countries does some- 
what depend : for it is certain that one ounce of silver 
is always of equal value to another ounce of silver, con- 
sidered in its intrinsic worth, or in reference to the uni- 
versal trade of the world:  but  it  is  not of  the same 
value at the same time in several parts of the world, 
but is of the most worth  in that country where  there 
is the least money, in proportion to  its trade: and there- 
fore men may afford to give twenty ounces of silver in 
one  place,  to receive  eighteen  or  nineteen  ounces of 
silver in another.  But this is not all : to this then, (to 
find out the alteration of the exchange) the  over-balance 
of the trade must be taken int.0 consideration.  These 
two together regulate the exchange,  in  all the com- 
merce of the world, and in both the higher rate of ex- 
change depends upon one and the same thing, viz.  the 
greeter  plenty of money in one country than in the other : 
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only with this difference,  that where  the over-baiance 
of  trade raises the exchange above the par,  there it is 
the  plenty  of  money  which  private  merchants  have 
in  one  country,  which  they  desire  to  remove  in 
another:  but  where  the riches  of  the  country  raise 
the exchange  above the par, there it is the plenty of 
the money  in  the whole  country.  In  one,  the  mer- 
chant  has  more  money  (or  debts,  which  is  all one) 
in a foreign country, than his trade there will employ, 
and  so  is  willing  to  allow  upon  exchange  to him 
abroad, that shall pay him ready money at home, 1,2, 
3,  kc.  per cent. more  or less,  proportionably as his, 
or his countrymen's  plenty of ready money abroad, the 
danger of leaving it there, or the difficulty of bringing 
it home in  specie,  and his present  need  of money at 
home,  is  greater  or  less:  in  the  other,  the  whole 
country has  more  money  than can well  be employed 
in the trade thereof,  or at least the proportion of the 
money to the trade is greater than in the neighbouring 
country, where the exchange is below the par. 
For, supposing the balance of  trade to be equal be- 
tween England and Holland,  but that there is in Hol- 
land a greater plenty of money than in England, (which 
will appear by the lowness  of the natural use in Hol- 
land, and the height of the natural use in England, and 
also by the dearness  of  food  and labour in general in 
Holland, and the cheapness of it in England.)  If N. has 
10,0001.  in Holland,  which  the greater advantage he 
could  make  of  it  in  England,  eithe~  by  use or  pur- 
chase, tempts him to transfer into England,  it  is pro- 
bable he will give as much to a  merchant in England, 
to pay him 10,0001.  in  England, as the insurance  at 
that time between Holland and England is worth.  If 
this happens to be in a country, where the exportation 
of bullion is prohibited, he must pay the more, because 
his venture,  if  he carry it in  specie, will  be  greater; 
and upon this ground, perhaps, the prohibiting the ex- 
portation  of money out  of  England,  under penalties, 
may be of some use, by making the rate of the exchange 
greater to those countries, which import upon us more 
than they export in commodities;  and so  retain some 
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part of  the money,  which  their over-balance  of  trade 
would carry away from us,  though, after all, if we are 
over-balanced in trade, it must go. 
But, since the Holland merchant cannot receive N.'s 
10,0001. in money in Holland, and pay him 10,OOOZ.  in 
England,  unless  his  over-balance  of trade  make En- 
glishmen indebted to him 10,0001. in money, which he 
is not like  to take  in  commodities, I think the over- 
balance  of  trade is that,  which  chiefly raises  the ex- 
change in any country,  and that plenty  of  money  in 
any country does it only for so much of the money as is 
transferred, either to be Iet out to use, or to be spent 
there ;  and though lending to foreigners upon use doth 
not at all alter the balance of trade between those coun- 
tries, yet it does alter  the exchange between those coun- 
tries for so much as is lent upon use, by not calling away 
the money that should follow the over-balaace of trade, 
but letting it rest there, as if it were accounted for; all 
one as if  the balance of 'trade were for so much altered. 
But this being not much, in comparison of the general 
traffic between two nations, or at least varying slower, 
the merchant too regulating the exchange, and not the 
usurer;  I suppose it is the present balance of  trade on 
which the exchange  immediately and chiefly depends, 
unless some accident shall make a great deal of money 
be remitted at the same time from one place to another, 
which will for that time raise the exchange all one as an 
over-balance of trade ; and indeed, when examined, is 
generally very little different from it. 
To be able to estimate the par, with the rise and fall 
of the exchange,  it is  necessary to know the intrinsic 
value, i.  e. how much silver is in the coins of  the two 
countries, by which  you reckon  and charge the bill of 
exchange. 
Sir, if I have been led a little too far from one thing 
to another, in the consideration  of  money,  I beg. your 
pardon, hoping that these particulars will afford some 
light to our present subject. 
To  return to the price of land.  It  is evident, by what 
has been above said, that  the years' purchase of landdoes 
not increase with ihe fall of interest ;  and the abating 
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of that good quality in money, of yielding yearly six per 
cent.  to four, does  not presently  so  sink its value,  in 
respect of land, that one-third  more is required in ex- 
change : falling of  interest from  six  to four, will not 
raise land from twenty to thirty years'  purchase ; the 
rising and falling of the price of land, as of other things, 
depends much on the quantity of land set to sale, com- 
pared with  the quantity of money  designed  for  that 
traffic, or, which amounts to the same thing, upon the 
number of buyers and sellers ;  for where there are many 
sellers and few purchasers, though interest be lessened, 
land will be cheap, as I have already showed.  At least 
this is certain, that making a law to reduce interest will 
not raise the price of  land; it will  only,  by driving it 
more into the banker's  hands,  leave the country barer 
of money;  whereby,  if  the   rice  of  land about Lon- 
don should be accidentally raised, that of remoter coun- 
tries  would  thereby  have  fewer  purchasers,  and  at 
lower rates. 
This being  so,  that the low  rate  of  land  depends 
much on  the great number of  sellers in proportion to 
purchasers, the next thing to be inquired into is, what 
makes plenty of sellers?  And  to that the answer is ob- 
vious, general  ill husbandry,  and the consequence of 
it, debts.  If a neglect of government  and religion,  ill 
examples, and depraved education, have introduced de- 
bauchery,  and art,  or chance, has made it fashionable 
for men to live beyond their estates, debts will increase 
and multiply, and draw with them a necessity on men, 
first of encumbering, and then selling  their estates. This 
is generally the cause why men part with  their land: 
and 1  think there is scarce one in an hundred that thinks 
of  selling his  patrimony,  till mortgages have  pretty 
well eat into the freehold;  and the weight of growing 
debts  force  a man,  whether he will  or no,  out of his 
possessions.  When almost is there ever a clear and un- 
encumbered estate set to sale ?  It is seldom a thriving 
man turns his land into money,  to make the greater 
advantage :  the examples of it are so rare, that they are 
scarce of any consideration in the number of sellers. 
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Elizabeth's  days  (when  sobriety,  frugality,  and  in- 
dustry,  brought  in  daily  increase  to  the  growing 
wealth  of  the kingdom) land kept  up its price,  and 
sold for more years' purchase than corresponded to  the 
interest of  money,  then  busily employed in a thriving 
trade,  which  made  the natural interest inuch  higher 
than it is now,  as well  as the parliament  then  set it 
higher by law. 
On the contrary side, what  makes  scarcity of  pur- 
chasers ? 
1. The  same reason, ill husbandry.  When the trades- 
man lives up to the height of his income, and the vanity 
of  expenses either  drains  the  merchant's  coffers,  or 
keeps them from overflowing, he seldom thinks of pur- 
chasing.  Buying  of  land  is the result  of  a  full  and 
satiated gain : and men in trade seldom think of laying 
out their money upon land, till their profit has brought 
them in  more  than their trade can well employ;  and 
their idle bags,  cumbering  their counting-houses,  put 
them upon emptying them on a purchase. 
a.  Another thing that makes a scarcity of buyers of 
land, are doubtful  and ill  titles : where  these are fre- 
quent and fatal, one can no more expect that men, who 
have money, should be forward to purchase, than ships, 
richly laden, to venture themselves amongst rocks and 
quicksands.  It  is  no wonder such  seas should not be 
much frequented, where  the examples and remains of 
daily wrecks show the folly and hazard of the venture, 
in the number of those who have miscarried. 
3.  A general decay of  trade  discourages  men from 
purchasing : for this  threatens  an  universal  poverty, 
which is sure to fall first and heaviest upon land.  The 
merchant,  who  furnishes  the improvident  landholder, 
will not fail  to  have  money for  his wares  with gain, 
whethet the kingdom  get by his  trade or no,  and he 
will  keep  his  money rather employed  in trade, which 
brings him in  profit,  (for  the merchant  may get by a 
trade that makes the kingdom poor) than lay it out in 
land, whose rent he  sees sinking, and foresees,  by the 
course of trade,  is likely to continue to do so.  When 
a nation is running to decay and ruin, the merchant and 
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monied man,  do what  you  can,  will be sure to starve 
last: observe  it where you will, the decays that come 
upon, and bring to ruin any country, do constantly first 
fail upon the land :  and though the country gentleman, 
(who  usually securely relies  upon  so much  a year  as 
was given in at his marriage settlement, and thinks his 
land an unmoveable  fund  for such  an income) be not 
very forward  to think  so; yet this  nevertheless  is an 
undoubted truth, that he  is more  concerned in trade, 
and ought to take a greater  care  that it be well  ma- 
naged and preserved, than even the merchant himself.. 
For he will  certainly find, when  a  decay of trade hcls 
carried away one  part  of our  money out of the king- 
dom, and the other is kept in the merchant and trades- 
man's  hands, that no laws he can make, nor  any little 
arts of  shifting property amongst ourselves, will bring 
it back to him  again :  but his rents will  fall,  and his 
income every day lessen, till general industry and fru- 
gality,  joined  to a  well-ordered  trade,  shall  restore 
to the kingdom  the riches  and  wealth  it had  for- 
merly. 
This by the way, if well considered, might let us see, 
that taxes, however contrived, and out of whose hands 
soever  immediately  taken,  do,  in  a  country  where 
their great fund is in land, for the most part terminate 
upon  land.  Whatsoever  the people  is  chiefly main- 
tained by, that the government supports itself on: nay, 
perhaps it will be found, that those taxes which  seem 
least to affect  land, will  most  surely of all other  fall 
the rents.  This would  deserve to be well considered, 
in the raising of taxes, lest the neglect of it bring upon 
the country gentleman an evil, which  he will  be  sure 
quickly to feel, but not be able very quickly to remedy. 
For rents once fallen are not easily raised again.  A tax 
laid upon land seems  hard to the landholder, because 
it  is  so much  money going visibly out of  his pocket : 
and therefore, as an ease to himself, the landholder is 
always forward to lay it upoil commodities.  But,if he 
will  thoroughly consider  it, and  examine  the effects, 
he will find he buys  this  seeming ease  at a very dear 
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of;&  own purse, yet his purse will find it by a greater 
wapt of money there, at the end of the year, than that 
comes  to,  with  the  lessening  of  his  rents  to  boot: 
which is a settled and lasting evil, that will stick upon 
him beyond the present payment. 
To  make this clear, let us suppose in the present state 
of  affairs  in England, that  the rents of  England  are 
twelve millions, and that the charge and necessities of 
the government require n supply of three millions from 
the parliament, which  is  laid  on  land.  Here is one- 
fourth part of his yearly income goes immediately out 
of the landlord's  and  landholder's  pocket.  This is a 
burden very apt to be  felt.  The country gentleman, 
who actually pays the money out of his pocket, or finds 
it deducted out of his rent at  quarter-day for taxes, sees 
and very sensibly observes what goes thus out of  his 
estate.  But though this be a quarter of  his yearly in- 
come, and, out of an estate of  four hundred pounds a 
year, the public  tax  now openly talres  away one hun- 
dred ;  yet this influences not at a11  the yearly  rent  of 
the land, which the rack-renter, or under-tenant, pays: 
it being the same thing to him, whether he pays all his 
'ent  to the king, or his landlord ;  or half, or a quarter, 
or nQne at all to the king ; the case is  all one to him, 
what hand receives his rent,when due :  so trade  flourishes, 
and his c~mmodities  go off well, he will be able to pay 
his ~ent  on.  This lessens not any more the value of his 
farm,  than a high or  a  low chief rent does,  paid  out 
of it t~ the lord of the fee:  the tenant's  bargain and 
profit are the same, whether the land be charged, or not 
charged, with an annuity payable to another man.  We 
see this in college leases, where though the college te- 
nant pays for it to the college some years five times as 
much as he does others, upon the varying rate of corn; 
yet the under-tenant feels not this alteration in the least, 
nor  finds a reason  to have his  rent abated, because a 
greater part of it is diverted from his landlord.  All this 
is ,but cbuging  the hand that receives the rent, without 
any influence at all upon the yearly value of the estate ; 
which will  not he  let for one penny more, or  less, to 
the renter, however,  or amongst whomsoever,  the rent 
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he pays be  divided.  From hence  it is  evident, that 
taxes laid on land do not in  least make rents fall. 
But suppose, to shift off the burthen from the land, 
some country gentleman should think fit to raise these 
three millions  upon  commodities,  to let the land go 
free.  First, it is  to be  considered,' That  since the pub- 
lic wants require three millions, (for that we supposed 
for argument's  sake ;  let it be  three millions,  or one 
million,  that is all  one)  and so much  must  go into 
the king's  coffers, or else the necessities of the govern- 
ment will not be supplied: that for raising these three 
millions  on  commodities, and bringing  so  much  into 
the exchequer, there must  go  a  great deal more than 
three millions out of the subjects'  pockets.  For a tax 
of  that nature cannot be  levied  by officers,  to watch 
every littlerivulet of trade,without a great charge, espe- 
cially at first trial.  But supposing no more charges in 
raising it than of a  land-tax,  and that there are only 
three millions to be paid,  it is evident  that, to do this 
out ~f commodities,  they  must,  to the consumer, be 
raised a quarter in their price ; so that every thing, to 
him that uses it, must be a quarter dearer.  Let us see 
now  who, at  long-run, must pay this quarter, and where 
it  will light.  It is plain, the merchant and broker nei- 
ther will, nor can ; for,  if he pays a quarter more  for 
commodities than he did, he will  sell them at a price 
proportionably raised.  The poor labourer and handi- 
craftsman cannot :  for he  just lives from hand to mouth 
already, and all his food, clothing, and utensils costing 
a quarter more than they did before, either his wages 
must rise with the price  of  things, to make  him live, 
or else, not being able to maintain himself and family 
by his  labour,  he  comes to the parish;  and then the 
land bears the burthen a heavier way.  If  the labourer's 
wages be raised in proportion to the increased rates of 
things, the farmer who pays a quarter more for wages, 
as well as all other things, whilst he sells his corn and 
wool, either at the same rate, or lower, at the market 
(since the tax laid upon  it makes people less forward 
to buy) must either have his rent abated, or else break 
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value of the land is brought down.  And who then pays 
the tax at the year's  end, but tlie landlord? when the 
tenant, not able to raise his  rent  by  his  comlnodities, 
either runs  away in  his  landlord's  debt, or cannot be 
continued in the farm, without abatement of rent :  for, 
when the jearly charge in his farm is greater by the in- 
crease of the labourer's wages, and yet his product sells 
cheaper by reason of the tax laid on his colnmodities ; 
how will the  farmer  be  able to make up his  rent  at 
quarter-day? For this  may be worth  our  notice, that 
any tax laid on foreign commodities in England, raises 
its price, and makes the importer get more for his com- 
modity:  but, on the contrary, a  tax laid  on your na- 
tive product, and home-made commodities, lessens their 
price, and makes them yield less to the first seller. 
The reason whereof is plain.  For the merchant im- 
porting no  commodity, but what the necessity, or fa- 
shionable wantonness,  of your people  gives  him vent 
for, will not  only proportion  his gain to the cost  and 
risque, which he has  been at before landing; but will 
expect profit of  his  money paid here,  for any tax laid 
on it; and take advantage from thence to raise his price 
above what his tax comes to ;  and if he carmot do that, 
he will trade no more in that commodity.  For it being 
not the product of  his farm, he is not tied to bring it 
to market,  if  he  finds  its  price  not  answer  his  ex- 
pectation there, but turns himself to other wares, which 
he finds  your  markets take  off better.  A  merchant 
will never continue to trade in wares, which the change 
of fashion, or humour amongst  your people, has made 
less vendible, though he may be sometimes caught by 
a sudden alteration.  But that  seldom happens in the 
course of trade, so as to influence  the great bulk of it. 
For things of necessity must still be had, and things of 
fashion will  be  had, as  long  as men  have  money,  or 
credit, whatever rates they cost, and the rather because 
they are dear.  For, it being vanity,not  use, that makes 
the expensive fashion of your people, the emulation is, 
who shall have the finest, that is,  the  dearest  things, 
not the most convenient, or useful.  How many things 
do we value, or buy,  because  they come at dear rates 
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from Japan and China, which if they were our own ma- 
nufacture or  product, common to be had,  and for  a 
little money, would be contemned and neglected!  Have 
not several of our own  commodities, offered to sale at 
reasonable  rates,  been  despised,  and  the very  same 
eagerly  bought and bragged off, when sold for French, at 
a double price? You must not think, therefore, that the 
raising their price will  lessen the vent  of  fashionable, 
foreign commodities amongst you, as long as men have 
any way to purchase them, but rather increase it. French 
wine is become a modish drink  amongst us, and a man 
is ashamed to entertain  his  friend, or almost to dine 
himself without it.  The price is in the memory of man 
raised from Gd. to 2s. and does this hinder the drinking 
of  it? No, the quite contrary:  a man's  way of  living 
is commended, because he will give any rate for it :  and 
a man will  give  any rate rather  than pass  for a poor 
wretch, or  a penurious  curmudgeon, that is  not able, 
or  knows  not  how  to live well,  nor  use  his  friends 
civilly.  Fashion is, for the most part, nothing but the 
ostentation of  riches, and  therefore the high  price  of 
what  serves  to that, rather  increases  than lessens its 
vent.  The contest and glory is in the expense, not the 
usefulness of it; and people are then thought and said 
to live well, when  they can  make a show of  rare and 
foreign things, and such as their neighbours cannot go 
to the price of. 
Thus we see how foreign commodities fall not in their 
price, by taxes laid on  them, because  the merchant is 
not necessitated to  bring to your market any but fashion- 
able commodities, and those go off the better for their 
high rate.  But, on the contrary, your landholder being 
forced to bring his commodities to market, such as his 
land  and  industry  afford  him,  common  and  known 
things, he must sell them there at such a price as he can 
get.  This the buyer  knows;  and  these  home-bred 
commodities being seldom  the favourites of your peo- 
ple, or  any farther  acceptable than  as  great conveni- 
ency  recommends  them to the vulgar,  or  downright 
necessity to all ;  as soon as a tax is laid on them, every 
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may save his  money for other  necessary or creditable 
expenses.  Thus the price, which  our  native commo- 
dities yield  the first  seller, is mightily abated, and so 
the yearly  value  of  the  land, which  produces  them, 
lessened too. 
If, therefore, the laying  of  taxes upon commodities 
does, as it is  evident, affect  the land  that is out at a 
rack-rent, it is plain it does equally affect all the other 
land in England too. and the gentry will, but the worst 
way, increase their  own  charges, that is, by lessening 
the yearly value  of  their  estates, if they hope to ease 
their land, by charging commodities.  It  is in vain, in 
a country whose great fund is land, to hope to lay the 
public  charge of the government  on  any thing else ; 
there at  last it will terminate.  The merchant (do what 
you can), will not bear it, the  labourer cannot, and there- 
fore the landholder must :  and whether he were best do 
it, by laying it  directly where it will at last settle, or by 
letting  it come to him by the sinking of his rents, which, 
when  they are once  fallen,  every one  knows  are not 
easily raised again, let him consider. 
Holland is brought as an instance of laying the charge 
of  the public upon trade, and it is possibly (excepting 
some few small free towns) the only place in the world 
that could be  brought to favour  this way.  But yet, 
when examined, will  be  found to show the quite con- 
trary, and be a clear proof,  that lay the taxes how you 
will, land every where, in proportion, bears the greater 
share of the burthen.  The public  charge  of  the go- 
vernment, it is  said,  is,  in  the United Provinces, laid 
on trade.  I grant it is, the greatest part of it; but is 
the land excused, or  eased  by it  ?  By no means ;  but, 
on the contrary, so loaded, that in many places half, in 
others a quarter, in others one-eighth of the yearly value 
does not  come into the owner's  pocket:  and if I have 
not been misinformed, the land in some places will not 
pay the taxes :  so that we may say,  that the charge of 
the government  came not  upon  commodities, till the 
land could not bear it.  The burthen unavoidably settles 
upon the land first, and when it has pressed it so,  that 
it can yield  no more, trade must be  brought in  aid, 
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to help to support the government, rather than let all 
sink :  but the first stress is always upon land, and as far 
as that will  reach it is unavoidably carried, lay your 
taxes how you will.  It is known what a share of  the 
public charges of  the government is supported by the 
trade of  Amsterdam  alone;  as I  remember  that one 
town pays thirty-six  in the hundred of  all the public 
taxes raised in the United Provinces.  But are the lands 
of Guelderland  eased  by it?  Let any one see,  in that 
country of land more than trade, what they make clear 
of  their revenues,  and whether the country gentlemen 
there  grow  rich  on  their  land,  whilst  the merchant, 
having the taxes laid on his commerce, is impoverished? 
On the contrary, Guelderland is so low and out of cash, 
that Amsterdam has been  fain, for rnany years,  to lay 
down the taxes for them ;  which is, in effect, to pay the 
taxes of Guelderland too. 
Struggle and contrive as you will, lay your taxes as 
you please, the traders will  shift it off  from their own 
gain ; the merchants will bear the least part of  it, and 
grow poor last.  In Holland itself, where trade is so 
loaded,  who,  I  pray,  grows  richest,  the landholder, 
or the trader? Which of  them  is pinched,  and  wants 
money  most?  A  country  may  thrive,  the  country 
gentleman grow rich,  and his rents increase (for so it 
has been here) whilst the land is taxed: but I challenge 
any one to show me  a country, wherein  there is any 
considerable public charge raised, where the land does 
not most sensibly feel it, and, in proportion, bear much 
the greater part of it. 
We must  not,  therefore,  impute the falling of  the 
rents, or of  the price of  land, to high interest; nor, if 
ill husbandry has wasted our riches, hope by such kind 
of laws to raise them to their former value.  I humbly 
conceive we  shall in vain  endeavour it,  by the fall of 
interest.  The number of  buyers  must  be  increased, 
and  sellers  lessened,  which  must  be  done  by  other 
ways,  than regulating  of  interest, or else  the landed 
man will neither find chapmen for his land, nor for the 
corn that grows on it, at the rate he desires. 
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to four per cent.,  and the lowering of that immediately 
raise the purchaser's fine from 20 to 95 years' purchase; 
yet it may be doubted, whether this be fit to be made 
into a law, because it would be of no advantage to the 
kingdom.  For what profit would  it be to the nation 
to  make a law, that he who sells land, should instead of 
four have five hundred pounds of the purchaser ?  This 
indeed, a little alters the distribution of the money we 
have amongst us Englishmen here at  home, but neither 
helps to continue what we have,  nor brings in more 
from  abroad:  which,  being  the only concernment  of 
the  kingdom,  in reference  to its wealth,  is  apt to be 
supposed by us without doors to be the only care of a 
parliament.  For it matters not, so it be here amongst 
us,  whether  the money  be  in  Thomas  or  Richard's 
hands, provided  it be  so ordered, that whoever has it 
may be encouraged to let it go  into the current of trade, 
for the improvement of the general stock and wealth of 
the nation. 
As this increase of the fine, in the purchase of  land, 
is not an advantage to the kingdom ;  so neither is it to 
the  landholder,  who  is the person,  that,  bearing the 
greatest part of the burthens of the kingdom, ought, I 
think, to have the greatest care taken of him, and enjoy 
as many privileges,  and as much wealth,  as the favour 
of the law can (with regard to the public weal) confer 
upon him.  But pray consider :  the raising the price of 
lancljn sale, by increasing the number of years' purchase 
to be paid for it,  gives the advantage, not to the land- 
holder, but to him that ceases to be so.  He, that has 
no longer the land, has the more money:  and he, who 
has the land, is the poorer.  The true advantage of  the 
landholder is, that his corn, flesh, and wool, sell better, 
and yield a greater price ; this, indeed, is a profit that 
benefits the owner of the land, and goes along with it: 
it  is this  alone  raises  the rent,  and makes  the pos- 
sessor richer:  and this can only be done by increasing 
our wealth,  and drawing more money into England; 
which the falling of interest,  and thereby (if  it could 
effect  it)  raising  the purchase  of land, is so far hrn 
doing, that it does visibly and directly one way hinder 
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our increase of wealth, that is, by hindering foreigners 
to come here,  and buy  land,  and settle amongst  us. 
'Whereby we have this double loss ;  first, we lose their 
persons,  increase  of- people  being  the  increase  both 
of  strength  and  riches.  Secondly,  we  lose  so  much 
money;  for,  though  whatever  an  Englishman  gives 
to another for land, though raised to forty years'  pur- 
chase, be not one farthing advantage to the kingdom ; 
yet  whatever  a  foreigner,  who  purchases  land  here, 
gives for it, is so much every farthing clear gain to the 
nation:  for that money comes  clear in, without carry- 
ing out any thing for it, and is every farthing of it as 
perfect gain to the nation,  as if it dropped down from 
the clouds. 
But farther,  if consideration  be to be had  only of 
sellers  of  land,  the lowering  of  interest  to four per 
cent. will  not be in their favour, unless  by it you can 
raise land to thirty years' purchase, which is not at all 
likely : and I think  nobody,  by falling of  interest to 
four per cent.,  hopes to get chapmen for their land at 
that rate.  Whatsoever they have  less,  if law can re- 
gulate interest, they lose of their value of land, money 
being thus abased.  So that the landed man will scarce 
find  his  account neither,  by  this  law,  when  it comes 
to  trial.  And  at last,  I  imagine,  this  will  be  the 
result of  all such attempts,  that experience will  show 
that the price of things will not be regulated by laws, 
though the endeavours  after it will  be  sure to Dre-  -. 
judice  and inconvenience  trade,  and put your adairs 
out of order. 
If this  be  so,  that interest cannot be regulated  by 
law, or that, if  it could,  yet the reducing of  it to four 
per cent. would  do more harm than good : what then 
should there (you will say) be no law at all to regulate 
interest ?  I say not so.  For, 
1.  It  is necessary that there should be a stated rate 
of  interest, and in debts and forbearances, where con- 
tract has  not settled it between  the parties,  the law 
might  give  a  rule,  and  courts  of  judicature  might 
know what damages to allow.  This may,  and there- 
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2. That in the present current of running ash.  whioh 
now takes its course almost all to London,  and  is en- 
grossed by a very few hands in comparison, young men, 
and those in want, might not  too easily be exposed to 
extortion and oppression; and the dexterous and com- 
bining money-jobbers not have too great and unbounded 
a power,  to prey  upon  the ignorance or necessity  of 
borrowers.  There would  not be much danger of this, 
if money were more equally distributed into the several 
quarters of England, and into a greater number of hnnda, 
according to the exigencies of trade. 
If money were to be  hired, as land is;  or to be had 
as corn, or wool,  from the owner himself, and known 
good security be  given  for it; it might then probably 
be had at the market (which is the true) rate, and that 
rate of interest would be a constant gauge of your trade 
and wealth.  But, when  a kind of  monopoly,  by con- 
sent, has put this general commodity into a few hands, 
it may need regulation, though what the stated rate of 
interest should be, in the constant change of affairs, and 
flux of  money,  is hard to determine.  Possibly it may 
be allowed, as a reasonable proposal, that it should be 
within  such  bounds,  as should  not,  on  the one  side, 
quite eat up the merchant's  and tradesmen's profit, and 
discourage their industry ;  nor,  on  the other hand, so 
low, as should hinder men from risquing their money 
in other men's  hands, and so rather choose to keep it 
out  of  trade,  than venture  it  upon  so  small  profit. 
When it is too high, it so hinders the merchant's  pin, 
that he will  not borrow;  when too low, it so hinders 
the monied  man's  profit,  that he will not lend; and 
both these ways it is an hinderance to trade. 
But this being, perhaps, too general and loose a rule, 
let me add, that lf one would consider money and land 
alone, in relation one to another,-perhaps it is now st 
six per cent. in as good a proportlon as is possible :  six 
per cent. being a little higher than land at  twenty years' 
purchase, which is the rate pretty near, that land has 
generally carried in England, it never being much over, 
nor  under.  For supposing 1001. in money, and land 
of  51.  per  ann.  be  of  equal value,  which  is  land  at 
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twenty years' purchase ;  it is necessary for the making 
their value  truly equal,  that they should produce  an 
equal income, which the 1001.  at 51.  per cent.  inteiest 
is not likeiy to do. 
1. Because of the many, and sometimes long intervals 
of barrenness, which happen to money more than land. 
Money at  use,when returned into the hands of tlie owner, 
usually lies dead there,  till he gets  a  new tenant for 
it, and can put it out again ; and  all this time it pro- 
duces  nothing.  But  this  happens  not  to land,  the 
growing product whereof turns to account to the owner, 
even when  it is in  his  hands,  or is allowed for by the 
tenant, antecedently to his entering upon the farm.  For 
though  a  man,  that  borrows  nloney  at Midsummer, 
never begins to pay his interest from our Lady-day, or 
one moment backwards; yet he, who rents a farm at  Mid- 
summer,may have as much reason to begin his rent from 
our Lady-day, as if he had then entered upon it. 
2.  Besides  the  dead  intervals  of  ceasing  profit, 
which happen  to money more  than land,  there is an- 
other  reason  why  the profit  and  income  of  money 
let out should  be a  little higher  than that  of  land; 
and that is, because nloneyout at  interest runs a greater 
risque than land does.  The borrower may break,  and 
run away with the money, and then not only the interest 
due, but all the future profit, with the principal, is lost 
for ever.  Rut in land a man can lose but the rent due, 
for which 'usually too the stock upon  the land is suf- 
ficient security: and if a tenant run away in arrear of 
some rent,  the land  remains ;  that cannot be carried 
away or lost.  Should  a  man purchase  good  land in 
Middlesex of 51.  per ann. at  twenty years' purchase, and 
other land in Romney-marsh,  or elsewhere, of the same 
yearly value, but so situated, that it were in danger to 
be swallowed of the sea, and be utterly lost,  it would 
not be unreasonable, that he should expect to have it 
under twenty years' purchase ; suppose sixteen  and  a 
half: this is to bring it to just the case of land at  twenty 
years' purchase ;  and money at six per cent. where the 
uncertainty  of  securing  one's  money  may  well  be 
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allowed that advantage of greater  profit ;  and therefore, 
perhaps,  the legal interest now in England at six per 
cent. is as reasonable and conve~ient  a rate as can well 
be set by a standing rule, especially if we consider that 
the law requires not a man to pay six per cent. but ties 
up the lender from taking more.  So that if ever it falls 
of itself,  the monied-man  is  sure  to find  it,  and  his 
interest will be brought down to it. 
High interest  is  thought  by some  a  prejudice  to 
trade ;  but if we look back, we shall find that England 
never throve so well,  nor was there  ever brought into 
England so great an increaseof wealth since, as in queen 
Elizabeth's  and king James I.  and Charles the First's 
time, when money was  at ten  and eight per cent.  I 
will not say high  interest was  the cause of it.  For I 
rather think that our thriving  trade was the cause of 
high interest, every one craving money to employ in a 
profitable  commerce.  But this,  I  think,  I may rea- 
sonably infer from it,  That lowering of interest is not 
a sure way to improve either our trade or wealth. 
To  this I hear some say,  That the Dutch, skilful in 
all arts  of  promoting  trade,  to out-do  us  in this,  as 
well as all other advancements of it, have observed this 
rule, viz.  That,  when we fell interest in England from 
ten to eight, they presently sunk interest in Holland to 
four per cent.  And  again, when we lowered it to six, 
they fell it to three per cent., thereby to keep  the advan- 
tage, which the lowness of interest giyes to trade. From 
whence these men readily conclude, that the falling of 
interest will  advance trade in  England.  To  which I 
answer, 
1. That this looks like an argument rather made for 
the present  occasion,  to mislead  those  who  are  cre- 
dulous enough to swallow it, than arising  from  true 
reason, and matter of fact.  For, if lowering of interest 
were so advantageous to trade, why did the Dutch so 
constantly take their measures only by us,  and not as 
well  by some  other  of  their  neighbours,  with  whom 
they have as great, or greater commerce than with us? 
This is enough, at first sight, to make one suspect this 
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to be dust only raised to throw in people's  eyes,  and a 
suggestion made to serve a purpose.  For, 
2. It  will not be found true,  That, when we abated 
interest here in England to eight, the Dutch sunk it in 
Holland to four per cent. by law ; or that there was any 
la;t made in Holland to  limit the rate of interest to three 
per cent. when we reduced it in England to six.  It  is 
true, John de Witt, when  he  managed  the affairs  of 
Holland, setting himself to lessen the public debts, and 
having  actually  paid  some,  and  getting  money in  a 
readiness to pay others, sent notice to all the creditors, 
that those who would  not take four per cent.  should 
come and receive their money.  The creditors finding 
him in earnest, and knowing not how otherwise to em- 
ply their money, accepted his terms, and changed their 
obligations into four per cent. whereas before they were 
at five, and so (the great loans of the country being to 
the state) it might be said in this sense, That the rate 
of interest was reduced lower at that time: but that it 
was done by a law,  forbidding to take higher interest 
than four per cent.,  that I deny, and require any one to 
show.  Indeed,  upon good  security, one  might lately 
have borrowed money in Holland, at three,  and three 
and a half per cent. but not by virtue of any law,  but 
the naturaLrate of interest.  And I appeal to the men, 
learned in the law of  Holland, whether last year (and 
I doubt not but it is so still) a man might not lawfully 
lend his  money  for  what  interest he could get,  and 
whether in the courts he should not recover the interest 
he contracted for, if  it were ten per cent.  So that, if 
money be to be borrowed by honest and responsible men 
at three, or three and a  half  per cent.,  it is not by the 
force of statutes and edicts,  but by the natural course 
of things;  which will always bring interest upon good 
security low, where there is a  great deal  of  money to 
be lent, and  little  good security, in  proportion, to be 
had.  Holland is  a  country where  the  land makes a 
very little part of the stock of  the country.  Trade is 
their  great fund; and  their  estates  lie  generally in 
money:  so that  all,  who  ;Ire  not traders,  generally 
F 2 70  Considerations gthe  lowering of Interest, 
2.  Or the rent of that land is lessened.  1. Because 
the  use  of  the  commodity ceases : as the rents must 
fall in Virginia, were taking of  tobacco forbid in Eng- 
land.  8. Or,  because something else supplies the room 
of that product : as the rate  of coppice lands will fall 
upon the discovery of  coal mines.  3.  Or, because the 
markets are supplied with the same commodity cheaper 
from another place ;  as the breeding counties of Eng- 
land must needs  fall their rents by the importation of 
Irish cattle.  4.  Or, because a tax laid on your native 
commodities makes what  the farmer sells cheaper, and 
labour, and what he buys,  dearer. 
3.  Or the  money  in  the country  is  less;  for  the 
exigencies  and uses  of  money not lessening with its 
quantity,  and  it being  in  the same proportloll  to be 
employed and distributed still, in all the parts of its cir- 
culation,  so  much  as its quantity is lessened, so much 
must the share  of  every one  that has a right to this 
money be the less ;  whether  he  be landholder, for his 
goods ; or  labourer,  for  his  hire ; or  merchant,  for 
his brokerage.  Though the landholder usually finds it 
first ;  because money failing,  and falling short, people 
have not so much  money as formerly to lay out,  and 
so less money is brought to market, by which the price 
of things must necessarily fall.  The labourer  feels it 
next ;  for  when  the landholder's  rent  falls,  he must 
either bate the labourer's wages,  or not employ, or not 
pay him ;  which either way makes him feel the want of 
money.  The merchant feels it last ;  for though he sells 
less, and at a lower rate, he buys also our native com- 
modities,  which he exports at a lower rate too, and will 
be sure to leave our native commodities unbought, upon 
the hands of the farmer or manufacturer,  rather than 
export  them to a market  which  will  not  afford  him 
returns with profit. 
If one-third  of  the money employed in  trade were 
locked up, or gone out of England, must not the land- 
holders necessarily receive one-third less for their goods, 
and consequently rents fall ; a  less quantity of money 
by one-tl~ircl.  being to be distributed amongst an equal 
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number  of  receivers ?  Indeed,  people  not  perceiving 
the money to be gone, are apt to be jealous one of an- 
other ;  and each suspecting another's inequality of gain 
to rob him of  his  share, every one will  be  employing 
his skill and power the best he can to retrieve it again, 
and to bring money into his pocket in the same plenty 
as formerly.  But this is but scrambling amongst our- 
selves, and helps no more  against our want, than the 
pulling off a short coverlet will, amongst children that 
lie together, preserve  them a11  from the cold.  Some 
will  starve,  unless  the father  of  the  family  provide 
better, and enlarge the scanty covering.  This pulling 
and contest is usually between the landed man and the 
merchant; for the labourer's share, being seldom more 
than a bare subsistence, never allows that body of men 
time or opportunity to raise their thoughts above that, 
or struggle with the richer for theirs, (as one common 
interest) unless when some common and great distress,  , 
uniting  them  in  one  universal  ferment,  makes  them 
forget respect,  and emboldens them to carve to their 
wants  with  armed  force;  and  then  sometimes  they 
break in upon the rich,  and sweepsall like a  deluge. 
But this rarely happens but in the male-administration 
of neglected or mismanaged government. 
The usual struggle and contest, as I said before, in 
the decays of  wealth and riches, is between the landed 
man and the merchant, with whom I may here join the 
monied man.  The landed man finds himself aggrieved 
by  the falling of  his  rents,  and the straitening of  his 
fortune, whilst the monied man keeps up his gain, and 
the merchant thrives and grows rich by trade.  These, 
he thinks,  steal  his  income  into their  pockets,  build 
their fortunes upon his  ruin, and engross more of  the 
riches  of  the nation  than comes  to their share.  He 
therefore endeavours, by laws, to keep up the value of 
lands, which he suspects lessened by the other's  excess 
of profit : but a11 in vain.  The cause is mistaken, and 
the remedy too.  It is not the merchant's  nor rnonied 
man's  gains that makes  land  fall:  but the  want  of 
money  and lessening  of  our treasure,  wasted  by  ex- 
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the land  always first feels.  If the landed gentleman 
will  have, and by his  example make it fashionable to 
have,  more  claret, spice,  silk,  and other foreign con- 
sumable wares,  than our  exportation  of  commodities 
does exchange for,  money must unavoidably follow to 
balance the account, and pay the debt; and therefore, 
I fear that another proposal I hear talked of to hinder 
the exportation of  molley and bullion will show more 
our need  of  care to keep our monay from going from 
us, than a way and method how to preserve it here. 
It is death in Spain to export money: and yet they, 
who  furnish  all  the world with gold and silver,  have 
least of it amongst themselves.  Trade fetches it away 
from that lazy and indigent people, notwithstanding all 
their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there. 
It follows trade, against the rigour of their laws ;  and 
their want of  foreign commodities  makes it openly be 
carried out at noon-day.  Nature has bestowed  mines 
on several parts of the world : but their riches are only 
for the industrious and frugal.  Whomsoever else they 
visit, it is rvitli the diligent and sober only they stay ; 
and if  the virtue and provident way of  living of  our 
ancestors (content with our native conveniencies of life, 
without the costly itch after the materials of pride and 
luxury from abroad) were brought in fashion and coun- 
tenance spin amongst us ;  this alone would do more to 
keep and Increase our wealth, and enrich our land, than 
all our paper helps, about interest, money, bullion,  &c. 
which,  however  eagerly we  may catch  at, will  not, I 
fear, without better husbandry, keep us from sinking 
whatever contrivances we may have recourse to.  It is 
with a kingdom as with a family.  Spending less than 
our own commodities will pay for, is the sure and only 
way for the nation to grow rich ;  and when that begins 
once seriously to be considered, and our faces and steps 
are in earnest turned  that way, we may hope to have 
our rents rise, and the public stock thrive again.  Till 
then,  we  in  vain,  I  fear,  endeavour  with  noise,  and 
weapons of law, to drive the wolf from our own to one 
another's doors : the breed ought to be extirpated out 
of the island ;  for want, brought in by ill management, 
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and  nursed  up by  expensive  vanity,  will  make  the 
nation poor, and spare nobody. 
If three millions were necessary for the carrying on 
the trade of  England, whereof one million were for the 
landholder to maintain him ;  another were for the pay- 
ment of  the  labourer  and handicraftsman;  and  the 
third were  the share of  the brokers, coming to them 
for their care and pains in distributing; if one million 
of  this  money  were  gone  out of the kingdom,  must 
there not be one-third less to be shared amongst them 
for the product of  their land,  their  labour, and  their 
distribution ?  I do not say they will feel it at the same 
time.  But the landholder having nothing but what 
the product  of  his  land  will  yield;  and  the  buyer, 
according to the plenty or scarcity of  money  he has, 
always setting the price upon what is offered to sale ; 
the landholder must  be  content to take the market- 
rate for what he brings thither;  which always follow- 
ing the scarcity or plenty of money, if any part of our 
money be gone, he is sure first to find it in the price of 
his commodities ;  for the broker and merchant, though 
he sell cheaper,  yet he buys cheaper too : and he will 
be sure to get h~s  returns,  or let alone a commodity 
which will not produce  him gain:  and whatsoever is 
so  let alone,  and left  in hand,  always  turns  to the 
landholder's loss. 
Supposing that of our woollen  manufacture foreign 
markets took off one-half, and the other half were con- 
sumed  amongst ourselves:  if  a sensible  part (as one- 
third) of our coin were gone, and so men had equally 
one-third  less  money than they had,  (for it is  certain 
it must be tantamount, and what I escape of one-third 
ess, another must make up) it would follow, that they 
would have less to lay out in clothes, as well as other 
things, and so would wear them longer, or pay less for 
them.  If a clothier finds a want of vent, he must either 
sell cheaper, or not at all ;  if he sell cheaper, he must 
also pay less, both for wool and labour ;  and if the la- 
bourer hath less wages, he must also pay less for corn, 
butter, cheese, flesh, or else forbear some of these quite. 
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the other products of  land are brought down, and the 
land bears the greatest part of  the loss ;  for wherever 
the consumption or vent of  any commodity is stopped 
there the stop continues on,  till it comes  to the land- 
holder; and, wherever the price of any commodity be- 
gins to fall,  how many hands soever there be between 
that and the landholder,  they  all take reprisals  one 
upon  another, till at last it comes to the landholder ; 
and there the abatement of  price of  any of  his  com- 
modities lessens his  income,  and is a clear loss.  The 
owner of land, which produces the commodity,  and the 
last buyer who consumes it,  are the two extremes in 
commerce ; and though the falling of any sort of com- 
modity in the landholder's  hand  does  not prove  so to 
the last consumer, the arts of  intervening brokers and 
engrossers keeping up the price to their own advantage, 
yet, whenever want of money, or want ~f desire in the 
consumer, make the price low, that immediately reaches 
the first producer, nobody between having any interest 
to keep it up. 
Now  as to the two first  causes of  falling of  rents, 
falling of interest has no influence at all.  In the latter 
it has a great part, because it makes the money of Eng- 
land less, by making both  Englishmen and foreigners 
withdraw or withhold their  money ;  for  that which is 
not let loose  into trade is  all one, whilst hoarded up, 
as if it were not in being. 
I have heard it brought for a  reason  why  interest 
should  be  reduced  to four  per  cent.,  "  that thereby 
the landholder,  who  bears the burthen of  the public 
charge, may be in some degree eased by the falling of 
interest."  ' 
This argument will  be but right,  if you  say it will 
ease the borrower, and lay the loss on the lender.  But 
it concerns not the land  in  general,  unless  you will 
suppose all landholders in debt.  But I hope we may 
yet think that men in England, who have land, have 
money too ;  and that landed men, as well as others, by 
their providence and good husbandry, accommodating 
their expenses to their income,  keep themselves from 
going backwards in the world. 
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That  which is urged, as most deserving consideration 
and  remedy in the case is, "  that it is hard and  un- 
reasonable,  that one, who has mortgaged half his land, 
should  yet pay taxes for the whole,  whilst  the mort- 
gage  goes  away  with  the clear  profit  of  a  high  in- 
terest."  To this I answer, 
1. That, if  any  man  has  run  himself  in  debt for 
the service of  his country,  it is  fit the public should 
reimburse him, and set him  free.  This is a care that 
becomes  the ~ublic  justice,  that men,  if  they receive 
no rewards,  should  at least be kept from  suffering, in 
having served their country.  But I do not remember 
the polity of any nation, who altered their constitution 
in favour of those whose mismanagement had brought 
them  behind-hand;  possibly,  at3  thinking  the  public 
little beholden  to  those  who  had  misemployed  the 
stock  of  their  country in the excess of  their  private 
expenses,  and by their example spread  a fashion that 
carries ruin with it.  Men's  paying tares of mortgaged 
lands is  a punishment for ill husbandry, which ought 
to be discouraged :  but it concerns very little the frugal 
and the thrifty. 
8.  Another thing to be said in reply to this is, that 
it is with gentlemen in the country, as with tradesmen 
in the city.  If they will  own titles to greater estates 
than really they have,  it is their own faults, and there 
is no way left to help them from paying for them.  The 
remedy is in their own hands, to discharge themselves 
when they please ;  and when they have once sold their 
land,  and paid  their  debts,  they  will  no  longer pay 
taxes for what  they  own without  being really theirs. 
There is  another way  also whereby  they may be  re- 
lieved, as well  as a great many other inconveniencies 
remedied ;  and that is by a registry : for if the mort- 
gages were registered,  land-taxes  might reach them, 
and order the lender to pay his proportion. 
I  have  met  with  patrons  of  four  per  cent.  who 
(amongst  many  other  fine  things  they  tell  us  of) 
affirm,  cc  That if  interest  were  reduced  to four  per 
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rate, and pay their debts; others would  borrow more 
than they  now  do,  and  improve  their  land; others 
would borrow more, and employ it in trade and manu- 
facture."  Gilded words indeed, were there any thing 
substantial in them!  These men talk as if they meant 
to show  us  not  only  the wisdom,  but the  riches  of 
Solomon, and would  make gold and silver as common 
as stones in the street :  but at last, I fear, it will be but 
wit without money, and I wish it amount to that.  It  is 
without question, that could  the countryman and the 
tradesman take up money cheaper than now they do, 
every  man  would  be  forward  to borrow,  and  desire 
that he might have other men's  money to employ to his 
advantage.  I confess, those who contend for four per 
cent. have found out a way to set men's mouths a water- 
ing for money at  that rate, and to increase the number 
of  borrowers in  England, if  any body can imagine it 
would be an advantage to increase them.  But to an- 
swer all their  fine projects, I liave but this one short 
question to ask thein :  Will four per cent. illcrease the 
number of the lenders?  If it will not,  as any man at 
the very first hearing will shrewdly suspect it will not, 
then all the plenty of  money,  these conjurers bestow 
upon us, for improvement of land, paying of debts, and 
advancement of  trade, is but like the gold and silver 
which old women believe other conjurers bestow some- 
times, by whole lapfuls, on poor credulous girls, which, 
when they bring to the light, is found to be nothing 
but withered leaves ;  and the possessors of it are still 
as much in want of money as ever. 
Indeed, I grant it would be well for England, and I 
wish it were so, that the plenty of money were so great 
amongst us, that every man could  borrow as much as 
he could use in trade for four per cent.;  nay, that me11 
could borrow as much as they could employ for six per 
cent.  But even at  that rate, the borrowers already are 
far more than the lenders.  Why else doth the  mer- 
chant, upon occasion, pay six per cent. and often above 
that rate,  for  brokerage? And why doth the country 
gentleman of 10001. per ann. find it so difficult, with 
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all the security he can bring, to take up ~OOOZ.?  All 
which proceeds from the scarcity of  money and bad se- 
curity; two causes which will not  be less powerful  to 
hinder borrowing, after the lowering of interest ; and 
I do not see how any one can  imagine  that reducing 
use to four per cent. should  abate their force,  or how 
lessening the reward of  the lender,  without  diminish- 
ing his risk, should make him more forward and ready 
to lend.  So that  these men, whilst  they talk  that at 
four per  cent. men would  take up and  employ  more 
money to the public advantage, do but pretend to n~ul- 
tiply the number  of borrowers  among us,  of  which it 
is certain we have too many already.  While they thus 
set  men  a  longing for  the golden  days of  four  per 
cent., methinks they use the poor indigent debtor, and 
needy tradesman, as I have  seen prating jackdaws do 
sometimes  their  young,  who,  kawing  and  fluttering 
about the nest, set all their young ones a gaping, but, 
having nothing in  their  empty mouths  but noise  and 
air, leave them as hungry as before. 
It  is true these men have found put by a cunning pro- 
ject how, by the restraint of  a law,  to make the price 
of money one-third cheaper, and then they tell John a 
Nokes that he  shall have 10,0001.  of it to employ in 
merchandize, or clothin8 ;  and John a Stiles shall have 
40,0001. more  to pay hls debts ; and so distribute this 
money as freely as Diego did his  legacies, which they 
are to have, even where  they can  get them.  But till 
these men can  instruct  the forward  borrowers where 
they shall be furnished, they have perhaps done some- 
thing to increase men's desire, but not made money one 
jot easier to come  by;  and, till  they do that, all  this 
sweet jingling of money, in  their discourses, goes just 
to the tune of  "  If all  the world were oatmeal."  Me- 
thinks these undertakers, whilst they have put men in 
hopes of borrowing more plentifully. at easier rates, for 
the supply of their wants and trades, had done better 
to have bethought themselves of a way how men need 
not  borrow upon use  at all : for  this would be much 
more advantageous, and altogether as feasible.  It  is as 
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men, if they pay nothing for them at  all, as if they paid 
4s. a pair; ten  of them  (notwithstanding the statute- 
rate should be  reduced from  6s. to 4s. a pair) will be 
necessitated to sit still barefoot, as much as if they were 
to pay nothing for shoes at all.  Just so it is in a coun- 
try that wants money in proportion to trade.  It is as 
easy to contrire how every man shall be supplied with 
what money he needs (i. e. can employ in inlprovement 
of land, paying his debts, and returns of his trade) for 
nothing, as for four per cent.  Either we have already 
more money than the owners will lend, or we have not. 
If part  of the money, which  is now  in England, will 
not be let at  the rate interest is at present at, will men 
bemore ready to lend, and borrowers be furnished for 
all those brave purposes more plentifully, when money 
is brought to four per cent.?  If people do already lend 
all the money they  have,  above  their  own  occasions, 
whence  are those who  will  borrow more  at four  per 
cent. to be supplied ? Or is there such plenty of money, 
and scarcity of borrowers,that there needs the reducing 
of interest to four per cent. to bring men to  take it? 
All the imaginable ways of increasing money in any 
country are these two :  either to dig it in the mines of 
our own, or get it from our neighbours.  That four per 
cent. is not of the nature of the deusing-rod, or virguh 
divinn, able to discover mines  of gold and silver, I be- 
lieve will  easily be  granted me.  The way of getting 
from foreigners is either by force, borrowing, or trade. 
And whatever  ways, besides these,  men may fancy, or 
propose, for increasing  of money,  (except they intend 
to set up for  the philosopher's  stone) would be much 
the same with a distracted man's  device,  that I knew, 
who, in the beginning of his distemper, first discovered 
himself to be out of his wits, by getting together  and 
boiling a great iltlmber  of groats, with a design, as he 
said,  to make  them  plim, i. e.  grow  thicker.  That 
foul per cent. will raise armies,  discipline soldiers, and 
make men valiant, and fitter to conquer countries, and 
enrich  the~nselves  with  the spoils, I  think was  never 
pretended.  And that it will not bring in more of our 
neighbour's  money upon loan, than we have at  present 
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among us, is  so visible in  itself, that it will  not need 
any proof;  the contenders  for  four  per cent. looking 
upon it as an  undeniable truth, and  making use of  it 
as an argument to show the advantage it  will be to the 
nation,  by lessening  the use  paid  to foreigners,  who 
upon falling of use will take ho.me their money.  And, 
for the last way of increasing our money, by promoting 
of trade, how much lowering of interest is the way to 
that, I have, I suppose, showed you already. 
Having lately met with a little tract, entitled, "  A Letter 
to a Friend concernin6  Usury,"  printed  this presen t 
year, 1660 ;  which gzves, in short,  the arguments of 
some  treatises,  printed  many years  since, for  the 
lowering of  interest: it may  not be  umiss  brieJ'ly  to 
consider them. 
1. "  AN  high interest decays trade.  The advantage 
from  interest is greater  than  the profit  from  trade, 
which  makes  the rich  merchants  give over,  and put 
out their  stock to interest, and the lesser  merchants 
break." 
Answ.  This was printed in 1621, when interest was 
at ten per cent.  And whether England had ever a more 
flourishing trade than at that time, must be left to the 
judgment  of those who have  considered  the growing 
strength and riches of this kingdom in queen Elizabeth's 
and king James the First's reigns.  Not that I impute it 
to high interest, but to other causes I have mentioned, 
wherein usury had nothing to do.  But  if this be thought 
an argument  now in 1690, when the legal interest is 
six per cent.,  I desire those who  think fit to make use 
of  it, to  name  those  rich  merchants who  have  given 
over, and put out their stocks to interest. 
2.  Interest being at ten per cent.,  and in Holland 
at six, our neighbour merchants undersell us." 
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cent., and in Holland not limited by law, our neighbour 
merchants undersell us, because they  live more frugally, 
and are content with less profit. 
3.  Interest being lower  in  Holland than in  Eng- 
land,  their  contributions to war, works  of  piety, and 
all  charges  of  the state,  are cheaper  to them  than 
to us." 
Answ.  This needs  a  little  explication.  Contribu- 
tions, greater or less,  I understand ;  but contributions 
cheaper or dearer, I confess I do not.  If they manage 
their wars and charges  cheaper than we, the blame is 
not to be laid on high or low interest. 
4. a Interest being so high, prevents the building of 
shipping,  which  is  the  strength  and  safety  of  our 
island, most merchant-ships being built in Holland." 
Answ.  Though  this  argument be now  gone,  such 
ships being prohibited by a law, I will help the author 
to one as good.  The Dutch buy our rape-seed,  make 
it into oil, bring it back  to us, and sell it with ndvan- 
tage.  This may be  as well  said to be  from high in- 
terest here, and low there.  But the truth is,  the in- 
dustry and  frugality of that people  make  them m- 
tent to work cheaper, and sell at less profit than their 
neighbours, and so get the trade from them. 
5. "  The high rate of usury makes land sell so cheap, 
being  not worth  more than fourteen or  fifteen years' 
purchase ;  whereas  in  Holland,  where  interest is  at 
six, it is worth  above  twenty-five.  So that a low  in- 
terest raises the price of land.  Where money is dear, 
land is cheap." 
Answ. This argument plainly confesses, that there is 
something else regulates the price  of land besides the 
rate of interest; else, when money was at  ten per cent. 
here, should  land  have been at  ten years' purchase,whereas 
he confesses it then to  have been at fourteen or fifteen. 
One may suppose, to favour his hypothesis, he was not 
forward to speak  the most  of it.  And interest, as he 
says, being at  six per cent. in Holland, land there should 
have sold, by that rule,  for  sixteen  and an half year's 
purchase ;  whereas he says, it was worth about twenty- 
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five.  And  Mr.  Manly says,  p. 34  fl That money  in 
France  being at seven  per cent.,  noble  land  sells  for 
thirty-four  and  thirty-five  years'  purchase,  and  ordi- 
nary  land  for  twenty-five."  So  that  the true  con- 
clusion from hence is, not what our author makes, but 
this,  That it is not the legal interest, but something 
else, that governs the rate of land.  I grant his position, 
That where moncy is dear, land is cheap, and vice versa. 
But it must be so by the natural not legal interest.  For 
where  money will  be lent on good security at four or 
five  per cent. it is a demonstration  that there is more 
than will be ventured on ordinary credit in trade.  And 
when this plenty becomes general, it is a sign there is 
more  money than can be  enlployed  in  trade;  which 
cannot but put many upon seeking purchases, to lay it 
out in land,  and so raise the price of land, by making 
more buyers than sellers. 
6. " It is not probable lenders will call in their money, 
when  they  cannot  make  greater interest  any where. 
Besides, their security upon land will be better." 
Answer.  Some unskilful and timorous men will call 
in their money; others put it into the bankers' hands. 
But the bankers and skilful will  keep it up,  and not 
lend it, but at  the natural use, as we have shown.  But 
how securities will be mended,  by lowering of interest, 
is,  I confess, beyond my comprehension. 
Of  raising ow-  Coin. 
BEING  now upon the consideration  of  interest and 
money, give me leave  to say one  word  more on this 
occasion,  which  may  not  be  wholly  unseasonable  at 
this time.  I hear a talk  up and down of  raising our 
money, as a means to retain our wealtli, and keep our 
mwey from  being  carried  away.  I  wish  those  that 
use  the phrase of raising  our money had  some clear 
notion annexed  to it ; and that then they would exa- 
mine, "  Whether, that being true, it would at all serve 
to those ends for which it is proposed ?" 
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The raising of money, then, signifies one of these two 
things ;  either raising the value of our money, or raising 
the denomination of our coin. 
The raising the value of money, or any thing else, is 
nothing but the making a less quantity of it exchange 
for any other thing than would have been taken for it 
before;  v.  g.  If 5s. will exchange for,  or (as we  call 
it) buy a  bushel  of wheat; if  you  can make 4s. buy 
another bushel of the same wheat, it is plain the value 
of your money is raised,  in respect of wheat, one-fifth. 
But thus nothing  can  raise  or fall the value  of  your 
money,  but the proportion of  its plenty,  or scarcity, 
in proportion  to the plenty,  scarcity,  or vent  of  any 
other commodity  with  which  you  compare it,  or  for 
which you would exchange it.  And thus silver, which 
makes  the  intrinsic  value  of  money,  compared  with 
itself, under  any stamp or  denomination  of  the same 
or different countries, cannot be raised.  For an ounce 
of  silver,  whether  in  pence,  groats,  or  crown-pieces, 
stivers,  or  ducatoons,  or  in  bullion,  is,  and  always 
eternally  will  be,  of  equal value  to any other  ounce 
of  silver,  under what  stamp or denomination  soever ; 
unless  it can  be  shown that any stamp can add  any 
new or better  qualities to one parcel of silver, which 
another parcel of silver wants. 
Silver, therefore, being always of equal value to silver, 
the value of coin, compared with coin,  is greater, less, 
or equal, only as it has more, less, or equal silver in it: 
and in this respect, you can by no manner of way raise 
or fall your money.  Indeed, most of  the silver of  the 
world,  both in money and vessels, being alloyed, (i. e. 
mixed with  some  baser metals)  fine  silver, (i. e.  silver 
separated from all alloy) is usually dearer than so much 
silver alloyed,  or mixed with  baser  metals.  Because, 
besides  the weight of the silver, those who have  need 
of  fine (i. e.  urlmixed  silver;  as gilders, wire-drawers, 
&c.)  must,  according to their need,  besides  an equal 
weight  of  silver,  mixed  with  other  metals,  give  an 
overplus to rcwsrd the refiner's  skill and pains.  And 
in this ease, fine silver and alloyed  or mixed silver are 
considered as two distinct commodities.  But no money 
being coined  here,  or almost any tvliere, of  pure,  fine 
silver,  this  concerns not  the value  of  money  at all; 
wherein  an cqual  quantity of  silver is  always  of  the 
same value  tvitll  an equal quantity of  silvcr,  let tlie 
stamp or denomination be what it will. 
All then that can be done in this great mystery of 
raising money,  is only to alter the denomination, and 
call that n crown now, which  before,  by the law, tvas 
but a part of  a crown.  For example:  supposing, ac- 
cording  to the standard  of  our  law,  5s. or a  crown, 
were to weigh an ounce, (as it does now, wanting about 
16  grains) whereof one-twelfth were copper, and eleven- 
twelfths silver, (for tliereabouts it is) it is plain  here, 
it is the quantity of  silver gives tlie valuc to it.  For 
let another piece be coined of the same weight, wherein 
half the silver is taken out, and copper, or other alloy, 
put into the place,  every one knows  it will be worth 
but half as much.  For the value of the alloy is so in- 
considerable ns not to be reckoned.  This crown now 
must be raised, and from henceforth our crown-pieces 
coined  one-twentieth  lighter;  which  is  nothing  but 
changing the denomination, calling that a,  crown now, 
which yesterday was but a part, viz. nineteen-twentieths 
of a crown;  whereby you have only raisctl 19 parts to 
the denomination  formerly given to 90.  For I think 
nobody can be so senseless as to imagine that 19 grains 
or ounces of silver can be raised to tile value of  20;  or 
that 19 grains or ounces of silver shall at the same time 
exchange for, or buy as much corn, oil, or wine, ils 90; 
which is to raise it to the value of 20.  For if 19 ounces 
of silver can be worth 20 ounces of  silver, or pay for as 
much of any other commodity, then 18, 10, or one ounce 
may do the same.  For if the abating one-twentieth of 
the quantity of the silver of any coin, does not lessen its 
value, the abating nineteen-twentieths  of  the quantity 
of the silver of any coin will not abate its raluc.  And 
so a single three-pence, or a single penny, being called 
a crown, will buy as much spice,  or silk, or any other 
commodity,  as  a  crown-piece,  which  coiitains  20  or 
60  times  as inueli  silver:  which  is  an  absurdity  so 
ti  2 great, that I think  nobody will want eyes to  see, and 
sense to disown. 
Now this raising your money, or giving a less quantity 
of silver the stamp and denomination of a greater, may 
be done two ways. 
1. By raising one species of your money. 
2. By  raising all your silver coin, at once proportion- 
ably ;  which is the thing, 1 suppose, now proposed. 
1. The raising of one  species  of your coin,  beyond 
its intrinsic value,  is done by coining any one species, 
(which in account bears such a proportion to the other 
species of your  coin) with  less  silver in it than is re- 
quired by tliat value it bears in your money. 
For example:  a crown with us goes for (j0 pence,  a 
shilling for lqpence, a tester for 6 pence, and a groat 
for 4 pence ; alld accordingly, the proportion of  silver 
in each of  them, ought to be as 60,  12, 6, and 4.  Now, 
if in tlie mint there should be coined groats, or testers, 
that, beins of  the same  alloy with  our other money, 
had  bnt two-thirds  of  the  weight  that those  species 
are coine(1 at now ; or else, being of  tile same weight, 
were so alloyed,  as to have one-third of the silver,  re- 
quired  by the present standard, changed  into copper, 
and should thus, by law, be made current ;  (the rest of 
your silver money being kept to the present standard in 
weight and fineness) it is plain, those species would be 
raised one-third part ;  that passing for Gd. which  had 
but the silver of 4d.  in it ; and would  be all one, as if 
a groat should by law be made current for Gd. and every 
6d. in payment pass for 9d.  This is truly raising these 
species:  but  is  no  more  in  effect,  than  if  the  mint 
shoulcl coin clipped money ; and has, besides the cheat 
that is put by such base, or light money, on every par- 
ticular nlan that receives it, that he wants one-third of 
that real value, which the public ought to secure him, 
in the money it obliges him to receive, as lawful and 
current.  It has, I say, this great and unavoidable in- 
convenience to the public, that, besides the opportunity 
it gives to domestic coiners to cheat you with lawful 
money,  it puts it into the hands of foreigners to fetch 
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away  your  money,  without  ally  cominoditics  for  it. 
For  if  they  find  that  two-penny  weight  of  silver, 
marked with a certain impression, shall liere in Eng- 
land be equivalent to 3d. weight, marked with another 
impression,  they will  not fail to stamp pieces of  tliat 
fashion ;  and so importing that base and low coin, will, 
here in England, receive 3d. for 2d. and quickly carry 
away your silver in exchange for copper, or barely the 
charge of coinage. 
This is unavoidable in all countries, where  any one 
species of their money is disproportionate in its intrinsic 
value, (i. e. in its due proportion of  silver to the rcst of 
the money of  that country) an inconvenience  so cer- 
tainly attending the allowance of  any base  species of 
money to be current, that the king of France could not 
avoid  it,  with all  his  watchfulness.  For  though,  by 
edict, he made his 4 sols pieces (whereof  15 were  to 
pass for a French crown, though 20 of thenl had not so 
much silver in  them as mas  in a Frencll crown-piece) 
pass in the inland parts of his kingdom, 15 for a crown in 
all payments ;  yet he durst not make thein current in tlie 
sea-port towns, for fear that should give an opportunity 
to their importation.  But yet this caution served not 
the turn :  they were still imported ;  and by this means 
a great loss and damage brought upon his couatry.  So 
that he was forced to cry them down, and sink them to 
near their intrinsic value.  Whereby a great many par- 
ticular men, who had quantities of tliat species in their 
hands, lost a great part of their estates ;  and every one, 
that had any, lost proportionably by  it. 
If we had groats, or sixpences, current bylaw zmongst 
us, that wanted one-third of the silver, which they now 
have by the standard, to make them of  equal value to 
our other species of money; who can imagine, that our 
neighbours would  not presently pour in quantities of 
such money upon us, to the great loss and prejudice of 
the kingdom? The quantity of  silver, that is in  each 
piece,  or species of  coin,  being  that which  makes its 
real and intrinsic value,  the due proportions of  silver 
ought to be kept in each species, according to the re- 
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this is ever varied from, it is but a trick to serve some 
present occasion ; but is always with loss to the coun- 
try where the trick is played. 
2. The other way of  raising  money is by raising all 
your silver coin  at once,  the proportion of  a crown, a 
shilling,  and  a  penny,  in  reference  to one  another, 
being still kept, (viz.  That a shilling shall weigh one- 
fifth of a crowii-piece, and a penny-weight  one-twelfth 
of a shilling, in standard silver) but out of every one of 
these you  abate one-twentieth of  the silver they were 
wont to have in them. 
If all the species of money be,  as it is called, raised, 
by making each of  them to have one-twentieth less of 
silver in them tlian formerly, and so your whole money 
be lighter tlian it was ;  these following will be some of 
the consequences of it. 
1. It  will rob all creditors of one-twentieth (or five per 
cent.)  of  their debts,  and  all  landlords  one-twentieth 
of  their quit-rents for ever;  and in all other rents, as 
far as their former contracts reach,  (of  five per cent.) 
of their yearly income ;  and this without any advantage 
to the debtor,  or farmer.  For he,  receiving  no more 
pounds  sterling  for his  land,  or  commodities,  in this 
new  lighter coin,  than he should  have  done of  your 
old and weightier money,  gets nothing by it.  If you 
say, Yes,  he will  receive more crown,  half-crown,  and 
shilling pieces,  for what  he now sells for new money, 
tlian  he  should  have  done,  if  the money  of  the  old 
standard had continued ;  you confess your money is not 
raised in value, but in denoii~ination  : since what your 
new pieces want in weight  must now  be  made up in 
their number.  But, wh~ch  way soever this falls,  it is 
certain the public  (which  most  men  think  ought  to 
be the only reason of  changing a settled  law, and dis- 
turbing  the  common  current  course  of  things)  re- 
ceivcs not the least profit by it.  Nay, as we shall see 
by and by,  it will  be a  great charge and  loss to the 
kingdom.  But this, at first sight, is visible, That in all 
payments to be received  upon precedent  contracts, if 
your money  be in effect raised,  the receiver  will  lose 
' 
five pcr cent.  For money having been lent, and leases 
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and other bargains macle, when irioney was of  tlie same 
weight  and fineness  that it is  now,  upon  confidence 
that under the same  names  of  pounds,  shillings, and 
pence, they should receive the same value, i. e.  the sanle 
quantity of silver,  by giving the derionlination now to 
less quantities of silver by one-twentieth, you take from 
them five per cent. of their due. 
When men go to market, to buy any other commo- 
dities with their new, but lighter money, they will find 
20s. of their new money will  buy no niore of  any eom- 
modity tlian 19 would before.  For it not being the de- 
nomination,  but the quantity of  silvcr,  that gives  the 
value to any coin, 19 grains,  or parts,  of  silver,  how- 
ever denomiristed  or  marked, will  no  Inore be worth, 
or pass  for,  or buy so much  of  any otlier con~modity, 
as 80 grains of  silver will,  than 19s.  will  pass for 20s. 
If any one  thinks a  shilling, or a cr0Tv.n in name, has 
its value from the denomination, and ~ot  from the quan- 
tity of  silver in it, let it be tried ; and hereafter let a 
penny be called a shilling, or a shilling be called a crown. 
I believe  nobody would be content to receive his debts 
or rents in such money:  which, though the law should 
raise thus, yet he foresees 1le should lose eleven-twelfths 
by the one, and by the other four-fifths of the value he 
received;  and would  find his  new shilling, which  had 
no more silver in it than one-twelfth of what a shilling 
had  before,  would  buy  him  of  corn,  cloth,  or  wine, 
but one-twelfth of what an old shilling would.  This is 
8s plainly so in the raising,  as you call it, your crown 
to 5s. and 3d. or (which is the sarne thing) making your 
arown one-twentieth lighter  in  silver.  The only dif- 
ference is,  that the loss  is  so great, (it  being eleven- 
twelfths) that every body sees, atid abhors it at first pro- 
posal ;  but, in the other (it being but one-twentieth, and 
covered with the deceitful name of raising our money) 
people do not readily observe it.  If it be good to raise 
the crown-piece  this  way  one-twentieth  this  week,  I 
suppose it will be as good  and profitable to raise it as 
much again the next week.  For there is no reason, why 
it will not be as good to  raise it again, another one-twen- 
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ceed but ten weeks successively, you will, by new-year's 
day next,  have every half-crown  raised to a crown, to 
the loss of one-half of people's  debts and rents, and the 
king's revenue, besides the confusion of all your affairs : 
and,  if  you  please  to go on in this beneficial way of 
raising your money, you may, by the same art, bring s 
penny-weight of silver to be a crown. 
Silver, i. e.  the quantity of pure silver, separable from 
the alloy, makes  the real value  of  money.  If it does 
not, coin copper with  the same stamp and denominae 
tion, and see whether it will  be of  the same value.  I 
fiuspect your stamp will make it of no more worth than 
the copper money of  Ireland  is, which is its weight in 
copper,  and no more.  That money lost  so  much  to 
Ireland as it passed for above the rate of copper.  But 
yet I think nobody suffered so much by it as he by whose 
authority it was made current. 
If  silver  give the value,  you will  say, what need is 
there then of the charge of coinage ?  May not men ex- 
change silver by weight  for other things ; make  their 
bargains  and keep their  accounts in silver by  weight? 
This  might  be  done,  but  it  has  these  inconve- 
niencies : 
I. The weighing of silver to every one me had occa- 
sion to pay it to would  be very troublesome,  for every 
one most carry about scales in his pocket. 
2. Scales would noc do the business ;  for, in the next 
place,  every one  cannot distinguish  between fine and 
mixed silver: so that though he received the full weight, 
he was not sure he  received  the full weight of silver, 
since  there might be  a mixture of  some  of the baser 
metals, which he was not able to discern.  Those who 
have had the care and government  of  politic  societies 
introduced  coinage,  as a  remedy to those  two incon- 
veniencies.  The stamp was a warranty of  the public, 
that,  under such a  denomination,  they should receive 
a piece of such a weight,  and such a fineness ;  that is, 
they should  receive  so  much  silver.  And  this  is  the 
reason  why the counterfeiting  the stamp is  made  the 
highest crime, and has the weight of treason laid upon 
it : because the sta~np  is  the public voucher of the in- 
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trinsic value.  The  royal authority gives the stamp, the 
law allows  and  confirms  the denomination, and both 
together give,  as it were,  the public faith,  as a secu- 
rity, that sums of money contracted for under such de- 
nominations shall be of  such a value, that is, shall have 
in them so much silver; for it is silver, and not names, 
that pays debts, and purchases commodities.  If there- 
fore I have contracted for twenty crowns, and the law 
then  has required  that each of  those  crowns  should 
have an ounce of silver;  it is certain my bargain is not 
made good;  I am defrauded (and  whether the public 
faith be not broken with me,  I leave to be considered) 
if, paying me twenty crowns, the law allots them to be 
such ae have but nineteen-  twentieths of  the silver they 
ought to have, and really had in them, when I made my 
contract. 
2. It diminishes all the king's  revenue five per cent. 
For though the same number of pounds, shillings, and 
pence are paid  into the exchequer  as were wont,  yet 
these names being given to coin that have each of them 
one-twentieth  less  of  silver in  them ; and that being 
not a secret concealed  from  strangers, no more  than 
from his own subjects ;  they will sell the king no more 
pitch, tar, or hemp,  for 20 shillings,  after the raising 
your money, than they would before for 19: or, to speak 
in the  ordinary phrase,  they will  raise  their  commo- 
dities five per cent. as you have raised your money five 
per cent.  And it is well if they stop there.  For usually 
in  such  change,  an  outcry  being  made  of  you, 
lessening your coin, those, who have to deal with your 
taking  the advantage, of  the alarm, to secure themselves 
from any loss by your new trick, raise their price even 
beyond the par of your lessening your coin. 
I hear of  two inconveniencies complained of,  which 
it is proposed by  this project to remedy. 
The one is, the melting down of our coin : the other, 
the carrying away of our bullion.  These are both incon- 
veniencies which,  I fear,  we  lie under:  but neither of 
them will he in the least removed, or prevented, by the 
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1. It  is past doubt that our money is melted down. 
The reason whereof is evidently the cheapness of  coin- 
age.  For a tax on wine paying the coinage, the parti- 
cular owners pay nothing for it.  So that 100 ounces of 
silver  coined  come to the owner at the same rate as 
100  ounces  of  standard  silver  in  bullion.  For  deli- 
verinm into the mint his silver in bars, he has the same  b  quant~ty  of silver delivered  out to him  again in coin, 
without any charges to him.  Whereby, if at any time 
he has occasion for bullion, it is the same thing to melt 
down our milled.money, as to buy bullion from abroad, 
or take it in  exchange for  other commodities.  Thus 
our mint, to the only advantage of  our officers, but at 
the public cost., labours in vain, as will be found.  But 
yet this makes you not have one jot less money in Eng- 
land than you  would have otherwise; but only makes 
you coin  that, which  otherwise would  not  have  been 
coined,  nor perhaps  been brought hither : and, being 
not brought hither by an over-balance  of your exporta- 
tion, cannot stay when it is here.  It  is not any sort of 
coinage does or can keep your money here; that wholly 
and only depends upon the balance of your trade.  And 
had all the money in king Charles the Second's and king 
James the Second's time been minted, according to this 
new proposal, this raised money would have been gone, 
as well  as the other, and the remainder been no more, 
nor no less  than it  is  now.  Though I doubt not but 
the mint would have coined as much  of it as it has of 
our present milled money.  The  short is this :  an over- 
balance  of  trade with  Spain  brings  you  in  bullion ; 
cheap coinage, when it is here, carries it into the mint, 
and inoney is made of  it ; but, if your exportation will 
not balance  your  importation  in  other parts of  your 
trade, away must your silver go again, whether monied 
or not monied.  For where goods do not,  silver must, 
pay for the commodities you spend. 
That this is so will appear by the books of the mint, 
where may be seen  how much milled  money has been 
coined in the two last reigns.  And  in a paper I have 
now in my hands (supposed written bya men not wholly. 
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ignorant in the mint) it is confessed, that whereas one- 
third of the current payments were some time since of 
milled money,  there  is  not  now one-twentieth.  Gone 
then it is: but let not  any one  mistake,  and  think it 
gone because in our present  coinage an ounce wanting 
about 16 grains is denominated  a crown:  or that (as 
is  now  proposed) a11  ounce wanting  about 40 grains, 
being coilled  in  one  piece,  and denominated a crown, 
would  have  stopped  it,  or  will  (if  our  money  be  so 
altered) for the future fix it here.  Coin what quantity 
of silver you please in one piece,  and give it the deno- 
mination  of  a crown;  when  your  money is  to go, to 
pay your foreign debts, (or else it will not go out at all) 
your heavy money  (i. e.  that which  is weight  accord- 
ing to its denomination,  by the standard of the mint) 
will  be  that  which  will  be  melted  down,  or  carried 
away in  coin  by the  exporter,  whether  the pieces  of 
each species be hy the law bigger or less.  For, whilst 
coinage is wholly paid for by a tax, whatever your size 
of money be, he that has need of bullion to send beyond 
sea,  or of  silver to make  plate,  need  but take milled 
money and melt it down,  and he has  it as cheap as if 
it were in pieces  of  eight,  or other silver corning from 
abroad;  the stamp, which  so well  secures the weight 
of the milled money, costing nothing at all. 
To this perhaps will be said, That if this be the effect 
of milled money, that it is so apt to be melted down, it 
were better to return to the old way of coining by the 
hammer.  To which I answer,  by no means.  For, 
1.  Coinage  by the  hammer  less  secures  you from 
having a great part of your money melted down.  For 
in that way  there being  a  greater inequality in  the 
weight of the pieces,  some  being too heavy, and some 
too light;  those, who  know how  to make their advan- 
tage of it, cull out the heavy pieces,  melt them down, 
and make a benefit of the over-weight. 
2.  Coinage by the hammer exposes you much more 
to the danger  of  false  coin.  Recause  the  tools  are 
easily made  and concealed,  and  the  work  carried  on 
with fewer hands and less noise than a mill ;  whereby 
false coiners are less liable to discovery. 3.  Thc pieces not being  so  round,  even,  and fairly 
stamped, nor  marked  on  the  edges,  are exposed  to 
clipping, which milled nioney is not. 
Milled  money  is,  therefore,  certainly  best  for  the 
public.  But, whatever be the cause of melting down 
our milled money, I do not see how raising our money 
(as  thev call  it)  will  at all  hinder  its  being  melted 
down.  ' For if our crown-pieces  should be coined one- 
twentieth lighter, why shollld  that hinder them  from 
being  melted  down, more  than  now?  The intrinsic 
value of  the silver  is  not altered,  as  we  have  shown 
already:  therefore that temptation to melt them down 
remains the same as before. 
cc  But  they  are  lighter  by  one-twentieth."  That 
cannot  hinder  them  from  being  melted  down.  For 
half-crowns are lighter by half,  and yet that preserves 
them not. 
'. But they arc of  less weight under the same deno- 
mination, and therefore thcy will not be melted down." 
That is true, if  any of  these present  crowns, that are 
one-twentieth  heavier, are current  for  crowns  at the 
same time.  For then they will no more melt down the 
new light crowns, than they will the old clipped ones, 
which are no more worth in coin and tale,than in weight 
and bullion.  But it  cannot be supposed that men will 
part with their old and heavier money at the same rate 
that the lighter new coin goes at, and pay  away their 
old crowns for  5s. in tale,  when at the mint they will 
yield  then1 5s. Yd And  then if  an old  milled crown 
goes for 5s. 3d. and a new milled crown (being so much 
lighter) goes  for a  crown,  What, I pray, wlll be the 
odds of  melting down the one or the other ?  The one 
has one-twentieth  less  silver  in  it,  and  goes for one- 
twentieth less;  and so  being weight,  they are melted 
down upon equal terms.  If it be a convenience to melt 
one, it will be as much a convenience to melt the other ; 
just as it is  the same  convenience to melt milled half- 
crowns as milled crowns, the one having, with half the 
quantity of  silver, half the value.  When the uloney is 
all brought to the new rate,  i.  e.  to be one-twentieth 
lighter,  and  comll~odities  raised  as  they will propor- 
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tionably, what shall hinder the melting down  of your 
money then, more than now, I would fain know ? If it be 
coined then, as it is now, gratis, a crown-piece, (let it 
be  of what weight  soever) will  be,  as  it is  now, just 
worth its own weight  in bullion  of the same fineness ; 
for the coinage which is the manufactory about it, and 
makes  all  the  difference,  costing nothing,  what  can 
make  the difference of value ?  And therefore, whoever 
wants  bullion,  will  as  cheaply rnelt  down  these  new 
crowns, as buy bullion with them.  The raising of your 
money cannot then (the act for free coinage stailding) 
hinder its being melted down. 
Nor, in the next place, much less can it, as it is pre- 
tended,  hinder  the  exportation  of  our  bullion.  Any 
denomination, or  stamp, we  shall  give to silver  here, 
will  neither give silver a higher value in England, nor 
make it less prized abroad.  So much silver will always 
be worth (as we have already showed) so much silver, 
(riven in exchange one for another.  Nor will it, when  e  in your mint a less quantity of it is  raised to a higher 
denomination (as when nineteen-twentieths of an ounce 
has the denomination  of a  crown, which  formerly be- 
longed only to the whole  20) be one jot raised, in  re- 
spect of any other commodity. 
You have raised the denomination of your stamped 
silver one-twentieth, or, which is all one, five  per cent. 
And men will presently raise their commodities five per 
cent.  So that if yesterday 20 crowns wouldexchange 
for twenty bushels  of wheat, or  20 yards  of a  certain 
sort  of  cloth, if you will  to-day  coin  current  crowns 
one-twentieth lighter, and make them the standard, you 
will find 90 crowns will exchange for but 19 bushels of 
wheat, or 19 yards of that cloth, which will be just as 
much silver for a  bushel  as yesterday.  So that silver 
being of no more  real value, by your giving the same 
denomillation to a less quantity of it; this will no more 
bring in, or keep your bullion here, than if you had done 
nothing.  If this were otherwise, you would be beholden 
(as some people  foolishly imagine) to the clippers for 
keeping your money.  For if keeping the old denomi- 
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(as in  effect  it is  all th3t is or  can be  done in it, by 
this project  of making your  coin  lighter) the clippers 
have sufficiently done that :  and, if their trade go on a 
little while longer, at the  rate it has of late, and your 
milled money be  melted  down and carried away, and 
no more coined ;  your money will, without the charge 
of  new  coinage,  be,  by  that sort of  artificers, rdsed 
above five per cent. when all your current money  shall 
be clipped, and made above one-twentieth lighter than 
the standard, preserving still its former denomination. 
It will possibly be here objected to me, That  we see 
1001. of clipped money, above five per cent. lighter than 
the standard, will  buy as  much  corn,  cloth,  or wine, 
as 100Z. in milled money,~vhich  is above one-twentieth 
heavier: whereby it is  evident  that my rule fails, and 
that it is not the quantity of silver that gives the value 
to money, but its stamp and denomination.  To which 
I answer, That men make their estimate and contracts 
according to the standard, upon supposition they shall 
receive good  and  lawful money, which  is that of full 
weight : and so in  effect  they do, whilst  they receive 
the current money of the country.  For since 1001. of 
clipped money will  pay a  debt of 1001. as well as the 
weightiest milled money; and a new  crown out of the 
mint will  pay  for  no more  flesh, fruit, or  cloth, than 
five clipped shillings ; it is evident that they are equi- 
valent as to the parchase  of  any thing here at home, 
whilst nobody scruples to take five clipped shillings in 
exchange for a weighty milled crown.  But this will be 
quite otherwise as soon  as you  change your coin, and 
(to raise it as you call it) make your money one-twen- 
tieth  lighter  in  the mint;  for  then nobody  will  any 
more give an old crown of the former standard for one 
of  the new, than he will  now give you 5s. and Sd. for 
a  crown :  for  so  much then  his  old  crown will yield 
him at the mint.  . 
Clipped  and  unelipped  money will  always buy an 
equal quantity of any thing else, as long as they will 
without scruple change one for another. And this makes 
that the foreign merchant, who comes to sell his goods 
to you,  always counts upon  the value  of your money, 
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by the silver that is  in it,  and  estimates the quantity 
of silver by the standard of your milit ;  though perhaps 
by reason  of  clipped  or worn money amongst  it, any 
sum that is ordinarily received is much lighter than the 
standard, and so has less silver in it than what is in a like 
sum, new coined in the mint.  But whilst clipped and 
weighty money will equally change one for mother, it 
is  all  one  to him, whether  he  receives  his  money in 
clipped money or no, so it be  but current.  For if he 
buy other commodities here with his money, whatever 
sum he contracts for, clipped as well as weighty money 
equally pays for it.  If he would carry away the price 
of  his  commodity in  ready  cash, it  is  easily changed 
into weighty money: and then he has not only the sum 
in tale that he contracted for, but the quantity of silver 
he expected,  for  his  commodities,  according  to  the 
standard of our mint.  If the quantity of your clipped 
money be once grown  so great, that the foreign mer- 
chant cannot (if he has 3 mind to it) easily get weight 
money for it,  but having sold his merchandize, and re- 
ceived clipped money, finds a difficulty to procure what 
is weight  for  it; he will,  in  selling his  goods,  either 
contract to he paid in weighty money, or else raise the 
price  of  his  commodity, according to the diminished 
quantity of silver in your current coin. 
In Holland (ducatoons being the best money of the 
country, as well as the largest coin) men in payments 
received and paid those indifferently with the other mo- 
ney of  the country; till of  late the coining  of  other 
species of money, of baser  alloy, and  in greater quan- 
tities,  having  made the ducatoons, either by melting 
down, or exportation, scarcer than formerly, it becalne 
difficult  to change the baser  money into ducatoons; 
and since  that, nobody will pay a debt in ducatoons, 
unless he be allowed half per cent. or more, above the 
value they were coined for. 
To  understand this, we must take notice, That guil- 
ders is the denomination  that in Holland they usually 
compute by, and make their contracts in.  A ducatoon 
formerly passed at three guilders and three stivers, or 
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begun to be coined  another piece, which was  called a 
three guilders piece, and was ordered to pass for three 
guilders, or sixty stivers.  But 21 three guilders pieces, 
which were to pass for 63 guilders, not having so much 
silver  in them  as  $20 ducatoons, which  passed  for the 
same sum of  63 guilders, the ducatoons  were  either 
melted down in their mints (for the making of these three 
guilders pieces, or yet baser money, with profit) or were 
carried  away by  foreign  merchants; who, when  they 
carried back the product of  their sale in money, would 
be sure to receive their payment of the number of  guil- 
ders they contracted  for  in  ducatoons, or change the 
money they received into ducatoons: whereby they car- 
ried home more silver than if they had taken their pay- 
ment in  three  guilders  pieces,  or  any  other  species. 
Thus ducatoons became scarce.  So that now, he that 
will be paid in ducatoons, must allow half per cent. for 
them.  And  therefore the merchants,  when  they  sell 
any thing now, either make their bargain  to be paid in 
ducatoons ;  or, if they contract for guilders in general, 
(which will be sure to be paid them in the baser money 
of the country) they raise the price  of their commodi- 
ties accordingly. 
By this example, in a neighbour country, we may see 
how our new milled money goes away.  When foreign 
trade imports more than our commodities will pay for, 
it is certain we  must contract debts beyond  sea,  and 
those must be paid with money, when either we cannot 
furnish, or  they will  not  take our goods  to discharge 
them.  To have money beyond sea to pay our debts, 
when our commodities do not raise it, there is no other 
way but to send it thither.  And since a weighty crown 
costs no more here than a  light  one, and our coin be- 
yond sea is valued no otherwise than according to the 
quantity of  silver it has in  it, whether we  send  it in 
specie, or whether we melt it down here to send it in 
bullion, (which is the  safest way, as not  being  prohi- 
bited) the weightiest is sure to go.  But when so great 
a quantity of your money is clipped, or so great a part 
of  your weighty money is  carried  away, that the fo- 
reign  merchant,  or his  factor here,  cannot  have  his 
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price paid  in weighty money, or such as mill easiIy be 
changed into it, then every one will sce (when men will 
no  longer take five  clipped  shillings  for  a milled  or 
weighty crorvn)  that it is the quantity of  silver that 
buys  commodities and pays debts,  and not the stamp 
and denomination which is put upon it.  And then too 
it will  be  seen what  a  robbery  is  committed  on  thc 
public by clipping.  Every grain diminished  from the 
just weight of our money is so much loss to the nation, 
which  will  one  time  or  other be  sensibly  felt;  and 
which, if it be not taken care of, and speedily stopped, 
will,  in that enormous course  it is  now in, quickly,  I 
fear,  break out into open ill effects, and at one blow 
deprive us of a great part (perhaps near one-fourth) of 
our money.  For that will be really the case, when the 
increase of clipped money makes it hard to get weighty: 
when men  begin to put a difference of value between 
that which is weighty and light money ; and will  not 
sell their commodities,  but for money that is  weight, 
and will make their bargains accordingly. 
Let the country gentleman, when it comes to that 
pass,  consider  what  the decay of  his  estate will  be! 
When receiving his rent in the tale of clipped shillings, 
according to his bargain, he cannot get them to pass 
at market for more  than their weight.  And  he that 
sells  him  salt,  or  silk,  will  bargain  for  5s.  such  a 
quantity, if  he pays him in fair weighty coin,  but in 
clipped money  he will  not  take  under 5s. 3d.  Here 
you see you have your money, without this new trick 
of coinage, raised five per cent; but whether to any ad- 
vantage of the kingdom, I leave every one to judge. 
Hitherto me have only considered the raising of silver 
coin,  and that has been  only by  coining it with less 
silver in it,  under the same  denomination.  There is 
another way  yet of  raising money,  which  has some- 
thing more of reality, though as little good in it as the 
former.  This too, now that we are upon the chapter of 
raising  money, it may not be unseasonable to open a 
little,  The raising I mean is, when either of  the two 
richer metals (which money is usually made of) is by 
law  raised  above its natural value,  in respect of  the 
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other.  Gold  and silver have,  in almost  all ages and 
parts of the world (where money was  used) generally 
been thought the fittest materials to make it of.  But . 
there being a great disproportion in the plenty of these 
metals in the world, one has always been valued much 
higher than the other ;  so that one ounce of  gold has 
exchanged  for several ounces of  silver : as at present, 
our guinea passing for 21s. 6d.  in silver,  gold is now 
about fifteen and a half times more worth than silver: 
there being about fifteen and a half  times more silver 
in 21s. 6d. than there is gold in a guinea.  This being 
now the market rate of  gold to silver;  if  by an esta- 
blished law the rate of guineas should be set higher, (as 
to 22s. 6d.) they would be raised indeed, but to the loss 
of  the kingdom.  For by this  law,  gold being raised 
five per cent.  above its natural true value,  foreigners 
would  find it worth while  to send  their gold  hither, 
and so fetch away our silver at five per cent. profit, and 
so much loss to us.  For when so much gold as would 
purchase but 100 ounces of silver any where else will in 
England purchase the merchant 105  ounces, what shall 
hinder him from bringing his gold to so good a market ; 
and either selling it at the mint, where it will yield so 
much,  or  having  it coined  into  guineas? And  then 
(going  to market with  his  guineas) he  may buy our 
commodities at the advantage of  five per cent. in  the 
very  sort of  his  money;  or change them into silver, 
and carry that away with him. 
On the other side, if by a law you would raise your 
silver money,  and make four crowns, or 20s.  in silver, 
equal to a guinea, at which  rate I suppose it was first 
coined,  so that by your law a guinea should pass but 
for  %Is.,  the same  inconveniency  would  follow.  For 
then strangers would  bring in silver and carry away 
your  gold,  which was to be had here at a lower rate 
than any where else. 
If you say, that this inconvenience is not to be feared ; 
for  that as soon  as people  found that gold began to 
grow scarce, or that it was more worth than the law set 
upon it, they would not then part with it at the statute 
rate,  as we see the broad pieces that were coined  in 
king James the First's  time for 20s. nobody will now 
part with under 83s.  or more, according to the market 
value ; this I grant is true, and it does plainly confess 
the foolishness of making a law, which cannot produce 
the effect  it is made for:  as indeed it will  not, whcn 
you would  raise the price of  silver, in respect of  gold, 
above its natural market value : for then, as we see in 
our gold, the price of  it will raise itself.  But, on the 
other side, if you should by a law set the value of gold 
above its par ; then people would  be bound to receive 
it at that high rate, and so part with their silver at an 
under value.  But supposing, that having a mind  to 
raise your silver in respect of gold, you make a law to 
do it, what  comes of  that? If your law prevail,  only 
this ;  that, as much as you raise silver, y.ou debase gold, 
(for they are in the condition of two th~ngs,  put in op- 
posite scales, as much as the one rises the other falls) and 
then your gold will be carried away with so much clear 
loss to the kingdom, as you raise silver and debase gold 
by  your law, below their natural value.  If you raise 
gold in proportion to silver, the same effect follows. 
I say, raise silver in respect of gold, and gold in pro- 
portion to silver.  For, when you would raise the value 
of money,  fancy what you will, it is  but in respect of 
something you would change it for; and is done only 
when you can make a less quantity of the metal, which 
your money is made of,  change for a greater quantity 
of that thing which you would raise it to. 
The  effect indeed, and ill consequence of raising either 
of  these two metals,  in respect of  the other,  is more 
easily observed, and sooner found in raising gold than 
silver coin :  because your accounts being kept, and your 
reckonings all made in pounds,  shillings,  and pence, 
which are denominations of silver coins, or numbers of 
them ;  if gold be made current at a rate above the free 
and market value of those two metals,  every one will 
easily perceive  the inconvenience.  But there being a 
law for it, you cannot refuse the gold in payment for 
so much.  And all the money,  or bullion, people will 
carry bcyond  sea from you, will be in silver;  and the 
money,  or bullion,  brought in, will  bc in gold.  And 
H '2 100  Consi(1cmtions of  tlre lowering of  Interest, 
just the same will happen, when your silver is raised 
and  gold  debased,  in respect of  one another, beyond 
their true and uatural proportion :  (natural proportion 
or value I call that respective ratc they find, any mliere, 
without tlic prescription of  law.)  For tharl silvcr will. 
be tlirxt which is brought in, and gold will  be carried 
out; and that still with loss to tlie kingdom, answerable 
to thc over-value set by the law.  Only as soon as the 
mischief is felt, people will (do what you can) raise the 
gold to its natl~ral  value.  For your accounts and bar- 
gains being made in the denomination of silver money, 
if, when gold is raised above its proportion, by the law, 
you cannot refuse it in payment (as if  the law should 
make  a  guinea  current  at 22s.  6d.) you  are bound 
to take it at that rate in  payment.  But if  tlie  law 
should make guineas current at  BUS.,  lie that has them 
is not bound to pay them away at that rate, but may 
keep them, if he pleases,  or get more for them,  if he 
can: yet,  from  such  a  law,  one  of  these  things  will 
follow.  Either, lst, The law forces them to go at 20s. 
and then being found  passing at that rate,  foreigners 
make their advantage of it :  Or, gdly, People keep them 
up, and will  not part with them at the legal rate, un- 
derstanding them really to be worth more, and then all 
your gold lies dead,  and is  of  no  more  use to trade 
than if it were all gone out of the kingdom : Or, 3dly, 
It  passes for more than the law allows, and then your 
law signifies  nothing,  and had  been  better let alone. 
Which  way  soever  it succeeds,  it proves  either pre- 
judicial  or ineffectual.  If the design of your law takes 
place, the kingdom loses by it: if the inconvenience be 
felt and avoided, your law is eluded. 
Money is the measure of  commerce, and of the rate 
of every thing,  and therefore ought to be kept (as all 
other measures) as steady and invariable as may be.  But 
this cannot be, if  your money be made of  two metals, 
whose proportion, and, consequently, whose price,  con- 
stantly varies in respect to one another.  Silver, for many 
reasons, is the fittest of  all metals to be this measure ; 
and therefore  generally made use of  for money.  But 
then it is very unfit and inconvenient that gold, or any 
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other metal,  should be made current,  legal money, at 
a standing, settled  rate.  This is to set a  rate upon 
the varying value of things by law, which justly cannot 
be done;  and is,  as I have  showed, as  far as it pre- 
vails, a constant damage and prejudice to the country, 
where it is practised.  Suppose fifteen to one be now 
the exact par between  gold  and silver,  what law can 
make it lasting ; and establish it so, that next year, or 
twenty years hence, this shall be the just value of gold 
to silver f  and that one  ounce  of  gold  shall be just 
worth fifteen ounces of silver, neither more nor less ?  It 
is possible,  the East India trade sweeping away great 
sums of gold, may make it scarcer in Europe.  Perhaps 
the Guinea trade,  and  mines of  Peru,  affording  it in 
greater abundance,  may make it more  plentiful ;  and 
so its value,  in respect of silver,  come on the one side 
to be  as sixteen,  or,  on the other,  as fourteen to one. 
And can any law you shall make alter this proportion 
here,  hen it is so every where  else round about you? 
If your law  set it at fifteen,  when  it is,  at the free 
market rate, in the neighbouring  countries, as sixteen 
to one ; will  they not send  hither their silver to fetch 
away your gold at one sixteen loss to you? Or if  you 
will keep its rate to silver as fifteen to one, when in 
Holland,  France, and  Spain, its market value  is  but 
fourteen;  will  they  not  send  hither  their  gold,  and 
fetch  away  your  silver,  at one  fifteen  loss  to you ? 
This is  unavoidable,  if  you will  make money of  both 
gold and silver,  at the same time,  and set rates upon 
them by  law, in respect of one another. 
What then!  (will  you  be ready to say) 'Would you 
have gold kept out of England ?  Or, being here, would 
you  have  it useless  to trade;  and must there be no 
money made of it? I answer, quite the contrary.  It  is 
fit the kingdom should make use of  the treasure it has. 
It  is necessary your gold should be coined, and have the 
king's  stamp upon  it,  to  secure nlen  in  rcceiritlg  it, 
that there is so much gold in each piece.  llut it is rlot 
necessary that it  should have a fixer1 value set on it by 
public authority:  it is not convenicnt that it should in 
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as other commodities,  find its own  rate.  And  when, 
by the king's  image and inscription, it carries with it a 
public assurance of  its weight and fineness;  the gold 
money, so coined, will  never fail to pass at the known 
market rates,  as readily  as any other species of your 
money.  Twenty guineas, though designed at first for 
2Ol.,  go nbw as current for all. 10s. as any other money, 
and sometimes for more, as the rate varies.  The value, 
or price,  of  any thing, being only the respective  esti- 
mate it bears to some other, which it comes in compe- 
tition with,  can only be known by the quantity of  the 
one which will  exchange for a certain quantity of  the 
other.  There being no  two things in nature  whose 
proportion and use does not vary, it is impossible to set 
a standing, regular price between them.  The growing 
plenty, or scarcity, of  either in the market, (whereby 
I mean the ordinary place where they are to be had in 
traffic) or the real use, or changing fashion of the place, 
bringing either of  them  more  into demand than for- 
merly, presently varies the respective value of any two 
things.  You will as fruitlessly endeavour to keep two 
different things steadily at  the same price one with an- 
other, as to keep two things in an equilibrium, whe~e 
their varying weights depend on different causes.  Put 
a piece of  sponge in one scale, and  an exact counter- 
poise of silver in the other ; you will be mightily mis- 
taken if you imagine, that because they are to-day equal, 
they shall always remain so.  The weight of the sponge 
varying with every change of  moisture in the air, the 
silver,  in the opposite  scale, will  sometimes  rise  and 
sometimes fall.  This is just the state of silver and gold, 
in regard of their mutual value.  Their proportion,  or 
use,  may, nay constantly does vary,  and with it their 
price.  For,  being  estimated  one  in  reference to the 
other, they are, as it were, put in opposite scales ;  and 
as the one rises the other falls, and so on the contrary. 
Farthings,  made of  a baser  metal,  may on this ac- 
count too deserve your consideration.  For whatsoever 
coil1 you  make current, above the intrinsic value, will 
always  be damage to the public,  whoever  get by  it. 
But of this  I sli~~ll  riot,  at present,  enter into a  more 
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particular inquiry ;  only this I will  confidently affirm, 
that it is the interest of every country, that all the cur- 
rent money of it should be of one and the same metal; 
that the several  species  should be of the same alloy, 
and none  of a baser  mixture : and that the standard, 
once thus settled, should be  inviolably and immutably 
kept to perpetuity.  For whenever that is altered, upon 
pretence soever, the public will lose by it. 
Since then  it will  neither  bring us in more money, 
bullion, or  tracle ; nor  keep what we  have  here,  nor 
hinder  our weighty money, of what denomination  so- 
ever, from being melted ;  to what purpose should the 
kingdom  be  at the  charge  of  coining  all  our  mo- 
ney anew ?  For I do not suppose any body can propose 
that we should have  two sorts of money, at the same 
time, one  heavier  and the  other  lighter, as  it comes 
from the mint; that is very absurd to imagine.  So that 
if all your  old  money must be  coined  over again ;  it 
will indeed be some advantage, and that a very consi- 
derable one, to the officers of the  mint.  For they being 
allowed 3s. 6d.  (it should be sixteen-pence halfpenny), 
for  the coinage  of  every  pound  troy,  which  is very 
near five and a half per cent.,  if our money be six mil- 
lions, and must  be  coined  all over  again, it will  cost 
the nation to the mint  three hundred thirty thousand 
pounds.  One hundred thirty thousand pounds, if the 
clipped money must escape, because it  is already as li,~ht 
as your new standard; do you not own that this design 
of new coinage is just of the nature of clipping? 
This business of money and coinage is by some men, 
and amongst them somevery ingenious persons, thou  ht 
a great mystery, and very hard to be understood.  fot 
that truly in itself it is so, but because interested peo- 
ple, that treat of  it, wrap up the secret they make ad- 
vantage  of  in  a  mystical,  obscure, and unintelligible 
way of talking ;  which men, from a pre-conceived  opi- 
nion  of the dificulty of  the subject, taking for sense, 
in a matter not easy to be penetrated, but by the men 
of  art,  let  pass  for  current,  without  examination. 
Wilereas, would  they look  into those  discourses, arid 
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find, for the most part, either their positions to be false, 
their deductions to be wrong, or (which often happens) 
their words to have no distinct meaning at all.  Where 
none of these be, there their  plain, true, honest sense, 
would prove very easy and intelligible, if expressed in 
ordinary and direct language. 
That this is so, I shall show, by examining a printed 
sheet on  this  subject,  entitled,  Remarks  on a Paper 
given in to the Lords, &c. 
Rem.  "  It is  certain, That what place  soever  will 
give most for  silver  by weight, it will  thither  be  car- 
ried and sold : and if of  the money which now passes 
in England, there call  be  5s. 5d. the ounce given for 
standard silver  at the mint, when  but 5s. 4d. of the 
very same  can be  given  elsewhere for  it, it will  cer- 
tainly be brought to the mint ;  and when coined, can- 
not be  sold  (having one  penny over-value  set upon it 
by the ounce) for  the same that other plate may be 
bought  for, so will be  left unmelted ;  at least, it will 
be the interest of  any exporter to buy plate to send 
out, before  money;  whereas now it is his  interest to 
buy money to send out before plate." 
Answ.  The author would  do well  to make it intel- 
ligible, how, "  of the money that now passes  in Eng- 
land, at the mint  can  be given 5s. 5d. the ounce for 
standard silver, when  but 5s. 4d. of the same money 
can be given  elsewhere for it."  Next, "  How it has 
one  penny  over-value  set  upon  it by  the ounce,  so 
that, when  coined,  it cannot  be  sold."  This,  to an 
ordinary reader, looks very mysterious ;  and, I fear, is 
so, as either signifying nothing at all, or nothing that 
will hold.  For, 
1. I ask, Who it is at the mint, that "  can give 5s. 
5d.  the ounce  for  standard  silver,  when  nobody else 
can  give  above  5s. 4d.?"  Is it the king, or  is  it the 
master-worker, or ally of the officers ?  For to give 5s. 
5d. for what will yield  but 5s. 4d. to any body else, is 
to give one-sixty-fifth  part more than it is worth.  For 
so much every thing is worth  as it will  yield.  And I 
do not see  how this can turn to account  to the king, 
or be borne by any body else. 
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8. I ask, How a penny over-value  can be set upon it 
by the ounce, so "  that it cannot be  sold ?"  This is so 
mysterious, that I  think  it near impossible.  For an 
equal quantity of  standard silver will  always  be just 
worth an equal  quantity of standard silver.  And it is 
utterly impossible to make sixty-four parts of standard 
silver equal to,  or worth, sixty-five  parts of the same 
standard silver ;  which is meant by "  setting a penny 
over-value upon it by the ounce," if that has any mean- 
ing at all.  Indeed, by the workmanship  of  it,  sixty- 
four ounces of  standard silver  may be  made not only 
worth sixty-five ounces, but seventy or eighty.  But the 
coinage, which is all the workmanship here, being paid 
for by a tax, I do not see how that can be reckoned at 
all: or if  it be, it must  raise  every 5s. 4d. coined  to 
above 5s. 5d.  If I carry sixty-four ounces of standard 
silver in bullion  to the mint to be coined, shall I not 
have just 64 ounces back  again for it in coin ?  And if 
so, can these sixty-four ounces of coined standard silver 
be  possibly made worth  sixty-iive ounces of the same 
standard silver uncoined, when they cost me no more ; 
and 1 can, for barely going to the mint, have sixty-four 
ounces of standard silver  in bullion  turrled into coin? 
Cheapness  of  coinage in England, where it costs no- 
thing, will indeed make  money be  sooner  brought to 
the mint than any where  else ;  because there I have 
the convenience  of having  it made into money for no- 
thing.  But this will no more keep it in England than 
if it were perfect  bullion.  Nor will  it hinder it from 
being melted down, because it cost no more in coin than 
in bullion :  and  this  equally, whether  your pieces  of 
the same denomination  be  lighter, heavier, or just  as 
they  were  before.  This  being  explained,  it will  be 
easy to see whether the other things said in the same 
paragraph be true or false, and particularly, whether 
"  it will be the interest of every exporter to buy plate 
to send out before money." 
Rem.  6c It is only barely asserted, That if  silver be 
raised  at the mint, that it will  rise  elsewhere above 
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Answ.  The author tells  us, in  the last paragraph, 
that silver that is worth "but 5s. Rd.  per ounce at the 
mint, is  worth  5s. 4d.  elsewhere."  This,  how  true, 
or what inconvenience it hath, I will not here examine. 
But, be the inconvenience of it what it will, this raising 
the money he proposes as a remedy: and to those who 
say, upon  raising  our  money,  silver will  rise  too, he 
makes this answer, that 6'it can never be known whether 
it will or no, till it be tried."  To which I reply, That 
it may be known  as certainly without trial, as  it can, 
that two pieces of silver that weighed equally yesterday, 
will weigh equally again to-morrow in the same scales. 
"  There is silver (says our author) whereof an ounce 
(i. e.  480 grains) will  change  for  5s.  4d,"  (i.  e. 4<96 
grains) of our standard silver coined.  To-morrow you 
coin your money lighter ;  so that then 5s. 4d. will have 
but 472 grains of coined  standard silver in it.  Can it 
not then be known, without trial,  whether that ounce 
of  silver, which  to-day will  change for 496 grains of 
standard silver coined, will  change to-morrow  but for 
472 grains of the same standard silver coined? Or can 
any one imagine  that 480 grains  of the same silver, 
which to-day are worth 496 grains of our coined silver, 
will  to-morrow  be worth but 472 grains  of  the same 
silver, a  little differently coined ?  He that can have  a 
doubt about this till it be tried, may as well demand a 
trial to be made, to prove that the same thing is equi- 
ponderant, or equivalent to itself.  For I think it is as 
clear, that 472 grains of  silver  are  equiponderant to 
496 grains  of  silver, as that an ounce of silver, that is 
to-day worth 496 grains of  standard silver, should to- 
morrow be worth but 472 grains of the same standard 
silver, all circumstances  remaining  the same, but the 
different weight  of  the pieces  stamped: which is that 
our author asserts, when he says, That  it is only barely 
asserted, &c.  What has bken  said  to this may serve 
also for an answer to the next paragraph.  Only I de- 
sire it may be taken notice of, that the author seems to 
insinuate, that silver goes not in England as in foreign 
parts,  by weight:  which  is a very dangerous,  as well 
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as false  position ;  and which, if allowed, may let into 
our mint what  corruption  and debasing of our money 
one pleases. 
Rem.  '<  That our trade hath heretofore furnished us 
with an overplus,  brought  home in gold and silver, is 
true: but that we  bring  home  from  any place  more 
goods than we now  export to it, I do not  conceive  to 
be so.  And more goods might be sent to those parts; 
but by reason  of the great value  of silver  in this part 
of  the world,  more  money is  to be got by exporting 
silver than by any other thing that can  be  sent,  and 
that is  the  reason  of  it.  And  for  its being melted 
down, and sent out, because  it is  so heavy, is not by 
their paper denied." 
Answ.  That we bring home  from any place more 
goods than we now  export,  (the  author  tells  us) he 
doth not conceive." 
Would he had told us a reason for his conceit ! But 
since the money of any country is  not presently to be 
changed, upon any private man's  groundless conceit, I 
suppose this argument will not be of much weight with 
many men.  I make bold to call it a groundless  con- 
ceit; for  if the author please to remember the great 
sums of money are carried every year to the East  Indies, 
for  which  we  bring  home  consumable  commodities; 
(though I must own it pays us again with advantage) 
or if  he will  examine  how much  only two commodi- 
ties, wholly consumed  here,  cost  us yearly in money, 
(I mean Canary wine and currants) more than we pay 
for, with  goods  exported  to the Canaries  and Zant; 
besides  the over-balance  of  trade upon  us  in several 
other  places,  he will  have  little  reason  to  say,  he 
doth not conceive we bring home from any place more 
goods tlia~i  we now  export to it." 
As to what he  says  concerning the "  melting down 
and exporting our  money, because  it is heavy :" if by 
heavy he means, because our crown-pieces (and the rest 
of  our  species  of money in  proportion) are 23  or 94 
grains heavier than he would  have then1 coined : this, 
~vlioever  grants it, I deny upon  grounds which,  I sup- 
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Indeed, when your debts beyond sea, to answer  the 
over-balance of foreign importations, call for your mo- 
ney, it is certain  the heavy money, which has the full 
standard  weight,  will  be  melted  down  and carried 
away ;  because foreigners value not your stamp or de- 
nomination, but your silver. 
He  would do well to tell us what he means by "  the 
great value  of silver in this part of the world."  For 
he speaks of it as a  cause that draws away our money 
more now than formerly, or else it might as well have 
been  omitted  as mentioned in this  place :  and if  he 
mean, by this part of  the world, England; it is scarce 
sense to say, that the great value of silver in England 
should draw silver  out of England.  If he means the 
neighbouring countries to England, he should have said 
it, and not doubtfully this part of the world.  But let 
him,  by this  part of  the world,  mean what he will, I 
dare say every one will  agree, that silver  is not more 
valued  in this than any other part of the world,  nor 
in this age more than in our grandfathers' days. 
I am  sorry, if  it be  true,  what  he tells  us,  That 
"more money is to be got by exportation of silver than 
by  any other thing that can  be  sent."  This is  an 
evidence that a  we  bring home  more goods than we 
export."  For till that happens, and has brought us 
in debt beyond  sea, silver will  not be exported;  but 
the overplus  of people's  gain being  generally laid up 
in silver,  it will  be  brought  home  in silver;  and  so 
our people will value it as much as any other, in this 
part of the world. 
The truth of the case in short is this.  Whenever we, 
by a losing trade, contract debts with our neighbours, 
they will put a great value  on  our silver, and "  more 
money  will  be  got by  transporting  silver  than  any 
thing can be sent :"  which comes about thus: Suppose 
that by an over-balance  of their  trade (whether by  a 
sale of pepper, spices, and  other East India commodi- 
ties, it matters not) we  have received great quantities 
of goods, within these two or three months from Hol- 
land, and sent but little thither;  so that the accounts 
balanced between the inhabitants of England and the 
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United  Provinces,  Ire  of  England were  a  mlllion  in 
their  debt: what  would  follorv  from  hence ?  This; 
That these Dutch  crctfitors, clcsiring  to hare what is 
due to them, give orders to their factors and correspond- 
ents here, to return it to them.  For inquiring as we do, 
what are the eff'ects of an over-balance of trade, we must 
not suppose they invest their debts in commodities, and 
return their effects that way.  A million then being to 
be returned fro111 Esgland to Holli~nd  in money, every 
one seeks bills of cschnnge; but Englishmen not having 
debts in Holland to answcr this million, or any the least 
part of it, bills are not to be got.  This presently makes 
the exchange very high:  upon which  the bankers, kc. 
who have  the command  of  great quantities of  money 
and  bullion,  send  that  away  to  Holland  in  specie, 
and so  take money here to pay it again there,  upon 
their bills,  at such a  rate of exchange  as  gives them 
five, ten,  fifteen, &c. per cent. profit:  and thus some- 
times  a  5s.  piece  of  our  milled  money  may truly be 
said to be worth 5s.  3d. 4d. 6h  9d. in Holland.  And 
if  this  be "  the  great  value  of  silver  in  this  part 
of the world,"  I easily grant it him.  But tllis  great 
value is to be  remedied,  not  by the alteration of  our 
mint, but by the regulation  and balance of our trade. 
For be your coin what it will, our neighbours,  if they 
over-balance  us  in  trade, will  not  only have  a  great 
value for our silver,  but get it too; and there will be 
"  more to be got by exporting silver to them than by 
any other thing can be sent." 
Kern.  "  The alterations of  the coins  in  Spain and 
Portugal are no way at all like  this.  For there they 
altered in denomination near half, to deceive those they 
y  aid, with paying those, to whom they owed one ounce 
of silver, but half an ounce for it.  But in the alteration 
here designed, to  whoever an ounce of silver was owing, 
an ounce will be paid in this money; it being here only 
designed, that an ounce of money should equal an ounce 
of silver  in value,  at home  as  well  as  abroad, which 
now it does not." 
Answ.  In this  paragraph the author confesses the 
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but the Cc  alteration  here  designed, he says,  is not :" 
but tlic reason he gives for it is admirable:  riz.  "  Be- 
cause  they there  altered in  denomination  near half," 
and here denomination is altered but five per cent. for 
so in truth it is,  whatever be designed.  As if fifty per 
cent.  were  a  cheat,  but five  per cent.  were not; be- 
cause  perhaps  less  perceivable.  For the two things, 
that are pretended to be done here by this new coinage, 
I fear will both fail,  viz.  I. That "to whomsoever an 
ounce  of silver  is  owing, an ounce  of  silver shall be 
paid in this money."  For when  an ounce  of  silver 
is coined, as is proposed,  into 5s.  5d. (which is to make 
our money five per cent.  lighter than it is now) I that 
am to receive 1001. per ann. fee-farm rent ;  shall I in this 
new money receive 1051.  or barely loo/. ?  The first I 
think will not be said.  For if  by law you have made 
it 100l.,  it is  certain the tenant will pay me no more. 
If you do not mean that 400 crowns, or YO00 shillings 
of your new coin shall be IOOL, but thcre must be five 
per cent.  in tale added  to every 100, you  are at the 
charge of new coinage to no other purpose but to breed 
confusion.  If I must receive 1002. by tale of  this new 
money for my fee-farm rent,  it is demonstration that I 
lose five ounces per cent.  of the silver that was due to 
me.  This a  little lower he confesses in these words,  .' That where a man has a rent-s~c,  that can never be 
more,  this may somewhat  affect  it,  but so very little, 
that it will scarce eve?  at all be perceived."  This very 
little is five per cent.;  and if a mdn be cheated of that, 
so he perceives  it not,  it goes  for nothing.  But this 
loss will not affect only such rer.ts  as can never be more, 
but all payments whatsoever,  that  are contracted for 
before this alteration of our money. 
2. If it be true, what he affirms, "  That an ounce 
of money doth equal an ounce of  silver in  value abroad, 
but not at home ;" then this  part of  the undertaking 
will also fail.  ForIdeny that the stamp on our money 
does any more debase it here at home than abroad, or 
make the silver in  our money  not  equal in value to 
the same weight  of  silver  every where.  The author 
would have done well  to have  made it out,  and not 
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left so great a  paradox  only to the credit of a single 
assertion. 
Rem.  "  And  for what  is  said  in  this  bill  to  pre- 
vent  exportation,  relates  only to the keeping in our 
coin and bullion,  and leaves all foreign to be exported 
still." 
Answ.  What  the  author  means  by our  own  and 
foreign bullion, will need some explication. 
Rem. '' There is now no  such thing as payments in 
weighty and milled money." 
Answ.  I believe there are very few in town, who do 
not very  often  receive  a  milled  crown  for  5s.  and a 
milled  half-crown  for  2s. 6d.  But he  means,  1 sup- 
pose, in great and entire sums of milled money.  But I 
ask, if all the clipped money were called in,whether then 
all the payments would not be in weighty money;  and 
that not being called  in, whether if it be  lighter than 
your new milled money, the new milled money will not 
be melted down as much as the old ?  Which I think the 
author there confesses, or else I understand him not. 
Rem.  "  Nor will  this  any way interrupt trade;  for 
trade will  find  its own  course;  the denomination  of 
money in any country no way concerning that." 
Answ.  The denomination  to  a  certain  weight of 
money, in all countries, concerns trade; and the altera- 
tion of that necessarily brings disturbance to it. 
Ram. "  For if so be  it occasions  the coining more 
money.-9' 
Answ.  He  talks as if it would  be  cc  the occasion of 
coining more  money."  Out of what?  Out of money 
already coined, or out of  bullion ?  For I would be glad 
to know where it is. 
Rem. '' It may be some gain to those that will ven- 
ture to melt  down  the coin,  but very  small loss  (if 
any) to those which shall be paid in the new :  it is not 
to be denied,  but that where  any man has a rent-ssc, 
that can never be more,  this  may somewhat affect it ; 
but so  very little,  it will  scarce  ever at all be  per- 
ceived." 
Answ.  As much as it  will be gain to melt down their 
coin, so much loss will it be  to those who are paid in new, via.  five per cent.,  which, I suppose, is more than 
the author would  be willing  to lose,  unless  he get by 
it another way. 
Rem. "  And if the alteration designed sho~~ld  have the 
effect  of  making  our  native  commodities  any  ways 
dearer-" 
Answ.  Here our author confesses,  that proportion- 
ably as your money is raised, the price of other things 
will be raised too  But to make amends, he says, 
Rem. "  It  does at the same time make t,he  land which 
produces them of more than so much more in value." 
Answ.  This "more  than so much more in value,"  is 
more  than  our author,  or any body else  for him,  will 
ever be able to make out. 
The price of things will  always be estimated by the 
quantity of  silver given  in  exchange for  them.  And 
if you make your money less in weight, it must be made 
up in tale.  This is  all  this great mystery of  raising 
money, and raising land.  For example :  the manor of 
Blackacre would  yesterday have yielded  one hundred 
thousand  crowns,  which  crown-pieces,  let us suppose 
numero rotundo  to weigh  each of  them an ounce of 
standard silver.  To-day your new coin comes in play, 
which is five per cent. lighter.  There is your money 
raised: the land now at  sale yields one hundred and five 
thousand crowns, which is just  the same one hundred 
thousand ounces of standard silver.  There is the land 
raised.  And is not this an admirable invention, for which 
the public ought to be at above one hundred thousand 
pounds charge for new coinage, and all your commerce 
put in disorder ?  And  then to recommend  this inven- 
tion, you  are told,  as a great secret, That,  "had  not 
money, from time to time, been raised in its denomina- 
tion, lands had not so risen too :" which is to say,  Had 
not your money been  made lighter, fewer pieces  of it 
would have bought as much  land as a greater number 
does now. 
Rem. "  The loss  of payments, there spoken of,  will, 
in no sort, be so great, as if the parties, to whom these 
debts  are owing,  were  now  bound  to receive  them 
in the money that now passes,  and then to melt the 
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same  down;  so  at this  they  will  liave  no  cause to 
complain." 
Answ.  A  very good  argument!  the clippers  have 
robbed the pblic  of a good part of their money (which 
men will,  some  time  or  other,  find  in  the payments 
they receive)  and it is  desired  the mint  may have  a 
liberty to be beforehand with those to whom debts are 
owing.  They are told, they will have no reason to com- 
plain of it who suffer this loss, because it is not so great 
as the other.  The damage is already done to the pub- 
lic, by clipping.  Where at last it will light, I cannot 
tell.  But men who receive clipped money,  not being 
forced to melt it down,  do not yet receive any loss by 
it.  When  clipped  money will  no  longer  change for 
weighty,  then  those who  have clipped money in their 
hands will find the loss of it. 
Rem.  It will  make  the custorns  better paid,  be- 
cause there will be more money." 
Answ.  That there will be more money in tale,  it is 
possible :  that there will be more money in weight and 
worth, the author ought to show.  And then, whatever 
becomes of  the customs,  (which I do not hear are un- 
paid now) the king will lose in the excise above thirty 
thousand pounds per annum.  For in all taxes where so 
many pounds,  shillings,  or  pence  are determined  by 
the law to be paid, there the king will lose five per cent. 
The author here, as in other places, gives a good reason 
for it :  for, "  his majesty being to pay auTay  this money 
by tale, as he receives it, it will be to  him no loss at all." 
As  if  my  receiving  my  rents  in  full tale,  hut  in 
money of undervalue five per cent. were  not  so much 
loss to me, because I was to pay it away again by tale. 
Try  it  at 50 per cent.; the odds only is, that one being 
greater than the other, would make more noise.  Rut 
the author's great refuge in this is,  that it will not be 
perceived. 
Rem. '' If all foreign commodities were to be pur- 
chased with this  new  species  of  money sent out; we 
agree, that with  1001.  of  it,  there  could  not be so 
much  silver,  or  other  commodities  bought,  as with 
1001.  in  crown-pieces  as  now  coined,  because  they 
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would be heavier;  and all coin,  in any kingdom  but 
where it is coined,  only goes by weight ;  and for the 
same weight of  silver,  the same every where still will 
be bought;  and so  there  will,  with the same  quan- 
tity of goods.  And if those goods should cost five per 
cent. more here in England than heretofore, and yield 
but the same money (we mean by the ounce abroad) the 
same money,  brought home and coined, will yield the 
importer five per cent. more at the mint than it here- 
tofore could do, and so no damage to the trader at all." 
Answ.  Here truth forces from the author a  confes- 
sion of  two things,  which  demonstrate the vanity and 
uselessness of  the project.  1. That, upon this change 
of your coin, foreign goods will be raised.  Your own 
goods will cost five per cent. more.  So that goods of 
all kinds being thereupon raised ;  wherein consists the 
raisingof your money, when an  ounce of standard silver, 
however minced,  stamped,  or  denominated,  will buy 
no more commodities than it did before ?  This confes- 
sion also shows the falsehood of that dangerous supposi- 
tion, that money, "  in the kingdom where it is coined, 
goes not by weight,"  i.  e. is not valued by its weight. 
Rein. "  It is  true,  the owners  of  silver will find a 
good market for it,  and no  others will be damaged; 
but, on the contrary, the making plenty of money will 
be an advantage to all." 
Answ.  1,grant it true, that if your money were really 
raised five per cent. the owners of silver would get so 
much by it, by bringing it to the mint to be coined. 
But since,  as is confessed, commodities will (upon this 
raising your money) be raised to five per cent.,  this al- 
teration will be an advantage to nobody, but  the officers 
of the mint, and hoarders of money. 
Rem. "  When standard silver was last raised at the 
mint, (which it was from 5s. to 5s. and 2d.  the ounce, 
in the 4Sd of  Eliz.)  and,  for  above  forty years after, 
silver  uncoined  was  not  worth  above  4s.  10d.  the 
ounce, which occasioned much coining;  and of  money 
none in those days was exported :  whereas silver now 
is worth but the very same 5s. 2d.  the  ounce  still at 
the mint,  and is worth 5s. 4d. elsewhere.  So that if 
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this bill now with  the lords does not happen to pass, 
there can never  any silver be ever any more coined at 
the mint ;  and all the milled money will, in a very little 
time more, be destroyed." 
Answ. The reason of so much money coined in queen 
Elizabeth's  time, and afterwards, was not the lessening 
of  your  crown-pieces  from 480 to 462  grains,  and so 
proportionably all the rest  of  your  money  (which is 
that the author calls raising standard silver from 5s. to 
5s. 2d. the ounce)  but from the over-balance  of  your 
trade, bringing them in plenty of bullion; and keeping 
it here. 
How standard silver (for if the author speaks of other 
silver,  it is a  fallacy) should be worth its own weight 
in standard silver at the mint, (i.  e.  5s.  2d. the ounce) 
and be worth more  than its own weight  in  standard 
silver,  (i.  e.  5s.  4d.  the ounce)  in. Lombard-street, is a 
paradox that nobody, I think, will be able to compre- 
hend, till it be better explained.  It  is time to give off 
coining, if  the value of  standard silver be lessened by 
it; as really it is, if an ounce of coined standard silver 
will not exchange for  an ounce of  uncoined standard 
silver,  unless  you  add 15  or 16 grains overplus to it: 
which is what the author would  have taken upon his 
word, when he says, "  Silver is worth five shillings four- 
pence elsewhere." 
Five  shillings  fourpence of  money  coined  at the 
mint, the author must allow to be at least 495 grains. 
An ounce  is  but 480 grains.  How then an ounce of 
uncoined  standard  silver  can be worth  five  shillings 
fourpence, (i. e. how 480 grains of  uncoined standard 
silver  can be worth 495 grains of  the same standard 
silver, coined into money) is unintelligible ;  unless the 
coinage of our mint lessens the value of standard silver. 
"  SIR, 
"  COIN  and interest are two things of so great mo- 
ment  to the  public,and of so great concernment in trade, 
that they ought very accurately to be examined into, 
and very nicely weighed,  upon any proposal of altera- 
I 2 116  Considerations of the lowing of Interest, 
tion  to be  made  in  them.  I  pretend  not  to have 
treated of  them here as they deserve.  That must be 
the work of  an abler hand ; I have said something on 
these subjects, because you required it.  And, I hope, 
the  readiness  of  my  obedience  will  excuse  to  you 
the faults  I have  committed,  and  assure  you  that 
I am, 
"  Your most humble servant, 
a  JOHN LOCKE." 
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SHORT  OBSERVATIONS 
OW  A  PRINTED PAPER,  ENTITLED, 
Pm  encouraging the coining Silver Money in England, 
and am  for  keeping it here. 
THE  author says, "  Silver yielding the proposed 2d. 
or 3d. more by the ounce,  than  it will  do by being 
coined  into money,  there  will  be  none  coined  into 
money ;  and matter of fact shows there is none." 
It would be hard to know what he means,  when he 
says, "  silver yields 2d. or 3d. more by the ounce, than 
it will  do by being  coined  into money:"  but that he 
tells us in plain words at the bottom of the leaf, "  that 
an ounce of  silver uncoined is of  2d.  more value than 
after it is coined it will be ;" which,  I take the liberty 
to say,  is so far from being true, that I affirm it is im- 
possible to  be so.  For which I shall only give this short 
reason,  viz.  because  the stamp neither does nor can 
take away any of the intrinsic value of the silver;  and 
therefore an ounce of  coined  standard silver must ne- 
cessarily be of  equal value  to  an ounce of  uncoined 
standard silver.  For example, suppose a goldsmith has 
a round plate of standard silver, just of the shape, size, 
and weight of a coined crown-piece, which, for brevity's 
sake, we will  suppose  to be  an ounce;  this ounce of 
standard silver is certainly of equal value to any other 
ounce of unwrought standard silver in his shop ; away 
he goes with his  round  piece  of  silver to the Tower, 
and has there the stamp set upon it ;  when  he brings 
this numerical piece back again to his shop coined, can 
any one imagine that it is now  2d. less worth  than it 
was when  he carried it out smooth, a quarter  of  an 
hour before ;  or, that  it is not still of equal  value to any 1  18  Considerations OJ  the lowering of Interest, 
other ounce of unwrought standard silver in his shop ? 
He that can say it is 2d.  less worth than it was before 
it had the king's  image and inscription  on it,  may as 
well say,  that sixty grains of  silver,  brought from the 
Tower,  are worth but fifty-eight  grains of  silver  in 
Lombard-street. 
But the author  very warily limits  this  ill  effect of 
coinage only to England ;  why it is in  England,  and 
not every where, would deserve a reason. 
But let us grant it to be true, as our author affirms, 
that coined silver in England is one-thirtieth worse, or 
of less value, than uncoined ; the natural consequence 
from this, if it be true, is, that it is very unfit that the 
mint should be employed in England, where it debases 
the silver one-thirtieth;  for,  if  the stamp lessens  the 
value of our silver this year, it will also do so the next, 
and so on to the end of  the world,  it always working 
the same way.  Nor will the altering the denomination, 
as is proposed, at all help it. 
But yet he thinks he has some proof for his proposi- 
tion, because it is matter of fact that there is no money 
coined at the mint.  This is the great grievance, and 
is one indeed,  but for  a  different  reason  from what 
seems to inspire that paper. 
The matter in short is this ;  England sending more 
consumable commodities to  Spain than it receives from 
thence, the merchants, who manage their trade,  bring 
back the overplus  in bullion,  which,  at their return, 
they sell  as a  commodity.  The chapmen,  that give 
highest for this, are, as in all cases of buying and selling, 
those who can make most profit by it; and those are 
the returners of  our money,  by exchange,  into those 
countries where our debts, anyway contracted,  make 
a need of  it: for they getting 6,  8, 10, &c. per cent. 
according to the want and demand of money from Eng- 
land there,  and  according  to the risk of the sea,  buy 
up this bullion,  as  soon  as it comes  in,  to send it to 
their correspondents in those parts, to make good their 
credit for  the bills  they have drawn on them,  and so 
can give  more  for  it  than  the mint-rate,  i.  e. more 
than equal weight of milled money for an equal weight 
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of  standard bullion;  they being  able to make more 
profit of it by returns. 
Suppose the balance of our trade with Holland were 
in all other commodities equal, but that in the last East 
India sale we bought of them of East India commodi- 
ties to the value  of a million,  to be paid in a month ; 
within a month a million  must be returned into Hol- 
land :  this presently raises the exchange, and the traders 
in exchange sell their  bills  at high rates ;  but the ba- 
bnce of trade being (as is supposed in the case) equal 
in all other  commodities, this  million  can no way be 
repaid  to their  correspondents,  on whom  those bills 
were drawn, but by sending them money or bullion to 
reimburse them. 
This is the true reason why the bullion brought from 
Spain is not carried to  the mint to be coined, but bought 
by traders in foreign exchange, and exported by them, 
to supply the overplus of our  expenses  there, which 
are  not paid  for  by our  commodities.  Nor will  the 
proposed raising of our money, as it is called, whether 
we coin our money for the future one-thirtieth, or one- 
twentieth, or one-half lighter than now it is, bring one 
ounce more to the mint than now, whilst our affairs in 
this respect remain in the same posture.  And I chal- 
lenge the author to show that it will ;  for saying is but 
saying.  Bullion  can never  come  to the mint to be 
coined, whilst the over-balance of trade and foreign ex- 
penses are so great, that to satisfy them, not only the 
bullion your trade in some parts now yearly brings in, 
but also some of ywr  formerly coined  money is requi- 
site, and must be sent out :  but when a change in that 
brings in and lodges bullion here,  (for now it seems it 
only passes through England) the increase of silver and 
gold  staying in  England will  again  bring  it  to the 
mint to be coined. 
This makes it easily intelligible how comes it to pass 
that, when now at the mint  they can give but 5s. 2d. 
per ounce for silver, they can give 5s. 4d. the ounce in 
Lombard-street, (which is what our author means when 
he says, '' silver is now worth but 5s.  Bd. the ounce at 
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reason whereof is plain,  viz. 13ecause the mint,  giving 
weighty money for  bullion, can  give  so  much and no 
more  for  silver than  it is coined  at, which  is 5s.  Bd. 
the ounce,  the public  paying all the odds that is be- 
tween coined  and  uncoined  silver, which is the manu- 
facture of coinage :  but the banker, or returner of mo- 
ney, having  use  for  silver  beyond  sea, where  he can 
make his profit  of  it, by answering bills  of exchange, 
which he sells dear, must either send our money in spe- 
cie, or melt  down  our  coin to transport, or else with 
it buy bullion. 
Tlie sending our money in specie, or melting it down, 
has some hazard, and  therefore, if he  could have bul- 
lion  for 5s. Bd. per  ounce, or a  little  dearer, it is like 
he would  always rather choose  to exchange corn  for 
bullion,  with some little loss, rather  than run the risk 
of melting it down for exportation. 
But  this would scarce make him pay 2d. in the crown, 
which is almost three and a half per cent., if there were 
not  something  more  in  it  than  barely  the risk  of 
melting, or exportation ; and that is  the lightness of 
the greatest part of  our  current coin.  For example, 
N. has given bills  for  thirty thousand pounds sterling 
in Flanders, and so has need of ten thousand weight of 
silver to be transported thither ;  he has thirty thousand 
pounds sterling by him  in ready money, whereof five 
thousand pounds is weighty milled money ;  what shall 
hinder him then from  throwing that into his melting- 
pot, and so reducing it to bullion  to be transported? 
But what  shall he do for  the other twenty-five thou- 
sand pounds, which, though he has by him, is yet clip- 
~ed  and light money, that is  at least  twenty per cent. 
lighter than the standard? If he transports  or melts 
down this, there is so much clear loss to him; it is there- 
fore more  advantage to him  to buy bullion  at 5s. Bd. 
the ounce with that light money, than to transport or 
melt it down;  wherein,  though the seller  of  the bul- 
lion has less weight in silver than he parts with, yet he 
finds his account, as ~nuch  as if he received it in weighty 
coin, whilst a  clipped  crown-piece,  or shilling,  passes 
as well  in  payment  for  any commodity here in Eng- 
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land  as  a  milled one.  Thus our mint is  kept from 
coining. 
But this paper,  For encouraging  the coining,  &c. 
would fain have the mill  at work, though there be  no 
grist to be  had,  unless you  grind  over again what  is 
ground already, and pay toll for it  a second time :  a pro- 
position fit only for the miller himself to make; for the 
meanest housewife in the country would laugh at it, as 
soon as proposed.  However, the author  pleases him- 
self, and thinks he has a good argument to make it pass, 
viz. because the toll to be paid for it will not amount to 
three hundred and thirty thousand pounds, as is said in 
a late treatise about raising the value of money, p. 170; 
for,  he says,  that writer  is mistaken in  saying  that 
"  3s. and Gd. is allowed at  the mint  for the coinage of 
every pound troy,"  whereas there is but sixteen-pence 
halfpenny there  allowed for the same ;  which sixteen- 
pence halfpenny  being  above  one-third  of  3s.  6d.  it 
follows by his own computation, that the new coining 
our money will cost the nation above one hundred and 
ten thousand pounds ; a small sum,  in this our plenty 
of riches, to be laid out for  the purchasing  these fol- 
lowing inconveniencies,  without  any the least advan- 
tage. 
1. A loss to the  king of  one-thirtieth  (if  you coin 
your  money Bd. per  crown, one-twentieth, if you coin 
your money 3d. per  crown  lighter) of all his standing 
revenue. 
2. A  like loss  of  one-twentieth, or  one-thirtieth, in 
a11 rents  that are settled;  for these  have, during the 
term, the nature of rent-sec :  but five per cent. loss in 
a man's  income  he thinks  so little, it will not be  per- 
ceived. 
3. Trouble to merchants in their trade.  These  in- 
conveniencies he is forced  to allow.  He might have 
said disorder to all people in their trade, though he says 
it will be but a little trouble to merchants, and without 
any real damage to trade.  The author would  have 
done well  to have  made  out this, and  a great many 
other  assertions  in  that paper ;  but saying  is  much 
easier, if that may pass for proof. 
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above-mentioned,  in  the conclusion  of  his  paper,  in 
these words : "  And he that so grossly mistakes in  so 
material points  of what  he would assert, it is plain  is 
not free  from  mistakes."  It does not  appear  that he 
who published that book ever thought himself free from 
mistakes; but he that mistakes in two material points 
niay be in the right in two others, and those will still 
need an answer.  But one of these material points will, 
I think,  by what  is  already said, appear not  to be  a 
mistake ;  and for any thing the author of the paper hath 
said, or can say, it will  always be true, that an ounce 
of  silver  coined,  or  not coined  is,  and  eternally will 
be, of equal value to any other ounce of silver.  As to 
any other mistake  concerning the rate of  coinage, it 
is like he had his  information  from some disinterested 
person, whom he thought worthy of credit.  And whe- 
ther it be 3s. 6d.,  as he was told, or only sixteen-pence 
halfpenny per pound  troy, as the paper says, whether 
the reader will believe  the one  or  the other, or think 
it worth  his more  exact  inquiry,  this  is  certain,  the 
kingdom ought not to be at  that, or any other charge, 
where there is no advantage, as  there will  be none  in 
this proposed coinage, but quite the contrary. 
In his answer to 
Object. 1. He says from Edw. 111. "  Silver has from 
time to time  (as  it grew in  esteem)  been by degrees 
raised  in all  mints."  If  an ounce  of silver  now not 
exchanging  or paying for what one-tenth of an ounce 
would  have  purchased  in Edward  the Third's  time, 
and so being ten times less worth now than it was then, 
be growing in esteem, this author is in the right ;  else 
silver has  not,  since Edward the Third's  reign, from 
time to time grown in esteem.  Be  that as it will, he 
assigns a wrong  cause  of raising  of silver, as he calls 
it, in our  mint.  For if growing  thus in request, i. e. 
by lessening its value, had been the reason of altering 
our money, this change of coin, or raising the denomi- 
nation of silver in ours, and other mints, ought to have 
been greater by much, since Henry the Seventh's time, 
than it was between that and Edward the Third's; be- 
cause the great change of the value  of silver has been 
made  by  the  plenty  of  it poured  into  this part  of 
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the  world  from the West Indies,  not discovered  till 
Henry the Seventh's reign.  So that I think I may say, 
that the value  of  silver  from Edward  111.  to Henry 
VII. changed not one-tenth, but from Henry VII. till 
now  it changed above  seven-tenths ; and yet,  money 
having  been  raised  in our mint  two-thirds since Ed- 
ward the Third's time, the far greater part of the rais- 
ing of  it was  before Henry the Seventh's  time, and a 
very small part of it since ;  so that the cause, insinuated 
by our author, it is evident, was not the cause of lessen- 
ing our coin  so  often, whatever it was : and it is pos- 
sible there wanted not men  of projects  in those days, 
who for private ends, by wrong suggestions, and false 
reasonings,  covered with  mysterious  terms,  led  those 
into mistakes, who had not the time and will nicely to 
examine ;  though a  crown-piece  three times as big as 
one of ours now, might, for its size alone, deserve to be 
reformed. 
To Object. 2 he  says, "  The raising the denomina- 
tion of  money in Spain  and Portugal, was  making it 
go for more when  coined than its true value." 
This, I say, is impossible, and desire the author to 
prove it.  It did in Spain and Portugal, just what it 
will do here and every where ;  it made not the silver 
coined go for more  than its value, in all  things to be 
bought, but  just so much as the denomination wasraised, 
just so  much  less  of commodity had  the buyer in ex- 
change for it : as it would be  here, if you should coin 
sixpences into shillings;  if  any  one  went  to market 
with this  new money, he would  find  that, whereas he 
had a bushel of wheat last week for eight shillings of the 
former coin, he would have  now but half a bushel for 
eight of the  new shillings, when the same denomination 
had but half the quantity of silver.  Indeed those who 
were to receive  money upon  former  contracts would 
be defrauded of half their due, receiving,  in their full 
tale of  any denomination  contracted for, but half the 
silver they should have ;  the cheat whereof they would 
find, when they went to market with their new money. 
For this I have above proved, that one ounce of silver 
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of silver; and all that can possibly put a difference be- 
tween them is  only  the different  value  of  the work- 
manship bestowed on  one  more  than another, which 
in coinage,  3ur  author  tells in this paper, is  but six- 
teen-pence halfpenny per pound troy.  I demand there- 
fore of  our  author, to show that any sort of coinage, 
or, as he calls it, raising of money,  can raise the value 
of coincd silver, or make it  go for more than uncoined, 
bating the charge of coinage ;  unless it be to those who, 
being to receive money upon former contracts, will, by 
receiving  the tale agreed for, receive  less than  they 
should  of  silver,  and  so  be defrauded  of  what  they 
really contracted for. 
What effect such a raising of their money had in one 
particular,  I will  tell  our  author.  In Portugal they 
count their money by reys, a very small, or rather ima- 
ginary coin, just as if we here should count all our sums 
by farthings. It  pleased the government, possibly being 
told that it would  raise  the value  of their money, to 
raise in  denomination  the several  species,  and make 
them go for a greater (let us suppose double) the  num- 
ber of reys than formerly.  What  was the consequence ? 
It not  only  confounded  the property  of  the subject, 
and disturbed  affairs  to  no  purpose;  but  treaties 
of  commerce  having  settled the rates of  the customs 
at so  many  reys  on  the  several  commodities,  the 
king  immediately lost in  the value  half his  customs. 
The  same  that  in  proportion  will  happen  in  the 
settled revenue  of  the crown here,  upon  the  pro- 
posed change. 
For though our author in these words, "  whereas all 
now desired by this act is to keep silver, when coined, 
of the same value it was before,"  would insinuate, that 
this raising the denomination, or lessening our coin, as 
is proposed,  will  do no  such thing; yet it is demon- 
stration, that when our coin is lessened 3d. in 5s., the 
king will receive five per cent. less in value in his cus- 
toms, excise, and all his  settled revenue, and  so pro- 
portionably, as the quantity of  silver,  in every species 
of our coin, shall be made less than now it is coined in 
those of the same denomination. 
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But, whatever our author means by  cc making money 
go for  more  when  coined  than  its true value,  or by 
keeping silver, when  coined, of  the same value it was 
before ;" this is evident, that raising their money thus, 
by coining it with less  silver in it than it had  before, 
had not  the effect in Portugal and Spain, which  our 
author proposes from it here :  from it has not brought 
one  penny  more  to the  mint  there,  nor  kept  their 
money,  or silver, from exportation  since, though for- 
feiture and death be the penalties joined in aid to this 
trick of raising to keep it in. 
But our author tells us in answer to Object 4.  This 
sc will scarce ever at  all be perceived."  If of 100 guineas 
a man has in his pocket, five should be picked out,  so 
he should not perceive it, the fraud and the loss would 
not be one  jot the less ;  and though he perceived it not 
when,  or how  it was  done,  yet he will  find  it in his 
accounts, and the going so much back in his estate at 
the end of the year. 
To  Object 3 he says, The "  raising your coin (it may 
be) may raise the price of  bullion here in England." 
An ounce of  silver will  always be equal in value to an 
ounce of  silver every where,  bating the workmanship. 
I say it is impossible to be otherwise, and require our 
author to show it possible in England, or any where, or 
else hereafter to spare his "may  be."  To  avoid fallacies, 
I desire to be understood, when I use the word silver 
alone, to mean nothing but silver,  and to lay aside the 
consideration of baser metals that may be mixed with 
it :  for I do not say that an ounce of standard, that has 
almost one-twelfth of copper in it, is of equal value with 
an  ounce of fine silver that has no alloy at all ;  but that 
any two ounces of equally alloyed silver will always be 
of  equal value;  the silver being the measure of  com- 
merce, it is the quantity of silver that is in every piece 
he receives, and not the denomination of  it, which the 
merchant looks after, and values it by. 
But  this raising of the denomination our author would 
have pass, because it will be "better  for the possessors 
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who now in England are possessed of so much bullion? 
or what private men are there in England of that con- 
sideration, that  for their advantage all our money should 
be new coined,  and of  a less weight, with  so great a 
charge to the nation, and loss to his majesty's revenue? 
He farther adds, Answer 3,  It doth not thence in- 
evitably follow,  it will raise "  the price of  bullion be- 
yond sea." 
It will  as inevitably follow, as that nineteen ounces 
of  silver will  never  be  equal in weight,  or mrth, to 
twenty ounces of  silver : so much  as you lessen your 
coin, so much more you must pay in tale, as will make 
the quantity  of  silver  the  merchant  expects  for  his 
commodity;  under what  denomination  soever  he re- 
ceives it. 
The clothier, thus buying his Spanish wool, oil, and 
labour,  at five  per  cent.  more in denomination,  sells 
his woollen manufacture proportionably dearer to the 
English merchant, who,  exporting it to Spain, where 
their money is not changed, sells it at  the usual market- 
rate, and so brings home the same quantity of  bullion 
for it %hich he was wont;  which,  therefore,  he must 
sell to you at the same raised value your money is at : 
and what then is gained by all this ?  The denomination 
is only changed to the prejudice of the public ;  but as 
to  all the great matters of your trade, the same quantity 
of silver is paid for commodities as before, and they sold 
in their several f~reign  markets for the same quantity 
of silver.  But whatever happens in the rate of foreign 
bullion,  the raising of the denomination of  our money 
will  bring none of  it to our mint to be coined ;  that 
depends on the balance of our trade, and not on lessen- 
ing our coin under the same denomination :  for whether 
the pieces we call crowns be coined 16,24, or 100 grains 
lighter, it will be all one as to the value of  bullion, or 
the bringing more or less of  it into England or to our 
mint. 
What  he says in his answer to Object. 4, besides what 
we have already taken notice of,  is partly against his 
bill,  and partly mistake. 
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1.  He says,  cc It may be some (as it is now) gain to 
those, that will venture to melt down  the milled  and 
hea-ry  money  now  coined."  That  men  do venture 
to melt down the milled  and heavy money is  evident, 
from the  small  part of  milled  money  is  now  to be 
found  of  that  great  quantity  of  it  that  has  been 
coined ;  and a farther evidence is this, that milled mo- 
ney will now yield four or five more per cent. than the 
other, which must be to melt down and use as bullion, 
and not as money in ordinary payments.  The reason 
whereof is, the shameful and horrible debasing, (or as 
our author would have it, raising) our unmilled money 
by  clipping. 
For the odds betwixt  milled  and unmilled  money 
being now, modestly speaking, above twenty per cent., 
and bullion,  for reasons elsewhere given, being not to 
be had,  refiners,  and such as have need of  silver, find 
it the cheapest way to buy milled money for clipped, 
at  four, five, or more per cent. loss. 
I ask, therefore, this gentleman, What shall become 
of all our present milled  and heavy money,  upon  the 
passing of this act?  To  which his paper almost confesses, 
what I will venture to answer for him, viz.  that, as soon 
as such a law is passed,  the milled  and heavy money 
will  all be  melted  down; for it being  five per cent. 
heavier, i.  e. more worth than what is to be coined in 
the mint,  nobody will  carry it thither to receive  five 
per cent. less for it, but sell it to such as will give four, 
or four and a half per cent. more for it, and at that rate 
melt it down with advantage :  for Lombard-street is too 
quick-sighted,  to give sixty ounces of  silver  for  fifty- 
seven ounces of  silver, when  bare throwing it into the 
melting-pot will make it change for its equal weight. 
So that by this law five per cent. gain on all our milled 
money will be given to be shared between the possessor 
and the melter of our milled money, out of the honest 
creditor and landlord's pocket, who had the guaranty 
of the law, that under such a tale of pieces, of such a 
denomination as he let his land for, he should have to 
such a value,  i.  e.  such a weight in silver.  Now I ask, 
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against this bill,  that he confesses,  that it will  be -  n 
gain  to  those,  who  will  melt  down  the milled  and 
heavy money,"  with so much loss to the public;  and 
not,  as he says, " with very small loss to those,  that 
shall  be  paid  in  the new,"  unless  he calls  five per 
cent. very small loss ;  for just so much is it to receive 
but fifty-seven  grains,  or ounces  of  silver,  for  sixty, 
which  is  the  proportion  in making  your  crowns 3d. 
lighter.  This is certain, nobody will pay away milled 
or weighty crowns for debts,  or commodities,  when it 
will  yield  him  four  or  five  per  cent.  more;  so  that 
which is now  left of  weighty  money,  being scattered 
up and down the kingdom,  into private hands, which 
cannot tell how to melt it down, will  be kept up and 
lost to our trade.  And,  as to your clipped  and light 
money, will  you make a  new act for coinage, without 
taking any care for that? The making a new standard 
for your money cannot do less than make all money, 
which  is lighter than that standard, unpassable;  and 
thus  the milled  and  heavy  money  not  coming  into 
payment, and the light and clipped not being lawful 
money,  according  to  the  new  standard,  there  must 
needs be a sudden stop of trade, and it is to be feared, 
a general confusion of affairs ;  though our author says, 
"  it will not any ways interrupt trade." 
2.  The latter part of  the section, about raising the 
value of  land, I take the liberty to say is a mistake ; 
which, though a sufficient reply to an assertion without 
proof, yet I shall not so far imitate this author as barely 
to say things :  and therefore, I shall add this reason for 
what I say,  viz.  Because  nothing can truly raise  the 
value,  i.  e. the rent of  land, but the increase of  your 
money :  but  because raising the value of land is a phrase, 
which,  by its uncertain  sense,  may deceive  others, we 
may reckon up these several.  meanings of it. 
1. The value  of  land is  raised,  when  its intrinsic 
worth is increased, i. e. when it is fitted to bring forth 
a greater quantity of any valuable product.  And thus 
the value of land is raised only by good husbandry. 
2. The value of  land is raised, when,  remaining  of 
the same fertility, it  comes to yield more rent, and thus 
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its value  is raised  only by  a  greater plenty of  money 
and treasure. 
3. Or it may be raised  in  our  author's vny, which 
is,  by  raising the rent in tale of  pieces, but not in the 
quantity of  sllver  received  for  it; which,  in truth, is 
no raising it at all, any more than it could be accounted 
the raising of a man's rent, if  he let his land this ).ear 
for  forty sixpences, which last year lie  let for twenty 
shillings.  Nor would it alter the case, if he should call 
those  forty  sixpences  forty  shillings;  for  having  but 
half the silver of  forty shillings in them, they would be 
a lon \Ifere  but of half the value, however their denomin  t' 
changed. 
In his answer to the fifth ob-jection, there is this dan- 
gerous insinuation, That coin,"in any country where it 
is coined, goes not by weight, i. e.  has its value from 
the stamp and denomination, and not the quantity of 
silver in it.  Indeed in contracts already made, if your 
species be by law coined a fifth part lighter, under the 
same denomination,  the creditor must take a  hundred 
such light shillings, or twcnty such light crown-pieces 
for 51.  if the law calls  them so, but he loses one-fifth, 
in the intrinsic value of  his debt.  But, in bargains to 
be made,  and things to be purchased,  money has, and 
will always have, its value from the quantity of  silver 
in it, and not from the stamp and denomination, as has 
been al.ready proved, and will,  some time  or other,  be 
evidenced with a witness, in the clipped money.  And 
if it were not so, that the value of money were not ac- 
cording to the quantity of silver in it, i.  e. that it goes 
by weight, I see no reason why clipping should be so 
severely punished. 
As to foreigners, he is forced to confess, that it is all 
one what our money is, greater or less, who regard only 
the quantity of  silver they sell  their  goods  for; how 
then can the lessening our money bring more plenty of 
bullion into England or to the mint? 
But he says, a The owners and importers of  silver 
will find a good market at the mint,"  &c.  But always 
n better in Lombard-street,  and not a  grain of  it will 
come  to the mint,  as long as by an under-balance of 
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trade, or other foreign expenses, we contract debts be- 
yond sea, which require the remitting of greater sums 
thither, than are imported in  bullion.  a If  for above 
forty years  after  silver was  raised, in the forty-third 
year of queen Elizabeth, from 5s. to 5s. 2d. the ounce, 
uncoined  silver  was  not  worth  above  4s.  10d.  per 
ounce;"-the  cause was  not  that raising  of  silver in 
the mint, but an over-balance of  trade, which bringing 
in an increase of  silver yearly,  for which men  havin 
no occasion abroad, brought it to the mint to be coine$ 
rather than let it lie dead by them in bullion :  and when- 
ever that is the case again in England, it will occasion 
coining again, and not till  then.  "  No money was in 
those days exported,"  says he ; no, nor bullion neither, 
say I ;  why should, or how could it, when our exported 
merchandize paid  for all the commodities we brought 
home, with an overplus of silver and gold, which, stay- 
ing here,  set the mint on work.  But the passing this 
bill will not hinder the exportation of one ounce either 
of  bullion  or money, which  must gc,,  if  you  contract 
debts beyond sea ;  and how its having been once melted 
in  England,  which  is  another thing proposed  in this 
bill,  shall hinder  its exportation,  is hard to conceive, 
when even coining has not been able to do it, as is de- 
monstrable, if it be examined what vast sums of milled 
money have been coined in the two last reigns, and how 
little of  it is now left.  Besides,  if the exportation of 
bullion should be brought under any greater difficulty 
than  of  any other commodity,  it is  to be considered 
whether  the management  of  that trade,  which  is  in 
skilful hands,  will  not thereupon be  so ordered,  as to 
divert  it from coming  to England  for the future, and 
cause it to be sent from Spain directly to those places 
where  they know English  debts will  make it turn to 




RAISING  THE VALUE 
MONEY. 
WHEREIN 
MR.  LOWNDES'S  ARGUMENTS  FOR  IT,  IN HIS  LATE REPORT CON- 
TAlNING "  AN  ESSAY FOR  THE  AMENDMENT  OF THE  SILVER 
COINS;'  ARE PARTICULARLY EXAMINED. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
SIR  JOHN SOMMERS,  KNT. 
LORD KEEPER OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ESGLAND,  AND  ONE OF HIS 
MAJESTY'S  MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY-COUNCIL. 
MY LORD, 
THE  papers I here  present  your lordship  are in sub- 
stance the same with one which I delivered to you in 
obedience  to the commands I received,  by your lord- 
ship,  from  their  excellencies  the lords justices;  and 
with another, which I writ in answer to some questions 
your lordship was pleased to propose to me, concerning 
our coin.  The approbation your lordship was pleased 
to give them  then has been  an encouragement to me 
to  revise them now,  and put them  in  an order fitter 
to comply with  their desires, who will  needs  have me 
print something at this time on this subject :  and could 
any thing of this nature be received with indifferency 
in this age, the allowance they have had from your lord- 
ship, whose great and clear judgment  is, with general 
consent  and  applause,  acknowledged  to be  the just 
measure of right  and wrong amongst us,  might make 
me hope  that they might  pass  in the world without 
any great dislike. 
However, since your lordship thought they might be 
of use to clear some difficulties, and rectify some wrong 
notions,  that are taken up about money, I have ven- 
tured them into the world,  desiring  no  mercy to any 
erroneous positions,  or wrong  reasonings, which shall 
be found  in them.  I shall never knowingly be of  any 
but truth's and  my country's  side ; the former I shall 
always gladly embrace and own, whoever shows it me: 
and in  these  papers, I am  sure, I have  no other aim 
but to do what little 1 can for the service of my coun- 
try.  I'our  lordship's so evideiitIy preferring that to a11 other considerations, does, in the eyes of all men, sit so 
well upon  you,  that my ambition will  not be blamed, 
if I in this propose to myself so great an example, and 
in my little sphere am moved by the same principle. 
I have a long time  foreseen  the mischief  and ruin 
coming upon us by clipped money, if it were not timely 
stopped: and had  concern  enough  for  the public,  to 
make me print some thoughts touching our coin, some 
years  since.  The principles I there went  on I see no 
reason  to  alter:  they  have,  if  I mistake  not,  their 
foundation in nature,  and will  stand;  they have their 
foundation in nature, and are clear ; and will be so, in 
all  the train  of  their  consequences,  throughout this 
whole (as it  is thought)mysterious business of money, to 
all those, who will but be at  the easy trouble of stripping 
this  subject  of  hard,  obscure,  and  doubtful words, 
wherewith men are often  misled,  and mislead others, 
And now the disorder is come to extremity, and can no 
longer be played with, I wish it may find a sudden and 
effectual cure, not a remedy in sound and appearance, 
which may flatter us on to ruin,  in a continuation of a 
growing mischief, that calls for present help. 
I wish too that the remedy may be  as easy as pos- 
sible; and that the cure of  this evil be not ordered so, 
as to lay a great part of the burden unequally on those 
who have had no particular hand in it.  Westminster- 
hall is so great a witness  of  your lordship's unbiassed 
justice, and steady care to preserve  to every one their 
right, that the world will not wonder you should not be 
for such a lessening our coin, as will, without any rea- 
son, deprive great numbers of blameless men of a fifth 
part of their estates, beyond the relief of Chancery.  I 
hope this age will escape so  great a blemish.  I douht 
not  but there  are many, who, for the service of their 
country, and for the support of the government, would 
gladly part with, not only one-fifth, but a much larger 
portion of  their estates.  But when  it shall be taken 
from them, only to be  bestowed  on men,  in their and 
the common opinion, no better deserving of their coun- 
try than themselves,  unless  growing exceedingly rich 
by the public necessities,  whilst every body else  finds 
his fortune straitened by them, be  a public merit, that 
deserves a public and signal reward ;  this loss of  one- 
fifth of  their debts and income will sit  heavy on them 
who shall feel it, without  the alleviation of  any profit, 
or credit, that will thereby accrue to the nation by such 
a lessening of our coin. 
If any one ask,  how I, a retired, private man,  come 
at this time to  meddle with money and trade, for they are 
inseparable ?  I reply, that your lordship, and the other 
great men that put me upon it,  are answerable for it : 
whether what I say  be  to  the purpose or  no,  that I 
myself  am  answerable  for.  This I can answer to all 
the world, that I have not said any thing  here, without 
a  full persuasion  of  its  truth;  nor  with  any other 
motive, or purpose, than the clearing of this artificially 
perplexed,  rather  than  in itself  mysterious,  subject, 
as far as  my poor talent  reaches.  That which,  per- 
haps,  I shall not be  so  well able to answer  to your 
lordship and myself, is the liberty I have taken, in such 
an address as this, to profess that I am, 
My Lord, 
Your lordship's  most humble, 
and most obedient servant, 
JOHN LOCKE. PREFACE. 
THOUGH  Mr. Lowndes and I differ in the way, yet, 
I assure myself, our end is the same ; and that we both 
propose  to ourselves the service of  our country.  He 
is a man known so able in  the post he is in, to which 
the business  of  money  peculiarly  belongs;  and  has 
showed himself so learned in  the records  and matters 
of the mint, and so exact in calculations and combina- 
tions of  numbers relating  to our coin,  either already 
in use,  or designed by him,  that I think I shoulci have 
troubled the public  110  more  on  this subject, had not 
he himself engsged me in it ;  and brought it to that pass, 
that either I must be thought to renounce my own opi- 
nion, or must publicly oppose his. 
Whilst his treatise was yet a manuscript, and before 
it was laid before those great persons,  to whom it was 
afterwards submitted, he did me the favour to show it 
to me; and made me  the compliment  to ask me  my 
opinion of it.  Though we had some short discourse on 
the subject, yet the multiplicity of  his  business, whilst 
I staid in town, and my health, which soon after forced 
me out of it, allowed us not an occasion to debate any 
one point thoroughly, and bring it to an issue.  Before 
I  returned  to  town,  his  book  was  in the press,  and 
finished before I had an opportunity to see Mr. Lowndes 
again.  And here he laid  a new obligation on me, not 
only in giving me one of  them, but telling me when I 
received it from his hands,  that it was the first he had 
parted with to any body.  I then went over it a second 
time,  and having  more  leisure to consider  it,  I found 
there were a great many particulars in it drawn out of 
~nciellt  records, not comlnonly known, wherewith  he 
had obliged the ~vorld. These, which  very pleasingly 
entertained me, though they prevailed not on me to be 
of his opinion every where, yet,  joined  with the great 
civilities he had shown me, left me in  a disposition so 
little inclined to oppose  any thing in  it, that I should 
rather  have chosen to acknowledge myself in print to 
be his  convert, if  his  arguments  had  convinced  me, 
than to have troubled the world with the reasons why 
I dissent from him. 
In this disposition, my pen rested from meddling any 
farther with  this  subject whilst  I was  in  town; soon 
after my own health, and the death of  a friend, forced 
me into the country; and the business occasioned there- 
by, and my own private affairs, took up all my time at 
my first coming thither; and  had  continued to do so, 
had not several repeated intimations and instances from 
London, not without some reproaches ofmy backward- 
ness, made me  see  that the world  concerned me par- 
ticularly  in  Mr.  Lowndes's  postscript,  and expected 
something from me on that occasion. 
Though possibly I was  not wholly out of  his mind 
when Mr. Lowndes writ that invitation, yet I shall not 
make myself the compliment to think I alone am con- 
cerned  in it.  The great  importance  of  the matter, 
made him desire every one to contribute what he could 
to  the clearing of it, and setting it in a true light.  And 
1 must do him this right to think, that he prefers the 
public good  to his  private opinion ; and therefore is 
willing his proposals and arguments should with free- 
dom be examined to the bottom ;  that, if there be any 
mistake  in  them,  nobody  may be  misled  by  his  re- 
putation and authority, to the prejudice of his country. 
Thus I understand his  postscript, and thus I shall en- 
deavour to comply with it.  I shall, to the best of my 
skill, examine his  arguments with  all respect to him, 
and fidelity to truth, as far as I can discover it.  The 
frankness of his proceeding in particular with  me, as- 
sures me he is so great a lover of truth and right, that 
he will  not  think  himself  injured when  that is  de- fended ; and will be  glad  when  it is  made plain, hy 
whose hand soever it be. 
This  is  what  has  made  me  publish  these  papers, 
without  any derogation  to Mr. Lowndes, or  so much 
as a  suspicion  that he will  take it amiss.  I judge of 
him by myself.  For I  shall think  myself  obliged to 
any one who shall show me, or the public,  any material 
mistake in  any thing I  have  here said, whereon  any 




RAISING THE VALUE 
SILVER  is the instrument and measure of commerce 
in all the civilized and trading parts of the world. 
It is  the instrument of  commerce  by  its intrinsic 
value. 
The intrinsic value of silver, considered as money, is 
that estimate which common  consent has placed on it, 
whereby it is made equivalent to all other things, and 
consequently is the universal barter, or exchange, which 
men give and receive for other things they would pur- 
chase  or part with for  a valuable  consideration : and 
thus,  as the  wise  man  tells  us,  money  answers  all 
things. 
Silver is  the measure  of  commerce  by its quantity, 
which is the measure also of its intrinsic value.  If one 
grain of silver has  an intrinsic value in  it, two grains 
ofsilver have double that intrinsic value, and three grains 
treble, and so on proportionably.  This we have daily 
cuperience  of in  common  buying  and selling;  for  if 140  F~6rl  her Consi~lerntions  cokerning 
one ounce of silver will  buy,  i. e.  is of  equal value to, 
one l~ushel  of  wheat,  two ounces  of  silver  will  buy 
two bushels  of  the same wheat,  i.  e.  have double  the 
value. 
Hence it is  evident, that an  equal  quantity of  sil- 
ver  is  always  of  equal value to an equal quantity  of 
silver. 
This common sense, as well  as the market,  teaches 
us; for silver being all of  the  same  nature and good- 
ness, having all the same qualities,  it is  impossible but 
it should in the same quantity have the same value ;  for 
if a less  quantity of  any commodity be allowed to be 
equal in value to a greater quantity of the same sort of 
commodity,  it must  be  for  some good  quality it has, 
which the  other wants.  But silver to silver  has  no 
such difference. 
Here it will  be asked, is  not  some  silver finer than 
other ? 
I answer, one mass of mixed metal, not discerned by 
the eye to be any thing but silver, and therefore called 
silver, may have a less mixture of baser metal in it than 
another, and  so in  conlmon  speech is  said to be finer 
silver; so ducatoons having  a less  mixture  of copper 
in them than our English coin has, are said to be finer 
silver.  But the truth is, the  silver  that is in  each is 
equally fine, as will appear when the baser metal is se- 
parate  from it; and it is of  this pure or fine silver  I 
must  be  understood, when  I mention  silver; not re- 
garding the copper  or leari'which  may chance to be 
mixed with it.  For example: Take an ounce of silver, 
and one-fourth of an ounce  of copper, and melt them 
together ;  one may say of the whole mass that it is not 
fine silver ;  but it is  true there is  an ounce of fine sil- 
ver in it ;  and though this mass, weighing one  ounce 
and a quarter, be not  of equal value to one ounce and 
a quarter of fine silver, yet the ounce of fine silver in it 
is,  when  separate from  the copper, of equal value  to 
any other ounce of silver. 
By this  measure  of  commerce,  viz.  the quantity of 
silver,  men  measure  the  value  of  all other things. 
Thus to measure what the value of lead is to wheat, and 
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of  either of  them to a certain sort of  linen cloth,  the 
quantity of  silver  that  each  is valued at,  or sells for, 
needs only be known ;  for if a yard of cloth be sold for 
half an ounce of silver, a bushel of wheat for one ounce, 
and a hundred weight of  lend for two ounces ;  any one 
presently sees and says, that a bushel of wheat is double 
the value of a yard of that cloth, and but half the value 
of a hundred weight of lead. 
Some are of o$nion,  that this measure of  commerce, 
like all other measures,  is arbitrary, and may at plea- 
sure be varied, by putting more or fewer grains of silver 
in pieces of  a known denomination,  v. g. by making a 
penny or  a shilling lighter  or heavier in silver,  in a 
country  where  these  are  known  denominations  of 
pieces of  silver  money.  But they will  be of  another 
mind, when they consider, that silver is a measure of  a 
nature quite different from all other.  The yard or quart 
men measure by, may rest indifrerently in the buyers' or 
sellers', or a third person's hands, it inatters not whose 
it is.  But it is  not  so  in  silver:  it is the thing bar- 
gained  for, as well as 611e  measure of the bargain ;  and 
in commerce passes from the  buyer to the seller, as being 
in such a quantity equivalent  to the thing  sold; and 
so it not only measures the value of  the commodity it 
is applied to,  but is  given  in  exchange for  it,  as of 
equal value.  But this  it does,  (as is visible)  only by 
its quantity, and nothing else : for it must be remem- 
bered, that silver is the instrument as well as measure 
of commerce,  and is given in exchange for the things 
traded for; and, every one desiring to get as much as 
he can of it,  for  any commodity he sells,  it is by the 
quantity of  silver he gets for it in exchange, and by no- 
thing else, that he measures the  value of the commodity 
he sells. 
The coining of silver,  or making money of it, is the 
ascertaining of its quantity by a public mark, the bet- 
ter to fit it for commerce. 
In  coined silver or money, there are these three things 
which are  wanting in other silver.  1. Pieces of exactly 
the same weight and fineness.  2. A stamp set on those 142  Further  Considerations  concernirzg 
pieces by  the public authority of  that country.  3.  A 
known dellomination given to these pieces by the same 
authority. 
The stamp is  a  mark,  and,  as it were,  a  public 
voucher,  that a piece of  such denomination is of such 
a weight, and of such a fineness, i. e. has so much silver  -. 
in it. 
That precise  weight  and  fineness,  by  law  appro- 
priated to the pieces  of  each denomination,  is called 
ihe standard.  - 
Fine silver, is silvet without the mixture of any baser 
metal. 
Alloy is baser metal mixed with it. 
The  fineness of any metal appearing to be silver, and 
so called, is the proportion of silver in it, compared with 
what there is in it of baser metals. 
The fineness of standard silver in England is eleven 
parts silver  and one  part copper,  near; or,  to speak 
more exactly, the proportion of  silver to copper is as 
111 to 9.  Whatever piece, or mass, has in it, of baser 
metal, above the proportion of  9 to 111  is  worse,  or 
coarser than standard.  Whatever mass of metal has a 
less proportion than 9 to Ill, of  baser metal in it, is 
better, or finer than standard. 
Since silver is the thing sought for, and would better 
serve for the measure of commerce, if it were unmixed, 
it will possibly be  asked, "  why any mixture of baser 
metal is allowed  in money,  and what use is there of 
such  alloy,  which  serves  to  make  the  quantity  of 
silver  less  known  in  the  several  coins  of  different 
countries ?" 
Perhaps it would have been better for commerce in 
general,  and more convenient for all their subjects, if 
the princes every where,  or at least in this part of the 
world, would at first have agreed on the fineness of the 
standard to have been just one-twelfth alloy,  in round 
numbers, without those minuter fractions which are to 
be found in the alloy of most of the coin of the several 
distinct dominions  of  this part of  the world.  Which 
broken proportion of baser metal to silver, in the stand- 
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ard of the several mints, seems to have been introduced 
by the skill of men employed in coining,  to keep that 
art (as all trades are called) a mystery, rather than for 
any use or necessity there was of such broken numbers. 
But, be that as it will, the standard in our mint being 
now settled by  authority,  and established by custom, 
known at home and abroad, and the rules and methods 
of assaying suited to it, and all the wrought plate,  as 
well as coin of England, being made by that measure, 
it is of  great concernment  that it should  remain in- 
variable. 
But to the question,  What need  is there of  any 
mixture of baser metal with silver in money or plate ?" 
I answer there is great reason for it; for, 
1. Copper mixed with silver makes it harder, and so 
wears and wastes less in use than if it were fine silver. 
a. It melts easier.  3. Silver, as it is drawn and melted 
from the mine,  being  seldom perfectly fine,  it would 
be a great charge by refining to separate all the baser 
metals  from  it,  and  reduce  it to perfectly  unmixed 
silver. 
The use  of  coined  silver or  money is, that every 
man in the country,  where it is current by public au- 
thority, may, without the trouble of refining, assaying, 
or weighing, be assured what quantity of silver he gives, 
receives,  or contracts for,  under  such and such deno- 
minations. 
If this security goes not along with the public stamp, 
coining is labour to no purpose,  and puts no difference 
between coined money and uncoined bullion.  This is 
so obvious,  that I think no government, where money 
is  coined,  ever  overlooks  it; and  therefore the laws 
every  where,  when  the quantity  of  silver  has  been 
lessened in any piece carrying the public stamp, by clip- 
ping,  washing,  rounding,  &c. have  taken off  the au- 
thority of  the public stamp,  and declared it not to be 
lawful money.  This is known to be so in England, and 
every one may not only refuse any money bearing the 
public stamp, if it be clipped,  or any ways robbed of 
the due weight of its silver, hut lie that offers it in pay- 
ment  is  liable  to indictment,  fine, and imprisonment. From whence wre may see, that the use and end of  the 
public stamp is only to be a guard and voucher of  the 
qirantity of silver which men contract for; and the in- 
jury  done  to the public  faith,  in  this  point,  is  that 
whicll in clipping and false coining heightens the rob- 
bery into trcason. 
Men in their bargains contract not for denominations 
or sounds, but for the intrinsic value, which is the quan- 
tity of  silver,  by public authority,  warranted to be in 
pieces of  such denominations;  and  it is  by having  a 
~reater  quantity of  silver,  that men  thrive and grow  b  richer, and not by having a greater number of  denomi- 
nations ;  which, when they come to have need of  their 
money, ~vill  prove but empty sounds, if they do not carry 
with them the real quantity of silver expected. 
The standard once settled by public authority,  the 
quantity of  silver established under the several denomi- 
nations (I hun~bly  conceive) should not be altered till 
there were an absolute necessityshown of such n change, 
which I think can never be. 
The reason why it should not be changed is this; be- 
cause the public authority is guarantee for the perform- 
ance of  $1  legal contracts.  But men are absolved from 
the  performance of their legal contracts, if the quantity 
of  silver under settled  and legal denominations be al- 
tered ;  as is evident, if  borrowing 1001. or 400 ounces 
of silver, to repay the same quantity of  silver (for that 
is understood by the same sum, and so the law warrants 
it) or taking a lease of lands for years to come,  at the 
like rent of  1001. they shall pay both the .one and the 
other, in money coined under the same denominations, 
with one-fifth  less silver in it than  at the time of the 
bargain;  the landlord here and creditor are each de- 
frauded of twenty per cent. of what they contracted for, 
and is their due.  And I ask, how nlucll juster it would 
be thus to dissolve the contracts they had made than to 
make a law, that from henceforth all landlords and cre- 
ditors should be paid their past debts, and the rents for 
leases already made, in clipped money, twenty per cent. 
lighter than it should be  ?  80th  ways they lose twenty 
per cent. of tlieir due, and wit11 equal justice. 
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The case would be the same and legal contracts be 
avoided, if the standard should be altered, on the other 
side,  and each  species of  our coin be  made one-fifth 
heavier;  for then he that had borrowed,  or contracted 
for any sum,  could not be discharged,  by paying the 
quantity he agreed for,  but be  liable to be forced to 
pay twenty per cent. more than he bargained for, that 
IS, more than he ought. 
On the other side: Whether the creditor be forced to 
receive less, or the debtor be forced to pay more than 
his contract, the damage and injury is the same, when- 
ever a man is defrauded of  his due ;  and whether this 
will not be a public failure of justice thus arbitrarily to 
give one man's right and possession to another, without 
any fault on the suffering man's  side, and without any 
the least  advantage to the public, I shall leave to be 
considered. 
Raising of coin is but a specious word to deceive the 
unwary.  It only  gises  the usual  denomination of a 
greater quantity of  silver to a  less,  (v. g. calling four 
grains of silver a penny to-day,when five grains of silver 
made  a penny yesterday)  but adds no worth or real 
value to the silver coin, to make amends for its want of 
silver.  That  is impossible to be done ;  for it  is only the 
quantity of silver in it that is, and eternally will be, the 
measure of  its value.  And  to convince  any one  of 
this, I ask,  whether he,  that is forced  to receive  but 
320 ounces of  silver  under  the denomination  of 1001. 
(for 400 ounces of  silver which  he lent under the like 
denomination of 1001.)  will think these  320 ounces of 
silver,  however denominated, worth those 400 ounces 
he lent?  If any one can be supposed so silly, he need 
but go to the next market,  or shop,  to be  convinced, 
that men value not money by the denomination, but by 
the quantity of  silver  there  is  in  it.  One  may  as 
rationally hope to lengthen a  foot, by dividing it into 
fifteen  parts,  instead  of  twelve,  and  calling  them 
inches,  as  to  increase  the value  of  the silver,  that 
is  in  a  shilling,  by  dividing  it into fifteen parts in- 
stelad  of  twelve,  and calling them pence.  This is all 
VOL. v.  L that is  done, whenla shilling is  raised from twclvc to 
fiftecn pcnce. 
Clippilig of  money is  raisin5 it without  public  au- 
thority;  the  same  denolilination  remaining  to  the 
piece,  that  hat11  riow  less  silver  in  it than  it  had 
before. 
Altering the standard, by coining pieces  under the 
snnle denomination with lcss  silver in them than they 
formerly had,  is doing  the same thing by public au- 
thority.  The  only  odds  is,  that  by  clipping,  the 
loss is not forced  on  any one, (for  nobody is  obliged 
to receive  clipped  money);  by altering the standard, 
it is. 
Altering the standard, by raising the money, will not 
get to the public,  or bring  to the mint to be  coined, 
one  ounce  of  silver:  but will  defraud  the king,  the 
church, the universities  and hospitals, &c. of so much 
of their  settled  revenue  as the money is raised,  v. g. 
twenty per cent. if the money (as is proposed) be raised 
one-fifth. It  will weaken, if not totally destroy, the public 
faith, when all that have trusted the public, and assisted 
our present necessities, upon acts of parliament, in the 
million lottery, bank act, and other loans,  shall be de- 
frauded of twenty per cent.  of what those acts of par- 
liament were security for.  And to conclude, this raising 
our money will defraud all private men of twenty per 
cent. in all their debts and settled revenues. 
Clipping, by Englishmen, is robbing the honest man 
who receives clipped money, and transferring the silver, 
i.  e.  the value is pared  off  from it,  into the clipper's 
pocket.  Clipping by  foreigners is robbing  England 
itself; and thus the Spaniards lately robbed Portugal of 
a great part of  its treasure,  or commodities, (which is 
the same thing) by importing upon them clipped money 
of the Portugal stamp. 
Clipping,  and clipped  money,  have,  besides  this 
robbery of the public,  other great inconveniencies :  as 
the disordering of trade, raising foreign exchange,  and 
a general disturbance, wliich every one feels thereby in 
his private affairs. 
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Clipping is so gainful and so  secret  a robbery, that 
penalties cannot restrain it, as we see by experience. 
Nothing, I humbly conceive,  can put a stop to clip- 
ping, now-it is groan so universal, and men become so 
skilful in it, but making it unprofitable. 
Nothing can make clipping unprofitable, but making 
all light money go only for its weight.  This stops clip- 
ping in a moment, brings out all the milled and weighty 
money, deprives us not of  any part of our clipped mo- 
ney for the use  of  trade,  and brings  it orderly,  and 
by degrees,  and without  force,  into  the mint  to be 
recoined. 
If  clipped money be called in all at  once, and stopped 
from passing by weight, I fear it will stop trade, put our 
affairs all at a stand, and introduce confusion.  Whereas, 
if it be permitted to pass  by its weight, till it can by 
degrees be coined, (the stamp securing its fineness,  as 
well then as now, and the scales determining its weight) 
it  will serve for paying of great sums as commodiously 
almost  as  weighty  money,  and  the weighty  money, 
being  then brought  out,  will  serve  for  the  market 
trade, and less payments, and also to weigh the clipped 
money by. 
On the other side,  if clipped  money be allowed to 
pass current by tale,  till it be all recoined, one of these 
two effects will apparently follow :  either that we shall  -. - 
want money for Gnde, as ;he  clipped money decreases, 
by being  coined  into  weighty;  (for  very  few,  if  any 
body, who  get weighty money  into their  hands,  will 
part with it, whilst clipped money, not of half the value, 
is current) or if  they do, the coiners and clippers will 
pick it up, and new coin  and clip it, whereby clipped 
money will be  increased ;  so that, by this way,  either 
money will be wanting to tradc, or clipped money con- 
tinued.  If clipped money bc stopped all at once, thcrc 
is immediately a stop of  trade.  If it be permitted to 
pass in tale, as if it  were lawful, weigl~ty  money, whilst 
it is recoining,  and till all be recoined, that way also 
there will  be  an end of  tradc,  or  no  end of  clippcd 
money.  But, if it be made to  pass for its weight, till it 
be a11  recoined,  both  these evils arc avoidcd,  L 2  and the 148  Further Considerntions concerning 
weighty money,  which  we want, will  be brought out 
to Soot. 
Money is necessary to the carrying on of trade.  For 
where money fails, men cannot buy, and trade stops. 
Credit will  supply the  defect  of  it to some  small 
degree, for a little while.  But, credit being nothing but 
the expectation  of  money  within  some limited  time, 
money must be had, or credit will fail. 
Money also is necessary to us,  in a  certain propor- 
tion to the plenty of  it amongst our neighbours.  For, 
if any of our neighbours have it in a much greater abun- 
dance than we, we  are many ways obnoxious to them, 
I. They can maintain  a  greater force.  2.  They can 
tempt away our people,  by  greater wages,  to serve 
them by land or sea, or in any labour.  3. They can com- 
mand the markets,  and thereby break  our trade,  and 
make  us  poor.  4.  They can on any occasion engross 
aval and warlike stores, and thereby endanger us. 
In countries  where domestic  mines  do not supply 
it, nothing can bring in silver but tribute,  or trade. 
Tribute is the effect of  conquest:  trade,  of skill and 
industry. 
By commerce silver is brought in,  only by an over- 
balance of trade. 
An over-balance  of  trade,  is when  the quantity of 
commodities which we send to any country do more 
than pay for those we bring from thence :  for then the 
overplus is brought home in bullion. 
Bullion is  silver,  whose workmanship has no value. 
And thus foreign coin hath no value here for its stamp, 
and our coin is bullion in foreign dominions. 
It is useless  and labour in vain  to coin  silver,  im- 
~orted  into any country, where it is not to stay. 
Silver imported cannot stay in any country in which, 
by an over-balance of their whole trade, it is not made 
theirs,  and doth not become  a real increase of  their 
wealth. 
If, by a general balance of its trade, England yearIy 
sends out commodities to the value of  four  hundred 
thousand ounces of  silver  more than the commodities 
we bring home from abroad cost us,  there is one hun- 
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dred thousand  pounds  every year clear again ;  which 
will  come home in money,  be a  real increase  of  our 
wealth, and will stay here. 
On the other side, if, upon a general balance of our 
whole trade, we yearly inlport commodities from other 
parts  to  the value  of  a  hundred  thousand  pounds 
more than our commodities exported pay for, we every 
year grow a hundred  thousand  pounds poorer.  And 
if,  besides  that,  we should  also  import  a  million  in 
bullion from Spain every year, yet it  is not ours; it is no 
increase to our wealth, nor can it stay here;  but must 
be exported  again, every grain of  it,  with a hundred 
thousand pounds of our own money to boot. 
I have  heard  it  proposed,  as  a way  to keep our 
money here,  that we should pay our debts contracted 
beyond seas by bills of exchange. 
The idleness of such a proposition will appear, when 
the nature of exchange is a little considered. 
Foreign  exchang?  is  the paying  of  money in one 
country, to receive it in another. 
The exchange is high,  when a man pays for bills of 
exchange above the par.  It is low, when he pays less 
than the par. 
The par is a certain  number  of  pieces of  the coin 
of  one country, containing in them  an equaI quantity 
of  silver to that in another number  of  pieces of  the 
coin of another country :  v.  g. supposing 36 skillings of 
Holland to have just as much silver in them as 20 En- 
glish shillings,  Bills of exchange drawn from England 
to Holland  at the rate of  36 skillings Dutch for each 
pound sterling, is according to the par.  He  that pays 
the money here,  and receives it there, neither gets nor 
loses by the exchange ;  but  receives just the same quan- 
tity of silver in the one place, that he parts with in the 
other.  But if he pays one  pound  sterling to receive 
but  30 skillings in Holland, he pays one-sixth more than 
the par, and so pays  one-sixth  more silver for the ex- 
change, let the sum be what it will. 
The reason of  high  exchange  is the buying  much 
commodities in any foreign country, beyond the value 
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glishmcn have need of  great sums there, and this raises 
the exchange,-or price of bills.  For what grows more 
into demand, Increases presently in price. 
Returning money  by  exchange  into  foreign parts 
keeps not one farthing from going out ;  it only prevents 
the more  troublesome  and hazardous way of  sending 
money in specie, forwards and backwards.  Bills of ex- 
change are sent more commodiously, and by scrips of 
paper even the accounts between particular debtors and 
creditors, in different countries, as far as the commerce 
between those two places is equivalent :  but where the 
over-balance,  on  either side,  demands payment, there 
bills  of  exchange  can  do nothing;  but  bullion,  or 
money in specie, must be sent.  For in a country where 
we owe money,  and  have  no debts owing to us, bills 
will not  find credit,  but for a  short time,  till money 
can be sent to reimburse those that paid them ;  unless 
we can think  men  beyond  sea will part with  their 
money for nothing.  If the traders of England owe their 
correspondents of Holland a hundred thousand pounds, 
their accounts with  all the rest of the world standing 
equal, and remaining so,  one farthing of this hundred 
thousand pounds cannot be paid by bills of exchange. 
For example, I owe  a thousand pounds of it ;  and,  to 
pay that, buy a bill of N.  here, drawn on John de  Wit 
of Amsterdam, to pay P.  Van Lore, my correspondent 
there.  The money is paid  accordingly, and thereby I 
am out  of Van Lore's  debt ;  but not one farthing of the 
debt of England to Holland is thereby paid ;  for N.  of 
whom I bought the  bill  of  exchange,  is now as much 
indebted to John de Wit,  as I was  before  to P. Van 
Lore.  Particular  debtors and creditors are only changed 
by bills  of  exchange ;  but,  the debt owing from one 
country to  the other, cannot be paid without real effects 
sent thither  to that value,  either in  commodities or 
money.  Where the balance  of  trade barely pays for 
commodities  with commodities,  there money must be 
sent, or else the debt cannot be paid. 
I have spoken of silver coin alone, because that makes 
tlie money of account and measure of trade, all through 
tlie world.  For all contracts are, 1 think, every wlierc 
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made and accounts kept in silver coin.  I am sure they 
are so in England and the neighbouring countries. 
Silver therefore, and  silver  alone, is the measure of 
commerce.  Two metals, as gold and silver, cannot be 
the measure  of commerce both  together in any coun- 
try; because the measure of commerce must be perpe- 
tually the same, invariable, and keeping the same pro- 
portion of value in all its parts.  But so only one metd 
does, or can do to itself: so silver is to silver, and gold 
to gold.  An ounce of silver  is always  of equal value 
to an ounce of silver, and an ounce of gold to an ounce 
of gold; and two ounces of  the  one  or  the other, of 
double the value to an ounce  of the same.  But gold 
and silver change their value one to another :  for sup- 
posing them to be in value as sixteen to one now; per- 
haps the next month  they may be as fifteen and three 
quarters, or fifteen and seven-eighths to one.  And one 
may as well make a measure, u. g. a yard, whose parts 
lengthen and shrink, as a measure of trade of materials 
that have no-t always a settled, invariable value to one 
another. 
One metal, therefore, alone can be the money of ac- 
count and contract; and the measure of commerce in 
any country.  The fittest  for this  use, of all other,  is 
silver, for many reasons, which need  not here be men- 
tioned.  It  is enough that  the world has agreed in it, 
and made it their common money, and, as the Indians 
rightly  call  it, measure.  All  other metals,  gold as 
well as lead, are but commodities. 
Commodities are moveables, valuable by money, the 
common measure. 
Gold, though not the money of  the world, and the 
measure  of commerce, nor  fit to be so, yet may,  and 
ought to  be coined, to ascertain its weight and fineness ; 
and such coin may safely have a price, as well as a stamp 
set upon it by public  authority;  so  the value set be 
under the market-price.  For then such pieces coined 
will be a commodity as passable  as silver money, very 
little varying  in their  price:  as guineas, which were 
coined at the value  of  20s. but passed  usually for be- 
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not having so high a value put upon them by the law, 
nobody could be  forced  to take them  to their loss at 
21s.  6d. if the price of gold should happen at any time 
to be cheaper. 
From what has been said, I think it appears, 
I. That silver is that which mankind have agreed on 
to  take and give in exchange for all commodities as an 
equivalent. 
2.  That it is  by the quantity of silver  they give or 
take, or  contract for, that they estimate  the value  of 
other  things,  and  sa,tisfy for  them;  and  thus,  by its 
quantity, silver becomes the measure of  commerce. 
3. Hence it necessarily follows, that a greater quan- 
tity of  silver  has  a  greater value; a less quantity of 
silver has a less value ;  and an equal quantity an equal 
value. 
4. That money differs from  uncoined  silver only in 
this, that the quantity of silver in each piece of money 
is ascertained by the stamp it bears ;  which is set there 
to be a 3ublic voucher of its weight and fineness. 
5.  That gold is treasure as well as silver, because it 
decays not in keeping, and never sinks much in value. 
6.  That gold is fit to be coined as well as silver ;  to 
ascertain its quantity to  those who have a mind to  traffic 
in it; but not fit to be joined with silver as a measure 
of commerce. 
7. That jewels  too are treasure,  because they keep 
without  decay, and have  constantly a  great value in 
proportion to their bulk ;  but cannot be used for mo- 
ney, because their value is not measured by their quan- 
tity, nor can they,  as gold  and  silver, be divided, and 
keep their value. 
8.  The other metals are not  treasure, becs..se  they 
decay in keeping,  and  because  of  their plenty, which 
makes their value little  in  a great bulk ;  and so unfit 
for money, commerce, and carriage. 
9.  That the  only way  to  bring  treasure into Eng- 
land, is the well ordering our trade. 
10. That the only way to bring silver and gold to the 
mint, for the increase of our stock of money and trea- 
sure, which  shall stay here, is  an  aver-balance of our 
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whole trade.  All other ways,  to increase our money 
and riches, are but projects that will fail us. 
These things premised, I shall now proceed to show 
wherein  I differ  from  Mr. Lowndes,  and  upon what 
grounds I do so. 
Mr. Lowndes  proposes, that our money  should  be 
raised  (as it is called)  one-fifth :  that is,  That all our 
present  denominations of  money,  as penny,  shilling, 
half-crown, crown, &c. should each  have one-fifth less 
silver in it,  or  be  answered with  coin of one-fifth less 
value.  How he  proposes to have it done I shall con- 
sider hereafter.  I shall  at present  only examine  the 
reasons he gives for it. 
His first reason, p.  68, he gives us  in  these words, 
a  The value of the silver in the coin ought to be raised 
to the foot of six shillings three-pence in every crown; 
because the price  of standard silver in bullion is risen 
to six shillings five-pence  an ounce." 
This reason  seems to me to labour under  several 
mistakes ;  as 
1. That standard silver can rise in respect of itself. 
2. That standard bullion is now, or ever was worth, 
or sold to  the traders in it for 6s. 5d. the ounce, of law- 
ful money of England.  For if that matter of fact holds 
not to be so, that an ounce of sterling bullion is worth 
6s. 5d. of our milled weighty money, this reason ceases: 
and our weighty crown-pieces ought not to be raised to 
6s. 3d. because  our light clipped money will  not pur- 
chase an ounce  of standard bullion, under  the rate of 
6s. 5d.  of  that light  money.  And  let me add here, 
nor for that rate neither.  If therefore the author means 
here, that an ounce of standard silver is risen to 6s. 5d. 
of our clipped money, I grant it him, and higher too. 
But then, that has nothing to do with the raising our 
lawful coin, which  remains  unclipped ; unless he will 
say too, that standard bullion is so risen, as to be worth, 
and actually to sell for, 6s. 5d. the ounce, of our weighty 
milled money.  This I not only deny, but farther add, 
that it is  impossible  to be  so.  For 6s. 5d. of milled 
money weighs  an ounce  and a  quarter near.  Can it 
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should be worth  an ounce  and a quarter of the self- 
same commodity, and of exactly the same goodness ? 
for so is standard silver to staadard silver.  Indeed, one 
has a  mark upon  it, which the other has not; but it 
is a mark that makes it rather more than less valuable : 
or if the mark, by hindering its exportation, makes it 
less  valuable  for  that purpose,  the melting-pot  can 
easily take it off. 
The complaint  made of melting down  our weighty 
money answers this  reason  evidently.  For  can it be 
supposed that a  goldsmith will  give one  ounce and a 
quarter of coined silver for one ounce of bullion ;  when, 
by putting it into his melting-pot, he can, for less than 
a penny charge, make it bullion? (For it is always to 
be remembered, what I think is  made  clear, that the 
value of silver, considered as it is money, and the mea- 
sure of commerce, is nothing but its quantity.)  And 
thus a milled shilling, which has  double the weight of 
silver in it to a current shilling, whereof half the silver 
is clipped  away, has  double the value.  And to show 
that this  is  so, I will  undertake that any  merchant, 
who has bullion to sell, shall sell it for a great deal less 
number of  shillings in tale, to any one who will  con- 
tract to pay him  in  milled  money, than if he be paid 
in the current clipped money. 
Those who  say bullion  is risen, I desire to teIl me, 
what they mean by risen? Any commodity, I think, is 
properly said to be risen,  when the same quantity will 
exchange for a greater quantity of another thing ;  but 
more particularly of  that thing, which is the measure 
of commerce in the country.  And thus corn is said to 
be risen among the English in Virginia, when a bushel 
of it will sell or exchange for more pounds of tobacco; 
amongst the Indians, when  it will sell  for more yards 
of wampompeak, which  is  their  money;  and amongst 
the English here, when it will  exchange for a greater 
quantity of  silver  than  it would  before.  Rising and 
falling of commodities are always between several com- 
modities of distinct worths.  But nobody can say that 
tobacco (of the same goodness) is risen in respect of it- 
self.  One pound of the same goodness will never ex- 
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,%ange for a  pound  and  a quarter of  the same good- 
ness.  And so it is in silver:  an ounce of silver will 31- 
ways be of equal value to an ounce of silver :  nor can 
it ever  rise or  fall  in respect  of itself:  an  ounce of 
silver can never be worth an ounce and a quar- 
ter of standard silver; nor one ounce of uncoined silver 
exchange for  an ounce and a quarter of coined  silver : 
the stamp cannot  so much  debase its value.  Indeed 
the stamp, hindering its free exportation, may make the 
goldsmith  (who profits  by the return of money)  give 
one hundred and twentieth, or one-sixtieth, or perhaps, 
one-thirtieth more, that is,  5s. 23d. 5s. 8d. 
or 5s. 4d. the ounce of coined silver for uncoined, when 
there is need  of sending silver beyond  seas; as there 
always  is, when  the balance of  trade will not supply 
our wants,  and pay our debts there.  But much  be- 
and this  the goldsmith will  never  give for bullion ;  y.  since he can make it out of coined money at a cheaper 
rate. 
It is said bullion is risen  to 6s.  5d  the ounce,  i.  e. 
that an ounce of uncoined  silver will  exchange for an 
ounce and a quarter of coined silvef.  If  any one  can 
believe this, I will put this short case to him :  He has 
of  bullion,  or standard,  uncoined  silver,  two  round 
plates,  each of an exact size and weight of a crown- 
piece:  he has besides,  of the  same bullion,  a  round 
plate of the weight and size  of a shilling, and another 
yet less, of an exact weight  and size of a three-pence. 
The two great plates being of equal weight and fine- 
ness, I suppose he will allow to be of equal value, and 
that the two less, joined to either of them, make it one- 
fifth more worth than the other is by itself, they hav- 
ing all three together  one-fifth  more  silver  in them. 
Let us suppose then one  of  the greater, and the two 
less plates to have received  the next moment, (by mi- 
racle, or by the mill, it matters not how) the mark or 
stamp of our crown, our shilling, and our three-pence: 
Can  any body say, that now they have got the stamp of 
Our mint upon them, they are so fallen in value, or the 
other unstam~ed  piece  so risen, that that unstamped 
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the other pieces, is now  worth them all three ?  Which 
is to say, that an  ounce of uncoined silver is worth an 
ounce and a quarter of coined.  This is what men would 
persuade us, when they say, that bullion is raised to 6s. 
5d. (of lawful money) the ounce, which I say is utterly 
impossible.  Let us consider this a little further, in an- 
other instance.  The present milled crown-pieces,  say 
they, will not exchangne for  an ounce of  bullion, with- 
outthe  addition ofa shilling and a three-penceofweighty 
coin added to it.  Coin but that crown-piece  into 6s. 
Sd. and then they say it will  buy an ounce of bullion, 
or else they give up their reason and measure of raising 
the money.  Do that which  is allowed  to be  equiva- 
lent to coining of a  present  milled  crown-piece  into 
6s. 3d. viz. call it 75 pence,  and then  also it must by 
this rule of raising buy an ounce of bullion.  If this be 
so, the self-same  milled  crown-piece will and will not 
exchange for an ounce  of  bullion.  Call it 60  pence, 
and it  will not :  the very next moment call it 75 pence, 
and it will.  I am afraid  nobody can think change of 
denomination has such power. 
Mr.  Lowndes  supports  this  his  first  reason  with 
these  words,  p. 68 : '' This  reason,  which I  humbly 
conceive  will  appear irrefragable,  is  grounded  upon 
a  truth so  apparent, that it may well be  compared 
to an axiom,  even in mathematical reasoning ;  to wit, 
that,  whensoever  the  intrinsic value  of  silver  in the 
coin hath been,  or shall be,  less  than the price  of 
silver  in bullion,  the coin  hath,  and will  be  melted 
down." 
This I think, though it be allowed Mr. Lowndes for 
as apparent a truth, and as certain a maxim as he could 
wish,  let  serves not at all to  his  purpose of lessening 
the corn.  For when  the coin is,  as it  should  be,  ac- 
cording to  the standard (let the standard bewhat it  will) 
weighty and unclippcd,  it is impossible that the value 
of coined silver should be  less than the value or price 
of uncoined ;  bccause,  as I have  shown, the value and 
quantity of  silver are the same :  and where the quanti- 
ties are equal, the values are equal, excepting only the 
odds that may be between bullion  that may be freely 
exported,  and coined  silver  that may not;  the odds 
scarce  ever  amounts to above t2d. per ounce, 
and rarely to above a  penny,  or  an halfpenny.  And 
this odds (whatever it be)  will  equally  belong to his 
raised milled money,  which  cannot be  exported,  as it 
will to our present milled money,  which cannot be ex- 
ported,  as I shall have occasion to show more particu- 
larly hereaftcr.  All this disorder, and a thousand others, 
come  from  light and  unlawful  money being current. 
For then it is no wonder that bullion should be kept 
up to the value of your  clipped money ;  that is,  that 
bullion should not be sold by the ounce for  less than 
6s. 5d.  whei2  that  6s. 5d. clipped money,  paid for it, 
does not weigh above an ounce.  This instance, there- 
fore,  of  the present  price of  bullion,  proves  nothing 
but that the quantity of  silver  in money governs the 
value  of  it,  and not the denomination;  as appears, 
when clipped money is brought to buy bullion.  This 
is a fair trial: silver is set against silver, and by that  is 
seen,  whether  clipped  money  be  of  the  same value 
with  weighty of  the same denomination,  or  whether 
it be not the quantity of silver  in it that regulates its 
value. 
I cannot but wonder that Mr. Lowndes,  a  man so 
well skilled in the law,  especially of the mint,  the ex- 
chequer,  and of  our money,  should all  along in this 
argument speak of  clipped  money  as if it were  the 
lawful money of England ;  and should propose by that 
(which is in effect by the clipper's  sheers) to regulate 
8 new sort of coin to  be introduced into England.  And 
if  he will  stand  to that measure,  and lessen the new 
coin to the rate of  bullion  sold  in exchange for pre- 
sent,  current,  clipped money,  to  prevent  its  being 
melted down, he must make it yet much lighter than 
he proposes ;  so that raising it,  or,  to give it its due 
name,  that lessening of  it one-fifth will not serve the 
turn : for I will be bold  to say,  that bullion  now  in 
England is nowhere to be bought by the ounce for 6s. 
5d. of  our present,  current,  clipped money.  So that 
if this rule be true,  and nothing can save the weighty 
coin from melting down, but reducing it to  the weight that clipped money is brought to,  he must lessen  the 
money in his new coin much more than one-fifth ; for 
an ounce of  standard bullion  will always be worth an 
ounce of clipped money, whether that in tale amounts 
to 6s.  5d.  Cis.  Gd.  10s.  or  any other number of  shil. 
lings or pence of the nick-named  clipped money.  For 
a piece of silver, that was coined for a shilling, but has 
but half  the silver clipped off,  in the law, and in pro- 
priety of  speech,  is  no more a shilling than a piece of 
wood,  which was  once  sealed  a yard,  is still  a yard, 
when one half of it is broken off. 
Let us consider this maxim  a  little farther :  which, 
out of  the language of  the mint,  in plain English,  I 
think amounts to thus much, viz. '(  That  when an ounce 
of  standard bullion  costs  a  greater number of  pence 
in tale,  than an ounce of  that bullion  can be coined 
into, by the standard  of  the mint,  the  coin  will  be 
melted down."  I  grant it,  if  bullion should  rise  to 
15  pence the ounce above 5s. Bd. as is now pretended ; 
which is  to say, that  an ounce of  bullion  cannot be 
bought for less than an ounce and a quarter of the like 
silver coined.  But that, as I have showed, is impossible 
to be : and every one would  be convinced of  the con- 
trary, if  we had none now but lawful money current. 
But it is no wonder, if the price and value of things be 
confounded and uncertain,  when  the measure itself is 
lost.  For we have now no lawful silver money current 
amongst us ;  and therefore cannot talk nor judge right, 
by our present, uncertain, clipped money,  of the value 
and price of things, in reference to our lawful, regular 
coin, adjusted and kept to the unvarying standard of the 
mint.  The pice of  silver in bullion  above the value 
of silver in coin, when clipping has not defaced our cur- 
rent cash (for then the odds is veryrarely above a penny, 
or twopence the ounce) is so far from being a cause of 
melting down our coin, that this price,  which is given 
above the value of  the silver in our coin, is given only 
to  preserve our coin from being melted down :  for no- 
body buys bullion at  above 5s. Pd. the ounce, (which is 
just the value) for any other reason,  but to avoid the 
crime and hazard of melting down our coin. 
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I tllink it will be agreed on  all hands,  that nobody 
will melt down our money, but for profit.  Now profit 
can be maclc by melting dolvn our motley  but only in 
two cases. 
First,  When the current pieces of  the same deno- 
mination are unequal,  and of  different weights7 somc 
heavier7 some lighter : for  then  the traders in money 
cull out tlie heavier,  and melt thern down with profit. 
This is the ordinary fault  of  coining  by the hammer, 
wherein it usually sufficed, that a bar of  silver was cut 
into as many half-cro~vns,  or shillings,  as answered its 
weight ;  without being very exact in making each 
particular piece of its due weight; whereby somc pieces 
came to be heavier and some hghter, than by the stand- 
ard they  should.  And then the heavier pieces  were 
culled out,and there was profit to be made (as one easily 
perceives)  in melting them down.  But this cause of 
melting  down  our money  is easily prevented,  by the 
exacter way of coining by the mill, in which each single 
piece is brought to its just weight.  This inequality of 
pieces of the same denomination, is to be found in our 
money,  more  than ever,  since  clipping  has  been  in 
fashion : and therefore  it is  no wonder  that, in this 
irregular state of our money, one complaint is, that the 
heavy money is melted down.  But this also the making 
clipped money go at present for its weight,  (which is 
a sudden reducing of  it to the standard) and then, by 
deerees, recoining it into milled  money,  (which is the 
ult~mate  and more complete reducing it  to the standard) 
perfectly cures. 
The other  case,  wherein  our money  comes  to be 
melted down,  is a losing trade ; or, which is the same 
thing in other words, an over-great consumption of fo- 
reign commodities.  Whenever the over-balance of fo- 
reign trade makes it difficult for our mcrchnnts to get 
bills of exchange, the exchange presently rises, and the 
returns of money raise them in proportion to the want 
of  money Englishmen have in any parts beyond  seas. 
They who thus furnish them with bills,  not being able 
to satisfy their correspondents, on whom those bills are 
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must send silver from hence to reimburse them, and re- 
pay the  money they have drawn out of  their  hands. 
Whilst bullion may be had for a small price more than 
the weight of our current cash, these exchangers gene- 
rally choose rather to buy bullion,  than  run  the risk 
of  melting down  our  coin,  which  is  criminal by the 
law.  And  thus  the matter  for  the most part went, 
whilst milled and clipped money passed promiscuously 
in payment:  for so long a  clipped half-crown  was as 
good here as a milled one, since one passed,  and could 
be had as freely as the other.  But as soon as there 
began to  be a distinction between clipped andunclipped 
money, and weighty money could no longer be had for 
the light, bullion (as was natural) arose ;  and it  would 
fali again to-morrow  to the price it was  at before,  if 
there were none but weighty money to pay for it.  In 
short, whenever the whole of our foreign trade and con- 
sumption exceeds our exportation of commodities, our 
money must go  to pay our debts so contracted, whether 
melted or not melted down.  If  the law makes the ex- 
portation of  our coin  penal,  it will be melted down ; 
if it leaves the exportation of  our coin free, as in Hol- 
land,  it will  be carried out in  specie.  One way  or 
other,  go it must,  as we  see in Spain; but whether 
melted down,  or not melted  down,  it matters little: 
our coin and treasure will be both ways equally dimi- 
nisl-  +  ,  and can be  restored  only by an over-balance 
of G  whole exportation, to our whole importation of 
consumable  commodities.  Laws  made  against  ex- 
portation of money or bullion will be all in vain.  Re- 
straint, or liberty in that matter, makes no country rich 
or poor:  as we see in  Holland, which had plenty  of 
money under  the free liberty of  its exportation,  and 
Spain in great want of  money under  the severest pe- 
nalties against carrying of it out.  But the coining, or 
not coimng our money, on the same foot it was before, 
or in bigger or less pieces,  and under whatsoever de- 
nominations  you  please,  contributes  nothing  to,  or 
against its melting down, or exportation, so our money 
be all kept,  each  species  in its full weight of  silver, 
according to the standard: for if some be heavier, and 
,*me  lighter, allowed to be current, so under the same 
denomination the heavier will  b2 melted down, where 
the temptation of profit is considerable, which in well- 
coin kept to the standard cannot be.  But 
this melting down carries not  away one  grain of  our 
treasure  out of  England.  The coming and going of 
that depends wholly upon  the balance of  our trade; 
and therefore it is a wrong conclusion which we  find, 
p. 71, '  That continuing either old  or new  coins  on 
the present foot will  be  nothing else but furnishing s 
Species to melt down at an extramgant profit, and will 
encourage a violent exportation of our silver, for thesuke 
of the gain only, till we shall have little or none left." 
For example:  let us suppose all our light money new 
coined, upon the foot that this gentlenlan would  have 
it, and all our old  milled  crowns  going for 75 pence, 
as he  proposes,  and the rest of  the old  milled  money 
prop~rtio~lably  ; I  desire  it to  be  showed  how  this 
would  hinder the exportation of  one ounce of  silver, 
whilst our affairs  are in the present  posture.  Again, 
on the other side,  supposing all our money were now 
milled coin upon the present  foot, and, our balance of 
trade  changing, our exportation of comlmdities were 
a million  more  than  our importation,  and  likely  to 
continue so yearly ;  whereof  one half was to Holland, 
and the other to Flanders, there being an equal balance 
between England and all other parts of  the world  we 
trade to :  I ask, what possible gain could  any English- 
man  make,  by  melting  down  and  carrying  out  our 
money to Holland and Flanders, when  a million was 
to come thence hither, and Engiishmen had more there 
already than they knew how to use there,  and could 
not get home without  paying  dear tliere  for  bills  of 
exchange ?  If that were the case of  our trade, the ex- 
change would presently fall here, and rise there beyand 
the par of  their money to ours, i. e. an English mer- 
chant must  give in  Holland  morc silver  for the bills 
he  bought  there,  than he should  receive upon  those 
bills  here,  if  the two sums were weighed  one against 
the other:  or run the risque  of  bringing  it hone in 
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specie.  And what then could any Englishman get by 
exporting money or silver thither ! 
These are the only two cases wherein  our coin  can 
be melted down with  profit;  and I challenge any one 
living to show me any other.  The one of  them is re- 
moved  only by a  regular just coin,  kept equal  to the 
standard :  be that what it will, it matters not, as to the 
point of melting down of the money.  The other is to 
be  removed  only  by  the balance  of  our trade  kept 
from  running  us  behind-hand, and contracting debts 
in foreign  countries  by  an over-consumption  of  their 
commodities. 
To  those who sap, that the exportation of our money, 
whether melted  down,  or not  melted  down,  depends 
wholly upon our consumption of  foreign commodities, 
and not at all upon the sizes of  the several  species of 
our money,  which will be equally exported, or not ex- 
ported, whether coined upon  the old or the proposed 
new foot : Mr. Lowndes replies : 
1. That "  the  necessity  of  foreign  expense,  and 
exportation to answer  the balance  of  trade,  may be 
diminished, but cannot in any sense be augmented, by 
raising the value of our money." 
I beg his  pardon,  if  I cannot assent  to this.  Be- 
cause the necessity of  our exportation of  money,  de- 
pending wholly upon the debts which we  contract in 
foreign parts, beyond what  our cominodities exported 
can  pay : the  coining  our money  in  bigger  or less 
pieces,  under the same or different denominations,  or 
on the present or  proposed  foot, in  itself  neither in- 
creasing those debts, nor the expenses that make them, 
can neither  augment nor diminish  the exportation of 
our money. 
2.  He  replies,  p.  72, That  melters  of  the  coin 
"  will  have  less  profit  by  fourteen-pence  halfpenny 
in the  crown,"  when  the money  is coined  upon  the 
new foot. 
To  this I take liberty to say, that there will  not be 
a farthing more profit in melting down the money,  if 
it were all new milled  money,  upoil the present  foot, 
than if it were all new coined, as is proposed, one-fifth 
lighter.  For whence should the profit arise more in the 
one than the other? But Mr. Lowndes goes upon this 
supposition; That standard bullion  is now worth six 
shillings and five-pence an ounce of  milled money, and 
would  continue to sell for six shillings and five-pence 
the  ounce,  if  our  money  were  all  weighty  milled 
money :  both which  I take to be mistakes,  and think 
I have proved them to be so. 
3.  He says, "  It is  hoped  that  the  exchange  to 
Holland  may  be  kept  at n stand,  or  at least  from 
falling  much  lower."  I hope  so too.  But how that 
concerns this  argument, or  the coining of  the money 
upon a new foot, I do not see. 
4.. Hc says, p. 73, "  There is a great difference, with 
regard  to the  service or disservice  of  the  public,  be- 
tween carrying out bullion, or coin for necessary uses, 
or for prohibiting commodities."  The gain to the ex- 
porters, which is that which makes them melt it down 
and export it, is the same in both cases.  And the ne- 
cessity of  exporting it is the same.  For it is to pay 
debts,  which  there  is  an  equal necessity  of  paying, 
when once contracted, though for useless things.  Tl~ey 
are thc goldsmiths  and dealers in silver,  that usually 
export what silver is sent beyond sea, to pay the debts 
they have contracted by their bills of  exchange.  Rut 
those  dealers in exchange seldom know,  or  consider, 
how they, to whom  they give their bills, have,  or will 
employ, the money they receive upon those bills.  Pro- 
hibited commodities, it is true, should be kept out, ant1 
useless ones inlpoverish us by being brought in.  But 
this is the fault of our importation :  and thcrc the mis- 
chief  should  be cured by laws, and our way of  living. 
For the exportation of our treasure is not the cause of 
their  importation, but the consequence.  Vanity 2nd 
luxury spends them : that gives them vent here : that 
vent  causes  their  importation:  and  when  our  mer- 
chants have brought them, if our commodities will not 
be enough, our money must go to pay for them.  But 
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coil1 upon  the present  foot,  or for  making our  cdn 
lighter, I confess here again,, I do not see. 
It is true what Mr. Lowndes observes here, the im- 
portation of gold, and the going of  guineas at 30s. has 
been a great prejudice and loss to the kingdom.  But 
that has been wholly owing to our clipped money, nnd 
not at all to our money being coined at five  shillings 
and two-pence the ounce ;  nor is the coining our money 
lighter the cure of it.  The only remedy for that mis- 
chief, as well as a great many others, is the putting an 
end to the passing of  clipped  money by tale,  as if  it 
were lawful coin. 
5.  I-Iis  fifth  head,  p.  74,  is  to answer  those,  who 
hold,  that,  by  the lessening  our money  one-fifth,  all 
people,  who  are  to  receive  money  upon  contracts 
already made,  will  be  defrauded  of  twenty per cent. 
of  their due: and thus all men will  lose  one-fifth  of 
their  settled  revenues,  and  all  men,  that  have  lent 
money,  one-fifth  of  their principal  and  use.  To re- 
move this objection, Mr. Lowndes says,  that silver  in 
England  is  grown  scarce,  and  consequently  dearer, 
and so is of higher price.  Let us grant for the present, 
it is of  higher price (which  how he makes out, I shall 
examine by and by).  This, if it were so, ought not to 
annul any man's bargain, nor make him receive less in 
quantity th.an  he lent.  He was  to receive again the 
same sum, and the public authority was guarantee, that 
the same sum should have the same quantity of silver, 
under the same denomination.  And  the reason is plain, 
why in justice he ought to have  the same quantity of 
silver again, notwithstanding any pretended rise of  its 
value.  For if silver had grown more plentiful, and by 
consequence (by our author's rule) cheaper, his debtor 
would not have been compelled, by the public authority, 
to have paid  him,  in consideration of  its cheapness,  a 
greater  quantity  of  silver  than they contracted  for. 
Cocoa-nuts were the money of a part of America, when 
we first came thither.  Suppose then you had lent me 
last year 300, or fifteen  score cocoa-nuts,  to be repaid 
this  year,  would  you be  satisfied,  and think yourself 
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paid  your  due,  if I  should  tell you, cocoa-nuts  were 
scarce this  year,  and that fourscore were of  as much 
value this year  as a hundred the last; and that there- 
fore you were well and fully paid, if I restored to you 
only  240 for  the 300  I  borrowed?  Would  you  not 
think yourself defrauded of two-thirds of your right by 
such a yayment ?  Nor would  it make any amends for 
this to justice, or reparation to you, that the public had 
(after your contract, which was made for fifteen score) 
altered  the denomination  of  score, and  applied  it to 
sixteen  instead of  twenty.  Examine it,  and you will 
find this just the case,  and the loss  proportionable in 
them  both;  that is,  a  real  loss  of  twenty  per  cent. 
As  to Mr. Lowndes's  proofs,  that silver  is  now one- 
fifth more value than it was,  and therefore a man has 
right  done  him,  if  he  receive  one-fifth  less  than  his 
contract, I fear none of them will reach Mr. Lowndes's 
point.  He saith, p. 77,  rc By daily experience nineteen 
penny-weights,  and three-tenths of  a penny-weight of 
sterling silver, which  is just  the weight  of  a  crown- 
piece,  will purchase  more coined  money than five un- 
clipped shillings."  I wish  he had told  us  where this 
daily experience he speaks of  is  to be  found:  for  I 
dare say nobody hath seen a sum of unclipped shillings 
paid for bullion any where these twelve months,  to go 
no further back. 
In the next place, I wish he had told  us how much 
more  than five lawful milled  shillings  bullion of  the 
weight of a crown-piece will purchase.  If he had said 
it would purchase six shillings and three-pence weighty 
money, he had  proved  the matter  in question.  And 
whoever has the weight of  a crowQ in silver paid him 
in Mr. Lowndes's  new coin, instead of six shillings and 
three-pence of  our present money, has no injury done 
him, if it will certainly purchase him six shillings and 
three-pence  all unclipped, of our present money.  But 
every one, at first sight, perceives this to be impossible, 
as  I have  already proved it,  I have in this the con- 
currence of Mr. Lowndes's  new scheme, to prove it to 
be  so.  For,  p.  62, he proposes  that his  silver  unit, 
having  the weight and finmess of  a present unclipped crown-piccc,  slioultl  go for  75  pence;  and that the 
prcscnt  shilling  should  go for  15  pence;  by  which 
establisl~mcnt  there will  be 75 pence  in his unit,  and 
$13  pence  three-farthings  in  six  shillings  and  three- 
pence,  weighty money  of  the present  coin;  which  is 
an undeniable  confession,  that it is as impossible  for 
his silver unit, having no  more silver in it than a  pre- 
scrit unclipped cro~vn,  to bc worth,  and so to purchase, 
six unclippcd shillings  and three-pence  of  our prescnt 
money;  as it is  for 75  pence  to be worth 93 of  the 
same pence, or 75 to be equal to 93. 
If lie means by inore, that his sterling silver of  the 
weight  of  a  crown-piece  will  purchase  a  penny,  or 
two-pence more than five unclipperl shillings, which is 
the most, and which is but accidental too ;  what is this 
rise  of  its value to 15 pence? And what amends will 
one-sixtieth (a little more or less) rise in value,  make 
for one-fifth diminished in weight, and lost in quantity? 
which is all one as to say, that a penny, or thereabouts, 
shall make amends for fifteen-pence  taken away. 
Another  way to recommend his new coin  to those 
who shall receive  it, instead of  the prescnt weightier 
coin,  he tells  them,  p. 77,  it will  pay as much  debt, 
and  purchase  as  much  commodities, as  our  present 
money, which is one-fifth heavier :  what he says of debts 
is true.  But yet I would have it well considered by our 
English gentlemen, that though creditors will lose one- 
fifth of their principal and use, anrt landlords will lose 
onc-fifth  of their income,  yet the debtors and tenants 
wrill  not get it.  It will be asked, who then will get it? 
Those, I say, and those only, who have great sums of 
weighty money (whereof  one sees not a piece now in 
payments)  hoardcd  up by  them,  will  get by it.  To 
those,  by the proposed  change of  our money, will  be 
an increase of one-fifth addecl to their riches, paid out 
of the pockets of the rest of the nation.  For what these 
nien received for four shillings,  they will pay again for 
five.  This weighty money hoarded up, Mr. Lowndes, 
p. 105, computes at one million and six hundred thou- 
sand pounds.  So that, by raising our money one-fifth, 
there will three hundred and twenty thousand pounds 
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be given  to those, who have  hoarded  up our weighty 
money;  which  hoarding  up of  inoney  is  thought  by 
many to have no other merit in it, than the prejudicing 
our trade and public aPairs,  and increasing our neces- 
sities, by keeping so grcat a  part of our money from 
coming abroad, at a time when there was so great need 
of  it.  If the sum of  unclipped  money in  the nation 
be,  as some  suppose,  much  greater; then there will, 
by this contrivance of the raising our coin, be given to 
thcse rich hoarders much above  the aforesaid  sum of 
three hundred and twenty thousand pounds of our pre- 
sent money.  Nobody else, but these hoarders, can get 
a farthing by this proposed change of our coin ; unless 
men in debt have  plate by them, which they will coin 
to pay their debts.  Those too, I must confess, will get 
one-fifth by all the plate of their own, which they shall 
coin and pay debts with, valuing their plate at  bullion ; 
but if they shall consider the fashion of their plate, what 
that cost when they bought it, and the fashion that new 
plate will cost them,  if  they intend ever to have plate 
again, they will  find  this  one-fifth  seeming  present 
profit, in coining their plate to pay their debts, amounts 
to little or  nothing at  all.  Nobody then but the hoarders 
will get by this twenty per cent. ;  and I challenge  any 
one to show,  how any body else  (but that little in the 
case of plate coined to pay debts) shall  get a farthing 
by it.  It seems to promise fairest to the debtors : but 
to them too it will  amount to nothing;  for  he,  that 
takes up money to  pay his  debts, will receive this new 
money, and pay it again at the same rate he received it, 
just as he does now our present coin, without any profit 
at all ; and though commodities (as is natural) shall be 
raised,  in proportion  to  the lessening of  the money, 
nobody will get by that,  any more than they do now, 
when all things are grown dearer; only he that is bound 
up by contract to receive any sum, under such 3 deno- 
mination of  pounds, shillings,  and pence, will find  his 
loss sensibly, when  he goes to  buy comn~odities,  and 
nlake new bargains.  The markets and the shops will 
soon  convince  him,  that his money, which is one-fifth lighter,  is  also  one-fifth  worse;  when  he must  pay 
twenty per cent, more for all the commodities he buys, 
with the money of the new foot,  than if  he bought it 
with the present coin. 
This Mr. Lowndes  himself will not deny,  when  he 
calls to mind what he himself,  speaking of the incon- 
veniencies we suffer by our clipped money, says, p. 115. 
"  Persons,  before  they conclude  in any bargains,  are 
necessitated  first to settle  the price or value  of  the 
very money they are to  receive  for their  goods ;  and 
if it be in clipped  or  bad  money,  they set the price 
of  their  goods  accordingly;  which  I think  has been 
one great cause of raising the price,  not only of mer- 
chandize,  but even  of  edibles,  and other necessaries 
for  the sustenance  of  the  cammon  people,  to  their 
great grievance."  That every  one  who  receives  mo- 
ney, after the raising  our  money,  on  contracts made 
before  the change,  must  lose  twenty per cent.  in  all 
he shall buy, is demonstration, by Mr. Lowndes's  own 
scheme.  Mr. Lowndes proposes  that there should be 
shillings  coined  upon  the new  foot,  one-fifth  lighter 
than our present shillings, which should go for twelve- 
pence a-piece ; and that the unclipped shillings of the 
present coin should go for fifteen-pence  a-piece ;  and 
the crown for seventy-five  pence.  A man,  who  has a 
debt of a hundred pounds  owing him,  upon bond, or 
lease, receives it in these new shillings, instead of law- 
ful money of the present standard ;  he goes to market 
with twenty shillings in one pocket of this new money, 
which are valued at 840 pence ;  and in the other pocket 
with four milled  crown-pieces,  (or twenty milled  shil- 
lings of  the present  coiu) which  are valued  at three 
hundred pence,  which is  one-fifth  more :  it is demon- 
stration then, that he loses one-fifth, or twenty per cent. 
in all that he buys,  by the receipt of this new money, 
for the present coin, which was  his due ;  unless those 
he deals with will take four for five pence, or four shil- 
lings for five shillings.  He buys, for example, a quart 
of oil  for  fifteen-pence:  if  he pay for it with the old 
money in one pocket,  one shilling will do it: if w.ith 
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the new money in the other, he must add three-pence 
to it, or a quarter of another shilling; and so of all the 
rest that he pays for, with either the old money, which 
he should have received his debts in,  or with the new, 
which he was forced to receive  for it.  Thus far, it is 
demonstration, he loses twenty per cent.  by receiving 
his debt in a new money thus raised, when he uses it to 
buy any thing.  But to make him amends, Mr. Lowndes 
tells  him,  silver is now dearer,  and all things  conse- 
quently will be bought cheaper twenty per cent.  And 
yet at the same time he tells him, in the passage above 
cited, out of page 115, that all other things are grown 
dearer.  I am sure there is no demonstrat~on,  that they 
will be sold twenty per cent.  cheaper.  And, if I may 
credit  housekeepers  and  substantial  tradesmen,  all 
sorts of provisions  and commodities are lately risen ex- 
cessively;  and,  notwithstanding the scarcity of silver, 
begin lo come up to the true  val~le  of our clipped money, 
everyone selling their commodities so as to make them- 
selves amends, in the number of  light pieces for what 
they want  in weight.  A creditor ought to think  the 
new  light money  equivalent  to the present  heavier, 
because it will buy as much commodities.  But what if 
it should fail, as it is ten to one but it will, what secu- 
rity has he for it?  He is told so, and he must be satis- 
fied.  That salt,  wine,  oil,  silk,  naval stores,  and  all 
foreign commodities, will  none  of them  be sold us by 
foreigners for a  less quantity of silver than before, be- 
csnse we have giren the name of  more pence to it, is, 
I  think, demonstration.  All our names, (if they are any 
mare to  us) are to them but bare sounds ;  and our coin, 
as theirs to us,  but mere  bullion,  valued  only by its 
weight;  and a Swede will  no  more  sell you his hemp 
and pitch, or a Spaniard his oil, for less silver, because 
you  tell him  silver  is  scarcer now  in  England, and 
therefore risen  in value  one-fifth than a tradesman of 
London will  sell his  commodity  cheaper  to  the Isle 
of Man, because they are grown poorer, and money is 
scarce there. 
All foreign commodities must be shut out  of the num- 
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our money.  Corn  also,  it is  evident, does not rise or 
fall, by the differences of more, or less plenty of money, 
but by the plenty and scarcity that God gives ; for our 
money,  in  appearance,  remaining  the same, the pricc 
of  corn  is  double  one  year  to  what  it was  the pre- 
cedent; and therefore we must certainly make account, 
that, since the money is  one-fifth  lighter,  it will  buy 
one-fifth less corn comrnul~ilrus  annis;  and this being the 
great expense of the poor, that takes up almost all their 
earnings, if corn  be,  commzinibus annis,  sold  for one- 
fifth more money in tale, than before the change of our 
money, they too must  have  one-fifth  more  in  tale, of 
the new money,  for their wages than  they have now; 
and the day-labourer  must have,  not only twelve, but 
fifteen-pence of the new money a-day, which is the pre- 
sent shilling that lie  has now,  or else  he cannot live ; 
so that all foreign commodities, with  corn  and labour, 
keeping up their value to the quantity of silver they sell 
for now,  and not  complying,  in the fall  of  their real 
price, with the nominal raising of our money,  there is 
not illuch  left, wherein  landlords  and creditors are to 
expect the recompense of  twenty per cent. abatement 
of price in commodities,  to make up their loss in the 
lightness of  our money they are paid  their  rents  and 
debts in.  It would  be  easy to show the same thing, 
concerning our other native commodities,  and make it 
clear that we have no reason to expect they should abate 
of their present price,  any more than corn and labour: 
but this is enough, and any one who has a  mind to it, 
may trace the rest at his leisure. 
And thus I fear the hopes  of  cheaper pennyworths, 
which might beguile some men into a belief that land- 
lords  and  creditors would  receive  no less by the pro- 
posed  new money,  is  quite vanished.  But if the pro- 
mise  of  better pennyworths, and  ct  fall of  all commo- 
dities twenty per cent. should hold true, this would not 
at  all relieve creditors and landlords, and set them upon 
equal terms with their neighbours:  because  the cheap 
pennyworths  will  not be  for  them  alone,  but every 
body else, as well as they, will share in that advantage ; 
so that their silver being diminished  one-fifth  in their 
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rents and debts, which are paid them, they would still 
be twenty per cent. greater losers than their unhonrding 
neighbours,  and forty per cent. greater losers than tlie 
hoarders of money ;  who will certainly get twenty per 
cent. in the money, whatever happens in the price  of 
things; and twenty per cent. more in the cheapness of 
commodities,  if  that  promised  recompense  be  made 
Sood  to creditors and  landlords; for  tlie  hoarders of 
honey (if the price  of  things  falls) will buy as cheap 
as they ;  so  that whatever  is  said of the cheapness of 
commodities, it is demonstration, (whether that proves 
true or no) that creditors and landlords, and  all those 
who are to receive  money upon bargains  made before 
the proposed change of our coin, will unavoidably lose 
twenty per cent. 
One thing Mr. Lowndes says in this paragraph is very 
remarkable,  which I  think decides the question.  His 
words,  p.  78, are  these:  " That if  the value  of  the 
silver in the  coins  (by an  extrillsic  denomination)  be 
raised  above  the value, or  market-price, of  the same 
silver reduced to bullion, the subjects would  be  pro- 
portionably  injured  or  defrauded,  as  they were  for- 
merly  in  the case  of  base  monies,  coined  by  public 
authority."  It remains  therefore  only to show,  that 
the  market-price  of  standard bullion  is not  one-fifth 
above our coin that is to be  raised, and then we have 
Mr. Lowndes of our side too against its raising.  I think 
it  is abundantlv proved  already, that standard bullion 
neither is, nor " can be, worth one-fifth more  than our 
lawful  weighty  money:  and  if  it  be  not,  by  Mr. 
Lowndes's  confession, there is no need  of raising  our 
present legal milled  money to that degree; and it is 
only our clipped  money that wants  amendment : and 
when that ie  recoined  and reduced  all to milled  and 
lawful money, that then  too will have no need of rais- 
ing.  This I shall now  prove  out of Mr. Lowndes's 
own words here. 
Mr. Lowndes, in the forecited words,  compares the 
value  of silver, in our  coin, to the value  of the same 
silver reduced to bullion, which he supposing to be  as four to five, makes that the measure of the raising our 
money.  If this be the difference ofvalue between silver 
in bullion  and silver in  coin;  and if it be  true that 
four ounces of standard bullion  be worth five ounces of 
the same silver coined;  or, which  is  the same thing, 
that bullion will sell by the ounce for six shillings and 
five-pence unclipped  money;  I will  take the boldness 
to advise his majesty to buy, or to borrow any where so 
much bullion, or, rather than be without it, meit down 
so much plate, as is equal in weight to twelve hundred 
pounds sterling of our present m~lled  money.  This let 
him sell  for  milled money;  and, according to our au- 
thor's  rule, it will yield  fifteen hundred pounds.  Let 
that fifteen hundred  pounds be  reduced into bullion, 
and sold again, and it will  produce eighteen hundred 
and sixty pounds; which  eighteen  hundred and sixty 
pounds of weighty money being reduced  into  bullion 
will still produce one-fifth more in weight of silver, be- 
ing sold for weighty money; and thus his majesty may 
get nt least three hundred and twenty thousand pounds 
by selling o-f  bullion  for weighty money, and melting 
that down into bullion,  as fast as he receives it ;  till he 
has brought into his hands the million and six hundred 
thousand pounds, which Mr. Lowndes  computes there 
is of weighty money left in England. 
I doubt not but every one who reads it  will think this 
s very ridiculous proposition.  But he must think it ri- 
diculous for no other reason, but because he sees it is 
in~possible  that bullion should sell for one-fifth above its 
weight of the same silver coined; that is, that an ounce 
of standard silver should sell for six shillin~s  and five- 
pence of our present  weighty money ;  for if it will, it 
is no ridiculous thing that the king should melt down 
and make that profit of his money. 
If our author's  rule  (p. 78, where  he says,  6r That 
the  only just  and  reasonable  foot,  upon  which  the 
coins should be current, is  the very price  of the silver 
thereof, in case it be  molten in the same place where 
coins are made current")  be to be observed;  our ma- 
ney  is  to be  raised  but  an halfpenny,  or  at most  a 
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penny in five shillings :  for that was the ordinary odds 
in the price  between bullion  and coined silver, before 
clipping had deprived us, in commerce, of all our milled 
and weighty money.  And  silver  in standard bullion 
would not be in value one jot above the same silver in 
coin, if  clipped  money were  not  current by tale, and 
coined  silver,  (as  Mr. Lowndes  proposes,  p.  73)  as 
well  as bullion, had  the liberty of  exportation.  For 
when we have no  clipped  money,  but a11  our current 
coin is weight, according to tl:~  standard, all the odds 
of value that silver in bullion  has to silver  in coin, is 
only owing to the prohibition of  it^  exportation in mo- 
ney ;  and never rises, nor can rise, above what the gold- 
smith  shall estimate  the risk  and  trouble of melting 
it down ;  which is so little, that the importers of silver 
could never raise it to above a penny an ounce, but at 
such times as the East India Company, or some foreign 
sale, calling for  a  great  quantity of silver  at a  time, 
made the goldsmiths  scramble  for it ; and so the im- 
porters of bullion raise its price upon them, according 
to the present need of great quantities of silver which 
every goldsmith (eager to engross to himself as much as 
he could) was  content to pay high for, rather than go 
without:  his present  gains from those whom  he  fur- 
nished,  and  whom  otherwise  he  could  not  furnish, 
making him amends. 
The natural  value then between  silver in  bullion 
and in coin is (I say)  every where equal ;  bating the 
charge of coinage, which  gives  the advantage to the 
side of the coin.  The ordinary  odds here in England 
between silver in bullion, and the same in our coin, is, 
by reason that the stamp hinders  its free exportation, 
about a penny in the crown.  The accidental difference, 
by reason of sudden occasions, is sometimes (but rarely) 
two-pence in five shillings, or somewhat more in great 
urgencies.  And since the ordinary rate of things is to 
be taken as the measure of their price, andMr. Lowndes 
tells us,.  p.  '78, "  That if  the value  of  the silver  in 
their  coins should  be  raised  above  the value or mar- 
ket-price of the same silver reduced to bullion, the sub- 
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I leave hinl  to make  the  inference, what will  be the 
consequence  in  England,  if  our coin  be  raised  here 
one-fifth, or twenty per cent. 
Mr. Lowndes says  farther,.^. 80,  That silver has a 
price.  I answer,  silver  to silver  can have  no  other 
price, but quantity for quantity.  If there be any other 
difference in value,  it is  or  can  be  nothing  but  one 
of these two : first, either the value  of the labour em- 
ployed  about one  parcel  of silver  more than another, 
makes a difference in  their  price ;  and thus fashioned 
plate sells for more than its weight of the same silver; 
and in  countries where  the owners  pay for  the coin, 
silver in coin is more rvorth than its weight in bullion ; 
but here, where the public pays the coinage, they are 
of very near equal value, when there is no need of ex- 
portation :  for then there is no more odds than the trou- 
ble  of  carrying  the  bullion  to the mint and fetching 
again  are worth;  or the charge of  refining  so  much 
of it as will  bring it to  standard, if  it be worse  than 
standard. 
Or, secondly, some privilege belonging to one parcel 
of silver, which is denied  to another, viz. here in Eng- 
land a liberty of  exportation  allowed  to silver in bul- 
lion,  denied  to silver  stamped.  This when  there is 
need of exportation  of  silver, gives some  small advan- 
tage of  value  to  uncoined silver here  above  coined; 
but that is ordinarily very inconsiderable, and can never 
reach to one-fifth, nor half one-fifth, as has been already 
shown.  And this I think will  answer  all that is said 
about the price of  silver in that place. 
It is true what Mr. Lowndes says, in the next words, 
p. 8  1 ,  cc  That five shillings, coined upon the foot pro- 
posed,  will  actually contain  more  real  and  intrinsic 
value of silver by a great deal,  than is  in the current 
money now commonly applied  to the payment of the 
said  rents, revenues,  and  debts."  But will  he hence 
conclude,  because  there  is  now  lost in  those  rents, 
revenues, and debts, a great deal more than twenty per 
cent. under the present irregularity of our coin, and the 
robbery in clipped money,without any the least neglect, 
or miscarriage  in  the owner, that entitlcd him to that 
loss, that therefore it is just that the loss of twenty per 
cent. be  established  on him  by law for  the future, in 
the reforming of our coin ? 
Mr. Lowndes's  second  reason  for  lessening  of  our 
coin, we  have, p.  82, in  these words, "  The value  of 
the silver in the coin ought to be raised, to encouraee 
the bringing of bullion to the mint to be coined.  Thls 
raising of money is in effect, as has been seen, nothing 
but giving a  denomination of  more pence to the same 
quantity of silver, viz. That the same quantity of silver 
shall hereafter  be  called  seventy-five  pence, which  is 
now called but sixty-pence.  For that is all is done, as 
is manifest,  when a crown-piece,  which now  but goes 
for  sixty-pence, shall be  made  to go for seventy-five 
pence :  for it is plain  it contains  nothing  of silver, or 
worth in  it, more  than it did before.  Let us suppose 
that all our silver coin now in England were sixpences, 
shillings,  half-crowns, and  crowns,  all  milled  money, 
full we~ght,  according to the present standard ;  and that 
it should be  ordered  that for  the  future the crown- 
piece,  instead of going for  sixty-pence,  should go for 
seventy-five  pence,  and so  proportionably  of  all  the 
other pieces ;  I ask then, how such  a  change of deno- 
mination shall bring bullion  to the mint  to be coined, 
and from whence ?  I suppose this change of names, or 
ascribing to it more imaginary parts of any denomina- 
tion, has no charms in  it to bring bullion  to the mint 
to be  coined:  for  whether you  call the piece coined 
twelve-pence, or fifteen-pence, or sixty, or seventy-five, 
a crown or a  sceptre, it will buy no more silk, salt, or 
bread  than  it would  before.  That therefore  cannot 
tempt people to bring it to the mint.  And  if it will 
pay more debts, that is perfect  defrauding, and ought 
not to be  permitted.  Next, I ask, from whence shall 
this  raising fetch  it  ?  For bullion  cannot be  brought 
hither to stay here, whilst  the balancc  of our trade re- 
quires all the bullion we bring in to be exported again, 
and more silver out of our formerstock withit, to answer 
our exigencies beyond  seas.  And whilst  it is so, the 
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bullion to export, than the mint can give for it to coin; 
and so none of that will come to the mint. 
But,  says  our  author,  p.  83,  "  An  halfpenny  an 
ounce profit, which will be in the proposed coin, above 
the present  price  of  sterling bullion, will  be  an en- 
couragement to those who have English plate to bring 
it in to be  coined."  I doubt whether  there will  be 
any such profit;  for I imagine  that standard  bullion 
cannot now be bought per  ounce  for sir shillings and 
five-pence  of our  cl~pped  running  cash, which  is  the 
measure  whereby  Mr.  Lowndes  determines  of  the 
price of sterling silver.  But, taking this halfpenny an 
ounce profit for granted, it will  not bring to the mint 
any plate, whose  fashion  is  valued  by  the owner  at 
above an halfpenny per ounce ;  and how much then it 
is like to bring to the mint is easy to guess. 
The true and only good  reason  that brin~s  bullion 
to the mint to be coined, is the same that brings it to 
England to stay there, viz.  The gain we make by  an 
over-balance of trade.  When our merchants carry com- 
modities abroad to a greater value than those they bring 
home, the overplus  comes to them in foreign coin, or 
bullion, which will stay here, when we gain by the ba- 
lance  of our  whole  trade.  For then we  can  have  no 
debts beyond sea to be  paid with it.  In  this thriving 
posture of our trade, those to whose share this bullion 
falls  not  having  any use  of it, whilst  it is  in bullion, 
choose to carry it to the mint  to have it coined there, 
whereby it is of more  use to them for all the business 
of silver in trade, or purchasing land ;  the mint having 
ascertained the weight and  fineness  of it : so that on 
any occasion every one is ready to take it at  its known 
value, without any scruple; a convenience that is want- 
ing in bullion.  But when our trade runs on the other 
side,  and our exported  commodities will  not  pay for 
those foreign ones we consume, our treasure must go ; 
and then it is in vain to  bestow the labour of coining on 
bullion that  must  be exported again.  To what pur- 
pose is it to make it pass through our mint, when it  will 
away? The less pains and charge it costs us the  better. 
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His third reason, p.  83, is, that this raising our coin, 
by  making it '(  more in tale, will  make it more com- 
mensurate  to the general need thereof,"  and thereby 
hinder the increase of hazardous paper credit, and the 
inconveniency of bartering. 
Just as the boy cut his leather into five quarters (as 
he called them) to cover his ball, when  cut into four 
quarters it fell short; but after all his pains,  as much 
of his ball lay bare  as before :  if the quantity of coined 
silver,  employed in England, fall short, the arbitrary 
denomination of a greater number of pence given to it, 
or, which  is all one, to the several coilled  pieces of  it, 
will not make it commensurate to the size of our trade, 
or the greatness of our occasions.  This is as certain, 
as that if the quantity of-a board, which  is to stop a 
leak of a ship fifteen inches square, be but twelve inches 
square, it will not be made to do it, by being measured 
by a foot, that is divided into fifteen inches, instead of 
twelve, and so having a larger tale, or number of inches 
in denomination given to it. 
This, indeed, would be a convincing reason, if sounds 
would give weight to silver, and the noise of a greater 
number of pence (less in quantity proportionably as they 
are more in number) were a  larger supply of  money, 
which our author, p. 84,  says our occasions require, and 
which  he by an increase of  the tale of  pence hopes to 
provide.  But that mistake is very visible, and shall be 
farther shown in the business of bartering. 
The necessity of  trust and bartering  is one of  the 
many  inconveniencies  springing  from  the  want  of 
money.  This inconvenience the multiplying arbitrary 
denominations will no more supply, nor any ways make 
our scarcity of coin commensurate to the need there is 
of it,  than  if the cloth which was providing for cloth- 
ing the army, falling short, one should  hope to make 
it commensurate  to that need  there is of it, by mea- 
suring it by a yard one-fifth shorter than the standard, 
or changing the standard of  the yard,  and so getting 
the full denomination of yards, necessary  according to 
the present measure.  For this is all will  be done by 
raising our coin, as is proposed.  All it amounts to is no 
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more but this, viz. That each piece,  and consequently 
our whole stock of money, should be measured and de- 
nominated by a penny, one-fifth less than the standard. 
Where there is not coined  silver,  in proportion  to 
the value of the commodities that daily change owners 
in trade, there is a necessity of  trust or bartering, i.  e. 
changing  commodities  for  commodities,  without  the 
intervention of  money.  For example :  let us suppose 
in Bermudas but an hundred pounds  in ready money, 
but that there is every day there a transferring of com- 
modities  from  one  owner to another,  to the value of 
double as much.  When the money is all got into hands, 
that have already bought a11 that they have need of, for 
that day, whoever has need of any thing else that day, 
must either go on tick,  or barter for it, i.  e. give the 
commodities he can best spare for the commodities he 
wants,  v.  g.  sugar for bread,  &c.  Now it is evident 
here, that changing the denomination of the coin they 
already have in Bermudas, or coining it  over again under 
new denominations, will not contribute in the least to- 
wards the removing this necessity of trust,  or barter- 
ing.  For the whole silver they have in coin being but 
four hundred ounces ;  and the exchange of the commo- 
dities made in a distance of time, wherein  this money 
is paid not above once, being to the value of eight hun- 
dred ounces of  silver ;  it is plain,  that one half  of  the 
commodities, that shift hands, must of necessity be taken 
upon credit, or exchanged by barter ; those who want 
them having no money to pay for them.  Nor can any 
alteration of  the coin,  or denomination  of  these four 
hundred ounces of  silver,  help this ;  because the value 
of the silver,  in respect of other commodities, will not 
thereby  be  at  all  increased;  and  the  commodities 
changed, being (as  in the case) double in value to the 
four hundred ounces of  coined  silver to be laid out in 
them, nothing can supply this want but a double quan- 
tity, i.  e.  eight hundred ounces of coined silver ;  how de- 
nominated, it matters notc so there be a fit proportion 
of small pieces to supply small payments. 
Suppose the commodities passing every day in Eng- 
land, in markets and fairs, between strangers,  or such 
as trust not one another, were to the value of a million 
of  ounces of silver;  and there was but half  a million 
of  ounces of  coined  silver in the hands of  those who 
wanted  those  commodities;  it is  demonstration they 
must truck for them, or go without them.  If then the 
coined  silver of  England be not sufficient to answer 
the value of commodities moving  in trade amongst us, 
credit,  or barter, must do it.  Where the credit and 
money fail,  bartcr alone  must do it : which  being  in- 
troduced by thc want ofa greater plentyof coined silver, 
nothing but a  greater plenty of  coined  silver can rc- 
move  ~t.  The increase of  denomination  does,  or can 
do nothing in the case;  for it is silver by its quantity, 
and not denomination, that is tlic price of things, and 
measure of  commerce;  and it is  the weight of  silver 
in it, and not the name of  the piece, that men estimate 
commodities by, and exchange them for. 
If this  be not  so, when  the necessity of  our affairs 
abroad, or ill husbandry at home, has carried away half 
our treasure, and a moiety of our money is gone out of 
England ;  it is but to issue a proclamation, that a penny 
shall go for two-pence,  six-pence  for a shilling, half n 
crown for a crown,  &c. and immediately, ~vithout  any 
more ado, we are as rich as before.  And when half the 
remainder is gone, it is but doing the same thing again, 
and raising the denomination anew, and we are where 
we were, and so on:  where, by supposing the denomi- 
nation  raised 5,  every man will  be  as  rich with  an 
ounce of silver in his purse, is  he was before, when he 
had  sixteen ounces there;  and in as great plenty of 
money, able to carry on his trade, without bartering ; 
his silver, by this short way of  raising,  being changed 
into the value of gold :  for when silver will buy sixteen 
times  as much wine,  oil,  and bread, &c.  to-day,  as it 
would yesterday, (all other things remaining the same, 
but the denomination) it hath the real worth of gold. 
This, I guess,  every body sees cannot be so.  And 
yet this must be so, if it be true that raising the deno- 
mination one-fifth can supply the want, or one jot raise 
the value of silver in respect of other commodities, i. P. 
make a less quantity of it to-day buy a greater quantity 
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of corn, oil, and cloth, and all other commodities, than 
it would  yesterday,  and thereby remove the necessity 
of bartering.  For, if raising the denomination can thus 
raise the value of  coin,  in exchange for other commo- 
dities, one-fifth, by the same reason it can raise it two- 
fifths, and afterwards three-fifths,  and  again,  if  need 
be, four-fifths,  and as much farther as you please.  So 
that, by this admirable contrivance of raising our coin, 
we shall be  as rich,  and as well  able to support the 
charge of the government, and carry on our trade with- 
out bartering, or any other inconvenience,  for want of 
money, with sixty thousand ounces of coined  silver in 
England, as if we had six, or sixty millions.  If this be 
not so, I desire any one to show me, why the same way 
of raising the denomination, which can raise the value 
of  money,  in respect  of  other  commodities,  one-fifth, 
cannot, when you please,  raise it to another fifth, and 
so on? I beg to be told where it must stop, and why 
at such a degree, without being able to go farther. 
It  must be taken notice of, that the raising I speak of 
here, is the raising  of the value  of our coin in respect 
of other commodities  (as I call it all along) in contra- 
distinction to raising the denomination.  The confound- 
ing of these  in discourses  concerning money, is  one 
great cause,  I suspect, that this matter is so little un- 
derstood, and so often talked of with so little informa- 
tion of the hearers. 
A penny is  a  denomination  no more  belonging  to 
eight than to eighty, or to one  single grain of silver; 
and so it  is not necessary that there should be sixty sneh 
pence,  no  more  nor  less,  in an ounce  of  silver,  i.  e. 
twelve in a piece called a shilling, and sixty in a piece 
called a crown; such like divisions, being only extrinsi- 
cal denominations, are every where perfectly arbitrary. 
For here  in England there might as well  have  been 
twelve shillings in a penny, as twelve-pence  in a  shil- 
ling, i.  e. the denomination  of  the less  piece  might 
have been a shilling, and of the bigger a penny.  Again, 
the shilling might have been coined ten times as big as 
the penny, and the crown ten times as big as the shil- 
ling ;  whereby the shilling would have  but ten-pence 
in it, and the crown  an hundred.  But this, however 
orderd, alters not  one jot  the value  of the ounce of 
silver in respect of other things, any more than it does 
its weight.  This raising being but giving of names at 
pleasure  to aliquot parts of  any piece,  viz. that now 
the sixtieth part of an ounce of silver shall be called a 
penny, and to-morrow  that the seventy-fifth part of an 
ounce shall be called a penny, may be done with what 
increase you please.  And thus it may be ordered by a 
proclamation, that a  shilling  sllall  go for twenty-four 
pence,  an half-crown  for sixty instead of thirty-pence, 
and so of the rest.  But that an half-crown should be 
worth, or contain sixty such pence,  as the pence were 
before this change of denomination was made, that no 
power on earth can do.  Nor can any power, but that 
which can make the plenty or scarcity of commodities, 
raise the value of our money thus double in respect of 
other commodities,  and make that the same piece, or 
quantity of silver, under a  double denomination, shall 
purchase double the quantity of pepper, wine, or lead, 
an instant after such proclamation, to what it would do 
an instant before.  If this could be, we might, as ?very 
one sees,  raise  silver  to the value  of gold, and rllake 
ourselves as rich as we pleased.  But it is but going to 
market with  an ounce of  silver  of  one hundred and 
twenty-pence, to be convinced  that it will purchase no 
more than an ounce of silver of  sixty-pence.  And the 
ringing of the piece will  as soon purchase  more com- 
modities, as its change  of denomination,  and the mul- 
tiplied name of pence, when  it  is called six  score in- 
stead .of sixty. 
It  is proposed that the twelve-pence should be raised 
to fifteen-pence, and the crown to seventy-five pence, 
and so proportionably of  the rest:  but yet that the 
pound sterling should  not be raised.  If there be any 
advantage in  raising, why should  not that be  raised 
too? And as the crown-piece  is  raised  from  sixty to 
seventy-five pence, why should not the pound sterling 
he raised  in  the same proportion, from two hundred 
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Further, If this raising  our  coin  can so stretch our 
money, and enlarge our pared  remainder of it, as "to 
make  it  more  commensurate  to  the  general  need 
thereof, for carrying on  the common  traffic and com- 
merce  of  the  nation,  and  to  answer  occasions  re- 
quiring  a  large supply of  money,"  as  Mr.  Lowndes 
tells us in his  third  reason, p. 83, why are we  so nig- 
gardly to ourselves in  this time of occasion, as to stop 
at one-fifth ?  Why do we not  raise  it one full moiety, 
and thereby double our nioney ? If Mr. Lowndes's rule, 
p.  78, "  That if  the value  of  the silver  in  the coin 
should be raised  above  the market-price of  the same 
silver, reduced  to bullion,  the subject would  be  pro- 
portionably  injured  and  defrauded,"  must  keep  us 
from these  advantages, and the public care of justice 
stop the raising of the money at one-fifth ;  because, if 
our money be  raised  beyond the market-price  of bul- 
lion, it will be so  much  defrauding of the subject : I 
t>en say, it must not  be raised one-fifth, nor half one- 
fifth, that is, it must not be raised fifteen-pence in the 
crown:  no,  nor  five-pence.  For  I deny  that  the 
market-price  of standard bullion ever was, or ever can 
be five shillings seven-pence  of lawful weighty money 
the ounce :  so that if our present milled money be raised 
one-fifth,  the subject will,  by Mr. Lowndes's  rule, be 
defrauded sixteen per cent., nay, above eighteen per cent. 
For the market-price  of standard bullion  being ordi- 
narily under five shillings four-pence  the ounce, when 
sold for weighty money,  (which  is  but one-thirtieth) 
whatever our  present milled money is raised above one- 
thirtieth, it is,  by  Mr.  Lowndes's  rule,  so  much de- 
frauding the subject.  For the market-price of any thing, 
and so of bullion, is to be taken from its ordinary rate 
all the year round, and not from the extraordinary rise 
of two or three market-days  in a  year.  And  that the 
market-price of standard silver was not found, nor pre- 
tended  to be  above  five shillings and four-pence  the 
ounce, before clipping had left none but light running 
cash to pay  for  bullion, or any tiling  else, is evident 
from a paper then  published,  which I took the liberty 
to examine in my Considerations of the Consequences 
of raising the Value of Money,"  &c. printed 1692.  The 
author of that paper, it is manifest, was not ignorant of 
the price of silver,  nor had a  design to lessen its rate, 
but set down the highest price it then bore. 
If then Mr. Lowndes's  rule  of justice,  and care of 
the subject, be to regulate the  rise of our milled money, 
it must not be raised above  one-thirtieth  part.  If the 
advantages he promises, of making  our  money, by raising 
it one-fifth,  cc more commensurate to the general need 
thereof,"  be to be laid hold on, it is reasonable to raise 
it higher,  "to make it yet more commensurate to the 
general need  there  is  of  it."  'Whichever  of  the two 
Mr. Lowndes will prefer, either reason of state or rule 
of justice,  one-fifth must not be his measure of raising 
our present milled money.  If the advantage of making 
our money more proportionate  to our trade and other 
necessities be to govern its proposed raising, every one 
will cry out to Mr. Lowndes, If your way will do what 
you say, the raising it one-half will be much better than 
one-fifth,  and therefore pray let an half-crown be raised 
to a crown, and six-pence to a shilling.  If equity and 
the consideration of the subject's property ought to go- 
vern in the case,  you must not raise our milled crown 
to above five shillings and four-pence. 
If it  be here said to me, that I do then allow that our 
money may be raised one-thirtieth,  i. e.  that the crown- 
piece should he raised to five shillings and two-pence, 
and so proportionably of the other species of our coin ; 
I answer, he that infers so, makes his inference a little 
too quick. 
But let us for once allow the ordinary price of stand- 
ard silver to be five shillings four-pence  the ounce,  to 
be paid  for in weighty coin  (for that must always be 
remembered, when we talk  of  the rate of bullion) and 
that the rate of bullion is the just  measure of  raising 
our money.  This I say is no reason for the raising our 
milled crown now to five  shillings four-pence, and re- 
coining all our clipped  money upon  that foot;  unless 
we intend, as soon as that is done, to new raise and coin 
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quire the exportation of  silver,  and the exportation of 
our coined silver is prohibited,  and made penal by our 
law, standard bullion will always be sold here for a little 
more  than its weight of  coined silver.  So that, if we 
shall endeavour  to equal  our weighty coined silver to 
standard bullion, by raising  it, whilst there is a neces- 
sity of the exportation of  silver, we  shall do no other- 
wise than a child,  who runs to overtake and get up to 
the top of his shadow, which still advances at the same 
rate that he does.  The privilege that bullion has to  be 
exported freely,  will  give it a  little  advance in price 
above our coin, let the denomination of that be raised 
or fallen as you  please,  whilst there is need of its ex- 
portation, and the exportation of our coin is prohibited 
by law.  But this advance will be but little,  and will 
always keep  within  the  bounds,  which the risk  and 
trouble of melting down our coin shall set to it, in the 
estimate of  the exporter.  He that will rather venture 
to  throw an  hundred pounds into his melting-pot, when 
nobody sees him,  and reduce  it to bullion, than give 
an hundred and five pounds for the same weight of the 
like bullion, will never give five shillings and five-pence 
of milled money for an ounce of  standard bullion;  nor 
buy at that price what he can have near five per cent. 
cheaper, without any risk,  if  he will  not accuse him- 
self.  And I think it may be concluded, that very few, 
who have furnaces,  and other  conveniencies ready for 
melting silver, will give one per cent. for standard bul- 
lion, which  is under  five shillings and three-pence per 
ounce,  who  can,  only  for  the  trouble  of  melting it, 
reduce our coin to as good bullion. 
The odds of  the price  in  bullion  to coin  on  this 
account (which  is the only one, when the coin is kept 
to the standard) can never be the reason for raising our 
coin to preserve it from  melting down :  because  this 
price  above  its weight  is  given  for  bullion,  only  to 
avoid melting down our coin;  and so this difference of 
price between standard  bullion and our coin can be no 
cause of its melting down. 
These three reasons, which I have examined, contain 
the great advantages, which  our author supposes the 
proposed raising of our coin will produce ; and there- 
fore I have  dwelt  longer upon  them.  His remaining 
six reasons being of less moment,  and offering most of 
them but some circumstantial conveniencies,  as to the 
computation of our money,  &c.  I shall more briefly 
pass over.  Only before T proceed to them,  I shall here 
set down  the different  value  of  our money,  collected 
from our author's  history of the several changes of our 
coin since Edward the First's  reign, quite down to this 
present  time.  A  curious history  indeed, for  which I 
think myself, and the world, indebted to Mr. Lowndes's 
great learning in this sort of knowlcdge, and his great 
exactness in relating the particulars. 
I shall remark only the quantity of  silver was in  a 
shilling,  in each of  those  changes; that so the reader 
may at first sight, without farther trouble, compare the 
lessening  or increase  of  the quantity of  silver  upon 
every change.  For in propriety of speech, the adding 
to the quantity of silver in our coin, is the true raising. 
of its value ;  and the diminishing the quantity of silver 
in it,  is  the sinking of  its value ; however they come 
to be transposed, and used in the quite contrary sense. 
If my calculations, from the weight  and fineness I 
find set down in  Mr. Lowndes's  extract out of the in- 
dentures of the mint, have not misled me, the quantity 
of  silver to a grain, which was  in  a  shilling in every 
change  of  our money,  is  set  down  in the following 
table : 
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And so it has remained from the 43d year of queen 
Elizabeth to this day. 
Mr. Lowndes's  69 
Mr.  Lowndes  having  given  us the fineness  of  the 
standard silver in every reign, and the number of pieces 
a pound troy was coined,  into closes  this history with 
words to this purpose,  page 56, "  By this deduction it 
doth evidently appear, that it hath been a policy con- 
stantly practised in the mints of  England, to raise the 
value  of  the coin  in  its extrinsic denomination, from 
time to time, as any exigence or occasion required, and 
more especially to encourage  the bringing  of bullion 
into the realm to be coined."  This, indeed, is roundly 
to conclude  for  his  hypothesis.  But I could  wish, 
that from  the  histories  of  those  times,  wherein  the 
several  changes  were  made,  he had  showed  us the 
exigencies and occasions  that produced the raising of 
the coin, and what effects it had. 
If I mistake not, Henry the Eighth's several raisings 
of our coin brought little increase  of  silver into Eng- 
land.  As  the  several species  of  our coin  lessened in 
their respective quantities of  silver,  so the treasure of 
the realm decreased too : and he, that found the king- 
dom rich, did not, as I remember, by all his raising our 
coin, leave it so. 
Another thing, that (from this history) makes me sus- 
pect, that the raising the denomination was never found 
effectively to draw silver into England, is the lowering 
the denomination, or adding more silver to the species 
of our coin ; as in Henry the Sixth's time, the shilling 
was  increased from  one  hundred  forty-two  grains of 
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silver to one hundred seventy-six;  and in the sixth of Ed- 
ward the Sixth,  in whose time raising the denomination 
seems to have been tried to the utmost, when a shilling 
was brought to twenty grains of silver.  And the great 
alteration that was  then quickly made  on  the  other 
hand, from twenty to eighty grains at one leap, seems 
to show  that this  lessening  the silver in our coin had 
 roved  prejudicial:  for  this  is  a  greater  change  in 
sinking of  the denomination  in proportion,  than ever 
was made at once in raising  it ;  a shilling being made 
four times  weightier in silver,  the sixth,  than it was 
in the fifth year of Edward the Sixth's reign. 
Kingdoms are seldom found weary of  the riches they 
have,  or averse  to the increase  of  their treasure.  If 
therefore  the raising the denomination  did  in reality 
bring silver into the realm,  it cannot be thought that 
they would at any time sink the denomination, which, 
by the rule of contraries, should be at  least suspected to 
drive or keep it out. 
Since,  therefore,  we  are not  from  matter of  fact 
informed, what were the true motives that caused those 
several changes in  the coin ;  may we  not with reason 
suspect, that they were owing to that policy of the mint, 
set down by our author,  p. 83, in these words,  That 
the proposed  advance  is agreeable to the policy that 
in past  ages  hath  been  practised,  not  only in  our 
mint,  but in the mints  of  all  politic  governments ; 
namely,  to raise  the value  of  silver  in  the  coin  to 
promote  the work  of  the  mint!"  As I remember, 
suitable to this policy of the mint, there was, some two 
years since,  a  complaint  of  a worthy gentleman,  not 
ignorant of it, that the mill in the mint stood still ;  and 
therefore there was a proposal offered for bringing grist 
to the mill. 
The business of money,  as in all times,  even in this 
our quick-sighted  age,  hath been  thought a mystery: 
those employed in the mint must,  by their places,  be 
supposed to penetrate deepest into it.  It is no impos- 
sible thing then to imagine, that it was not hard, in the 
ignorance of past ages, when money was little, and skill 
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ness  and policy  of  the  mini  to  persuade  a prince, 
especially if money were scarce,  that the fault was in 
the standard of the mint,  and that the v7ay  to increase 
the plenty of money was to raise  (a  well-sounding word) 
the value of the coin.  This could not but be willingly 
enough  hearkened  to;  when,  besides  the  hopes  of 
drawing an increase of silver into the realm, it brought 
present gain,  by the part which  the king got of  the 
money, which  was hereupon all coined  anew, and the 
mint officers lost nothing, since it promoted the work 
of the mint. 
This opinion  Mr. Lowndes  himself  gives  sufficient 
grounds for in his book, particularly page 09,  where we 
read these words : "Although  the former debasements 
of the coins, by public authority, especially those in the 
reigns of king Henry the Eighth, and king Edward tlie 
Sixth, might be  projected for the profit  of the crown, 
and the projectors might measure  that profit by the 
excessive  quantities of  alloy, that were mixed with the 
silver  and  the  gold,"  (and  let  me  add,  or  by  the 
quantity of silver lessened in each specie, which is the 
same thing.)  "And  though this  was enterprised  by 
a  prince,  who  could  stretch his  prerogative very far 
upon his  people;  and was  done  in times,  when  the 
nation had very  little  commerce,  inland  or  foreign, 
to be injured or  prejudiced  thereby;  yet experience 
presently showed,  that the projectors were mistaken, 
and that it was  absolutely necessary to have  the base 
money reformed."  This,  at least,  they were not mis- 
taken in, that they brought work to  the miat, and a part 
of the money coined to  the crown for seniorage: in  both 
which there was  profit.  Mr. Lowndes  tells us,  p. 45, 
That Henry the Eighth  had  to the value  of  fifty 
shillings for  every  pound  weight of  gold  coined."  I 
have  met with it somewhere, that formerly  the king 
might take what he pleased  for coinage.  I know not 
too,  but the flattering name of  raising money  might 
-prevJ1  then as it does now; and impose so far on them 
as to  make them think the raising,  i. e.  diminishing the 
silver in their coin, would bring  it into the realm, or 
stay it here, when  they found it  going out.  For if we 
may guess at the other by Henry the Eighth's raising, 
it was probably when,  by reason of  expense in foreign 
wars,  or ill-managed trade, they found money begin to 
grow scarce, 
The having the species of  our coin one-fifth bigger, 
or one-fifth  less  than they  are  at present,  would  be 
neither good nor harm to England, if  they had always 
been so.  Our standard has  continued  in weight and 
fineness, just  as it is now,  for very near this hundred 
years last past :  and those who think the denomination 
and size of our money have any influence on the state of 
our wealth, have no reason to change the present stand- 
ard of our coin ;  since under that we have had a greater 
increase,  and longer continuance of  plenty of  money, 
than perhaps any other country can show : I see no rea- 
son to think, that a little bigger or less size of the pieces 
coined is of  any moment one way or the other.  The 
species of  money in any country, of  whatsoever  sizes, 
fit for coining,  if  their proportions to one another be 
suited  to arithmetic  and calculations,  in whole  num- 
bers, and the ways of accounts in that country; if they 
are adapted to small payments,  and carefully kept to 
their just  weight  and fineness,  can have  no harm in 
them.  The  harm  comes  by  the  change,  which  un- 
reasonably and unjustly gives away and transfers men's 
properties, disorders trade, puzzles accounts, and needs 
a new  arithmetic to cast  up reckonings,  and keep ac- 
counts in; besides  a  thousand  other inconveniencies, 
not to mention the charge of recoining the money ;'  for 
this may be depended on, that, if  our money be raised 
as is proposed,  it will enforce the recoining of  all our 
money, both old and new, (except the new shillings) to 
avoid the terrible difficulty and confusion there will be 
in keeping accounts  in  pounds,  shillings,  and pence, 
(as they must be)  when  the species of  our money are 
so ordered as not to answer thosedenominations inround 
numbers. 
This consideration leads me to Mr. Lowndes's fifth 
and  sixth reasons, p.  85,  wherein he recommends  the 
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convenience,  to our accounting by  pounds,  shillings, 
and pence ;  and  for  obviating perplexity among  tlie 
common people, he proposes the present weighty crown 
to go at six shillings three-pence ;  and the new scepter, 
or unit,  to be coined of  the same wcight,  to go at thc 
same rate ;  and half-crowns, half-scepters, or half-units, 
of the weight of  the present half-crown,  to go for two 
shillings  seven-pcncc  halfpenny : by  no  number  oi' 
which pieces can there be made an even pound sterling, 
or any number of  even  shillings under a  pound ;  but 
they always fall into fractions of pounds and sliillings, 
as may be seen by the follo.tving table : 
I.  s.  d. 
1  Half-crown, half-scepter, or half-unit piece  -  0  3  14 
1  Crown, scepter, or unit j~iece  -  -  -  OG3 
3 I-Ialf-crown pieces  -  0  9  4: 
2 Crown pieces  0  12  G 
5 Half-crown pieces  -  0  1.5  7f 
3 Crown pieces  0  18  9 
7 Half-crown pieces  -  -  1  1104 
4 Crown pieces  -  -  -  I50 
The present shilling  and new testoon  going for fif- 
teen-pence,  no number of  them make  any number of 
even shillings ; but five  shillings, ten  shillings, fifteen 
shillings, and twenty shillings ;  but in all the rest thcy 
always fall into fractions. 
The like may be  said of  the present sixpences  and 
future half testoons  going for seven-pence halfpenny ; 
the quarter testoons, which are to go for  three-pence 
three-farthings ;  and the gross and groats, which are to 
go for fivepence ;  the half  gross or groat, which is  to 
go for two-pence halfpenny, and the prime, which is to 
go for  a  penny farthing : out  of  any tale of each of 
which species there can no just number of shillings be 
made,  as I think,  but five  shillings, ten  shillings, fif- 
teen  shillings, and twenty shillings ;  but they always 
fall into fractions.  This  new-intended  shilling alone 
seems to be  suited to our  accounting in pounds, shil- 
lings, and  pence.  The great pieces,  as scepters  and 
half-scepters, which arc made to serve for the payment 
of greater sums, and are for  despatch in tale, will not 
in tale fall into even pounds ;  and I fear it will puzzle 
a better arithmetician than  most  countrymen are, to 
tell, without pen and ink, how many of the lesser pieces 
(except  the shillings)  however  combined, will  make 
just sixteen or seventeen shillings ;  and I imagine there 
is not one countryman of three but may have it for his 
pains, if he can tell  an hundred pounds made up of a 
promiscuous mixture  of the species of this new raised 
money (excluding the shillings) in a  day's  time ;  and 
that which will help to confound him, and every body 
else, will be the old crowns, half-crowns, shillings, and 
sixpences,  current for new numbers of pence ;  so that 
I take it for  granted that if our coin be raised  as is 
proposed, not only all our clipped, but all our weighty 
and milled money, must of  necessity be recoined too ; 
if you would not have trade disturbed, and people more 
diseased with new money, which  they cannot tell, nor 
keep accounts in, than with light and clipped money, 
which they are cheated with;  and what a  charge the 
new coining of all our  money will be  to the nation I 
have computed in another place*.  That I think is of 
some consideration in our present circumstances, though 
the confusion that this new raised money, I fear, is like 
to introduce, and the want of money and stop of trade, 
when the clipped is called in, and the weighty is to be 
recoined, be of much greater. 
His fourth, eighth, and ninth reasons, p. 84 and 86, 
are taken from  the saving our present milled motley 
from being cut and recoined.  The end I confess to be 
good :  it is very reasonable that so much excellent coin, 
as good  as ever was  in the world, should  not  be de- 
stroyed.  But there is, I think, a surer and easier way 
to preserve it than what Mr. Lowndes proposes.  It is 
past doubt, it will be in no danger of recoining, if our 
money be kept upon the present foot: but if it be raised, 
as Mr. Lowndes proposes, all the present milled money 
will be in danger, and the difficulty of counting it, upon 
* Vid. Short Observations on  a Paper, entitled,  For encouraging 
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the new proposed  foot, will  enforce it to be recoined 
into new pieces  of  crowns, half-crowns, shillings,  and 
six-pences, that may pass for the same number of pence 
the present do,  viz. 60, 30, 12, and 6, as I have above 
shown.  He  says in his  fourth reason, that  if pieces 
having the same bigness  should have  different values, 
it might be  difficult  for  the  common  people  (espe- 
cially  those  not  skilled  in  arithmetic)  to  compute 
how  many  of  one kind will  be  equal to the sum  of 
another."  Such difficulties  and  confusion  in count- 
ing money,  I  agree with him,  ought  carefully to be 
avoided ;  and therefore, since if pieces having the same 
bigness  and stamp, which  the people  are acquainted 
with, shall have new values  different from those which 
people are accustomed to ; and these new values shall 
in numbers of pence not answer our way of accounting 
by pounds and shillings; "  It will be  difficult for  the 
common people (especially  those not skilled in arith- 
metic) to compute  how  many  of  any  one  kind  will 
make any sum they are to pay or receive ;" especially 
when  the numbers of  any one  kind of fpieces will  be 
brought into so few even sums of pounds and shillings. 
And thus Mr.  Lowndes's  argument here turns upon 
himself, and is against raising our coin to the value pro- 
posed by him, from the confi~sion  it will produce. 
His 8th reason, p.  86, we have in these words :  "  It 
is difficult to conceive  how any design of  amending 
the clipped money can be  compassed,  without raising 
the value of  the silver  remaining in them, because of 
the great deficiency of the silver  clipped away, which 
(upon recoining) must necessarily be defrayed or borne 
one way or other." 
It is  no difficulty to conceive  that clipped money, 
being not lawful money, should be prohibited to pass 
for more than its weight.  Next, it is  no difficulty to 
conceive that clipped money, passing for no more than 
its weight, and so being in the state of standard bullion, 
which cannot be  exported,  should  be brought  to the 
mint,  and there exchanged  for weighty  money.  By 
this  ruay, '  it is  no  difficulty  to conceive  how  the 
amending the clipped  money may  be  compassed, be- 
cause this  way  the  deficiency  of  the  silver  clipped 
away will  certainly be  defrayed  or  borne one way or 
other." 
And thus I have gone over all Mr. Lowndes's reasons 
for raising our coin;  wherein,  though I seem to differ 
from him, yet I flatter myself  it is  not altogether  so 
much as at first sight may appear ;  since by what I find 
in another part of his book, I have reason to judge he 
is a great deal  of my mind ; for he has five very good 
arguments for continuing the present stanzard of fine- 
ness, each of which is as strong for continuing also the 
present standard of weight,  d.  e. continuing a penny of 
the same weight of standard silver which at present it 
has.  He that has a mind to be  satisfied  of this, may 
reed Mr. Lowndes's  first five reasons for continuing the 
present standard  of fineness, which  he will find in his 
29,  30, 31,  32 pages  of  his  report;  and when  Mr. 
Lowndes himself has again considered what there is of 
weight in them, and how far it reaches, he will at least 
not think it strange if they appear to  me  and others 
good itrguments against putting less silver into our coin 
of the same denomination, let that diminution be inade 
what way it will. 
What Mr. Lowndes says about gold coins, p. 88, &c. 
appears to me  highly rational,  and I perfectly agree 
with him ;  excepting only that I do not think gold is in 
regard of  silver  risen  one-third  in England, which  I 
think may be thus made out : A guinea weighing five 
penny-weights  and nine  grains, or  one  hundred  and 
twenty-nine grains ;  and a pound sterling weighing one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty grains ;  a guinea at 
twenty shillings, is as one hundred and twenty-nine to 
one thousand eight hundred and sixty ;  that is, as one 
to fourteen and an half. 
A guinea at  two and twenty shillings, is as one hun- 
dred and twenty-nine to two thousand forty-two, i  e. 
as one to sixteen. 
A guinea at  thirty shillings, is as one hundred  twenty - 
nine to two thousand seven  hundred eighty-four, i.  e. 
as one to twenty-one and an half, near. 
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He therefore  that receives  twenty shillings milled 
money for a guinea, receives  one thousand eight hun- 
dred and sixty grains standard silver for one hundred 
and twenty-nine grains of standard gold, i. e.  fourteen 
and an half for one. 
He who  receives  two  and  twenty shillings  milled 
money for a guinea, has two thousand forty-two grains 
standard silver for one hundred and twenty-nine grains 
standard gold, i. e. sixteen for one. 
He who receives  thirty shillings milled money for a 
guinea, has two thousand  seven  hundred eighty-four 
grains  standard  silver for  one  hundred  twenty-nine 
grains of gold, i. e.  twenty-one and an half for one. 
But the current cash being (upon trials made about 
Midsummer  last)  computed  by Mr. Lowndes, p. 108, 
to want half its standard weight, and not being mended 
since, it is evident, he who  receives  thirty shillings of 
our present  clipped money for  a guinea, has but one 
thousand three hundred ninety-two grains of standard 
silver for one hundred twenty-nine grains of gold, i. e. 
has  but ten  and three quarters  of  silver  for  one of  - 
gold. 
I have left out the  utmost precisions of fractions in 
these computations,  as  not necessary in  the present 
case, these whole  numbers  showing well  enough the 
difference of the value of guineas at  those several rates. 
If it be true what I here  assert, viz.  that he.who 
receives thirty shillings in our  current clipped money 
for a guinea, receives not eleven grains of silver for one 
of gold ;  whereas the value  of gold to silver in all our 
neighbouring countries is about fifteen to one, which is 
about a third part more ;  it  will probably be demanded 
how it comes to pass that foreigners, or others, import 
gold, when they do not  receive  as much  silver for it 
here as they may have in all other countries? The rea- 
son whereof  is visibly this, that they exchange it not 
here for silver, but for our commodities :  and our bar- 
gains for  commodities, as well  as all other contracts, 
being made in pounds,  shillings, and pence, our clip- 
ped money retains amongst the people (who know not 
how to count but by current money) a part of its legal 
value, whilst it passes for the satisfaction of legal con- 
tracts, as if it were lawful money.  As long as the king 
receives it for his taxes, and the landlord for his rent, 
it is no wonder the farmer and tenant should receive it 
for  his  comn~odities. And  this,  perhaps,  would  do 
well enough, if our money and trade were to circulate 
only amongst ourselves, and we had no commerce with 
the rest of the world, and needed it not.  But here lies 
the loss, when foreigners  shall bring over gold hither, 
and with that pay for  our  commodities at the rate of 
thirty shillings the guinea, when  the same quantity of 
gold that is in a guinea is not, beyond sea, worth more 
silver than is in twenty, or one and twenty and sixpence 
of our milled and lawful money ;  by which way ofpay- 
ing for our commodities, England loses near one-third 
of the value of all the commodities it thus sells ;  and it 
is all one as if foreigners paid for them in money coined 
and clipped beyond sea, wherein was one-third less sil- 
ver than there ought to be; and thus we lose near one- 
third in  all our exportation, whilst  foreign gold  im- 
ported  is  received  in payment  for  thirty shillings  a 
guinea.  To  make this appear, we need but trace this 
way of commerce  a  little, and there can be no doubt 
of the loss we suffer by it. 
Let us suppose, for example, a bale of Holland linen 
worththere one hundred and eighty  ounces of our stand- 
ard silver; and a bale of serge here worth also the same 
weight of  one hundred and  eighty ounces of the same 
standard silver ;  it  is evident these two bales are exactly 
of  the  same  value.  Mr.  Lowndes  tells  us,  p.  88, 
"  That at this time the gold  that is  in a guinea (if it 
were carried to Spain, Italy, Barbary, and some other 
places)  would  not purchase  so much  silver  there,  as 
is equal to the standard of  twenty of  our  shillings." 
i. e.  would be in value there to silver scarce as one to 
fourteen and an  half: and I think I may say that gold 
in Holland is, or lately was,  as one to fifteen, or not 
much above.  Taking then  standard  gold in Holland 
to be in proportion to standard silver, as one to about 
fifteen, or a little more ;  twelve ounces of our standard 
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gold, or as much  gold as  is  in forty-four guineas and 
an half, must be given for  that bale of EIolland linen, 
if any one will pay for it there in gold :  but if he buys 
that bale  of serge here  for  one  hundred  and eighty 
ounces of silver, which  is  forty-eight  pounds sterling, 
if he pays for it in gold at thirty shillings the guinea, 
two and thirty guineas will pay for it ;  so that in all the 
goods that we sell beyond  sea  for  gold imported, and 
coined into guineas, unless the owners raise them one- 
third above what  they would  sell  them  for  in milled 
money, we lose twelve in forty-four and an half, which 
is very near one-third. 
This loss is wholly owing to the permitting clipped 
money in payment ;  and this loss we must unavoidably 
suffer, whilst  clipped  money  is  current  amongst  us; 
and this robbing of England of near  one-third  of the 
value  of  the commodities we  send  out will  continue, 
whilst people had rather receive guineas at thirty shil- 
lings than silver coin (no other being to be had) that is 
not worth half what they take it for ;  and yet this clip- 
ped money, as bad as it is, and however unwilling peo- 
ple are to be charged with  it, will  always have credit 
enough to pass, whilst the goldsmiths and bankers re- 
ceive  it; and they will always  receive it, whilst  they 
can pass it over again to the king with advantage, and 
can have hopes to prevail, that  at last when  it can be 
borne no longer, but must be  called in, no part of the 
loss of light money, which shall be found in their hands, 
shall fall upon them, though they have for many years 
dealt in it, and by reason of its being clipped, have had 
all the running cash of the kingdom in their hands, and 
made profit of  it.  I say, clipped  money, however bad 
it be, will  always  pass whilst  the king's  receivers, the 
bankers of any kind, and at last the exchequer, take it; 
for who will  not  receive  clipped  money, rather than 
have none for his necessary occasions, whilst he sees the 
great receipt of the exchequer admits it, and the bank 
and goldsmitlls will take it of him, and give him credit 
for it, so that he needs keep no more of it by him than 
he pleases ?  In this state, while the exchequer receives 
clipped money, I do  not see how it can be stopped from 
passing.  A  clipped half-crown, that goes at the exche- 
quer, will not be refused by any one who has hopes by 
his own or others' hands to convey it thither, and who, 
unless he take it, cannot  trade, or  shall not be paid ; 
whilst therefore the exchequer is open to clipped  mo- 
ney, it will pass, and whilst clipped money passes, clip- 
pers will  certainly be  at work;  and what  a  gap this 
leaves to foreigners, if they will make use of it to pour 
in clipped  money upon us  (as  its neighbours  did into 
Portugal) as long as we have either goods or weighty 
money left to be carried  away  at fifty  per cent.,  or 
greater profit, it is easy to see. 
I will suppose the king receives clipped money in the 
exchequer, and at  half or three quarters loss coins it into 
milled money.  For if he receives all, how much soever 
clipped,I suppose the clippers' shears are not sosqueam- 
ish as not to pare  away above hall:  It  ill be a yon- 
derful conscientiousness in them, nowhere that I know 
to be  paralleled, if  tl~ey  will  content tliernselves with 
less profit than  they can  make,  and will  leave  seven 
pennyworth  of  silver  in  an half-crown, if  six  penny- 
worth and the stamp be enough to make it pass for half 
a crown.  \Vhen  liis majesty hath coined this into milled 
money of standard weight, and paid it out again to the 
bankers, goldsmiths, or others, what shall then become 
of it? Either  they will  lay it up to get rid  of  their 
clipped money, for nobody will part with heavy money 
whilst he has any light ;  nor will any heavy money come 
abroad whilst there is light left; for whoever has clip- 
ped money by him, will sell good bargains, or  borrow 
at any rate of those who  are willing  to part with any 
weighty, to keep that by him  rather than the clipped 
money he has in his hands ;  so that, as far as this reaches, 
no milled  money,  how  much  soever  be  coined,  will 
appear abroad; or if  it does, will  it long escape  the 
coiners and clippers' hands, who will be  at work pre- 
sently upon it, to furnish the exchequer with more clip- 
ped money at fifty, sixty, seventy, or I know not what 
advantage ?  Though this be enough to cut off the hopes 
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clipped is  current, yet to this we may add, that gold 
imported at  an over-value, will sweep it away as fast as 
it is coined, whilst clipped money keeps up the rate of 
guineas above their former value.  This will be the cir- 
culation of our money, whilst clipped is permitted any 
way to be current ;  and if store enough of clipped mo- 
ney at home,  or from abroad,  can be but provided (as 
it is  more  than probable it may, now the trade is  so 
universal, and has been so long practised with great ad- 
vantage, and no great danger, as appears by the few 
have suffered, in regard to the great numbers it  is evi- 
dent are engaged in the trade, and the vent of it here in 
England is so known  and  sure) I do not see how in a 
little while we shall have any money or goods at  all left 
in England,  if clipping be  not  immediately stopped ; 
and how clipping can be stopped but by an immediate 
positive  prohibition, whereby all clipped  money shall 
be forbid to  pass in any payment whatsoever, or to  pass 
for  more  than its weight, I would  be  glad  to learn. 
Clipping is the great leak which for some time past has 
contributed more to sink us than all the forces of our 
enemies could do.  It  is like a breach in the sea-bank, 
which widens every moment till it be stopped ;  and my 
timorous temper  must  be  pardoned, if I am frighted 
with the thoughts of clipped money being current one 
moment  longer  at any other  value  but of warranted 
standard bullion ;  and therefore there can be nothing 
more true and reasonable, nor that deserves better  to 
be considered, than what Mr. Lowndes says in his Co- 
rollary, p. 90. 
Whoever desires to know the different ways of coin- 
ing money by the hammer and by the mill, may inform 
himself in the exact account Mr. Lowndes has given of 
both under his second general head ;  where lie may also 
see  the probablest guess that has been made of the quan- 
tity of our clipped money, and the silver deficient in it; 
and an account of what silver money was coined in the 
reigns of queen Elizabeth, king James I. and Charles I. 
more exact  than  it  is  to  be  had  any  where  else. 
There is only one  thing which I shall mention, since 
Mr. Lowndes does it  here again under this head, y. 100, 
and that is melting down our coin ; concerning which 
I shall venture  humbly  to propose  these  following 
questions : 
1.  Whether bullion  be any thing but silver, whose 
workmanship has no value ? 
2. Whether that workmanship, which can be had for 
nothing, has, or can have any value? 
3.  Whether, whilst the money in our mint is coined 
for the owners, without any cost to thern, our coin can 
ever have any value above any standard bullion ? 
4.  Whether,  whilst  our coin  is  not  of value  above 
standard bullion, goldsmiths and others, who have need 
of standard  silver, will  not rather take what is by the 
free labour of  the mint  already assayed  and adjusted 
to their use, ,and melt that down, than be at the trouble 
of melting, mixing,  and assaying of  silver for the uses 
they have ? 
5. Whether the only cure for this wacton, though cri- 
minal melting down our coin, be not,  that the owners 
should pay one moiety of the sixteen-pence  halfpenny 
which  is paid  per pound  troy  for  coinage of  silver, 
which the king now pays all? 
6.  Whether by this means standard silver in coin will 
not be more worth than standard silver in bullion, and 
so be preserved from this wanton melting down, as soon 
as an over-balance of our trade shall bring us silver to 
stay here ?  for till then,  it is  in vain  to think of pre- 
serving our coin from  melting down, and therefore to 
no purpose till then to change that law. 
7. Whether any laws, or any penalties, can keep our 
coin  from being  carried  out,  when  debts  contracted 
beyond seas call for it? 
8.  Whether  it be any  odds  to England,  whether 
it be  carried  out,  melted  down  into  bullion,  or in 
specie ? 
9. Whether,  whilst  the exigencies of our occasions 
and trade call for it abroad, it will not always be melted 
down for the conveniency of exportation, so long as the 
law prohibits its exportation in specie ? 200  Further Considerations concerning 
10.  Whether standard silver  in coin  and in bullion 
will not immediately be of  the same value,  as soon as 
the prohibition of carrying out money in specie is taken 
off? 
11. Whether an ounce of  silver the more would be 
carried out in  a  year,  if  that prohibition were taken 
off? 
12.  Whether  silver  in  our  coin  will  not  always, 
during the prohibition of its exportation, be a little less 
worth than silver in bullion, whilst the consumption of 
foreign commodities  beyond what ours pay for, malres 
the exportation  of  silver necessary ?  And  so, during 
such a state, raise your money as much, and as you will, 
"  silver in the coin will never fetch as much as the silver 
in bullion,"  as Mr. Lowndes expresses it,  p.  110. 
As to the inconveniencies  and damages we sustain by 
clipped  money passing  by  tale  as  if  it were  lawful, 
nothing  can  be  more  true,  more judicious,  nor  more 
weighty, than what Mr. Lowndes says, under his third 
general head ;  wherein I perfectly agree with him, ex- 
cepting only where he builds  any thing upon the pro- 
posed raising our coin one-fifth.  And to what he says, 
p. 1141, concerning  our being  4c deprived of  the use of 
our heavy money,  by  men's  hoardins it,  in  prospect 
that the silver, contained  in  those weighty pieces, will 
turn more to their ~rofit  than  lending it at interest, 
purchasing,  or trading  therewith;"  I crave  leave  to 
add,  that those hoarders  of  money,  a great many of 
them,  drive  no  less,  but  rather  a  greater  trade,  by 
hoarding  the weighty  money,  than  if  they  let it go 
abroad ; for by that means all the current cash being 
light, clipped,  and hazardous money,  it is all tumbled 
into their hands,  which gives credit to their bills, and 
furnishes  them  to trade for  as much as ,they please, 
whilst  every body else  scarce trades at all, (but just 
as necessity forces) and is ready to stand still. 
Where he sags, p. 114, "It is not likely the weighty 
monies will  soon  appear abroad, without raising their 
value,  and  recoining  the clipped  monies :"  I should 
agree with  him  if it ran thus:  without recoining the 
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clipped,  and in the mean time  making it  go for  its 
weight. ; for that will, I humbly conceive, bring out the 
heavy money,  without raising  its value,  as effectually 
and sooner ;  for it will do it immediately:  his will take 
up some  time;  and  I fear,  if  clipped  money  be  not 
stopped all  at once,  and presently,  from passing any 
way  in  tale,  the damage  it will  bring will  be  irre- 
parable. 
"  Mr. Lowndes's  fourth general head is to propose 
the means  that  must  be  observed,  and  the proper 
methods to be used in and for the re-establishment of 
the silver coins." 
The first is, "  That the work  should be finished in 
as little time as may be;  not  only to obviate a farther 
damage by clipping in  the interim,  but also that the 
needful  advantages  of  the new money may be sooner 
obtained for the service of the nation." 
These, I agree with him, are very good and necessary 
ends; but they  are both  to be  attained,  I conceive, 
much  sooner  by  making  clipped  money  go for  its 
weight, than by  the method  Mr. Lowndes proposes; 
for this immediately puts an end to  clipping, andobviates 
all farther damage thereby.  Next, it  immediatelybrillgs 
out all the hoarded weighty money, and so that advan- 
tage will be  sooner  obtained  for  the  service  of  the 
nation,  than it can  any other way besides.  Next, it 
preserves the use  of  clipped money for the service of 
the nation, in the interim, till it can be recoined all at 
the Tower. 
His second  proposition is, "  That the loss,  or the 
greatest part of  it,  ought to be borne by the public, 
and  not  by  particulars,  who,  being  very  numerous, 
will be prejudiced against a reformation for the public 
benefit, if it be to be effected  at the cost of particular 
men." 
A tax  given to  make good the defect of silver in clip- 
ped money, will be paid by particulars; and so the loss 
will be borne by particular men :  and whether these par-  . --  . 
ticulars be no<;ore  numerous, or at least a great num- 
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that way, than if it takes its chance  in  the hands of 
those men who have  profited  by the having it in their 
hand, will  be worth  considering.  And I wish  it here 
well weighed, which of the two ways the greater number  -  of men would be most dangerously prejudiced against 
this reformation. But as Mr. Lowndes orders the matter, 
every body will, I fear,  be  prejudiced against this re- 
formation,  when  (as  he  divides  it,  p. 133, 134) the 
owners will bear near one-half of  the loss, in the price 
of his clipped  money,  and every body else his  part of 
the remainder, in a tax levied on them for it.  I wish a 
remedy could be found without any body's  loss.  Most 
of those ways I have heard proposed, to make repara- 
tion  to every  particular  man  for  the clipped  money 
shall be found in his hands, do so delay the remedy, if 
not entail clipping upon  us,  that I fear such a care of 
particulars endangers the whole ;  and if that suffer, it 
will go but ill with particulars.  I am not for hindering 
those who  have  clipped  money  from any recompense 
which can be provided and made them.  The  question 
here is not whether the honest countryman shall bear the 
loss of his clipped money, without any more ado, or pay 
a tax to recompense himself?  That which, I humbly 
conceive,the nation is most concerned in, is that clipping 
should  be finally stopped,  and that the money which 
remains should go according to its true value,  for the 
carrying on  of  commerce,  and the present  supply of 
people's  exigencies,  till that part of  it,  which  is de- 
faced,  can  by  the mint be brought to its legal and 
due form ;  and therefore I think it will be the rational 
desire of  all particulars,  that the shortest  and surest 
way, not interfering with law or equity, should be taken 
to  put an effectual  end  to  an evil,  which every mo- 
ment it continues works powerfully towards a general 
ruin. 
His fourth proposition, "  That no room must be left 
for jealousy,"  I acknowledge to be a good one, if there 
can be a way found to obtain it. 
I cannot but wonder to find the words, p.  124, "  That 
no person  whatsoever  shall  hereafter  be  obliged  to 
accept, in legal payments,  any money whatsoever that 
is already clipped, or may hereafter be clipped, or dimi- 
nished ; and that no person shall tender or receive any 
such money in payment,  under some small penalty to 
be made easily recoverable,"  kc. 
As if any man  now were  obliged to receive clipped 
money in legal payments,  and there were not already 
a law, with severe penalties, against those who tendered 
clipped money in payment. 
It is  a  doubt to me,  whether the warden, master- 
worker, 8.c.  of  the mint at the Tower,  could find fit 
and skilful persons  enough to set nine  other mints at 
work,  in other  parts  of  England,  in  a  quarter of  a 
year, as Mr. Lowndes proposes,  p. 127.  Besides,  Mr. 
Lowndes tells us,  p. 96,  that the engines, which '' put 
the letters  upon the edges of  the larger silver pieces, 
and mark  the edges  of  the rest with  a graining, are 
wrought  secretly."  And,  indeed,  this  is  so  great a 
guard against counterfeiting, as well  as clipping our 
money, that it deserves well  to be kept  a secret, as it 
has been hitherto.  But how that can be,  if money be 
to be coined  in  nine  other mints,  set  up in several 
parts,  is hard to conceive;  and lastly, perhaps,  some 
may apprehend  it may be  of  ill consequence to have 
so many men instructed  and employed  in  the art of 
coining only for a  short job,  and  then  turned loose 
again  to shift for  themselves  by their  own skill  and 
industry, as they can. 
The provision  made  in his  fourth rule, p. 136, to 
prevent the gain of "subtle  dealers by culllng out the 
heaviest of  the clipped pieces,"  though it be the pro- 
duct of great  sagacity and foresight, exactly calculated, 
and as well contrived,  as in that case it can be ;  yet I 
fear is too subtle for the apprehension and practice of 
countrymen, who many of them, with their little quick- 
ness  in  such  matters,  have  also  but small  sums of 
money by  them, and so neither having arithmetic, nor 
choice of clipped money, to adjust it to the weight there 
required, will be hardly made to understand it.  But I 
think the clippers have,  or will take care that there 
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To  conclude ;  I confess  myself  not to see the least 
reason why our present milled  money should be at all 
altered in fineness, weight, or value.  I look upon it to 
be the best and safest from counterfeiting, adulterating, 
or any ways being fraudulently diminished, of any that 
ever was coined.  It  is adjusted to our legal payments, 
reckonings, and accounts, to which our money must be 
reduced : the raising its denomination will neither add 
to its worth, nor make the stock we have more propor- 
tionate to our occasions,  nor bring  one  grain of silver 
the more into England,  nor one farthing advantage to 
the public :  it will only serve to defraud the king, and 
a great number of  his subjects,  and perplex  all ;  and 
put the kingdom to a needless charge of recoining all, 
both milled as well as clipped money. 
If I might  take upon me to offer any thing new, I 
would  humbly propose,  that  since  market  and retail 
trade requires less divisions than sir-pences, a sufficient 
quantity of four-penny, four-penny-hal fpenny, and five- 
penny pieces should be coined.  These in change will an- 
swer all the fractions between six-pence and a farthing, 
and thereby supply the want of small monies, whereof I 
believe nobody ever saw enough common to answer the 
necessity of  small payments;  whether,  either because 
there was  never  a  sufficient quantity  of  such pieces 
coined,  or whether because of their smallness they are 
apter to  be lost out of any hands, orbecause they oftener 
falling into children's  hands, they lose them, or lay them 
up; so it is, there is always a visible want of them ;  to 
supply which,  without  the  inconveniencies  attending 
very small coin, the proposed pieces, I humbly conceive, 
will serve. 
If it be thought fit for this  end to have four-pence, 
four-pence half-penny, and five-penny pieces coined, it 
will, I suppose, be convenietlt,  that they should be di- 
stinguished from sixpences, and from one another, by s 
deep andverylarge  plain difference in the stamp  on both 
sides, to  prevent mistakes and loss of time in telling of 
money.  The  four-pence-halfpenny has already the harp 
for a  known  distinction, which  may be fit to be con- 
tinued ;  the five-pence may have the feathers, and the 
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four-pence  this mark IV. of four on the reverse ;  and 
on the other side  they may each have the king's  head 
with a  crown on it, to show on that side too that the 
piece so coined is one of those under a six-pence ;  and 
with that they may each, on that side also, have some 
marks of distinction one from another, as the five-pence 
this mark of V. the four-pence-halfpenny  a little harp, 
and the four-pence nothing. 
These or any other better distinctions which his ma- 
jesty shall order, will  in  tale readily discover them, if 
by chance any of  them fall into larger payments, for 
which they are not designed. 
And thus I have, with as much brevity and clearness 
as I could, complied with what Mr. Lowndes professes 
to  be the end of printing his report in these words, viz. 
"  That any persons,  who have considered an affair of 
this  nature, may  (if  they please)  communicate their 
thoughts for rendering the design here aimed  at more 
perfect, or  more  agreeable to the public service."  It 
must be confessed, that my considerations have led me 
to thoughts, in some parts of this affair, quite opposite 
to Mr. Lowndes's:  but how far this has been from any 
desire to oppose him, or to have a dispute with a  man 
no  otherwise  known to me but by his civilities,  and 
whom I have a very great esteem for,  will appear by 
what I printed about raising the value of money about 
three years since.  All that I have said here, in answer 
to him, being nothing but the applying the principles 
I then went  on,  particularly now,  to Mr.  Lowndes's 
arguments,  as  they came in my way, that  so thereby 
others may judge what will,  or will not, be the conse- 
quences of such a change of  our coin as he proposes; 
the only way,  I  think,, of  rendering his  design more 
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SPECI~~. 
Mexico real  -  -  - 
Ducatoon of Flanders  - 
Seville real  -  -  - 
Holland dollar  -  - 
Lyon dollar  -  - 
Rixdollar of the Empire  - 
Old cardecu  -  - 
French louis  -  -  - 
Double milrez of Portugal  - 
Single milrez of Portugal  - 
St. Mark of Venice  -  - 
Double Dutch stiver  - 
Cross dollar  - 
Zealand dollar  -  - 
Old Philip dollar  - 
Ferdinand0 dollar,  1623  - 
Prince of Orange dollar,  1624  - 
Leopoldus dollar,  1624  -  - 
Rodolphus dollar, 1607  - 
Maximilian dollar, 1  6  16  - 
Danish dollar, 1620  -  - 
Portugal testoon  -  . 
The quarter of a new louis  - 
One shilling contained of fine 
silver. 
28 Edw.  1 
18 Edw. 9 
27 Edw. 3 
9 Hen. 5 
1 Hen. 6 
4 Hen. 6 
49 Hen. 6 
1 Hen. 8 
34 Hen. 8 
36 Hen. 8 
37 Hen. 8 
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THE  LATTER, 
IS  AN  ESSAY  CONCERNING  THE TRUE  ORIGINAL,  EXTENT,  AND 
END,  OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
A pound weight of troy standard gold is cut into guineas 444,  one 
guinea weighs gr.  1294, i.  e. five pwt. nine gr.4. PREFACE. 
THOU  hast here the beginning and end of  a discourse 
concerning government ;  what  fate has otherwise dis- 
posed of the  papers that should have filled up  the middle, 
and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to 
tell thee.  These which remain I hope are sufficient to 
establish the throne of our great restorer, our present 
king  William ;  to  make  good his title in the consent ofthe 
people ;  which being the only one of all lawful govern- 
ments, he has more  fully and clearly than any prince 
in Christendom ;  and to justify  to the world  the peo- 
ple  of England, whose  love  of their just  and natural 
rights, with  their  resolution  to preserve  them, saved 
the nation when  it was  on the very brink  of  sIavery 
cznd  ruin.  If these papers have that evidence I flatter 
myself is to be found in them, there will  be no great 
miss  of  those  which  are  lost,  and  my  reader  may 
be satisfied without them.  For I imagine I shall have 
neither the time nor inclination to repeat my pains, and 
fill up the wanting part of my  answer, by tracing sir 
Robert again through all the windings and obscurities 
which are to be met with in the several branches of his 
wonderful system.  The king, and body of the nation, 
have since so thoroughly confuted his hypothesis, that 
I suppose nobody hereafter will have  either the  con- 
fidence to appear against our common safety, and be 
again an advocate for slavery ; or  the weakness to be 
deceived with  contradictions dressed up in a popular 
style and well turned periods.  For if  any one will be 
at the pains himself, in those parts which are here un- 
touched, to strip sir Robert's discourses of the flourish 
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of doubtful  expressions,  and endeavour to reduce his 
words to direct, positive,  intelligible propositions, and 
then compare them one with  another, he will quickly 
be satisfied there was never so much glib nonsense put 
together in well sounding English.  If he think it not 
worth while to examine his works all through, let him 
make an experiment  in that part where  he treats of 
usurpation ;  and let him try whether he  can, with all 
his  skill,  make sir  Robert  intelligible and  consistent 
with himself, or common sense.  I should not speak so 
plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had 
not the pulpit, of  late years, publicly owned his  doc- 
trine, and made  it the  current divinity of  the times. 
It is necessary those  men who, taking on  them to be 
teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be 
openly showed of what authority this their patriarch is, 
whom they have so blindly followed; that so they may 
either  retract  what  upon  so  ill  grounds  they  have 
vented,  and cannot be maintained ;  or else justify those 
principles which  they  have  preached  up for  Gospel, 
though they had no better an author than an English 
courtier.  For I should  not  have writ  against sir Ro- 
bert, or taken  the pains  to show his  mistakes, incon- 
sistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of,  and 
pretends  wholly  to build  on)  Scripture-proofs,  were 
there not men amongst us who, by crying up his books, 
and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach 
of writing against a dead adversary.  They have been 
so zealous  in this point, that if I have done him  any 
wrong, I cannot hope  they should  spare me.  I wish, 
where they have done the truth and the public wrong, 
they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just 
weight to this reflection, viz.  that there cannot be done 
a greater mischief  to prince and people, than the pro- 
pagating wrong notions concerning government ;  that 
so at last all times might not have reason to complain 
of the "  drum ecclesiastic."  If any one  really  con- 
cerned for truth undertake the confutation of my hy- 
pothesis, I promise him  either to recant my mistake, 
upon fair conviction, or to answer his difficulties.  But 
hc must remember two things, 
First,  That cavilling  here  and there  at some  ex- 
pression  or little incident of  my discourse, is  not  an 
answer to my book. 
Secondly,  That I shall not take railing for argu- 
ments,  nor  think  either  of  these  worth  my  notice: 
though I shall always look on myself as bound to give 
satisfaction to any one who shall appear to be consci- 
entiously scrupulous in the point, and shall show any 
just grounds for his scruples. 
I have  nothing  more  but to advertise  the reader, 
that A. stands for our  author, 0. for his Observations 
on Hobbes, Milton, &c.  And that a bare quotation of 
pages  always  means  pages  of  his  Patriarcha,  edit. 
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CHAPTER  I. 
5 1.  SLAVERY  is  SO  vile  and  miserable  an  estate 
of  man,  and  so  directly  opposite  to  the  generous 
temper and courage of our  nation, that it is hardly to 
be conceived that  an Englishman, much less a gentle- 
man,  should  plead  for  it.  And  truly I should have 
taken sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, as any other trea- 
tise, which would persuade all men that they are slaves, 
and ought to be so, for such another exercise of wit as 
was his who writ the encomium of Nero ; rather than 
for a serious discourse, meant  in earnest :  had not the 
gravity of the title and epistle, the picture in the front 
of the book, and the applause that followed it, required 
me to believe  that the author and publisher were both 
in earnest.  I therefore took it into my hands with all 
the expectation, and read it through with a11  the atten- 
tion  due to a  treatise that  made such a  noise at its 
coming abroad ;  and cannot but confess myself mightily 
surprised that in  a  book, which was to provide chains 
for all mankind, I  should  find  nothing but a  rope of 
sand ;  useful perhaps to such whose skill and business 
it is to raise  a dust, and would  blind  the people,  the 
better to mislead them; but in truth not of  any force 
to draw those into bondage who have their eyes open, 
and  so  much  sense  about  them, as  to consider  that 
chains  are but  an ill wearing, how much  care soever 
hath been taken to file and polish them. 
$ 9. If  any one think  I  take  too  much  liberty  in 
speaking so freely of a man who is the great champion 
of absolute power, and the idol of those wlio worship it; 
I beseech him  to make this  small allowance for once, 
to one  who,  even  after  the reading  of  sir  Robert's 
book, cannot but think himself, as the laws allow him, 
a free man :  and I know no fault it is to do so, unless any 
one, better skilled in the fate of it than I, should have 
it revealed to him that this treatise, which has lain dor- 
mant so long, was, when  it appeared in the world,  tc 
carry, by strength of its arguments, all liberty out or 
it;  end  that,  from  thenceforth,  our  author's  short 
model was  to be  the pattern in  the mount,  and  the 
perfect standard of politics for the future.  His system 
lies in a little compass ;  it is no more but this, 
That all government is absolute monarchy." 
And the ground he builds on is this, 
b6  That no marl is born free." 
$ 3. In this last age a generation of men has sprung 
up amongst us, that would  flatter princes with an opi- 
nion, that they have a divine right to absolute power, 
let the laws by which they are constituted and are to 
govern, and the  conditions under which they enter upon 
their authority, be what  they will ;  and their engage- 
ments to observe them ever so well  ratified by solemn 
oaths and promises.  To make way for  this doctrine, 
they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom ; 
whereby they have not only, as much  as in them lies, 
exposed all subjects  to the utmost misery  of  tyranny 
and oppression, but have  also  unsettled the titles and 
shaken the thrones  of princes : (for they too, by these 
men's  system, except only one, are all born slaves, and 
by divine right are subjects to Adam's  right heir);  as 
if they had designed to make war upon all government, 
and subvert the very foundations of human society, to 
serve their present turn. 
$ 4.  However we must believe  them upon their own 
bare words, when they tell us,  cc We are all born slaves, 
and we  must  continue  so ;" there is  no  remedy  for 
it ; life  and  thraldom we  entered into together,  and 
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other.  Scripture or reason, I am sure, do not any where 
say so, notwithstanding the noise of  divine right, as if 
divine authority hath subjected us to the unlimited will 
of another.  An admirable state of mankind, and that 
which they have not had wit enough to find out till this 
latter age ! For however  sir Robert Filmer  seems to 
condemn  the novelty  of  the contrary  opinion,  Patr. 
p. 3, yet I believe it will be  hard for  him to find any 
other age,  or country  of  the world,  but this,  which 
has asserted monarchy to be  jure  divino.  And he con- 
fesses,  Patr. p.  4,  that "  Heyward,  Blackwood, Bar- 
clay,  and  others,  that have  bravely  vindicated  the 
right of kings in  most  points, never  thought of this ; 
but, with one consent, admitted the natural liberty and 
equality of mankind." 
t~  5. By whom this doctrine came at  first to be broach- 
ed, and brought  in fashion  amongst us, and what sad 
effects it gave rise to, I leave to historians to relate, or 
to the memory of those who were contemporaries with 
Sibthorp and Manwaring to recollect.  My business 
at  present is only to consider what sir Robert Filmer, 
who is allowed to have carried this argument farthest, 
and is supposed to have  brought  it to perfection, has 
said in it: for  from  him  every one, who would be  as 
fashionable  as French was  at court, has  learned  and 
runs away with this short system of politics, viz. "Men 
are not born free, and therefore could never have  the 
liberty to choose either governors, or forms of govern- 
ment."  Princes  have  their power  absolute,  and  by 
divine right; for slaves  could  never  hare a  right  to 
compact or consent.  Adam was an absolute monarch, 
and so are all princes ever since. 
CHAPTER  11. 
Of  paternal crnd  regal Power.. 
6.  SIR Robert  Filmer's  great position  is,  that 
cr men  are  not  naturally free."  This is the founda- 
tion on which his absolute monarchy stands, and from 
which it erects itself  to an height,  that its power  is 
above every power :  caput inter .~zubila,  so high  above 
all earthly and human things, that thought can scarce 
reach it ; that promises  and oaths, which  tie the in- 
finite Deity, cannot confine it.  But if this foundation 
fails,  all his  fabric falls with it, and governments must 
be left  again to  the old way of  being  made by con- 
trivance and the consent of men ('AvBF~ivl  x~;Gv~)  making 
use of their reason to unite together into society.  To 
prove  this  grand  position  of his,  he tells  us,  p.  12, 
'<  Men are born in subjection  to their  parents,"  and 
therefore cannot be free.  And this authority of parents 
he calls  "royal  authority,"  p.  18, 14,  "  fatherly  au- 
thority,  right  of  fatherhood,"  p.  18, 20.  One would 
have thought he would,  in  the beginning  of  such a 
work as this, on which was to depend the authority of 
princes,  and the obedience  of  subjects, have  told  us 
expressly what that fatherly authority is, have defined 
it, though not limited  it, because in  some  other trea- 
tises  of  his  he  tells  us,  it is unlimited,  and unlimit- 
able * ;  he should at  least have given us such an account 
of it, that we might have  had an entire notion of  this 
fatherhood, or fatherly authority,  whenever it came in 
our way, in his writings: this I expected to have found 
in  the first  chapter  of  his  Patriarcha.  Rut instead 
thereof,  having,  1. En  pnssant,  made his  obeisance to 
* "  In grants and gifts  that have  their  original  from God or na- 
ture, as the power of the father hath,  no inferior power of man can 
limit, nor shake any law of prescription against them."  Obs. 158. 
"  The Scripture  teaches  that  supreme  power  was  originally  in 
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the arcana impetvii,  p.  5; 8. Made his compliment to 
the "  rights and liberties of this  or any other nation," 
p. 6, which he is going  presently to null and destroy ; 
and 3. Made his leg to those learned men who did not 
see  so far into the matter as himself, p. 7: he comes 
to fall on Bellarmine, p. 8, ancl  by a  victory over him 
establishes his fatherly authority beyond any question. 
Bellarmine being  routed  by his own confession, p. 11, 
the day is clear  got, and there is no more need of any 
forces:  for  having  done  that, I  observe  not  that he 
states the question, or rallies up any arguments to make 
good  his  opinion, but rather tells  us  the  story as he 
thinks  fit  of  this  strange kind  of domineering phan- 
tom called the fatherhood, which whoever could catch 
presently got empire,  and  unlimited  absolute power. 
He acquaints us  how this fatherhood began in Adam, 
continued its course,  and kept  the world in order  all 
the time  of  the patriarchs  till the flood;  got out of 
the ark with Noah and his  sons, made and supported 
all  the kings  of the earth till  the captivity of the Is- 
raelites in Egypt ; and then  the poor fatherhood was 
under hatches, till "  God, by giving the Israelites kings, 
re-established the ancient and prime right of the lineal 
succession in  paternal government."  This is  his bu- 
siness from p.  12 to 19.  And then, obviating an ob- 
jection,  and clearing  a  difficulty or two with one-half 
reason, p. 23, "  to confirin the natural right  of regal 
power,"  he ends the first chapter.  I hope it is no in- 
jury to call an half quotation an half reason ;  for God 
says, '' Honour thy father and mother ;" but our  au- 
thor  contents himself with  half, leaves  out  <'  thy mo- 
ther"  quite, as little  serviceable to his purpose.  But 
of that more in another place. 
$ 7. I do not think our author so little skilled in the 
way of writing discourses  of  this nature, nor so care- 
less  of  the point  in hand, that he by oversight  com- 
mits  the fault that he himself,  in  his "  anarchy of a 
mixed  monarchy,"  p.  $239,  objects  to Mr.  Hunton 
in these words : ''  Where first I charge the A.  that he 
liath  not  given  us  any  definition  or  description of 
monarchy in  general; for  by the  rules of method he 
should  have  first  defined."  And  by the like rule of 
method,  sir  Robert  should  have  told  us  what  his 
fatherhood, or fatherly authority is, before he had told 
us in whom it was to be found, and talked so much of 
it.  But,  perhaps,  sir Robert found,  that this fatherly 
authority,  this power  of  fathers,  and of  kings, for he 
makes them both the same, p.  84, would make a very 
odd and frightful figure, and very disagreeing  with what 
either children imagine of  their parents,  or subjects of 
their kings,  if  he  should  have  given  us  the whole 
draught together, in that gigantic form he had painted 
it in his own fancy;  and therefore,  like a wary physi- 
cian,  when  he would  have  his  patient  swallow  some 
harsh  or corrosive  liquor,  he  mingles it with  a large 
quantity of  that which may dilute it, that the scattered 
parts may go down with  less  feeling,  and cause  less 
aversion. 
$ 8.  Let us then endeavour to find what account he 
gives us of this fatherly authority, as it lies scattered in 
the several parts of his writings.  And first, as  it was 
vested in Adam,  he says, "  Not  only Adam,  but the 
succeeding  patriarchs,  had,  by  right  of  fatherhood, 
royal authority over their children,  p.  12.  This lord- 
ship,  which  Adam  by  command  had over  the whole 
world, and by right  descending  from  him  the patri- 
archs did enjoy, was as large  and  ample  as the abso- 
lute dominion of  any monarch which hath been  since 
the  creation,  p.  13.  Dominion  of  life  and  death, 
making  war,  and  concluding  peace,  p.  13.  Adam 
and  the patriarchs  had  absolute  power  of  life  and 
death,  p.  35.  Kings,  in  the right  of  parents,  suc- 
ceed  to the  exercise  of  supreme jurisdiction? p.  19. 
As  kingly  power is  by  the  law  of  God,  so  it  hath 
no  inferior  law  to limit  it ; Adam  was  lord of  all, 
p. 40.  The father  of  a  family  governs by no  other 
law than by  his  own  will,  p.  78.  The superiority of 
princes  is  above  laws,  p.  79.  The unlimited  juris- 
diction  of  kings  is  so  amply  described  by  Samuel, 
p.  80.  Kings  are above  the  laws,"  p. 93.  And  to 
this purpose see a great deal more, which our A. deli- 
vers in Badin's  words: '' It is  eertain,  that all laws, privileges,  and grants of  princes,  have  no force but 
daring their  life,  if  they  be not  ratified  by  the ex- 
press  consent,  or  by  sufferance  af  the  prince  fol- 
lowing,  especially privileges,  0. p. 279.  The reason 
why laws have  been  also  made  by  kings,  was  this: 
when  kings  were  either  busied  with  wars,  or  dis- 
tracted with  public  cares,  so  that every private man 
could not have access  to their persons,  to learn their 
wills  and  pleasure,  then  were laws of  necessity  in- 
vented,  that  so  every  particular  subject might  find 
his  prince's  pleasure  deciphered  unto  him  in  the 
tables  of  his  laws,  p.  98.  In a  monarchy,  the king 
must by necessity be  above  the laws,  p. 100.  A per- 
fect kingdom is that, wherein the king rules all things, 
according to his  own will, p.  100.  Neither  common 
nor  statute laws are,  or  can  be,  any  diminution  of 
that general power, which  kings have over their peo- 
ple,  by  right of  fatherhood,  p. 115.  Adam  was  the 
father, king,  and lord over  his  family;  a son,  a sub- 
ject,  and a servant  or  slave,  were one and the same 
thing at first.  The father had power  to  dispose  or 
sell  his  children  or servants;  whence  we  find, that, 
in the first reckoning up of  goods  in Scripture,  the 
man-servant  and  the  maid-servant  are  numbered 
among the possessions and substance of the owner, as 
other goods were, 0. pref.  God  also  hath  given  to 
the father a  right or liberty  to alien  his power  over 
his  children  to  any other;  whence  we  find the sale 
and gift of  children  to have been  much in use in the 
beginning of the world, when  men had their servants 
for a  possession  and an inheritance,  as well as other! 
goods ;  whereupon  we  find  the  power  of  castrating 
and making eunuchs  much  in  use  in old  times,  0. 
.  155.  Law is nothing else but the will  of  him that 
Eath  the  power  of  the  supreme  father,  0.  p.  em. 
It was God's  ordinance that the supremacy should be 
unlimited  in Adam,  and  as large as all the acts of 
his will;  and  as in  him,  so in  all  others  that have 
supreme power,"  0. p. 245. 
$9. I have been fain to trouble my reader with these 
several quotations in our A.'s  own words, that in them 
might  be  seen  his  own  description  of  his  fatherly 
authority,  as  it  lies  scattered  up  and down in his 
writings, which he supposes was first vested in Adam, 
and by right belongs to all  princes ever since.  This 
fatherly authority then,  or right of  fatherhood, in our 
A.'s  sense, is a divine unalterable  right of sovereignty, 
whereby a  father  or a prince  hath an absolute,  arbi- 
trary, unlimited, and unlimitable power over the lives, 
liberties,  and  estates  of  his  children  and  subjects; 
so  that he may  take  or  alienate  their  estates,  sell, 
castrate, or use their persons as he pleases, they being 
all his slaves, and he lord or proprietor of every thing, 
and his unbounded will their law. 
§ 10. Our A. having placed such a mighty power in 
Adam, and upon that supposition founded all govern- 
ment and all power of  princes,  it is reasonable to ex- 
pect that he should have  proved this with arguments 
clear and evident,  suitable  to the weightiness  of  the 
cause.  That since men had nothing else left them, they 
might in slavery have  such  undeniable  proofs  of  its 
necessity,  that their  consciences  might be convinced, 
and oblige them to submit peaceably to that absolute 
dominion, which their governors had a right to  exercise 
over them.  Without this, what good could our A. do, 
or pretend to do, by erecting such an unlimited power, 
but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men, too 
apt of itself to grow and increase with the possession of 
any power?  And  by  persuading  those,  who,  by  the 
consent of their fellow-men,  are advanced to great but 
limited degrees of it,  that by that part whichis given 
them,  they have a right to all that was not so ;  and 
therefore may do what they please,  because they have 
authority to do more than others,  and so tempt them 
to do what is neither  for their own,  nor  the good  of 
those under their care; whereby great mischiefs cannot 
but follow. 
5 11.  The sovereignty of Adam being that on which, 
as a  sure  basis,  our A.  builds  his  mighty  absolute 
monarchy, I expected,  that, in his Patriarcha, this his 
main  supposition would  have been  proved  and estac 
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fundamental tenet required ;  and that this,  on which 
th  great  stress  of  the business  depends, would have 
been  made  out, with reasons  sufficient  to justify  the 
confidence with which it was assumed.  But, in all that 
treatise, I could find very little tending that way;  the 
thing is there so taken for granted, without proof,  that 
I  could  scarce believe  myself,  when,  upon  attentive 
reading that treatise, I found there so mighty a struc- 
ture raised upon  the bare supposition  of  this founda- 
tion.  For it is  scarce credible,  that  in  a  discourse, 
where he pretends to confute  the erroneous principle 
of man's natural freedom, he should do it by a bare sup- 
position  of  Adam's  authority,  without  offering  any 
proof for that authority.  Indeed, he confidently says, 
that Adam had "  royal authority, p. 18 and 13.  Abso- 
lute lordship  and  dominion  of  life  and death, p. 13. 
An universal monarchy,.p.  33.  Absolute power of life 
and death,"  p.  35.  He is very frequent in such asser- 
tions ;  but,  what  is  strange,  in  all his  whole  Patri- 
archa, I find not one pretence of  a  reason to establish 
this his great foundation of government ;  not any thing 
that looks like  an argument, but these  words :  '<  To 
confirm this natural right of  regal power,  we find  in 
the decalogue, that the law which  enjoins  obedience 
to kings,  is delivered in the terms, Honour thy father; 
aa  if  all power  were  originally  in the father."  And 
why  may I not  add as well,  that in the decalogue 
the law that enjoins obedience to  queens, is delivered in 
the terms of "  Honour thy mother,"  as if all power were 
originally in the mother ?  The argument, as sir Robert 
puts it,  will hold as well  for  one as the other;  but of 
this more in its due place. 
5 19. All that I take notice  of  here is,  that this is 
all our A.  says,  in this  first,  or any of  the following 
chapters, to prove the absolute power of Adam, which 
is  his  great principle : and  yet,  as  if  he had  there 
settled  it  upon  sure  demonstration,  he begins  his 
second chapter with these words,  By conferring these 
proofs and reasons,  drawn from the authority  of  the 
Scripture."  Where those proofs and reasons for Adam's 
sovereignty are,  bating  that  of  Honour  thy father, 
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above-mentioned, I confess, I cannot find ; unless what 
he says,  p.  11,  '&  In these words we  have  an evident 
confession,"  viz.  of  Bellarmine,  that creation  made 
man prince of  his  posterity,"  must be taken for proofs 
and  reasons  drawn  from  Scripture,  or for  any  sort 
of proof at all : though  from thence, by a new way of 
inference, in the words  immediately following, he con- 
cludes the royal authority of Adam  sufficiently settled 
in him. 
$ 13.  If he has in that chapter, or any where in the 
whole treatise, given any other proofs of Adam's  royal 
authority, other than by often repeating it, which, among 
some men, goes for argument, I desire any body for him 
to show me the place and page, that I may be convinced 
of my mistake,  and acknowledge  my oversight.  If no 
such arguments are to be found, I beseech those men, 
who  have  so  much  cried  up this  book,  to  consider, 
whether they do not  give the world cause  to suspect, 
that it is  not the force  of  reason  and argument that 
makes them for absolute monarchy, but some other by 
interest,  and therefore  are resolved  to  applaud any 
author that writes in favour  of this  doctrine, whether 
he support it with reason or no.  But I hope they do 
not expect, that rational and indifferent men should be 
brought over to their opinion,  because this their great 
doctor of it, in a discourse made on purpose to set up 
the absolute monarchical power of Adam, in opposition 
to the natural freedom of mankind, has said so little to 
prove it, from whence it is rather naturally to be con- 
cluded, that there is little to be said. 
$ 14.  But  that  I  might  omit no  care  to  inform 
myself in our author's full sense, I consulted his Obser- 
vations  on Aristotle,  Hobbes,  &c.  to see whether in 
disputing with  others  he made use  of any arguments 
for this his darling tenet of Adam's  sovereignty; since 
in his treatise of the  Natural Power of  Kings, he hath 
been so sparing of them.  In his Observations on Mr. 
Hobbes's  Leviathan, I think he has  put,  in short, all 
those arguments for it together, which in his writings 
I find him any where to make  use  of: his words  are 
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him  made  the  woman,  and  if  by  generation  from 
them  two,  as  parts of  them,  all  mankind  be propa- 
gated : if  also  God  gave to Adam  not  only  the do- 
minion over the woman  and the children that should 
issue from them, but also over all the earth to subdue 
it, and over all the creatures  on it,  so that, as long as 
Adam lived,  no man could  claim  or  enjoy any thing 
but by donation, assignation,  or permisaon from him, 
I wonder,"  &c.  Obs. 165.  Here we have  the sum of 
all his arguments, for Adam's  sovereignty, and against 
natural freedom, which I find up and down in his other 
treatises : and they are these following ;  "  God's crea- 
tion of Adam, the dominion he gave him over Eve, and 
the dominion he had  as father over his children ;" all 
which I shall particularly consider. 
CHAPTER 111. 
Of  Adam's  Title to Sovereignty  by Creation. 
5 15. SIR  Robert, in his preface to his Observations 
on Aristotle's  Politics, tells us,  66 A natural freedom of 
mankind  cannot be  supposed,  without  the  denial of 
the creation of Adam :" but how Adam's  being created, 
which w  as nothing but his receiving a being, immediately 
from Omnipotency,  and the hand of God,  gave Adam 
a sovereignty over  any thing,  I cannot  see ;  nor  con- 
sequently understand,  how  a  supposition  of  natural 
freedom is  a  denial  of Adam's  creation ;  and would 
be glad  any  body  else  (since  our A.  did not vouch- 
safe  us  the  favour)  would  make  it  out  for  him. 
For  I  find  no  difficulty  to suppose  the  freedom  of 
mankind,  though  I  have  always  believed  the crea- 
tion of Adam.  He was created,  or began to exist, by 
God's  immediate power,  without  the intervention of 
parents, or the preexistence of any of the same species 
to beget him, when it pleased God lie should ; and so 
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did the lion, the king of beasts, before him, by the same 
creating power of  God : and if  bare existence by that 
power,  and in that way,  will  give  dominion,  without 
any more ado,  our A.  by this argument, will make the 
lion have as good a title to it as he,  and certainly the 
ancienter.  No;  for Adam had his  title  <'  by the ap- 
pointment of God,"  says our A.  in another place.  Then 
bare creation gave him  not dominion,  and  one might 
have supposed mankind free, without  the denying the 
creation of Adam, since it was God's appointment made 
him monarch. 
$ 16. But let us see  how  he puts his creation and 
this  appointment together.  By the appointment of 
God,  says  sir Robert,  as soon  as Adam  was  created, 
he was monarch of  the world,  though he had no sub- 
jects;  for  though there could  not  be  actual govern- 
ment till there were subjects,  yet by the right of  na- 
ture it was  due to Adam  to be governor  of  his  pos- 
terity : though not in act,  yet at least in habit, Adam 
was a king from his creation."  I wish he had told us 
here, what he meant by God's appointment.  For what- 
soever providence orders,  or the law of nature directs, 
or positive  revelation  declares,  may be said  to be  by 
God's  appointment: but I suppose it cannot be meant 
here in the first sense, i. e.  by providence ;  because that 
would be to say no more, but that as soon as Adam was 
created, he was  de facto  monarch,  because by right of 
nature it was due to Adam to be governor of  his  pos- 
terity.  But he could  not,  de facto,  be  by providence 
constituted the governor of  the world,  at a time when 
there was  actually no government,  no subjects to be 
governed,  which  our A.  here  confesses.  Monarch  of 
the world is also differently used by our A,, for some- 
times he means by it a proprietor of all the world,  ex- 
clusive of the rest of mankind, and thus he does in the 
same page of  his  reface  before  cited:  "Adam,  says 
he, being comman  c!  ed to multiply and people the earth, 
and subdue it,  and having  dominion  given him over 
all creatures,  was  thereby the monarch of  the whole 
world ;  none of  his  posterity had any right to possess 
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cession  from  him."  8. Let  us  understand  then,  by 
monarch  roprietor  of  the world,  and,  by  appoint-  ,  P  ment, God s actual donation, and revealed positive grant 
made to Adam, Gen. i. 48,  as we see sir Robert him- 
self does in this parallel place ;  and then his argument 
wills tand thus : "  by the positive grant of God :  as soon 
as Adam was created,  he was proprietor of  the world, 
because by tlie right of  nature it was due to Adam to 
be governor  of  his  posterity."  In which way of  ar- 
guing there are two manifest  falsehoods.  First,  it is 
false, that God made that grant to Adam, as soon as he 
was created,  since,  though it stands in the text imme- 
diately after his creation, yet it is plain it could not be 
spoken to Adam till after Eve was made and brought 
to  him ;  and how then could he be monarch by appoint- 
ment as soon as created,  especially since he calls,  if  I 
mistake not,  that which God says to Eve,  Gen. iii. 16, 
the original grant of  government, which not being till 
after the fall,  when Adam was  somewhat,  at least  in 
time,  and  very  much  distant  in  condition,  from  his 
creation, I cannot see, how our A. can say in this sense, 
that,  cc by God's  appointment,  as soon as Adam was 
created,  he  was  monarch  of  the world."  Secondly, 
were it true,  that God's  actual donation  appointed 
Adam monarch of the world, as soon as he was created:' 
yet the reason  here  given  for  it would not  prove it; 
but it would always be  a false inference that God,  by 
a positive donation,  appointed Adam monarch of the 
world, because by right  of nature it was due to Adam 
to be governor of his posterity :" for having given him 
the right of  government by nature, there was no need 
of a positive donation ;  at least it will never be a proof 
of such a donation. 
5 17. On the other side, the matter will not be much 
mended,  if  we understand  by God's  appointment  the 
law of  nature,  (though it be a pretty harsh expression 
for it in this place) and by monarch of the world, sove- 
reign ruler of  mankind :  for  then  the sentence under 
consideration must run thus : "  By the law of  nature, 
as soon as Adam was created he was governor of man- 
kind,  for by right of  nature  it was  due to Adam  to 
be governor of his posterity;"  which amounts to this, 
he was governor by right of nature, because he was go- 
vernor by right of nature.  But supposing we  should 
grant, that a man is by nature governor of his children, 
Adam could not hereby be monarch as soon as created : 
for this right of nature being founded in his being their 
father, how Adam could have a natural right to be go- 
vernor, before he was a father, when by being a father 
only he had that right, is,  methinks, hard to conceive, 
unless he would have him to be a father before he was 
a father, and have s title before he had it. 
§ 18. To  this foreseen objection, our A. answers very 
logically,  ('He was governor in habit, and not in act :" 
a very pretty way of  being a governor without govern- 
ment, a  father without  children, and  a  king without 
subjects.  And  thus  sir Robert was an author before 
he writ his book;  not in  act,  it is  true,  but in habit ; 
for when he had once  published it,  it was due to him, 
by the right of nature,  to be an author, as much as it 
was to Adam to be governor  of  his  children, when he 
had begot them;  and if  to be  such  a  monarch of the 
v,wrld,  an absolute monarch in habit,  but not in act, 
will serve the turn, I should not m~ch  envy it to any of 
sir Robert's friends,  thet he thought fit graciously to 
bestow it upon; though even  this of act and habit, if 
it signified any thing but our A.'s  skill in distinctions, 
be not to his  purpose in this place.  For the question 
is  not  here  about Adam's  actual exercise of govern- 
ment, but actually having a title to be governor.  Go- 
vernment, says our A. was "due to Adam by the right of 
nature:"  what is this right of  nature ?  A right fathers 
have over their children by begetting them ;  generatione 
jus acquiri~ur  parentibus in liberos,  says our A.  out of 
Grotius,  de J. B.  P.  L. 2. C. 5. S. 1.  The right then 
follows  the begetting BE arising from  it; so  that,  ac- 
cording to this way of reasoning  or distinguishing  of 
our A. Adam,  as soon  as  he was  created, had a  title 
only in habit, and not in  act, which  in  plain English 
is, he had actually no title at all. 
§ 19.  To  speak less learnedly, and more intelligibly, 
one may say of Adam,  he was in a possibility of being 
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governor, since it was possible he might beget children, 
and thereby acquire that right of  nature, be it what it 
will,  to govern them,  that accrues from  thence:  but 
what connexion has this with Adam's creation, to make 
him  say,  that "  as  soon  as  he  was  created, he  was 
monarch  of  the world ?"  For it may as well be said of 
Noah,that as soon as he was born he was monarch of the 
world,  since  he was  in  possibility  (which  in  our A.'s 
sense is enough to make  a  monarch, "  a  monarch  in 
habit,")  to outlive  all  mankind  but  his  own  poste- 
rity.  What such necessary connexion there is betwixt 
Adam's creation and his  right to government, so that 
a "  natural freedom of  mankind  cannot be supposed 
without  the denial  of  the creation  of Adam,"  I con- 
fess  for my part I do not  see; nor how  those  words, 
"  by  the appointment,"  &c.  Obs.  954,  however  ex- 
plained,  can  be  put together,  to  make any tolerable 
sense,  at least  to establish  this  position, with  which 
they end, viz.  Adam was a king from his creation ;"  a 
king, says our author, "  not in act, but in habit,"  i.  e. 
actually no king at all. 
5  20. I fear I have  tired  my  reader's  patience,  by 
dwelling longer on this passage than  the weightiness 
of any argument in it seems to require :  but I have un- 
avoidably been engaged in it by our author's way of writ- 
ing, who, huddling several suppositions together,  and 
that in doubtful and general terms, makes such a med- 
ley and confusion, that it is impossible to show his mis- 
takes, without examining the several senses wherein his 
words may be taken, and without  seeing how, in any 
of  these various meanings, they will  consist  together, 
and have any truth in them :  for in this present passage 
before us, how can any one argue against this position 
of  his, "  that Adam was  a  king  from  his  creation:' 
unless  one  examine,  whether  the words,  "  from  his 
creation,"  be to be  taken,  as  they may,  for  the time 
of  the commencement of his government,  as the fore- 
going words import, "  as  soon  as he was  created  he 
was  monarch ;"  or,  for  the  cause  of  it,  as he says, 
p. 11, "  creation  made man prince of  his  posterity?" 
How farther can one judge  of  the truth of his being 
thus king, till one has examined whether king be to be 
taken, as the words  in  the beginning of  this passage 
would persuade, on supposition of his private dominion, 
which was, by God's  positive  grant,  "monarch  of  the 
world  by  appointment ;" or  king  on  supposition  of 
his  fatherly  power  over  his  offspring,  which  was  by 
nature, "  due by the right of  nature;"  whether, I say, 
king be to be  taken in  both,  or one only of these two 
senses, or in neither of  them,  but only this,  that crea- 
tion made him prince, in a way different from both the 
other ?  For though this  assertion,  that "  Adam  was 
king from his creation," be true in no sense, yet it stands 
here as an evident conclusion drawn from the preced- 
ing words,  though in  truth it be but a bare assertion 
joined  to other assertions of the same kind, which con- 
fidently put together in  words  of  undetermined  and 
dubious meaning, look like a sort of arguing,when there 
is  indeed neither proof  nor  connexion;  a  way  very 
familiar with  our  author;  of which having given  the 
reader a taste here,  I shall,  as much as the argument 
will  permit  me,  avoid  touching  on  hereafter;  and 
should  not  have  done  it here,  were it not to let the 
world see, how incoherences in matter, and suppositions 
without proofs, put handsomely together in good words 
and a plausible style, are apt to pass for strong reason 
and good sense,  till they come  to be looked into with 
attention. 
CHAPTER IV. 
Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty, by Donation, Gen. i. 28. 
Q 21.  HAVING  at last got through the  foregoing 
passage, where we have been so long detained, not by 
the force of arguments and opposition,  but by the in- 
tricacy of the words, and the doubtfulness of the mean- 
ing ;  let us go on  to his  next  argument, for Adam's 
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sovereignty.  Our  author  tells  us  in  the  words  of 
Mr.  Selden,  that  '6  Adam  by  donation  from  God, 
Gen. i. 28,  was  made  the general lord  of  all things, 
not  without  such  a  private  dominion  to himself,  as 
without  his  grant  did  exclude  his  children.  This 
determination of  Mr. Selden,  says  our author, is con- 
sonant  to the history  of  the Bible,  and natural rea- 
son,"  Obs. 210.  And  in  his  Pref.  to  his  Observa- 
tions on Aristotle, he says thus, "  The  first government 
in the world was monarchical in the father of all flesh, 
Adam being  commanded  to multiply and  people  the 
earth, and  to  subdue it,  and having dominion  given 
him  over  all  creatures,  was  thereby the monarch  of 
the  whole  world.  None  of  his  posterity  had  any 
right  to  possess any thing,  but by his  grant or per- 
mission,  or  by  succession  from  him.  The  earth, 
saith  the  Psalmist,  hath  he  given  to  the  children 
of  men,  whicli  shows  the  title  comes  from  father- 
hood.* 
5 22.  Before I examine this argument, and the text 
on  which it is  founded,  it is  necessary  to desire the 
reader to observe,  that  our  author,  according to his 
usual  method,  begins  in one  sense,  and concludes in 
another; he  begins  here  with  Adam's  propriety,  or 
private dominion,  by donation ; and his conclusion is, 
"  which shows the title comes from fatherhood." 
$ 23.  But let us see the  argument.  The words of 
the text are these : "  And God blessed them, and God 
said unto them, Re fruitful and multiply, and replenish 
the  earth  and  subdue  it,  and  have  dominion  over 
the fish of  the sea,  and over the fowl  of the air, and 
over every living  thing that moveth  upon the earth," 
Gen. i. 28; from whence our author concludes,  "that 
Adam, having here dominion  given  him  over all crea- 
tures, was thereby the monarch of  the whole world :" 
whereby  must  be  meant,  that either  t.his  grant of 
God  gave  Adam  property,  or,  as  our  author  calls 
it, private  dominion  over  the earth,  and all inferior 
or irrational creatures, and so consequently that he was 
thereby monarch ; or, 2dly,  that it gave him rule and 
dominion  over  all  earthly  creatures whatsoever,  and 
thereby over his  children;  arid  so  he was monarch: 
for, as  Mr. Selden  has  properly  worded  it,  "  Adam 
was  made general lord of  all things,"  one may very 
clearly understand  him,  that he means nothing to be 
granted to Adam  here  but property, and therefore he 
says not  one  word  of  Adam's  monarchy.  But  our 
author  says,  '' Adam  was  hereby  monarch  of  the 
world,"  which,  properly speaking, signifies  sovereign 
ruler of  all the men in the world ; and so Adam, by this 
grant, must be constituted such a ruler.  If our author 
means  otherwise,  he might with  much clearness have 
said, that '' Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole 
world."  But he begs your pardon in that point : clear 
distinct  speaking not  serving every where to his pur- 
pose, you must not expect it in him, as in Mr. Selden, or 
other such writers. 
$ $24.  In opposition,  therefore,  to our author's  doe- 
trine, that ''  Adam was monarch of  the whole world," 
founded on this place, I shall show, 
1. That by this grant, Gen. i. 28,  God gave no im- 
mediate power to Adam over  men,  over his  children, 
over those of his own species ;  and so he was not made 
ruler, or monarch, by this charter. 
a.  That by this grant God gave him not private do- 
minion over the inferior  creatures,  but right in  com- 
mon with all mankind ;  so neither was he monarch upon 
the account of the property here given him. 
5 25. 1. That this donation,  Gen. i.  28, gave Adam 
no power over men, will appear if we  consider the words 
of it: for since all positive grnnts convey no more than 
the  express  words  they  are  made  in  will  carry,  let 
us see which of  them here will comprehend mankind, 
or Adam's  posterity ; and those I imagine, if any, must 
be these, "  every living thing that moveth :" the words 
in  Hebrew are nabin ilvn,  i. e.  bestiam reptuntem, of 
which  words  the  Scripture  itself  is  the  best  inter- 
preter:  God  having  created  the  fishes and fowls the 
5th day, the beginning of the 6th, he creates the irra- 
tional inhabitants of the dry land, which, ver. 20,  are de- 
scribed in these words,  "  Let the earth bring forth the living creature  after  his  kind;  cattle  and  creeping 
things,  and  beasts  of  the earth,  after  his kind;  and 
ver. 2,  and  God  made  the beasts  of  the earth after 
his kind,  and cattle after their kind,  and every thing 
that creepeth  on  the earth after his  kind :"  here,  in 
the creation of the brute inhabitants of the earth, he. first 
speaks of them all under one  general name, of living 
creatures, and then afterwards divides them into three 
ranks, 1. Cattle, or such creatures as were or might be 
tame, and so be the private possession of particular men; 
2. ;l19n  which,  ver. 24,  25,  in  our Bible,  is translated 
beasts, and by the Septuagint Bqpia, wild beasts, and is 
the same word, that here in our text, ver. 28, where we 
have  this great charter  to Adam,  is  translated living 
thing, and is also the same word used, Gen. ix. 2, where 
this grant is renewed to Noah, and there likewise trans- 
lated beast.  3.  The third rank were the creeping ani- 
mals, which, ver. 24,25, are comprised under the word, 
nttlt3yn, the same that is used here, ver. 28, and is trans- 
lated moving,  but in  the former verses  creeping, and 
by the Septuagint in all these places,  +w~r$, or reptiles ; 
from whence it appears, that the words which we trans- 
late here in God's  donation, ver.  28, "  living creatures 
moving,"  are the same,  which  in  the  history of  the 
creation, ver. 84,  25, signify  two ranks of  terrestrial 
creatures, viz.  wild beasts  and reptiles, and are so un- 
derstood by the Septuagint. 
§ 26. When God had made the irrational animals of 
the world, divided into three kinds, from the places of 
their habitation, viz.  fishes of the sea, fowls of the air, 
and living creatures of the earth, and these again into 
cattle, wild beasts, and reptiles; he considers of making 
man,  and the dominion  he should  have  over the ter- 
restrial world, ver. 26,  and then he reckons up the in- 
habitants of these three kingdoms, but in the terrestrial 
leaves out the second rank 3-n  or wild beasts: but here, 
ver. 28,  where  he actually exercises  this  design,  and 
gives him this  dominion,  the text mentions the fishes 
of  the sea,  and  fowls  of  the  air,  and the terrestrial 
creatures in the words that signify the wild beasts and 
reptiles,  though  translated  living thing that moveth, 
leaving out cattle.  In both which  places, though the 
word  that signifies wild beasts be omitted in one, and 
that which  signifies cattle in the other, yet, since God 
certainly executed in one place, what he declares he de- 
signed in the other, we cannot but understand the same 
in both places, and have here only an account how the 
terrestrial irrational  anitnals,wtr.ich  mere already created 
and reckoned up at  their creation, in three distinct ranks 
of cattle, wild  beasts, and  reptiles, were here, ver. 28, 
actually put under the dominion of man, as they were 
designed, ver. 26; nor do these words contain in them 
the least appearance of any thing that can be wrested 
to signify God's  giving to one man dominion over an- 
other, to Adam over his posterity. 
$  27.  And  this  further  appears  from  Gen.  ix.  2, 
where God renewing this charter to Noah and his sons, 
he gives them dominion  over the fowls of the air, and 
the fishes of the sea, and  the terrestrial creatures, ex- 
pressed by 3-ll  lym7 wild beasts and reptiles, the same 
words that in the text before us, Gen. i. 28, are trans- 
lated every moving  thing  that moveth on  the  earth, 
which by no means can comprehend man, the grant be- 
ing made to Noah and his sons, all the men then living, 
and not to one part of men over another ;  which is yet 
more evident  from the very next words,  ver. 3, where 
God  gives  every  Un'l  6c  every  moving  thing,"  the 
very words  used  ch. i.  28,  to them  for food.  By all 
which it  is plain that God's donation to Adam, ch. i. 28, 
and his  designation, ver.  26,  and  his  grant  again  to 
Noah and his sons; refer to, and contain in thern, nei- 
ther more nor  less  than  the works of  the creation the 
fifth day,  and the beginning  of the sixth, as they are 
set down from the 20th to 96th ver. inclusively of the 
1st ch. and so comprehend all the species of irrational 
animals of the terraqueous globe ;  though all the words, 
whereby they are expressed in the history of their crea- 
tion, are nowhere used in any of the following grants, 
but some of them omitted in one, and some in another. 
From whence I think it is past all doubt that man can- 
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over those of his own species be conveyed to Adam.  All 
the terrestrial  irrational  creatures are enumerated at 
their creation, ver. 25,  under the names, "  beasts of the 
earth, cattle, and creeping things;"  but man, being not 
then  created, was  not  contained  under  any of  those 
names ;  and therefore, whether we understand the He- 
brew words  right  or no, they cannot  be  supposed to 
comprehend man, in the very same history, and the  very 
next verses following, especially since that Hebrew word 
which, if any in  this  donation to Adam, ch. i.  28, 
must comprehend man,  is so plainly used in contradi- 
stinction to him,  as Gen.  vi.  20.  vii. 14, 21,  23. Gen. 
viii. 17, 19.  And  if God made  all  mankind slaves to 
Adam  and  his  heirs,  by giving Adam  dominion over 
"  every living thing that moveth  on the earth,"  ch. i. 
28, as our author would  have it ;  methinks sir Robert 
should have  carried  his  monarchical power  one  step 
higher, and satisfied the world  that princes might eat 
their  subjects  too,  since  God  gave as full  power to 
Noah and his heirs, ch. ix. 2, to eat "  every living thing 
that moveth,"  as he  did  to Adam  to have  dominion 
over them ;  the Hebrew word in both places being the 
581116. 
$ 28. David,  who  might be supposed to understand 
the donation of God in this text, and the right of  kings 
too, as well as our author, in his comment on this place, 
as the learned and judicious Ainsworth calls it, in the 
8th Psalm,  finds here no  such charter of monarchical 
power:  his  words  are, "  Thou hast made  him,  i.  e. 
man, the son  of  man, a  little lower  than the angels; 
thou madest  him  to have  dominion  over  the works 
of thy hands ;  thou  hast put all things under his feet, 
all sheep and  oxen,  and the beasts of  the field, and 
fowls  of the air,  and fish  of  the sea, and whatsoever 
passeth  through  the  paths  of  the  sea."  In which 
words, if any one can find out, that there is meant any 
monarchical power of one man over another, but only 
the  dominion  of  the whole  species  of  mankind  over 
the inferior  species  of creatures,  he may, for aught I 
know, deserve to be  one  of  sir Robert's  monarchs  in 
habit, for the rareness of the discovery.  And by this 
time, I hope it is evident, that he that gave "dominion 
over  every living  thing  that moveth  on  the  earth," 
gave Adam no monarchical power over those of his own 
species, which will yet  appear more  fully in  the next 
thing I am to show. 
$29.2.  Whatever God gaveby the  words ofthisgrant, 
Gen. i.  88, it was not to Adam in particular, exclusive 
of all other men : whatever dominion he had thereby, 
it was not a private dominion, but a dominion in com- 
mon with  the  rest  of  mankind.  That this  donation 
was not made in particular to Adam, appears evidently 
from the words of the text, it being made to more than 
one; for  it was  spoken  in  the plural  number,  God 
blessed  them,  and  said  unto them,  have  dominion. 
God says unto Adam and Eve, have dominion ;  there- 
by,  says  our  author,  "  Adam  was  monarch  of  the 
world :" but the grant being  to them, i. e. spoken to 
Eve also, as many interpreters think with reason, that 
these words were not  spoken  till Adam  had his wife, 
must not she thereby be lady, as well as he lord of the 
world? If it be said that Eve was subjected to Adam, 
it seems she was not so subjected to him as to hinder 
her dominion over the creatures, or property in them : 
for  shall we  say that God ever made a joint  grant to 
two, and one only was to have the benefit of it  ? 
30. But perhaps it will be said Eve was not made 
till afterward: grant it so, what advantage will our au- 
thor get by it?  The text will be only the more directly 
against him, and show that God, in this donation, gave 
the world to mankind in common, and not to Adam in 
particular.  The word  them  in the text must include 
the species of man, for it  is certain them can by no means 
signify Adam alone.  In  the 26th verse, where God de- 
clares his intention to give this dominion, it is plain he 
meant that he would make a species of creatures that 
should have dominion over the other species of this ter- 
restrial globe.  The words are,  "And God said, let us 
make  man  in  our image,  after our  likeness, and let 
them have  dominion over  the fish,"  &c.  They then 
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to have the image  of God, the individuals of that spe- 
cies of man  that he was going to make; for  that them 
should signify Adam  singly, exclusive of  the rest that 
should be in the world with him, is against both Scrip- 
tureand all reason: and itcannot possiblybe made sense, 
if man in the former part of  the verse do not signify the 
same with them in the latter; only man there, as is usual, 
is taken for the species, and tlzetn the individuals of that 
species: and we have  a reason in the very text.  God 
makes him "  in his own image, after his own likeness ; 
makes him an intellectual creature, and so capable of 
dominion :"  for  whereinsoever  else  the  image  of 
God consisted,  the intellectual  nature was cert?.inly a 
part of it, and be!onged  to the whole species,  and en- 
abled them to have dominion over the inferior creatures; 
and therefore David says, in the 8th Psalm above cited, 
"Thou hast made him little lower than the angels ;  thou 
hast made him to have dominion."  It  is not of Adam 
king David speaks here; for, verse 4, it is plain it is of 
man, and the son of man, of the species of mankind. 
§ 31. And that this grant spoken to Adam was made 
to him,  and the whole species of  man, is clear from our 
author's  own proof out of  the Psalmist.  "  The earth, 
saith  the Psalmist, hath he given  to the  children  of 
men, which shows  the title  comes  from fatherhood.'' 
These are sir Robert's words in the preface before cited, 
and a  strange inference  it is  he makes: "  God hath 
given  the earth to the children of men, ergo the title 
comes  from  fatherhood."  It  is  pity  the  propriety 
of the Hebrew tongue  had  not used  fathers of men, 
instead of children of men,  to express mankind :  then 
indeed our author might have had the countenance of 
the sounds  of  the words  to  have  placed  the title 
in the fatherhood.  But to conclude,  that the father- 
hood had the right to the earth, because God gave it 
to the children  of men, is a way of  arguing peculiar 
to  our author: and a man must have a great mind to go , 
contrary to the sound as well as sense of the words be- 
fore he could light on it.  But the sense is yet harder, 
and more remote from our author's purpose :  for as it  ' 
stands in his preface  it is to prove Adam's being mon- 
arch, and his reasoning is thus, "  God gave the earth 
to the  childrcn  of  men,  ergo Adam was  monarch  of 
the world."  I defy any man to make a more pleasant 
conclusion  than this,  which  carlnot  be  excused from 
the most  obvious absurdity, till it can be  shown that 
by children of men, he who had no father, Adam alone 
is signified; but whatever our author does, the Scripture 
speaks not nonsense. 
$ 32.  To maintain this property and private domi- 
nion of Adam, our author labours in the following page 
to  destroy the comrnunity granted to  Noah and his sons, 
in  that parallel place, Gen. ix. 1,0, 3; and he endea- 
vours to do it two ways. 
1. Sir Robert would persuade us, against the express 
words of the Scripture, that what was here granted to 
Noah, was not granted to his sons in common with 'him. 
His  words  are,  "  As  for the  general community be- 
tween Noah and his sons, which Mr. Selden will have 
to be  granted  to them, Gen. ix.  2,  the text doth  not 
warrant it."  What warrant  our author would  have, 
when the plain express words of Scripture, not capable 
of another meaning, will not satisfy him, who pretends 
to build wholly on Scripture, is not  easy to imagine. 
The text says, "  God blessed  Noah  and his  sons, and 
said  unto them,  i.  e.  as  our  author  would  have  it, 
unto him:  for,  saith he, although the sons are there 
mentioned with Noah  i11  the blessing, yet it may best 
be  understood,  with  a  subordination or  benediction 
in succession,"  0. 211.  That indeed  is  best  for our 
author to be understood, which best serves to his pur- 
pose ;  but that truly  may best be understood by any body 
else, which  best  agrees with the plain  construction of 
the words, and arises from the obvious meaning of  the 
place ;  and then with subordination  and in succession 
will not be best  understood  in a grant of God, where 
he himself put them not, nor mentions ally such limit- 
ation.  But yet  our  author has  reasons  why  it  may 
best be understood so.  "  The blessing,  says he in the 
following words, might  truly be  fulfilled,  if  the sons, 
either  under  or after their  father,  enjoyed  a  private 
dominion,"  0.  211;  which  is  to  say,  that  a,  grant, whose express words  give a joint  title in present  (for 
the text says, into your hands they are delivered) may 
bestbe  understood with a subordination or in succession ; 
because it is possible  that in subordination, or in suc- 
cession, it may be enjoyed.  Which is all one as to say, 
that a grant of any thing in present possession may best 
be understood  of reversion ;  because it is possible  one 
may live to enjoy it in reversion.  If the grant be  in- 
deed to a father and to his  sons after  him, who is so 
kind as to let his children enjoy it presently in common 
with him, one may truly say, as  to the event one will 
be as good as the other; but it can never be true that 
what the express words grant in possession, and in com- 
mon, may best be understood to be in reversion.  Thc 
sum of all his reasoning amounts to this: God did not 
give to the sons of Noah  the world  in  common with 
their father, because it was possible they might enjoy it 
under  or after him.  A very  good  sort of  argument 
against an express text of Scripture :  but God must not 
be believed, though he speaks it himself, when he says 
he does any thing whichwill not consist with sir Robert's 
hypothesis. 
$ 33.  For  it is  plain,  however  he would  exclude 
them, that part of  this benediction,  as he would have 
it in succession, must needs be meant to the sons,  and 
not to Noah himself at  all: "  Be fruitful and multiply, 
and replenish the  earth,"  says  God  in  this  blessing. 
This part of the benediction, as appears by the sequel, 
concerned not Noah himself at all :  for we read not of 
any children he had after the flood ;  and in the follow- 
ing chapter, where his posterity is  reckoned  up, there 
is no mention of any;  and so this  benediction  in suc- 
cession was not to take  place till 350 years after :  and to 
save our author's imaginary monarchy, the peopling of 
the world must be deferred 350 years ;  for this part of 
the benediction cannot be  understood with subordina- 
tion, unless our author will say that they must ask leave 
of their father Noah  to lie with  their wives.  But in 
this one point our author is constant to himself in all 
his discourses; he takes care there should be monarchs 
in theworld, but very little that there should be people; 
and indeed  his way of government  is  not  the way to 
people  the world:  for  how much  absolute  monarchy 
helps to fulfil this great and primary blessing of God 
Almighty, "  Be  fruitful and  multiply,  and  replenish 
the earth,"  which  contains  in  it the improvement too 
of arts and sciences, and the conveniencies of life ;  may 
be  seen  in those large and  rich  countries which  are 
llaypy  under the Turkish  government, where are not 
now to be  found  one-third,  nay in many,  if not most 
parts of  them,  one-thirtieth,  perhaps I might say not 
one-hundredth of the people, that were formerly, as will 
easily  appear  to  any one, who  will  compare  the ac- 
counts we have of it at this time with ancient history. 
But this by the by. 
$ 34. The other parts  of  this benediction  or grant 
are so expressed, that they must needs be understood to 
belong equally to them all; as much to Noah's  sons as 
to Noah himself, and not to his sons with a subordina- 
tion,  or  in succession.  "  The fear  of  you,  and the 
dread of  you,  says God, shall  be  upon  every beast," 
&c.  Will any body but our author say that the crea- 
tures feared and stood in awe of Noah only, and not of 
his sons without his leave, or till after his death ? And 
the following words, "  into your  hands  they are deli- 
vered,"  are they to be understood as our author says, if 
your father please, or they shall be delivered into your 
hands hereafter ?  If this be to argue from Scripture, I 
know not what  may not  be  proved  by it; and I can 
scarce see how much this differs from that fiction and 
fancy, orhow much a surerfoundation it will prove than 
the opinions of philosophers  and poets,  which  our au- 
thor so much condemns in his preface. 
$35. But our author goes on to prove, that '(  it nay 
best  be  understood with a  subordination, or  a  bene- 
diction in  succession ;  fbr,  says he,  it is  not probable 
that the private  dominion which  God gave  to Adam, 
and by his donation, assignation, or cession to his chil- 
dren, was  abrogated, and a  community of  all things 
instituted between Noah  and his sons-Noah  was left 
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that God would  disinherit  him of  his birth right, and 
make him of  all men  in the world  the only tenant in 
commoa with his children ?"  0. 211. 
9 36. The prejudices  of our  own  ill-grounded  opi- 
nions, however by us called probable, cannot authorize 
us to understand Scripture contrary to the direct and 
plain meaning of the words.  I  grant it is not probable 
that Adam's private dominion was here abrogated ;  be- 
cause it is more than improbable  (for  it will never be 
proved) that Adam had any such private dominion:  and 
since parallel places of  Scripture are most probable to 
make us know how they may be best understood, there 
needs but the comparing this blessing here  to Noah 
and his sons,  after the flood, with that to Adam after 
the creation, Gen. i. 28, to assure any one that God gave 
Adam no such private dominion.  It is probable, I con- 
fess, that Noah  should  have  the same title, the same 
property and dominion after the flood, that Adam had 
before it: but since  private  dominion  cannot  consist 
with the  blessing and grant  God gave to him and his sons 
in common, it is  a  sufficient  reason  to conclude that 
Adam had none,'especially  since, in the donation made 
to him, there are no words that express it, or do in the 
least favour it ;  and then let my reader judge whether 
it may best be understood, when in the one place there 
is not one word for it, not to say what has been above 
proved, that the text itself proves the contrary ;  and in 
the other, the words and sense are directly against it. 
37. But our author says, "  Noah was the sole heir 
of  the  world;  why  should  it be  thought  that  God 
would disinherit him of  his birth right ?"  Heir indeed, 
in England, signifies the eldest son, who is by the law 
of England  to have  all his  father's  land; but where 
God ever appointed any such heir of the world, our au- 
thor would have done well to  have showed us ;  and how 
God disinherited him of his  birth right, or what harm 
was done him if God gave his sons a right to make use: 
of a part of the earth for support of themselves and fa- 
milies, when the whole was not  only more than Noah 
himself, but infinitely more than  they all could make 
use  of,  and the possessions  of  one  could  not  at all 
prejudice,  or,  as  to any  use,  straiten  that  of  the 
other. 
9 38.  Our author  probably foreseeing he might not 
be very successful  in  persuading  people  out of  their 
senses, and,  say what  he could, men would be apt to 
believe the plain words of Scripture, and think, as they 
saw, that the grant was  spoken to Noah and his sons 
jointly;  he endeavours to insinuate, as if this grant to 
Noah  conveyed  no property,  no  dominion;  because 
"  subduing the earth and dominion over the creatures 
are  therein  omitted,  nor  the earth  once  named." 
And therefore, says he, ''  there is a considerable differ- 
ence between these two texts ; the first blessing gave 
Adam  a  dominion  over the earth and all  creatures; 
the latter allows Noah  liberty to use the living crea- 
tures  for  food:  here  is  no alteration or  diminishing 
of  his  title to a  property  of  all things,  but  an  en- 
largement  only of  his  commons,"  0. 211.  So that, 
in our author's sense, all that was said here to Noah and 
his sons, gave them no dominion, no property, but only 
enlarged the commons ;  their  commons, I should say, 
since God says, '(  to you are they given ;" though our 
author says his; for as to Noah's  sons,  they, it seems, 
by sir Robert's  appointment, during their father's life- 
time, were to keep fasting-days. 
9 39.  Any one  but our  author would  be  mightily 
suspected to be blinded  with prejudice, that in all this 
blessing to Noah  and his sons, could  see nothing but 
only an enlargement of commons :  for as to dominion, 
which  our  author thinks  omitted,  c6  the fear of you, 
and the dread of  you,  says  God, shall be  upon every 
beast,"  which  I  suppose. expresses the dominion,  or 
superiority, was designed man over the  living creatures, 
as fully as may be ; for  in that  fear  and dread seems 
chiefly to consist what was given to  Adam over the in- 
ferior animals,  who, as absolute a monarch as he was, 
could not make bold with a lark or rabbit to satisfy his 
hunger,  and had  the herbs but in  common with the 
beasts,  as is plain  from Den. i.  2, 9,  and SO.  In the 
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and his sons, property is not only given in clear words, 
but in a  larger  extent than it was  to Adam.  "  Into 
your  hands they  are given,"  says  God  to Noah  and 
his sons ; which words, if they give not property, nay, 
property in possession, it will be hard to find words that 
can ;  since there is not a way to express a man's  being 
possessed  of  any  thing more  natural, nor  more  cer- 
tain, than to say, it is  delivered  into his hands.  And 
ver. 3, to show, that they had then given them the ut- 
most property inan  is  capable  of, which  is to have  a 
right to destroy any thing by using it :  "  Every moving 
thing that liveth,  saith God,  shall be meat for you ;" 
which  was  not  allowed  to  Adam  in  his  charter. 
This  our  author calls  6c  a liberty  of  using  them  for 
food,  and  also  an  enlargement  of commons,  but no 
alteration of  property,"  0.  811.  What other  pro- 
perty man can have in the creatures, but the "  liberty 
of using  them,"  is hard  to be  understood:  so  that if 
the first blessing, as our author says, gave Adam c6do- 
minion over the creatures,"  and the blessing to Noah 
and his sons gave them "  such a liberty to  use them" as 
Adam had not; it must needs give them something that 
Adam with all his sovereignty wanted, something that 
one would be apt to take for a greater property; for cer- 
tainly he has no absolute dominion over even the brutal 
part of the creatures, and the property he has in them 
is very narrow and scanty, who cannot make that use of 
them which is permitted to another.  Should any one, 
who is absolute lord of  a country, have bidden our au- 
thor subdue the earth, and  given  him  dominion over 
the creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have 
taken a kid or a  lamb  out of the flock  to satisfy his 
hunger, I guess he would scarce have thought himself 
lord or proprietor of that land, or the cattle on it ;  but 
would have found the difference between "  having do- 
minion,"  which  a  shepherd  may  have,  and  having 
full property as an owner.  So that, had it been his own 
case, sir Robert, I believe, would have thought here was 
an alteration,  nay an enlarging of property; and that 
Noah and his children had by this grant not only pro- 
perty given them, but such a property given them in the 
creatures, as Adam hacl not :  for howcvcr, it1 rcspcct of 
one another, men may be allowed to have propriety in 
their distinct portions of the creatures ;  yet in rcspcct 
of God the maker of heaven and earth, who is sole lord 
and proprietor of the whole world,  man's propriety in 
the creatures is nothing hut that '(  libcrty to use them," 
which God has permitted ;  and SO mai1's property may 
be altered and enlarged, as we see it here, after the flood, 
when other uses of  them arc allowed, which before were 
not.  From all which I suppose it  is clear, that neither 
Adam,  nor Noah,  had  any "  private dominion,"  any 
property in the creatures, exclusive of  his posterity, as 
they should  successively grow  up into  need of  them, 
and come to be able to make use of them. 
9 40. Thus we have examined our author's argument 
for Adam's  monarchy,  founded  on  the  blessing pro- 
nounccd,  Gen. i. 28.  Wherein I think it is impossible 
for any sober readcr to find any other but the setting of 
mankind above the other kinds of creatures in this ha- 
bitable earth of  ours.  It is nothing but the giving to 
man,  the whole  species  of  man,  as  the  chief  inha- 
bitant, who  is  the imzge of  his Maker,  the doininion 
over the other creatures.  This lies  so obvious  in the 
plain words,  that any one  but our author would have 
thought it necessary to have shown,  how these words, 
that seemed  to say the quite contrary,  gave " Adam 
monarchical absolute power"  over  other men,  or the 
sole property in all the creatures ;  and methinks in a 
business of  this moment,  and that whereon he builds 
all that follows,  he  should have done something more 
than barely cite words, which apparently make against 
him;  for  I confess,  I  cannot  see any thing in them 
tending to Adam's monarchy, or private dominion, but 
quite the contrary.  And I the less deplore the dulness 
of my apprehension herein, since I find the apostle seems 
to have as little notion of  any such " private dominion 
of Adam" as I, when he says, "  God gives us all things 
richly to enjoy ;" which he could iiot do, if it were all 
given away already to monarch Adam,  and the mon- 
archs  his  heirs  and  successors.  To  conclude,  this 
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text is so far from proving Adain sole proprietor, that, 
on  the contrary,  it is  a  confirmation  of  the original 
community  of  all  things  amongst  the sons  of  men, 
which appearing from this donation of God, as well as 
other places of  Scripture,  the sovereignty  of  Adam, 
built upon his "  private dominion," must fall, not having 
any fouadation to support it. 
$41. But yet, if after all any one will needs have it 
so,  that by this donation of God Adam was made sole 
proprietor of  the whole earth,  what will this be to his 
sovereignty? and how will it appear, that propriety in 
land gives a man power over the life of another ? or how 
will the possession even of the whole earth give any one 
a sovereign arbitrary authority over the  persons of men ? 
The most specious thing- to be said is,  that he that is 
proprietor of the whole world, may deny all the rest of 
mankind food,  and so  at his pleasure starve them, if 
they will not acknowledge his sovereignty, and obey his 
will.  If this were true, it would be a good argument 
to prove,  that there never was any such property, that 
God never gave any su~h  private dominion ;  since it is 
more reasonable to think,  that God, who bid mankind 
increase and multiply, should rather himself give them 
all a right to make use of  the food  and raiment,  and 
other conveniencies  of  life,  the materials whereof  he 
had so  plentifully provided  for them; than to make 
them depend upon the will  of  a man for their subsist- 
ence, who should have power to destroy them all when 
he pleased, and who, being  no better than other men, 
was in succession likelier, by want and the dependence 
of a,  scanty fortune,  to tie them to hard service,  than 
by liberal allowance of the conveniencies of life to pro- 
mote the great design of God, "  increase and multiply:" 
he that  doubts  this,  let him  look  into the absolute 
monarchies of  the world, and see what becomes of  the 
conveniencies of life,  and the multitudes of people. 
$ sa. But we know God hath not left one man so to 
the mercy of  another,  that he  may starve  him  if  he 
please :  God, the Lord and Father of all,  has given no 
one of his children such a property in his peculiar por- 
tion of the things of  this world,  but that he has given 
his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods; 
so that it cannot justly be denied him, wl~eu  his press- 
ing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever 
have a just power over the life of  another by right of 
property in land or possessions ;  since it would always 
be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother perish 
for want of affording him relief out -of his  plenty.  As 
justice gives every man  a  title to the product  of  his 
honest  industry,  and the fair  acquisitions  of  his  an- 
cestors descended to him ; so  charity gives every man 
a title to so much out of  another's plenty as will keep 
him  from  extreme want,  where  he  has no  means  to 
subsist otherwise :  and a man can no mqre justly make 
use of  another's necessity to force  him to become  his 
vassal,  bp withholding that relief God requires him to 
afford to the wants  of  his  brother,  than he that 
more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to 
his obedience,  and  with a  dagger  at his  throat offer 
him death or slavery. 
5 43.  Should  any one  make  so  perverse  an  use of 
God's  blessings  poured  on him  with  a  liberal  hand; 
should any one be cruel axd uncharitable to that extre- 
mity;  yet  all  this would  not  prove that propriety in 
land,  even  in  this  case,  gave any  authority over  tlic 
persons of  men,  but only that  compact might;  sincc 
the authority of the rich proprietor, and the subjectio~l 
of the needy' beggar, began not from the possession of 
the lord,  but the consent of  the poor  man,  who pre- 
ferred being his subject to starving.  And the man lic 
thus submits to,  can  pretend  to no more power over 
him  than he has consented  to,  upon compact.  Upon 
this ground a man's having his stores filledin a time of 
scarcity, having money in his pocket, being In a vessel 
at  sea, being able to swim, &c. may as well be the foun- 
dation of rule and dominion,  as being possessor of  all 
the land in the world:  any of these being sufficient to 
enable me  to save a man's  life,  who would  perish,  if 
such assistance were denied him ;  and any thing, by this 
rule, that may be an occasion of working upon another's 
necessity to save his life,  or any thing dear to him,  at 
1;  ? the rate of  his freedom,  may be made a foundation of 
sovereignty, as well as property.  From all which it is 
clear, that though God should have given Adam private 
dominion, yet that private dominion could give him no 
sovereignty :  but we have  already sufficiently proved 
that God gave him no "  private dominion." 
CHAPTER V. 
Of Adnm'sTitle to Sovereignty, bythe Subjectio?~  ofEve. 
$44. THE  next place of Scripture we find our author 
builds his monarchy of Adam on, is Gen. iii. 86.  "  And 
thy desire shall be to thy husband,  and he shall rule 
over thee.  Here we have (says he) the original grant 
of  government,"  from  whence  he  concludes,  in  the 
following part  of  the page, 0. 244, " That the su- 
preme power is settled in the fatherhood,  and limited 
to one  kind  of  government, that is,  to monarchy." 
For  let his  premises  be  what  they  will,  this  is  al- 
ways the conclusion ;  let rule, in any text, be but once 
named,  and presently absolute monarchy is by divine 
right established.  If any one will but carefully read 
our author's  own reasoning from these words,  0.  244, 
and consider,  among other things, '' the line and pos- 
terity of Adam,"  as  he there brings them in,  he will 
find  some difficulty to make  sense of  what  he says; 
but we will  allow this  at present to his  peculiar way 
of writing,  and consider the force of the text in hand. 
The words are the curse of  God upon the woman for 
having been the first and forwardest in the disobedi- 
ence ;  and if we will consider the occasion of what God 
says here to our first parents,  that he was denouncing 
judgment,  and declaring his wrath against them both 
for their disobedience, we cannot suppose that this was 
the time wherein God was granting  Adam prerogatives 
and privileges,  investing him with dignity and antho- 
rity,  elevating  him  to dominion  and monarchy : for 
though, as a helper  in the temptation, Eve was laid 
below him,  and so he had  accidentally a  superiority 
over her, for her greater punishment; yet he too had his 
share in the fall, as well as the sin, and was laid lower, 
as may be seen in the following verses : and it would 
be hard  to imagine,  that God,  in  the  same  breath, 
should make him universal monarch over all mankind, 
and a day-labourer for his life ;  turn him out of "  pa- 
radise to till the ground,"  ver. 9.3, and at the same time 
advance him to a throne,  and all the privileges and 
ease of absolute power. 
§ 45.  This was not a time when Adam could expect 
any favours, any grant of  privileges, from his oEended 
Maker.  If this be "  the original grant of government," 
as our author tells us,  and Adam was now made mon- 
arch, whatever sir Robert would have him, it is plain, 
God made him but a very poor monarch,  such an one 
as our author himself  would have counted it no great 
privilege to be.  God sets him to work for his living, 
and seems rather to give him a spade into his hand to 
subdue the earth, than a sceptre to rule over its inha- 
bitants.  "  In the sweat of  thy face thou shalt eat thy 
hread,"  says God  to  him,  ver.  19.  This  was  una- 
voidable,  may it perhaps be answered,  because he was 
yet without subjects, and had nobody to  work for him; 
but afterwards,  living  as he did above 900 years,  he 
might have people enough, whom he might command 
to work  for  him: no,  says God,  not only whilst thou 
art without other he1  save  thy wife,  but as long as  P?  thou livest, shalt thou  ive by thy labour, "  In the sweat 
of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread,  till thou  return 
unto the ground,  for  out of  it wast thou taken; for 
dust thou art,  and unto dust shalt thou return," ver. 
19.  It will perhaps be answered again in favour of our 
author, that these words are not spoken personally to 
Adam,  but in him, as their representative,  to all man- 
kind, this being a curse upon mankind, because of  the 
fall. 
5 46.  God,  I believe,  speaks differently from men, 
because he speaks with more truth, more certainty: but when hc vouchsafes to speak to men, I do not tliink hc 
speaks differently fyom  thcm,  in  crossing the rules of 
language in use amongst them : this would  not  be to 
condescend to thcir capacities,  when he humbles him- 
self to speak to them, but to lose his design in s  eaking 
what, thus spoken,  they could  not understan!.  And 
yet thus must we think of  God,  if  the interpretations 
of  Scripture, neccssary to maintain  our author's  doc- 
trine, must be received  for good :  for  by the ordinary 
rules of  langua~e,  it will be very hard to understand 
what God says, ~f  what he speaks here, in the singular 
number, to Adam, must he understood to be spoken to 
all mankind ; and whdt he says in the plural number, 
Gen. i. 26 and 28, must be understood of Adam alone, 
exclusive of all others ;  and what he says to Noah and 
his sons jointly,  must be  understood  to be meant to 
Noah alone, Gen. ix. 
$ 47. Farther  it is  to be  noted,  that  these  words 
here of  Gen. iii. 16, which  our author calls " the ori- 
ginal grant of government,"  were not spoken to Adam, 
neither indeed was  there any grant in them made to 
Adam,  but a  punishment  laid  upon Eve : and if we 
will take them as they were directed in particular to her, 
or in her,  as their representative,  to all other women, 
they will at  most concern the female sex only, and im- 
port no more,  but that subjection they should ordina- 
rily be in to their husbands: but there is here no more 
law to oblige a woman to such subjection,  if  the cir- 
cumstances either of her condition, or contract with her 
husband, should exempt her from it, than there is, that 
she should bring forth her children in sorrow and pain, 
if there could be found a remedy for it, which is also a 
part of  the same curse upon her :  for  the whole verse 
runs thus,  "  Unto the woman he  said,  I will greatly 
~~lultiply  thy  sorrow  and thy  conception;  in sorrow 
thou shalt bring forth children,  and thy desire shall 
be to thy husband,  and  he  shall rule over thee."  It 
would, I think, have been a hard matter for any body, 
but our author, to havc found out a grant of "  monar- 
chical  government  to Adam"  in  these  words,  which 
were neither spokcil to,  iior  of  Iiim : rlcither  will  any 
one, I suppose,  by these words,  think the weaker sex, 
as by a law, so subjected to the curse contained in them, 
that it is their duty not to endeavour to avoid it.  And 
will any one say that Eve, or any other woman, sinned, 
if she were  brought to bed without  those multiplied 
pains God  threatens her  here with? or that either of 
our queens, Mary or Elizabeth,  had  they nlarried any 
of their subjects, had  been by this  text put into a po- 
litical  subjection  to him? or that he should thereby 
have had monarchical rule over her? God, in this text, 
gives not, that I see, any authority to Adam over Eve, 
or to men over their wives,but olllyforetels what should 
be the woman's lot ;  how by his  providence he wouid 
order it so, that she should be subject to her husband, 
as we see that generally the laws of mankind and cus- 
toms of nations have ordered it so :  and there is, I grant, 
a foundation in nature for it. 
§ 48. Thus when God says of Jacob and Esau, "  that 
the elder should  serve  the younger,"  Gen.  xxv.  23, 
nobody supposes that God hereby made Jacob Esau's 
sovereign, but foretold what should  de  facto  come to 
pass. 
Rut if these words here spoken to Eve must needs be 
understood as a law to  bind her and all other women to 
subjection,it can be no other subjection than  what every 
wife owes  her  husband; and then if this be the  ori- 
ginal grant of government, and the foundation of mon- 
archical power,"  there will be as many monarchs  as 
there are husbands :  if therefore these words give any 
power to Adam,  it can be only a  conjugal power, not 
political; the power that every husband hat11 to order 
the things of private concernment in his family, as pro- 
prietor of the goods and land there, and to have his will 
take place before that of his wife in all things of their 
common  concernment;  but not a political  power  of 
life and death over her, much less over any body else. 
$ 49.  This I am sure :  if our  author will  have this 
text to be a  6c grant, the original grant of government," 
political  government,  he  ought to have proved  it by 
some better arguments  than by barely saying, that  66 thy 
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Eve,  and "  all that should  come  of her,"  were sub- 
jcctcd to the absolntc monarchical power of Adam and 
his  heirs.  "  Thy desire shall be  to thy husband,"  is 
too doubtful an expression, of whose signification  in- 
terpreters are not agreed,  to build  so confidently on, 
and in a matter of such moment, and so great and ge- 
neral concernment:  but our author,  according to his 
way of writing, having once named the text, concludes 
presently, without any more ado,  that the meaning is 
as he would have it.  Let the words rule and subject be 
but found in  the text or margin, and it immediately 
signifies the duty of a subject to  his prince ;  the relation 
is changed, and  though God says husband, sir Robert 
will have it king ;  Adam has presently absolute monar- 
chical  power  over Eve,  and  not only  over  Eve,  but 
"  all  that should come of her,"  though the Scripture 
says not a word of it, nor our author a word to prove 
it.  But  Adam must for all that be an absolute monarch, 
and so down to the  end of the chapter.  And here I 
leave my reader to consider whether my bare saying, 
without offering any reasons to evince it, that this text 
gave not Adam  that absolute monarchical power, our 
author supposes,  be  not as sufficient  to destroy that 
power,  as his  bare  assertion  is  to establish it,  since 
the text mentions neither prince nor people,  speaks no- 
thing of absolute  or  monarchical power, but the sub- 
jection of Eve to Adam, a wife to her husband.  And 
he that would trace our author  so all through, would 
make a short and sufficient answer to the greatest part 
of the grounds he proceeds on, and abundantly confute 
them by barely denying ;  it being a sufficient answer to 
assertions without proof, to deny them without giving 
a reason.  And therefore  should I have said nothing, 
but  barely denied that by this text ''  the supreme power 
was  settled  and founded  by  God  himself,  in the fa.- 
therhood,  limited  to monarchy,  and  that to Adam's 
person  and heirs,"  all which our  author notably con- 
cludes from these words, as may be  seen in  the same 
page, 0. 244, it had  been a s~ifficient  answer :  should 
I hnvc desired any sober man only to have read the text, 
and considcrcd to whom  and on what occasion it was 
spoken,  he would  no doubt have  wondered  how our 
author found out monarchical absolute power in it, had 
he not had an exceeding good faculty to find it himself, 
where he could not show it others.  And thus we have 
examined the two places of Scripture, all that I remem- 
ber our author brings  to prove Adam's  sovereignty, 
that supremacy which he says ''  it was God's  ordinance 
should be  unlimited  in Adam, and as large as all the 
acts of  his will,"  0. 254,  viz.  Gen.  i.  28, and  Gen. 
iii. 16; one whereof signifies only the subjection of the 
inferior ranks of  creatures to mankind,  and the other 
the subjection that is due from a wife to her husband; 
both far enough from that which subjects owe the go- 
vernors of political societies. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
Of Adam's  Title to Sovereignfy @ Fatherhood. 
$ 50.  THERE  is  one thing more,  and  then I think 
I have  given  you  all  that  our  author  brings for 
proof of Adam's  sovereignty, and that is a supposition 
of a natural right  of dominion over his children, by being 
their father :  and this title of fatherhood he is so pleased 
with, that you will  find it brought in almost in every 
page ; particularly he says, "  not only Adam, but the 
succeeding  patriarchs  had,  by  right  of  fatherhood, 
royal  authority  over  their  children,"  p.  12.  And in 
the same page,  "this subjection  of children being the 
fountain  of  all regal authority,"  &c.  This being, as 
one would think by his so frequent mentioning it, the 
main basis  of a11 his  frame, we may well  expect clear 
and evident reason for it, since he lays it down as a po- 
sition necessary to his  purpose,  that "  every man that 
is  born  is  so far from  being  free,  that by  his  very 
birth  he becomes a  subject  of  him that begets him," 
0. 156.  So that Adam  being  the only man  created, and a11 ever since being begotten, nobody has been born 
frce.  If we ask how Adam comes by this power over 
his children,  he tells us here it is  by begetting them : 
and so again, 0.283, "  This natural dominion of Adam," 
says he,  "may  be  proved out of  Grotius himself, who 
teacheth that  generationc jus acquiritur parentibus in 
liberos."'  And indeed the act of begetting being that 
which makes a man a father, his right of a father over 
his children can naturally arise from nothing else. 
$ 51. Grotius tells us not here how far this "jus in 
liberos,"  this  power  of  parents  over  their  children 
extends ;  but our author, always very clear in the point, 
assures us it is supreme power, and like that of absolute 
monarchs over their  slaves, absolute power  of life and 
death.  He that should  demand  of  him  how, or  for 
what reason it is, that begetting a child gives the father 
such an absolute power over him, will find him answer 
nothing:  we are to take his word  for  this, as well  as 
several other things, and by that the laws of nature and 
the constitutions of government must stand or fall.  Had 
lie been an absolute monarch, this way of talking might 
have  suited  well  enough; "  pro  ratione  voluntas," 
might have been of force in his mouth; but in the way 
of  proof  or  argument is very  unbecoming,  and will 
little advantage his plea  for absolute monarchy.  Sir 
Robert has too much lessened a subject's  authority to 
leave himself the hopes of establishing any thing by his 
bare saying it; one slave's opinion without proof, is not 
of weight enough to  dispose of the liberty and fortunes 
of all mankind.  If all  men  are not,  aS  I think  they 
are, naturally equal, I am sure all slaves are; and then 
I may without presumption  oppose my single opinion 
to his ;  and be confident that my saying, "  that beget- 
ting of  children makes them  not  slaves  to their  fa- 
thers,''  as certainly sets all mankind free,  as his  af- 
firming the contrary makes them all slaves.  But that 
this position, which is the foundation  of all their doc- 
trine, who would  have monarchy to be "  jure divino," 
may have a11  fair play, let us hear what reasons others 
give for it, since our author offers none. 
$ 52. The argument I have  heard  others make use 
of to prove  that fathers,  by begetting  thern, come by 
an  absolute power  over their  children,  is  this;  that 
fathers have a power over the lives of their children, 
because  they give  them  life and being,"  which is the 
only proof it is capable of:  since  there can be no rea- 
son why naturally one  man  shouId  have any claim or 
pretence of right over that in another, which was never 
his, which he bestowed not, but was received from the 
bounty of  another.  1. I  answer,  that every  one who 
gives another any thing, has not always thereby a right 
to take it away again.  But, 2. They who say the fa- 
ther  gives  life to children,  are so  dazzled  with  the 
thoughts of monarchy, that they do not, as they ought, 
remember God, who is "the  author and giver of life : 
it is  in him  alone  we  live,  move,  and have  our  be- 
ing."  How  can  he  be  thought  to give  life  to an- 
other, that knows  not wherein  his  own  life consists? 
Philosophers are at a loss about it, after their most dili- 
gent inquiries ;  and anatomists, after their whole lives 
and studies spent in dissections, and diligent examining 
the bodies of men, confess their ignorance in the struc- 
ture and use of many parts of man's  body, and in that 
operation wherein life consists in the whole.  And doth 
the rude ploughman, or the more ignorant voluptuary, 
frame or fashion such an  admirable engine as this is, 
and then put life and sense into it? Can any man say 
he formed the parts that are necessary to the life of his 
child ?  or can he  suppose  himself to  give the life, and 
yet not know what subject is fit to receive it, nor what 
actions or organs are necessary for its reception or pre- 
servation 3 
9 53.  To  give life to that which  has yet no being, 
is to  frame and make a living creature, fashion the parts, 
and mould  and  suit them  to their uses;  and having 
proportioned and fitted them together, to  put into them 
a  living  soul.  He that could  do  this, might indeed 
have some pretence to destroy his own workmanship. 
But is there any one so bold  that dares thus far arro- 
gate to himself  the incomprehensible works of the Al- 
mighty ?  Who alone did at first, and continues still to make a living soul, he alone can breathe in the breath 
of life.  If any one  thinks himself an artist at this, let 
him number up the parts of  his child's  body  which he 
hath made, tell me their uses and operations, and when 
the living and rational  soul began  to inhabit this  cu- 
rious structure, when sense began, and how this engine, 
which he has framed, thinks  and reasons : if he made 
it,  let him, when  it is out of  order, mend  it, at least 
tell wherein the defects lie.  "Shall he that made the 
eye not see?"  says the Psalmist, Psalm xciv. 9.  See 
these men's  vanities ;  the structure of that one part is 
sufficient to convince  us  of an all-wise  Contriver, and 
he has so visible a claim to  us as his workmanship, that 
one of the ordinary appellations  of God in Scripture 
is,  God  our  maker,"  and "the  Lord  our  maker!' 
And therefore though our  author, for the magnifying 
his fatherhood, be pleased to say, 0. 159, "  That even 
the power which  God himself  exerciseth  over  man- 
kind is by  right  of  fatherhood,"  yet this fatherhood 
is such an one as utterly excludes all pretence of title 
in earthly parents ;  for he is king, because he is indeed 
maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be of 
their children. 
5 54.  But had men  skill and power to make their 
children,  it is not so  slight a piece  of  workmanship, 
that it can be imagined they could make them without 
designing it.  What father of a thousand, when he be- 
gets a child, thinks farther than the satisfying his pm 
sent appetite? God in his infinite wisdom has put strong 
desires of  copulation  into  the constitution  of  men, 
thereby to continue the race of  mankind,  which  he 
doth most commonly without the intention, and often 
against the consent and will  of the begetter.  And in- 
deed those who desire and design children, are but the 
occasions  of  their  being,  and,  when  they design and 
wish to beget them, do little more towards their making 
than Deucalion  and his wife in the fable did towards 
the making  of  mankind,  by  throwing  pebbles  over 
their heads. 
$55. But grant that the parents made their children, 
gave them life and being, and that hence there foll~wed 
an absolute powcr.  This would give tl~c  father but n 
joint dotninion with the mother over them :  for nobody 
call deny but that the woman hath an equal share,  if 
not the greater, as nourishing the child a long time in 
her own body out of her own substance:  there it is fa- 
shioned, and from her it receives the materials and prin- 
ciples of its constitution : and it is so hard to imagine 
the rational soul should  presently inhabit the yet un- 
formed embryo, as soon as the father has done his part 
in the act of generation, that if it must be supposed to 
derive any thing from the parents, it must certainly owe 
most to the mother.  But be that as it will, the mother 
cannot be denied an equal share in begettingof thechild, 
and so the absolute authority of the father will not arise 
from hence.  Our author indeed is of  another mind; 
for he says, "  we know that God at the creation gave 
the sovereignty to the man over  the woman,  as being 
the nobler and principal agent in generation,"  0. 179. 
I remember not this in my Bible ;  and when the place 
is brought where God  at the creation  gave the sove- 
reignty to man over the woman,  and that for this rea- 
son,  because "  he is the nobler and principal agent in 
generation,"  it will be  time  enough  to  consider, and 
answer it.  But it  is no new thing for our author to tell 
us his own fancies for certain and divine truths, though 
there be often a great deal of difference between his and 
divine revelations ;  for God in the Scripture says, 66 his 
father and his mother that begot him." 
§ 56.  They  who  allege  the  practice  of  mankind, 
for exposing or selling their children, as a proof of their 
power over them,  are with sir Robert happy arguers ; 
and cannot but recommend their opinion, 'uy founding 
it on the most  shameful  action,  and most  unnatural 
murder human nature is capable of.  The  dens of lions 
and nurseries of wolves  know no such cruelty as this: 
these savage inhabitants of  the desert obey God and 
nature in being tender and careful of  their offspring: 
they will hunt, watch, fight, and almost starve for the 
preservation of  their  young ;  never  part with them ; 
never forsake them, till they are able to shift for them- 
selves.  And is it the privilege of man alone to  act more 0  f  Government.  955  - 
contrary to nature than the wild and most untamed part 
of the creation? doth God forbid us under the scvercst 
penalty, that of  death, to take away the life of any man, 
a stranger, and upon provocation? and does he permit 
us to destroy those he has given us the charge and care 
of; and by the dictates of nature and reason, as well as 
his revealed command, requires us to preserve ?  He  has 
in all the parts of  creation taken  a  peculiar  care to 
propagate and continue the several species of creatures, 
and makes the individuals act so strongly to this end, 
that they sometimes neglect their own private good for 
it, and scem to forget that general rule,  which nature 
teaches all  things,  of  self-preservation ;  and the pre- 
servation of  their young,  as the strongest principle in 
them, over-rules the constitution of their particular na- 
tures.  Thus we see,  when their young stand in need 
of it, the timorous become valiant, the fierce and savage 
kind, and the ravenous, tender and liberal. 
$ 57.  But if the example of  what hath been  done 
be the rule of what ought to be,  history would have 
furnished our author with instances of this absolute fa- 
therly power in its height and perfection, and he might 
have showed us in Peru people tl~at  begot children on 
purpose to fatten and eat them.  The story is so re- 
markable, that I cannot but set it down in the author's 
words:  "  In some  provinces,  says  he,  they were  so 
liquorish after  man's  flesh,  that they would not have 
the patience to stay till the breath was out of the body, 
but would suck the blood  as it ran from the wounds 
of the dying man ;  they had public shambles of man's 
flesh,  and  their  madness  herein was  to that degree, 
that they spared not their  own  children,  which  they 
had begot on strangers taken in war :  for  they made 
their captives their mistresses,  and choicely nourished 
the children they had by them, till about thirteen years 
old they butchered and eat them; and they served the 
mothers after the same fashion,  when they grew past 
child-bearing,  and  ceased  to bring  them  any  more 
roasters."  Garcilasso  de 1s  Vega Hist. des Yncas de 
Peru, 1.  i. c. 12. 
58, Thus far ern1 the b~~sy  mind of man carry him 
to a brutality below the level of beasts,  when he quits 
his reason, which  places  him  almost  cqual  to angels. 
Nor can it be otherwise in a creature, whose thoughts 
are more  than the sands,  and wider than  the ocean, 
where  fancy  and  passion  milst  needs  run  hiin  into 
strange courses, if reason,  which  is  his  only star and 
compass, be not that he steers by.  The imagination is 
always restless, and suggests variety of  thoughts,  and 
the will, reason being laid aside, is ready for every ex- 
travagant project; and in this state he that goes farthest 
out of  the way, is thought fittest to lead, and is sure of 
most followers :  and when fashion hath once established 
what folly or craft began, custom makes it sacred, and 
it will be thought impudence, or madness, to contradict 
or questio~l  it.  He that will impartially survey the na- 
tions of the world, will find so much of their relisions, 
governments,  and manners,  brought in and continued 
amongst them by these means,  that he will  have but 
little reverence for  tlie practices which are in use and 
credit amongst men ;  and will have reason to think, that 
the woods  and forests, where  the irrational untaught 
inhabitants keep right by following nature, are fitter to 
give us rules,  than cities and palaces, where those that 
call themselves civil and rational,  go out of their way, 
by  the authority of example.  If precedents  are suffi- 
cient to establish a rule in this case, our author might 
have found in holy writ children sacrificed by their pa- 
rents, and this amongst the people of God themselves : 
the Psalmist  tells  us,  Psalm cri. 38, "  They shed in- 
nocent  blood,  even  the  blood  of  their  sons and of 
their daughters,  whom  they sacrificed  unto the idols 
of  Canaan."  But God  judged  not  of  this  by  our 
author's rule, nor allowed of  the authority of  practice 
against his righteous law ;  but, as it follows there, '' the 
land was polluted with blood ;  therefore was the wrath 
of the Lord kindled against his people,  insomuch that 
he abhorred his own inheritance."  The  killing of their 
children,  though it were  fashionable, was charged on 
them as innocent blood, and so had in tbe account  of God 956  Of  Gorren~rnettt. 
the guilt of  murder,  as the offering them to idols had 
the guilt of idolatry. 
$ 59.  Be it then,  as sir Robert says, :that anciently 
it  was usual for men "  to sell  and castrate their chil- 
dren,"  0.155.  Let it be,  that they exposed  them ; 
add to it, if you please,  for this is still greater power, 
that they begat them for their tables,  to fat and eat 
them :  if  this proves a right to do so, we may,  by the 
same argument,  justify  adultery, incest,  and sodomy, 
for there are examples of these too,  both  ancient and 
modern ;  sins, which I suppose have their principal ag- 
gravation from this, that they cross the main intention 
of nature,  which willeth the increase of mankind,  and 
the continuation of the species in the  highest perfection, 
and the distinction of families, with the security of the 
marriage-bed, as necessary thereunto. 
3 60.  In confirmation  of  this natural  authority of 
the father,  our author brings a  lame proof  from the 
positive command of God in Scripture : his words are, 
66  To confirm  the natural right of  regal power,  we 
find in the decalogue,  that the law which enjoins obe- 
dience to kings,  is delivered  in the  terms,  Honour 
thy father,  p.  23.  Whereas many  confess,  that go- 
vernment  only in  the  abstract,  is  the ordinance  of 
God, they are not  able to prove any such ordinance 
in the Scripture,  but only in the fatherly power ;  and 
therefore  we  find  the  commandment,  that  enjoins 
obedience  to superiors,  given  in  the terms,  Honour 
thy father;  so that not only the power  and right of 
government,  but the form  of  the power  governing, 
and the person  having  the power,  are all  the ordi- 
nances of  God.  The first  father had not only simply 
power,  but power  monarchical,  as he was  father im- 
mediately  from  God,"  0. 454.  To the  same pur- 
pose,  the same law is cited  by our author in several 
other places,  and just after the same fashion;  that is, 
a  and mother,"  as apocryphal words,  are always left 
out ;  a great argument of  our author's ingenuity, and 
the goodness  of  his  cause,  which  required  in  its de- 
fender zeal to J degree of  warmth,  able to warp the 
sacred rule of the word of  God, to make it co~nply  with 
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his present occasion;  a way of proceeding not unusual 
to those who  embrace not  truths because  reason  and 
revelation offer them, but espouse tenets and parties for 
ends different from truth, and then resolve at any rate 
to  defend them ; and so do with the words and sense of 
authors, they would  fit  to their purpose,  just  as Pro- 
crustes did with his guests, lop or stretch them, as may 
best  fit  them  to the size  of their  iiotioils;  ad  they 
always prove, like those so served, deformed, lame, and 
useless. 
Cj  61.  For had our  author set down  this  command 
without garbling, as God gave it, and joined mother to 
father, every reader would have seen, that it had made 
directly against him,  and that it was so far from esta- 
blishing the 'c monarchical  power of  the father,"  that 
it set  up the  mother  equal with  him,  and enjoined 
nothing  but was due in  common  to  both  father  and 
mother :  for that is the constant tenour of the Scripkur.e, 
" Honour thy father and thy mother,"  Exod. xx :'  He 
that smiteth his  father or motlier,  shall  surely be put 
to death,"  xxi. 15.  "  He that curseth  his  father  or 
mother, shall surely be put to death,"  ver. 17. repeated 
Lev.  XX.  9,  and by  our Saviour, Matth. xv.  4.  "  Ye 
shall fear every man his  mother  and his father,"  Lev. 
Gx. 3.  "  If any man have s rebellious son,  which will 
not  obey  the voice  of  his  father or  the voice  of  his 
mather;  then  shall his father and his mother lay bold 
on him,  and say,  This our son is stubborn and rebel- 
lious,  he will  not obey  our voice,"  Deut. xxi.  18,1$ 
20,  21.  "Cursed  be he that setteth light by his father 
or his mother,"  xxvii.  IG.  " My son, hear the instruc- 
tions  of  thy father,  atid  forsake  not  the law  of  thy 
mother,"  are the words of  Solomon,  a king wha was 
not ignorant of what belonged  to him as a father or a 
bag  ;,  and yet he joins father and mother together, in 
dl tbe instructions he gives children quite tllrough Jiis 
book  of  Proverbs.  "  Woe  unto him, that saitil unto 
his  father,  What begettest  thou? or to  tlie  womau, 
What hast thou brought forth ?"  Isn. xlv.  1 o.  I11  thee 
have they set light by  father ant1 mother,"  Ezek. xxii. 
7.  '6 And it shall come  to pass,  that  wlicn  any sball 
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yet  prophesy,  then  his  father  and  his  mother  that 
begat  him  shall  say  unto him,  Thou  shalt not live; 
and his  father  and  his  mother  that begat him  shall 
thrust  him  through  when  he  ~ro~hesieth." Zech. 
xiii. 3.  Mere  not  the father only, but the father and 
mother jointly,  had power in this cnse of  life and death, 
Thus  ran the law of the Old Testament, and in the New 
they are likewise joined,  in the obedience of their chil- 
dren, Eph. vi.  l.  The rule  is, "  Children,  obey your 
parents;"  and I do not remember,  that I any  where 
read, '; Children, obey your father,"  and no more : the 
Scripture joins  mother  too  in  that  homage  which  is 
due from children; and had there been any text, wheae 
the honour or obedience of  children had been directed 
to the father alone, it is not likely that our author, who 
pretends to build all upon Scripture,  would have omitted 
it: my, the Scripture makes the authority of  father 
and mother,  in  respect of  those  they have  begot,  so 
equal, that in some places it neglects even the priority 
of order, which is thought  due to the father, and the 
mother  is  put first,  as  Lev.  xix. 3.  From which  so 
constantly joining  father  and  mother  together, as is 
found quite through Scripture, we may conclude that 
the honour they have  a  title to from their children is 
one common right belonging so equally to them both, 
that neither  can claim  it  wholly,  neither can  be  ex- 
cluded. 
9 62.  One would wonder then how our author infers 
from  the fifth commandment,  that all  66 power  wiw 
originally in the father;"  how he finds  monarchical 
power  of  government  settled  and fixed  by the com- 
mandment,  Honour  thy father  and thy mother."  If 
all the honour  due by the commandment,  be  it what 
it will, be the only right of  the father,  because he,  as 
our  author  says,  "  has the sovereignty over  the  wo- 
man, as being the nobler and principal agent in genera- 
tion,"  why did God afterwards all along  join the mother 
with  him,  to share  in  his  honour ?  Can the father, 
by  this  sovereignty  of  his,  discharge  the child  from 
paying this honour to his mother?  The Scripture gave 
no such licence  to the Jews,  and yet there were often 
breaches wide enough betwixt husband and wife, even 
ta divorce and separation : and,  I think,  nobody will 
say a child  may withhold  honour from his mother, or, 
as the Scripture terms it, "  set light bv her,"  though his 
father should command him to do so- no more than the 
mother could  dispense with  him for neglecting to 110- 
nour his father: whereby it is plain, that this command 
of God gives the father no sovereignty, no supremacy. 
$ 63.  I agree with our author that the title to  this 
honour is vested in the parents by nature, and is a right 
which accrues to them  by their having begotten their 
children, and  God  by many positive  declarations  has 
confirmed  it to them : I also  allow our author's  rule, 
"  that in grants and gifts, that have their original from 
God  and  nature,  as  the  power  of  the  father,"  (let 
me add "  and mother,"  for whom God hath joined  to- 
gether let no man put asunder) "  no inferior power of 
men  can  limit,  nor  make  any  law  of  prescription 
against  them,"  0. 158: so  that the mother  having, 
by this law of  God,  a  right  to honour from her chil- 
dren, which is not subject  to the will  of her husband, 
we see this  absolute monarchical power of the father" 
can  neither  be  founded  on  it,  nor  consist  with  it ; 
and he has a power very far from monarchical, very far 
from that absoluteness our author contends for, when 
another has over his  subjects the same power he hath, 
and by the same title :  and therefore he cannot forbear 
saying himself  that  he cannot  see  how  any  man's 
children can be free from subjection to their parents," 
p.  12,  which,  in  common  speech,  I  think,  signifies 
mother  as well  as father,  or  if parents here signifies 
only father, it is the first tinie 1 ever yet knew it to do 
so, and by such an use of words one mity say any thing. 
$ 64.  By our author's  doctrine,  the father having 
absolute jurisdiction over his children, has also the same 
over their issue ;  and the consequence is good, were it 
true that the father had such a  power:  and yet I ask 
our author whether the grandfather, by his sovereignty, 
could discharge the grandcllild from paying to his father 
the honour due to him by the fifth  commandment.  If 
the grandfaher hath,  by  <'  right  of  fatherhood,"  sole 
s 2 sovereign power  in him,  and that obedience which is 
due to the supreme magistrate be commanded in these 
words, "  Honour thy father,"  it is certain the grand- 
father might dispense with the grandson's honouringhis 
father, which  since  it is  evident  in  common sense he 
cannot, it follows from hence, that "  honour thy father 
and  mother"  cannot mean  an  absolute  subjection  t6 
a  sovereign  power,  but  something  else.  The right 
therefore  which  parents  have  by  nature,  and which 
is confirmed to them  by  the fifth commandment,  can- 
not be that political dominion which our author would 
derive from it: for  that being  in  every civil  society 
supreme somewhere,can discharge any subject from any 
political  obedience  to any  one of  his  fellow-subjects. 
But what law of the magistrate can give a child liberty 
not to "  honour his father and mother ?"  It is an eternal 
law, annexed purely to the relation of parents and chil- 
dren, and so contains nothing of  the magistrate's power 
in it, nor is subjected to it. 
$  65. Our author says, "  God hath given to a father 
a right  or  liberty to  alien  his  power  over  his  chil- 
dren  to  any  other,"  0. 155.  I  doubt whether  he 
can alien wholly the right of  honour that is due from 
them;  but be that as it will, this I am sure, he cannot 
alien and retain the same power.  If  therefore the ma- 
gistrate's  sovereignty be,  as our author would have it, 
"  nothing but the authority of  a  supreme  father,"  p. 
23,  it is unavoidable,  that if  the magistrate hath all 
this paternal right, as he must have if fatherhood be the 
fountain  of  all  authority;  then the subjects,  though 
fathers, can have no power over their children, no right 
to honour fmm them :  for it cannot be all in another's 
hands,  and a part remain with the parents.  So that, 
according to our author's  own doctrine, "  Honour thy 
father  and mother"  cannot possibly be understood of 
political subjection and obedience :  since the laws both 
in the Old and New Testament, that commanded chil- 
dren to "  honour and obey their parents,"  were given 
to such, whose  fathers  were under  civil  government, 
and fellow-sub'ects  with them in political societies ;  and  h  to have  bid  t  em "  honour  and obey their parents," 
in our author's  sense, had been  to bid them besubjects 
ts those who had no title to it : the right to obedience 
from subjects being all vested in another; and instead 
of teaching obedience,  this had  been  to foment  sedi- 
tion, by  setting up powers that were not.  If therefore 
this command,  '<  Honour thy father and mother,"  con- 
cern  political  dominion,  it  directly  overthrows  our 
author's  monarchy:  since it being to be paid by  every 
child to his  father,  even in society,  every father must 
necessarily have poIitical dominion, and there will be as 
many sovereigns as there are fathcrs : besides that the 
mother too hath her title,which destroys the sovereignty 
of one supreme monarch.  But if "  Honour thy father 
and  mother"  mean  something  distinct from political 
power, as necessarily it must, it is besides our author's 
business, and serves nothing to his purpose. 
5  66.  <'  The law  that enjoins obedience to kings is 
delivered,"  says our author, "  in the terms, Honour thy 
father, as if  all power were  originally in the father," 
0. 254 : and that law is  also  delivered,  say 1,  in  the 
terms, '' Honour  thy mother,"  as  if  all  power  were 
originally  in the mother. I appeal whether the argument 
be not  as  good  on  one  side as  the other, father and 
mother  being  joined  all  along in  the Old  and  New 
Testament wherever  honour or  obedience is  enjoined 
children.  Again,  our  author tells  us,  0.254, "  that 
this command, Honour thy father, gives the right to go- 
vern, and makes the form of government monarchical." 
To which I answer,  that if by "  Honour  thy father" 
be meant obedience  to the political power  of  the ma- 
gistrate, it  concerns  not  any duty we  owe  to  our 
natural  fathers,  who  are subjects;  because  they,  by 
our author's  doctrine, are divested of all that power, it 
being placed wllolly in the prince, and so being equally 
subjects and  daves  with  their  children,  can have  no 
right,  by that title,  to any such  honour or obedience 
as contains in it political subjection : if  " Honour thy 
father and mother"  signifies the duty we owe our na- 
tural parents,  as by our Saviour's interpretation, Matth. 
XV. 4, and all  the other mentioned places, it is plain it 
does: then it cannot conccrli political obedience, but a duty tbt  is owing to persons who have m, title b  so- 
vereignty, nor any political authority  as magistrates uvsr 
subjects4 For the person of a private father, and a, title 
to  obedience, due bo the wprsme magistrate, are thing6 
inmsisterrt ; and therefore this command,  which must 
necessarily comprehend the persons of natural fathers, 
must mean  a  duty we  owe  thein  distinct  from  our 
obedience to the magistrate,  and from whioh the most 
absolute power  of  princes  cannot absolve  us.  What 
this duty is, we shall in its due place examine. 
$ 67. And thus we have at last got through all, that 
in our author looks like an argument for that absolute 
unlimited sovereignty described,  sect. 8, which he sup- 
poses in Adam;  so that mankind have ever since been 
all born slaves, without  any title to freedom.  But if 
creation, which  gave nothing  but a  being,  made not 
Adam  prince  of  his posterity:  if  Adam,  Gen.  i.  28, 
was not constituted lord of mankind, nor had a private 
dominion given him exclusive of his children, but only 
a right and power over the earth and inferior creatures 
in common with the children of  men :  if also,  Gen. iii. 
16, God gave not  any particular power to Adam over 
his wife and children, but  only subjected  Eve to  Adam, as 
a punishment, or foretold the subjection of the weaker 
sex, in the ordering the common concernments of their 
families, but gave not thereby to Adam, as to the hus- 
band,  power  of  life  and death, which  necessarily be- 
longs to the magistrate :  if fathers by begetting  their 
children acquire no such power over them ;  and if the 
command,  "  Honour thy father and xnotber,"  give  it 
not, but only enjoins a duty owing to parents equally, 
whether subjects or not,  and to the mother as well as 
the father :  if all this be so, as I think by what has been 
said is very evident;  then man has a natural freedom, 
notwithstanding all our author confidently says to tho 
contrary;  since  all that  share  in  the same  common 
nature, faculties, and powers, are in nature equal, and 
ought to partake in the same common rights and privi. 
leges,  till  the manifest  appointment of  God,  who  is 
&'  Lord over all, blessed for ever,"  can be produced to 
show any  particular person's supremacy ;  or n man's own 
consent subjects him to  a superior.  This is  so plain, 
that our author confesses that sir John Hayward, Black- 
wood, and Barclay, "  the great vindicators of the right 
of  kings,"  could not  deny  it, " but  admit  with one 
consent the natural liberty and equality of mankind," 
for a truth unquestionable.  And our author hath been 
so far from producing any thing that may make good 
his  great position,  '<  that  Adam  was  absolute  mon- 
arch,"  and so  men are not naturally free," that even 
his own proofs make against him ;  so that, to use his 
own way  of  arguing,  c6 the  first  erroneous  principle 
failing, the whole fabric of this vast engine of absolute 
power  and tyranny drops  down  of itself,"  and there 
needs no more to be said in answer to all that he builds 
upon so false and frail a foundation. 
$ 68. But to save others  the pains, were  there any 
need,  he  is  not  sparing himself  to show, by his own 
contradictions,  the  weakness  of  his  own  doctrine. 
Adam's  absolute and sole dominion is that which he is 
every where full. of, and all along builds on, and yet he 
tells us, p.  12, cc that as Adam was lord of his children, 
so his children  under him had  a command and power 
over  their  own  children."  The  unlimited  and un- 
divided sovereignty  of Adam's  fatherhood,  by our au- 
thor's  computation, stood but a little while, only during 
the first generation ;  but as soon as he had grandchil- 
dren, sir Robert  could  give but  a very ill account of 
it.  '6  Adam, as father of his children,"  saith he, "  hath 
an  absolute,  unlimited,  royal power over  them,  and 
by virtue  thereof over  those  that they begot, and so 
to  all generations;"  and  yet  his  children,  viz.  Caiu 
and Seth, have a paternal power over their children at 
the same time ;  so that they are at the same time abso- 
lute lords,.and yet vassals and slaves ;  Adam has all the 
authority,  as  "grandfather  of the people,"  and they 
have a part of it as fathers of a part of them :  he is ab- 
solute over them and their  posterity, by having begot- 
ten them,  and yet they are absolute over their children 
by the same title.  6'  No,"  says our author, "  Adam's 
children under him had power  over their own children, but &ill  with subordination  to the  first  parent."  A 
gooddistiflction, that sounds well; and it  is pity it sipi- 
fies aothing, nor can be  reconciled with  our  author's 
words.  I readily grant, that supposing Adam's  abso- 
lutm  pswer over his posterity, any of his children might 
ha*  from him  delegated, and so a subordinate power 
aver a part, or  all the rest:  but that cannot be the 
power our author speaks of here ;  it is not a power by 
grant and commission, but the natural paternal power 
he supposes a father to have over his children.  Bor, 1 
he says,  "As Adam was  lord  of  his  children, so his 
children under him  had a  power  over their own  chil- 
dren :" they were then lords over  their  own children 
after the same manner, and  by the same title, that Adam 
was;  i.  e. by right. of generation, by right  of  father- 
hood.  2. It  is plain he means the natural power of  fa- 
thers, because he limits it to be only " over their own 
children ;" a delegated power has  no  such limitation 
as  only over their own children; it might be over others, 
as well  as their  own  children.  3.  If it were a dele- 
gated power, it must appear in Scripture ;  but there is 
no grciund in Scripture to affirm, that Adam's  children 
had any other power  over theirs  than what  they  na- 
turally had as fathers. 
$ 69.  But that he means  here paternal power, and 
no other, is past doubt, from the inference he makes in 
these words  immediately following,  I see  not then 
how  the children  of  Adam,  or  of  any man  else, can 
be free from  subjection  to their parents."  Whereby 
it appears that thepower on one side, and the subjection 
on the other, our author here speaks of, is that natural 
power and subjection between parents and children :  for 
that  which everyman's children owed could be no other; 
and that our author always affirms to be absolute and 
unlimited.  This natural  power  of parents  over their 
children Adam had over his posterity, says our author; 
and this power of parents over their children,  his chil- 
dren had over  theirs  in  his  lifetime,  saps our author 
also ;  so that Adam,  by a  natural  right of father, had 
an absolute, unlimited power over all his posterity, and 
at  the same time his children had by the same right ab- 
solute, unlimited power over theirs.  Here then are two 
absolute,  unlimited powers existing together, which I 
would have  any body reconcile  one  to another, or to 
common sense.  For the salvo he has put in of subor- 
dination makes it more  absurd :  to have one absolute, 
unlimited,  nay unlimitable  power  in  subordination to 
another,  is  so  manifest a contradiction,  that nothing 
can be more.  "  Adam is absolute prince, with the un- 
limited  authority  of  fatherhood  over  all  his  poste- 
rity ;"  all  his  posterity  are then  absolutely  his  sub- 
jects ;  and, as our author says, his slaves, children, and 
grandchildren, are equally in this state ofsubjection and 
slavery;  and yet,  says  our  authar, "  the children  of 
Adam  have  paternal, i.  e.  absolute,  unlimited  power 
over their  own  children :" which  in plain English is, 
they are slaves and absolute princes at the same time, 
and in the same government ;  and one part of the sub- 
jects have an absolute, unlimited power over the other 
by the natural right of parentage. 
5 70.  If  any one will  suppose  in favour  of our au- 
thor, that he here meant that parents, who are in sub 
jection themselves to the absolute authority of their fa- 
ther, have yet some power  over their children ;  I con- 
fess he is something nearer the truth :  but he will not at 
all hereby help  our  author: for he nowhere speaking 
of the paternal power, but as an absolute, unlimited au- 
thority, cannot be supposed to  understand any thing else 
here, unless he himself had limited it, and showed how 
far it reached ;  and that he means here paternal autho- 
rity in that large extent, is plain from the immediately 
following  words :  "This  subjection of children being," 
says he, "  the foundation of all regal authority,"  p.  12. 
The subjection then  that in the former line, he says, 
every man  is in to his  parents,"  and consequently 
what Adam's  grandchildren were  in  to their parents, 
Was that which was the fountain of  all regal authority, 
i. e.  according to our author, absolute, unlimitrrble au- 
thority.  And thus Adam's children had regal authority 
over  their  children, whilst  they themselves were  sub- 
jects to  their father, and fellow-subjects  with their chil- dren.  But let him mean ss he pleases, it is plain he al- 
lows  Adam's children to have paternal power,"  p. 14, 
as also all other fathers to have "  paternal power over 
their  children!'  0. 156.  From whence  one of these 
two things will  necessarily follow, that either Adam's 
children, even  in  his life  time, had,  and  so  all  other 
fathers have,  as  he  phrases it, p.  12, "  by right of fa- 
therhood, royal authority over their children,"  or else 
that Adam, "  by right of fatherhood, had not royal au- 
thority."  For it cannot  be  but that  paternal power 
does,  or  does not,  give  royal  authority to them that 
have it: if it does  not, then Adam  could not be sove- 
reign by this title, nor  any body else ; and then there 
is an end of all our author's  politics at once :  if it does 
give royal authority, then  every one that has paternal 
power has royal authority ;  and then, by our author's 
patriarchal  government, there will  3e as many kings 
as there are fathers. 
5 71. And thus what a monarchy he hath set up, let 
him and his  disciples consider.  Princes certainly will 
have great reason to thank him for these new politics, 
which set up as many absolute kings in every country as 
there are fathers of children.  And yet who can blame 
our author for it, it  lying unavoidably in the way of one 
discoursing upon our  author's principles ?  For having 
placed an "  absolute power in fathers by right of beget- 
ting,"  he could  not  easily resolve  how much  of this 
power belonged to a  son over the children he had be- 
gotten; and so it fell out to be a very hard matter  to 
give all the power, as he does, to Adam, and yet allow 
a part in his life time to his  children when  they were 
parents, and which he knew not well how to  deny them. 
This makes him so doubtful in his expressions, and so 
uncertain where to place  this absolute natural power 
which  he  calls  fatherhood.  Sometimes  Adam  alone 
has it all, as p.  13, 0. 244,245,  and Pref. 
Sometimes parents have it, which word scarce signi- 
fies the father alone, p. 12, 19. 
Sometimes  children  during their  father's  lifetime, 
as p.  14. 
Sometimes fathers of families, as p. 78,79. 
Sometimes fathers indefinitely, 0. 155. 
Sometimes the heir to Adam, 0. 253. 
Sometimes the posterity of Adam, 944, 446. 
Sometimes prime fathers, all  sons  of grandchildren 
oE Noah, 0.244. 
Sometimes the eldest parents, p  12. 
Sometimes all kings, p. 19. 
Sometimes all that have supreme power, 0. 245. 
Sometimes heirs to those first progenitors who were 
at  first the natural parents of the whole people, p. 19. 
Sonietimes an elective king, y. 23. 
Sometimes those, whether a few or a multitude, that 
govern the commonweath, p. 23. 
Sometimes he that can  catch it,  an usurper, p.  23. 
0. 155. 
9 752.  Thus this  new nothing, that is to carry with 
it all power,  authority, and government ;  this father- 
hood, which is to design the person, and establish the 
throne of  monarchs, whom  the people  are to  obey; 
may, according to sir Robert, come into any hands, any 
how, and so by his politics give to democracy royal  au- 
thority, and make an usurper a lawful prince.  And if 
it will do all these fine feats, much good do our author 
and all his followers with their omnipotent fatherhood, 
which can serve for nothing but to unsettle and destroy 
all the lawful  governments in the world, and  to esta- 
blish in their room disorder, tyranny, and usurpation. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Of Fatherhood  and  Property  considered  together  as 
Fountains of  Sovereignty. 
5  73. IN  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  seen 
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and upon what titles hc founded it.  The foundations 
which he lays the chief  stress on, as those from which 
he  thinks  he may  best  derive monarchical  power  to 
future  princes,  are two,  viz.  <<  fatherhood  and pro- 
perty :" and  therefore  the way  he  proposes  to "re- 
move  the absurdities and inconveniencies  of the doc- 
trine of  natural freedom  is,  to maintain  the  natural 
and private dominion  of Adam,"  0. 222.  Conform- , 
able hereunto, he tell us, '' the grounds and principles 
of  government  necessarily  depend upon  the original 
of  property,"  0.108.  "  The subjection of children to 
their  parents  is the fountain of all regal  authority," 
p.  12.  "  And all power  on earth is either derived  or 
usurped  from  the  fatherly  power,  there  being  no 
other  original  to be  found  of  any  power  whatso- 
ever,"  0. 158.  I will not stand here to examine how 
it  can be said without a contradiction, that the "first 
groutids and principles of government  necessarily de- 
pend upon the original of property,"and  yet,"that  there 
is no other original of any power whatsoever but that 
of the father :" it being hard to understand how there 
can be "  no  other  original but fatherhood,"  and yet 
that the "  grounds  and principles  of government  de- 
pend  upon  the  original  of property;"  property  and 
fatherhood being as far different as lord of  a  manor 
and father of children.  Nor  do I  see how they will 
either  of  them  agree with what  our  author says, 0. 
444, of God's sentence against Eve, Gen. iii. 16, "  that 
it is the original grant of government :" so that if that 
were the original, government had not  its original, by 
our author's  own  confession,  either from  property or 
fatherhood ; and this text, which  he brings as a proof 
ofAdam's power over Eve, necessarily contradicts what 
he says of the fatherhood, that it is the "  sole fountain 
of all power :"  for if Adam had any such regal power 
over Eve  as our author contends  for,  it must  be  by 
some other title than that of begetting. 
$74. Rut I leave  him  to reconcile  these contradic- 
tions, as well as many others, which may plentifully be 
found in him  by any one, who will but read him with 
a little attention ;  and shall come now to consider, how 
these two  originals  of  government,  'cAdain's natural 
and private dominion,"  will  consist and serve to make 
out and establish the titles of succeeding monarchs, who, 
as our author obliges  them, must all derive their power 
from these fountains.  Let us then suppose Adam made, 
"  by God's donation,"  lord  and sole proprietor of  the 
whole earth, in as large and ample a ilianner as sir Ro- 
bert could wish ;  let us suppose him also, '' by ri,pht of 
fatherhood,"  absolute  ruler  over his  children w*h  an 
unlimited shpremacy ;  I ask theu, upon Adam's  death, 
what becomes  of  both  his  natural  and  private domi- 
nion? and I doubt not it will  be  answered,  that they 
descended to his  next  heir,  as our  author tells  us  in 
several places.  But this way, it is plain, cannot possibly 
convey both  his  natural  and  private dominion to the 
same person :  for should we allow that all the property, 
all the estateof the  father, ought to descend to the eldest 
son, (which will need some proof to establish it) and so 
he has  by  that title  all  the  private  dominion of  the 
father, yet the father's natural dominion, the paternal 
power,  cannot  descend  to him  by inheritance : for it 
being a right that accrues to a man only by begetting, 
no man can have this natural dominion over any one he 
does not beget ; unless it can be supposed that a man 
can have a  r~ght  to any thing, without doing that upon 
which that right is solely founded : for  if a father by 
begetting, and no other title, has natural dominion over 
his children,  he that does not beget them cannot have 
this natural dominion  over  them ; and  therefore be it 
true or false, that our author says, 0. 156, That  6c every 
man that is born, by his very birth, becomes a subject 
to him that begets him,"  this necessarily follows, viz. 
That a man by his  birth  cannot  become  a subject to 
his brother,  who did not beget him;  unless  it can be 
supposed that a man by the very same title can come 
to be under the  cc natural and absolute dominion" of two 
different men at once; or it be sense to say, that a rnan 
by birth  is under  the natural  dominion of  his father, 
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under the natural dominion of his eldest brother, though 
hc did not beget him. 
t~  75. If then the private dominioil of Adam, i. e.  his 
property in the creatures, descended at  his death all en- 
tirely to his eldest son, his heir ;  (for, if it  did not, there 
is presently an end of all sir Robert's monarchy) and his 
natural dominion,  the dominion a  father has over his 
children by begetting them, belonged, immediately upon 
Adam's  decease,  equally to all his sons who had chil- 
dren, by the same title their  father had  it,  the save- 
reignty founded  upon  property,  and the sovereignty 
founded upon fatherhood,  come  to be divided; sinee 
Cain, as heir,  had that of  property  alone ;  Seth, and 
the other  sons,  that of  fatherhood  equally with him. 
This is the best can be made of  our author's doctrine, 
and of the two titles of sovereignty he sets up in Adam: 
one of them will either signify nothing ;  or, if they both 
must stand, they can serve only to confound the rights 
of princes,  and disorder government in his posterity : 
for by  building upon two titles to dominion, which ean- 
not descend together, and which he allows may be se- 
parated, (for he yields that "  Adam's children had their 
distinct  territories  by  right  of  private  dominion~'' 
0. 210,  p. 40)  he  makes it perpetually a doubt  upon 
his principles where the sovereignty is, or to whom we 
owe our obedience ;  since fatherhood and property are 
distinct titles, and began presently upon Adam's death 
to be in distinct persons.  And which then was to give 
way to the other ? 
§ 76. Let us  take the account of  it,  as he himself 
gives it us.  He tells us out of Grotius, that "  Adam's 
children,  by  donation,  assignation,  or  some kind  of 
cession  before he was  dead, had  their  distinct terri- 
tories by  right  of  private  dominion;  Abel  had his 
flocks,  and pastures for them : Cain had his fields for 
corn,  and  the  land of  Nod,  where  he  built  him  o 
city,"  0.110.  Here it is  obvious to demand,  which 
of these two after Adam's  death was  sovereign ?  Cain, 
says our author, p  19.  By what title ?  "  As heir:  for 
heirs  to progenitors,  who  were  natural  parents  of 
their  people,  are not only  lords  of  their  own  chi]- 
dren, but also of their brethren,"  says our author, p. 19. 
What was Cain  heir  to? Not  the entire possessions, 
not all that which Adam had private dominion in;  for 
our author  allows  that Abel,  by a  title derived from 
his father,  had  his  distinct  territory for piisture by 
right of private dominion."  What then Abel had by 
private dominion, was  exempt from Cain's  dominion : 
for he could not have private dominion over that which 
was under the private dominion of another ;  and there- 
fore his sovereignty over his brother  is gone with this 
private dominion,  and so  there are presently two so- 
vereigns, and his imaginary title of fatherhood is out of 
doors,  and Cain is no prince over his brother:  or else, 
if Cain retain his sovereignty over Abel, notwithstand- 
ing his private dominion, it will follow, that the "first 
grounds and principles of  government"  have nothing 
to do with  property,  whatever our author says to the 
contrary.  It is true,  Abel  did  not  outlive his father 
Adam ;  but that makes nothing to the argument, which 
will hold good against sir Robert in Abel's  issue, or in 
Seth, or any of  the posterity of  Adam,  not descended 
from Cain. 
$77. The same inconvenience he runs into about the 
three sons of  Noah, who,  as he says, p. 13, "  had the 
whole  world  divided  amongst them by their father." 
I ask then,  in  which  of  the  three we shall find "  the 
establishment of regal powerJJ after Noah's death  ?  If 
in all three,  as our author there seems to say,  then it 
will follow, that regal power is founded in property af 
land, and follows private dominion, and not in paternal 
power or natural dominion ;  and so there is an end of 
paternal  power  as the  fountain  of  regal  authority, 
and the so much magnified  fetherhood quite vanishes. 
If the regal power  descended to Shem as eldest,  and 
heir to his father, then " Noah's division of  the world 
by lot to his sons,  or  his  ten  years'  sailing about the 
Mediterranean  to appoint each son  his  part,"  which 
our author tells of, p. 15, was labour lost; his division 
of  the world to them,  was to ill,  or  to no purpom :, 
for his grant to Cham and Japhet was little wort,h, if Shem,  notwithstanding  this  grant,  as  soon  as Noah 
was dead, was to be lord over them.  Or, if this grant 
of private dominion to them,  over their assigned terri- 
tories' were good, here were set up two distinct sorts of 
power, not subordinate one to the other, with all those 
inconveniencies which he musters up against the "power 
of  the people,"  0. 158,  which I shall set down in his 
own words,  only changing property for people :  c6 All 
power  on  earth is  either  derived  or  usurped from 
the fatherly power,  there being no  other  original  to 
be found of any power whatsoever: for if there should 
be granted two sorts of  power,  without  any subordi- 
nation of  one  to the other,  they would  be  in  perpe- 
tual strife which should be supreme, for two supremes 
cannot agree:  if the fatherly power be supreme,  then 
the  power  grounded  on  private  dominion  must be 
subordinate,  and  depend  on  it; and  if  the power 
grounded on  property be  supreme,  then  the fatherly 
power  must  submit to it,  and  cannot  be  exercised 
without  the  licence  of  the  proprietors,  which  must 
quite destroy the frame and course of  nature."  This 
is his  own  arguing against  two distinct  independent 
powers, which I have set down in his own words, only 
putting power  rising from property, for  power  of  the 
people ;  and when he has answered what he himself has 
urged here against two  distinct  powers,  we  shall be 
better able  to see  how,  with  any tolerable sense,  he 
can derive all regal authority "  from  the natural  and 
private dominion of Adam,"  from fatherhood and pro- 
perty together, which  are distinct  titles,  that do nat 
always meet in the same persons ; and it is plain,  by 
his own confession, presently separated as soon both as 
Adam's  and Noah's  death  made way for  succession: 
though our author frequently in  his  writings jumbles 
them  together,  and omits  not to make  use of  either, 
where hc thinks it will sound best to his purpose.  But 
the absurdities of this will more fully appear in tlre ne~t 
chapter, where we shall exanline the ways of corwey- 
ance of the sovereignty of  Adam tc princes that wen. 
to reign after him. 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
Of the Conveyance of  Adam's  sovereign monarchical 
Power. 
$ 78.  SIR Robert,  having  not  been  very happy in 
any proof  he brings  for  the sovereignty of  Adam,  is 
not much  more  fortunate in  conveying  it to  future 
princes;  who,  if his  politics  be  true,  must  all derive 
their  titles  from  that  first  monarch.  The ways  he 
has assigned, as they lie scattered up and down in his 
writings, I will set down in his own words :  in his pre- 
face he tells  us,  that "Adam  being  monarch  of  the 
whole  world,  none  of  his  posterity had  any right  to 
possess  any thing, but by his  grant or permission,  or 
by succession  from  him."  Here he makes  two ways 
of conveyance of  any thing Adam  stood  possessed of; 
and those  are grants,  or  succession.  Again  he says, 
a  All kings either are,  or are to be reputed,  the next 
heirs  to  those  first  progenitors,  who  were  at first 
the natural  parents  of  the  whole  people,"  p.  19.- 
"  There cannot be  any multitude  of  men whatsoever, 
but that in it, considered  by itself,  there  is  one man 
amongst  them, that in nature  lnath a right to be  the 
king of all the rest,  as being the next heir to Adam," 
0. 253.  Here in these places  inheritance is the only 
way  he  allows  of  conveying  monarchical  power  to 
princes.  In  other places  he tells  us,  0. 155, "  All 
power on earth is either  derived  or usurped from the 
fatherly power,"  0. 158.  "  All  kings that now  are, 
or  ever  were,  are  or  were  either  fathers  of  their 
people, or heirs of such fathers, or usurpers of the right 
of  such fathers,"  0.253.  And  here  he  makes  in- 
heritance  or usurpation  the only way  whereby kings 
come by this original power:  but yet he tells us. '' this 
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fatherly  empire,  as  it was  of itself  hereditary, so  it 
was alienable by patent,  and seizable by an usurper," 
0.190.  So then here inheritance, grant, or usurpation, 
will  convey  it.  And  last of  all,  which  is  most  ad- 
mirable,  he tells us, p.  100,  d(  It  skills not which way 
kings come by their power, whether by election, dona- 
tion,  succession,  or  by  any  other  means;  for  it  is 
still the manner of the government by supreme power 
that makes  them  properly kings,  and not  the means 
of  obtaining  their  crowns."  Which I think is  a full 
answer to all his whole hypothesis and discourse about 
Adam's  royal authority, as  the  fountain  from which 
a11  princes were to derive theirs:  and he might have 
spared  the trouble of  speaking  so  much  as he does, 
up and down, of heirs and inheritance, if to make any 
one properly  EL  king needs  no more but "  governing 
by supreme power,  and it matters not by what means 
he came by it." 
§ 79.  By this notable way,  our author may make 
Oliver as properly king as any one else he could think 
of:  and had he had the happiness to live under Massa- 
niello's  government, he could not by this  his own rule 
have forborne to have done  homage to him, with "  0 
king live  for ever,"  since the manner  of his  govern- 
ment by supreme power made him properly king, who 
was but the day before  properly a fisherman.  And if 
Don Quixote had taught his squire to govern with su- 
preme authority, our author no doubt could have made 
a most loyal subject in Sancho Pancha's island ;  he must 
needs have deserved  some preferment in such govern- 
ments, since I think he is the first politician who, pre- 
tending to settle government upon its true basis, and to 
establish the thrones  of  lawful  princes,  ever  told the 
world, that he was "properly  a king, whose manner of 
government  was by supreme power,  by  what  means 
soever he obtained  it;"  which  in plain  English is  to 
say, that regal and supreme power is properly and truly 
his, who can by any means  seize  upon  it: and if this 
be  to  be properly a king, I wonder how he came to  think 
of,or where he will find, an usurper. 
3 80.  This is so strange a doctrine, that the surprise 
of it  hath made me pass by, without their due reflection, 
the contradictions he runs into,  by making sometimes 
inheritance alone, sometimes only grant or inheritance, 
sometimes only inheritance or  usurpation,  sometimes 
all these three, and at  last election, or any other means, 
added to them, the ways whereby Adam's  royal autho- 
rity,  that is,  his  right to supreme rule, could be con- 
veyed down to  future kings and governors,  so as to give 
them  a  title to  the obedience  and subjection of  the 
people.  But these contradictions lie so open, that the 
very reading of  our  author's  own words will  discover 
them to any ordinaryunderstanding; and though  what I 
have quoted out of  him  (with abundance more of the 
same strain and coherence,  which  might be found in 
him) might well excuse me from any farther trouble in 
this  argument,  yet  having  proposed  to  myself  to 
examine the main parts of  his doctrine, I shall a little 
more  particularly  consider  how  inheritance,  grant, 
usurpation, or election, can any way make out govern- 
ment in the world upon his pri~ciples  ;  or derive to any 
one  a  right  of  empire,  from  this  regal  authority  of 
Adam,  had  it been  ever so  well  proved  that he had 
been absolute monarch, and lord of the whole world. 
CHAPTER IX. 
Of Monarchy 63 Inheritance ,from Adam. 
$ 82. THOUGH  it be ever so plain, that there ought 
to be government in the world,  nay,  should  all men 
be  of  our  author's  mind,  that  divine  appointment 
hod  ordained it to be  monarchical;  yet,  since  men 
eannot  obey  any  thing  that  cannot command;  and 
ideas of government in the fancy,  though ever so per- 
fect,  though ever so  right,  cannot give laws, nor pre- 
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scribe rules to the actions  of  men; it would be of no 
behoof for tlie  settling of  order,  and establishment of 
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless 
therewere rt way also taught how to know tlie person, to 
whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this 
dominion over others.  It  is in vain then to talk of sub- 
jection and obedience without telling us whom we are 
to obey :  for were I ever so fully persuaded that there 
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world;  yet1  am 
nevertheless at liberty still,  till  it appears who is the 
person that hath right to my obedience;  since, if there 
be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that 
hath right to rule from other men, it may be myself, as 
well as any other;  and therefore, though submission to 
government be every one's duty, yet since that signifies 
nothing but submitting  to the  direction and laws of such 
men as have authority to command, it is not enough to 
make a  man  a  subject,  to convince  him that there is 
regal power in the world ; but there must be ways of 
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal 
power of right belongs ;  and a man can never be obliged 
in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be 
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise 
that power over him.  If this were not so, there would 
be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes ;  he 
that  has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and 
crowns and sceptres would become the inheritance only 
of violence and rapine.  Men too  might  as often and 
as innocently change their governors,  as they do their 
physicians,  if  the person  cannot  be known who has n 
right to  direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound 
to  follow.  To  settle therefore men's consciences, under 
an obligatiori  to obedience,  it  is  necessary  that they 
know not only that there is a power somewhere in the 
world, but the person who  by right is vested with this 
power over them. 
$ 82. How successful our author has been in his at- 
tempts to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, 
the reader may judge  by  what has  been already said; 
but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author 
would desire it,  as I presume it is the contrary, yet it 
could  be  of  no  use  to  the  government  of  mankind 
now in the world,  unless  he  also  make  out these two 
thin~s. 
First, that this power of Adam was not to end with 
him, but was upon his decease conveyed entire to some 
other person, and so on to posterity. 
Secondly, that the princes  and rulers now on earth 
are possessed of this power of Adam,  by a right way of 
conveyance derived to them. 
S 83.  If the first  of  these  fail, the power of  Adam, 
were  it ever  so  great,  ever  so certain,  will  signify 
nothing to the present government and societies in the 
world;  but we  must seek out some  other original  of 
power for the government of polities than this ofAdam, 
or else  there will  be none  at all in the world.  If the 
latter fail, it will destroy the authority of  the present 
governors,  and  absolve  the people  from subjection to 
them, since they, having no better claim than others to 
that power, which is alone the fountain of all authority, 
can have no title to rule over them. 
$ 84.  Our author,  having fancied an absolute sove- 
reignty in Adam, mentions several ways of its convey- 
ance to princes, that were to be his successors;  but that 
which he chiefly insists on is that of inheritance, which 
occurs so often in his several discourses ; and I having 
in  the  foregoing chapter  quoted severalof these passages, 
3 shall not need here again to repeat them.  This sove- 
reignty  he  erects,  as  has  been  said,  upon  a  double 
foundation, viz.  that of  property,  and that of  father- 
hood.  One was the right he was supposed to have in 
all  creatures,  a  right  to  possess  the earth with  the 
beasts, and other inferior ranks  of  things in it, for his 
private use,  exclusive of all other men.  ,The other was 
the right he was supposed to have to rule and govern 
men, all the rest of mankind. 
$ 85.  In both  these  rights,  there being  supposed 
an exclusion of all ather men,  it must be upon  some 
reason  peculiar  to  Adam,  that they  must  both  be 
founded. 
That of his property our author supposes to rise from God's  inmtediate  donation,  Gen.  i.  28,  and  that  of 
fatherhood from the act of begetting.  Now in all inhe- 
ritance, if the heir succeed not to the reason upon which 
his  father's  right was  founded,  he cannot  succeed to 
the  right  which  followeth  from  it.  For example, 
Adam had  a  right of  property in the creatures upon 
the donation  and grant of  God Almighty,  who was 
Iord  and proprietor  of ,them all:  let this  be  so  as 
our author tells  us,  yet upon hi death  his  heir  can 
have  no  title to them,  no such right of  property in 
them,  unless  the  same  reason,  viz.  God's  donation, 
vested  a  right  in  the  heir  too:  for if  Adam  could 
have had no  property  in,  nor  use  of  the creatures, 
without  this  positive  donation  from  God,  and this 
donation were only personally to Adam, his heir could 
have  no  right  by  it;  but upon  his  death  it must 
revert to God,  the lord and owner again ;  for positive 
grants give no title farther than the express words con- 
vey it, and by which only it is held.  And thus, if, as 
our author himself contends, that donation, Cen. i.  28, 
were made only to  Adam personally, his heir could not 
succeed to his property in the creatures :  and if it were 
a donation to any but Adam,  let it be shown  that it 
was to his heir in our author's sense, i. e.  to one of his 
children, exclusive of all the rest. 
$ 86. But not to  follow our author too far out of the 
way,  the plain of the case  is  this :  God having made 
man, and planted in  him, as in all other animals, a strong 
desire of self-preservation, and furnished the world with 
things fit for food aud raiment, and other necessaries of 
life, subservient to his design, that man should live and 
abide for some time upon the face of the earth, and not 
that so curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship, 
by his own negligence,  or want of  necessaries, should 
perish again, presently after a few moments continuance; 
God, I say, having made man and the world thus, spoke 
to  him,  (that  is)  directed  him  by his senses and rea- 
son, as he did the inferior animals  by their sense and 
instinct, which were serviceable for his subsistence, and 
given him as the means af his preservation ';  and there- 
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fore I doubt not,  but  before  these  words  were  pro- 
nounced,  Gen.  i. 98,129,  (if  they must be understood 
literally to have  been  spoken) and without  any  such 
verbal donation, man had a right to an use of the crea- 
tures,  by the will  and grant of God:  for  the desire, 
strong desire, of preserving his life and being, having 
been planted  in him  as  a principle  of action  by God 
himself, reason, "  which was the voice of God in him," 
could not but teach him and assure him that pursuing 
that natural inclination he hud to preserve his being, he 
followed  the will  of  his Maker,  and therefore had a 
right to make use of those creatures which by his rea- 
son  or  senses he could  discover would  be serviceable 
thereunto.  And thus man's  property in the creatures 
was founded upon the right he had to make use of those 
things that were necessary or useful to his being. 
$ 87. This being the reason and foundation of Adam's 
property, gave the same  title on  the same ground to 
all his children, not only after his death, but in his life- 
time : so that here was  no privilege of his heir above 
his other children, which could  exclude them from  an 
equal right to the use of the inferior creatures, for the 
comfortable preservation  of  their  beings, which is all 
the property man  hath in them ;  and so Adam's  sove- 
reignty built  on property, or,  as our author  calls  it, 
private dominion, comes  to nothing. Every man had 
o right to the creatures by the same title Adam  had, 
viz. by the right every one had to take care of and pro- 
vide for their subsistence :  and thus men had a right in 
common, Adam's  children in common with him.  But 
if any one had begun, and made himself a property in 
any particular thing, (which how  he,  or any one else, 
could do, shall be shown in another place) that thing, 
that possession, if he disposed not otherwise of it by hi6 
positive grant, descended naturally to his children. and 
they had a right to succeed to it and possess it. 
$ 88. It might reasonably be asked here, how corns 
children by this right  of posses~ing~before  any other, the 
properties of their parent's  upon their decease? for it 
being personally the  parents, when they die, without ac- 
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return again to the common stock of mankind? Tt  will 
perhaps be answered, that  common  consent hath dis- 
posed of it to  their children.  Common practice, we see 
indeed, does so dispose  of it; but we cannot say that 
it is the  common consent of mankind ;  for that hath never 
been asked,  nor  actually given; and if  common tacit 
consent hath established  it, it would  make but a posi- 
tive, and not a natural right of children to inherit the 
goods of their parents : but where the practice is uni- 
versal, it is reasonable to think the cause is natural.  The 
ground then I think to be this :  the first and strongest 
desire God planted in men, and wrought into the very 
principles of  their  nature, being that of  self-preserva- 
tion, that is the foundation of a right to the creatures 
for the particular  support  and use of each  individual 
person himself.  But, next to this, God planted in men 
a strong desire also of propagating their kind, and con- 
tinuing themselves  in  their posterity ;  and this  gives 
children a title to share in the property of their parents, 
and a right to inherit their possessions. Men are not pro- 
prietors of what they have, merely for themselves ;  their 
children have a title to part of it, and have their kind 
of  right joined  with  their  parents  in  the possession, 
which comes  to be wholly theirs, when  death, having 
put an end to their parents' use of it, hath taken them 
from their possessions ; and  this we  call inheritance : 
men being by a like obligation bound to preserve what 
they have begotten,  as to preserve  themselves,  their 
issue come to have a  right in  the goods they are pos- 
sessed  of.  That children  have such  a  right  is plain 
from the laws of God;  and that men  are convinced 
that children have such a right is evident from the law 
of the land ;  both which  laws require parents to pro- 
vide for their children. 
5 89.  For  children  being  by  the course of  nature 
born weak, and unable to provide for themselves,  they 
have by the appointment of God himself, who hath thus 
ordered the course of nature, a right to be nourished and 
maintained by their parents ; nay,  a right not only to 
a bare subsistence, but to the conveniencies a11d com- 
fbrts of lifc,  as far as the conditiolls  of  their  parents 
can afford it.  Hence it comes, that when their parents 
leave the world, and so  the care due to their children 
ceases, the effects of it are to extend as far as possibly 
they can, and the provisions  they have  made in  their 
lifetime  are understood  to be intended, as nature  re- 
quires they should, for their children, whom, after them- 
selves, they are bound to provide for :  though the dying 
parents, by express words, declare nothing about them, 
nature appoints the descent  of  their property to their 
children, who thus  come to have  a  title, and  natural 
right of  inheritance to their fathers' goods, which the 
rest of mankind cannot pretend to. 
§ 90. Were it not for this right of  being  nourished 
and maintained by their parents, which God and nature 
has given to children, and obliged parents to as a duty, 
it would be  reasonable  that the father should inherit 
the estate ofhis son, and be preferred in the inheritance 
before his grandchild :  for to the grandfather there is 
due a long score of care and expenses laid out upon the 
breeding  and  education of his  son, which  one would 
think in justice ought to be paid.  But that having been 
done in obedience to the same law, whereby he received 
nourishment and education from his own parents; this 
score of education, received from a man's father, is paid 
by taking care and providing for his own children ;  is 
paid, I say, as much  as is  required  of payment by al- 
teration of property, unless present necessity of the pa- 
rents require a return of goods for their necessary sup- 
port and subsistence:  for we are not now speaking of 
that reverence,  acknowledgment, respect, and honour, 
that is always due from children to their parents ;  but 
of possessions and commodities of life valuable by mo- 
ney.  But  though it be incumbent on parents to bring 
up and provide for their children, yet this debt to their 
children does not quite cancel the score to their parents; 
but only is made by nature preferable to it :  for the debt 
a man owes his father takes place, and gives the father 
a right to inherit  the son's  goods, where, for want of 
issue, the right of  issue doth not exclude that title ;  and 
therefore a man having a right to be maintained by his 
children, whcrc he needs it, and to epjoy also the com- forts of  life  from them, when the necessary provision 
due to themand their children will afford it; if his son 
die without issue, the father has  a right in nature to 
possess his goods and inherit his estate, (whatever the 
municipal laws of some  countries may absurdly direct 
otherwise) ;  and so again  his  children  and their issue 
from him; or, for want of such, his father and his issue. 
But where no  such  are to be  found,  i.  e.  no kindred, 
there we see the possessions of a private man revert to 
the community, and so in politic societies come into the 
hands of the public magistrate ;  but in the state of na- 
ture become again perfectly common, nobody having a 
right to inherit them :  nor can any one have a property 
in them, otherwise  than in any other things  common 
by nature ;  of which I shall speak in its due place. 
3 91. I have been the larger, in showing upon what 
groundchildren have a right to succeed to the possession 
of  their  fathers'  properties,  not  only because by it, it 
will appear, that if Adam had a property (a titular, in- 
significant, useless property; for it  could be no  better, 
for he was bound to nourish and maintain his children 
and posterity out of it) in the whole earth and its pro- 
duct ;  yet all his children  coming to have, by the law 
of nature, and right of inheritance, a joint title, and a 
right of property in it after his death,  it could convey 
no right of sovereignty to any one of his posterity over 
the rest; since every one having a right of inheritance 
to his  portion,  they might  enjoy their  inheritance, or 
any part of it, in common,or  share it, or some parts of 
It, by division, as it best liked them.  But no one could 
pretend to the whole inheritance,  or any sovereignty 
supposed to accompany it; since a rigst of inheritance 
gave every one of the rest, as well as any one, a title to 
share in the goods  of his  father.  Not only upon this 
account, I say, have I been so particular in examining 
the reason of children's  inheriting the property of their 
fathers, but also because it will give us farther light in 
the inheritance of rule  and power, which in countries 
where their particular  municipal laws give the whole 
possession of land entirely to the first-born, and descent 
af  power has gone so to men by this custom, that  some 
have  been  apt  to be  deceived into an opinion,  that 
there was a natural or divine right of  primogeniture 
to both estate and power;  and that the inheritance of 
both  rule  over men,  and property  in things,  sprang 
from the same original,  and  were to descend by the 
same rules. 
$ 92.  Property,  whose  original  is from the right 6 
man has to use any of  the inferior  creatures,  for  the 
subsistence and comfort of his life, is for the benefit and 
sole advantage of  the proprietor,  so that he may even 
destroy the thing, that he has property in by his use of 
it, where need requires :  but government being for the 
preservation of every man's  right and property, by pre- 
serving him from the ~olence  or injury of others, is for 
the good of  the governed:  for the magistrate's  sword 
being for a "  terror to evil doers,"  and by that terror 
to enforce men to observe the positive laws of  the so- 
ciety, made conformable to the laws of  nature, for the 
public good, i. e.  the good of  every particular member 
~f that society, as far as by common rules it can be pro- 
vided for ;  the sword is not given the magistrate for his 
own good alone. 
3 93.  Children,  therefore,  as has  been  showed,  by 
the dependence they have on their parents for subsist- 
ence, have a right of inheritance to their fathers'  pro- 
perty,  as that which belongs to them for their proper 
good and behoof,  and therefore are fitly termed goods, 
wherein the first-born  has not a sole or peculiar right 
by any law of  God and  nature,  the younger children 
having an equal title with him, founded  on that right 
they  all  have  to maintenance,  support,  and cornfort 
from their parents, and on nothing else.  But govern- 
ment being for the benefit of the governed, and not the 
sole  advantage of  the  governors,  (but  only for theirs 
with the rest, as they make a part of that politic body, 
each of whose parts and members are taken care of, and 
directed in its peculiar  functions for the good of  the 
whole, by the lawe of  society) cannot be inherited by 
the same title that children have to the goods of  their 
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vided with the necessaries and conveniencies of life out 
of his father's  stock, gives him a right to succeed to his 
father's property for his own good ; but this can give 
him no right to succeed also to the rule which his father 
had over other men.  All that a child has right to claim 
from his father is nourishment and education,  and the 
things nature furnishes for the support of life :  but he 
has no right to demand rule or dominion from him :  he 
can subsist and receive  from him the portion of  good 
things and  advantages of  education naturally due to 
him, without empire and dominion.  That (if  his father 
hath any) was vested in him,  for  the good and behoof 
of others :  and therefore the son cannot claim or inherit 
it by a title,  which  is founded  wholly,,on  his own pri- 
vate good and advantage. 
9 94. We  must know how the first ruler, from whom 
any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground 
any one has empire, what his  title is to it,  before we 
can know who has a right to succeed him in it, and in- 
herit it from him :  if the agreement and consent of rnen 
first gave a sceptre into any one's hand, or put a crown 
on his head,  that also must direct its descent and con- 
veyance ;  for the same authority, that made the first a 
lawful ruler,  must make the second too,  and so give 
right of succession :  in this case inheritance, or primo- 
geniture, can in itself have no right, no pretence to it, 
any farther than that conse~lt,  which established the 
form of the government, hath so settled the succession. 
And thus we  see the succession  of  crowns,  in several 
countries, places it  on different heads, and he comes by 
right of  succession to by a prince in one  place,  who 
would be a subject in another. 
3 95. If God, by his positive grant and revealed de- 
claration, first gave rule and dominion to any man, he 
that will claim by that title, must have the same posi- 
tive grant of God for his succession :  for if that has not 
.  directed the course of  its descent and conveyance down 
b  others,  nobody can succeed to this title of  the first 
ruler.  Children have no right of  inheritance to this; 
and primogeniture  can lay no claim to it, unless God, 
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the Author  of  this  constitution,  hath so  crdained it. 
Thus we see the pretensions of  Saul's  family, who re- 
ceived his  crown  from  the immediate  appcintment of 
God,  ended with  his  reign ; and David,  by the same 
title that Saul reigned,  viz.  God's  appointment,  suc- 
ceeded in his throne, to the exclusion of Jonathan, and 
all pretensions of paternal inheritance :  and if Solomon 
had a right to succeed his father,  it must be by some 
other  title  than  that of  primogeniture.  A cadet, or 
sister's son, must have the preference in succession, if he 
has the same title the first lawful prince had : and in 
dominion that has  its foundation  only in  the positive 
appointment of God himself,  Benjamin, the youngest, 
must  have  the  inheritance  of  the  crown,  if  God so 
direct, as well as one of  that tribe had  the first pos- 
session. 
$ 96.  If paternal right,  the act of begetting, give a 
man rule and dominion,  inheritance or primogeniture 
can give no title ;  for he that cannot succeed to his fa- 
ther's title, which was begetting, cannot succeed to that 
power over his brethren,  which  his  father had by pa- 
ternal right over them.  But of this I shall have occa- 
sion to say more in another place.  This is plain in the 
meantime, that any government,  whether supposed to 
be at first founded  in  paternal  right,  consent  of  the 
people,  or the positive  appointment  of  God himself, 
which can supersede either of  the other, and so begin 
a new government upon a new foundation ;  I say,  any 
government began upon either of these,  can  by right 
of succession come to those only, who have the title of 
him they succeed to :  power  founded on  contract can 
descend only to him who  has  right by that contract: 
power  founded on begetting,  he only can have  that 
begets; and power  founded on  the positive  grant or 
donation of God, he only can have by right of  succes- 
sion to whom that grant directs it. 
§ 97.  From what 1  have said,  I think this is  clear, 
that a right to the use of the creatures, being founded 
originally in the right a man has to subsist and enjoy the 
conveniencies of  life ;  and  the natural  right  children 
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in the right  they have to the same subsistence and 
commodities of life, out of  the stock of  their parents, 
who are therefore taught by natural love and tenderness 
to provide for them,  as  a part of themselves ; and all 
this being only for the good of  the proprietor or heir; 
it can be no reason for children's  inheriting of rule and 
dominion,  which  has another  original and a different 
end.  Nor  can primogeniture have any pretence to a 
right of solely inheriting either property or power,  as 
we shall, in its due place, see more fully.  It is enough 
to  have showed here, that Adam's  property or private 
dominion could  not convey any sovereignty or rule to 
his heir, who not having a  right to inherit all his fa- 
ther's  possessions, could not thereby come to have any 
sovereignty  over his brethren : and therefore,  if  any 
sovereignty on account of his property had been vested 
in Adam,  which in truth there was  not,  yet it would 
have died with him. 
tj 98. As Adam's sovereignty, if,  by virtue of  being 
proprietor of the world, he had any authority over men, 
could not have been inherited  by any of  his  children 
over the rest, because they had the same title to divide 
the inheritance, and every one had a right to a portion 
of his father's possessions :  so neither could Adam's sove- 
reignty by right  of  fatherhood,  if  any such he had, 
descend to any one of his children :  for it being, in our 
author's account, a right acquired by begetting, to rule 
over those he had begotten, it was not a power possible 
to be inherited, because the right being consequent to, 
and built on, an act perfectly personal, made that power 
so too,  and impossible to be  inherited:  for  paternal 
Twer, being a natural right rising only from the rela- 
tion of father and son,  is as impossible to be inherited  .  . 
as the relation itself;  and a man may pretend as well 
to inherit the conjugal power  of  the husband,  whose 
heir he is,  had over his  wife,  as he can to inherit the 
paternal power  a  father over  his  children : for  the 
power of  the husband being founded on contract, and 
the power of  the father on begetting,  he may as well 
inherit the power obtained  by the conjugal contract, 
which was only personal, as he may the power obtained 
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bybegetting, which could reach no farther than the per- 
son of the begetter, unless begetting can be a title to 
power in him that does not beget. 
$ 99. Which makes it a reasonable question to ask, 
Whether Adam,  dying before Eve,  his  heir,  (suppope 
Cain or Seth) should have by right of inheriting AdariYs 
fatherhood, sovereign power over Eve his mother ?  for 
Adam's  fatherhood being nothing but a right he had to 
govern his  children,  because  he  begot  them,  he that 
inherits Adam's  fatherhood,  inherits nothing,  even in 
our author's sense, but the right Adam had to govern 
his children, because he begot them :  so that the mon- 
archy of  the heir would not have taken in Eve ; or if 
it did,  it being  nothing  but the fatherhood of Adam 
descended by inheritance, the heir must have right to 
govern Eve, because Adam begot her ;  for fatherhood 
is nothing else. 
t~  100. Perhaps it will be said with our author, that 
n  man can alien his power over his child ;  and what may 
be transferred by compact, may be possessed by inhe- 
ritance.  I answer, a father cannot alien the power he 
has over his child: he may perhaps to some degrees for- 
feit it,  but cannot transfer  it ;  and if  any other man 
acquire it,  it is not by the father's  grant, but by some 
act of his own.  For example, a father, unnaturally care- 
less  of  his child,  sells  or gives  him  to another Inan ; 
and he again exposes him;  a third man finding him, 
breeds him up,  cherishzs,  and provides for him as his 
own:  I think in this case, nobody will doubt, but that 
the greatest part of filial duty and subjection was here 
owing, and to be paid to this foster-father ;  and if any 
thing could be demanded from the child by either of the 
other, it could be only due to his natural father, who 
perhaps might have forfeited his right to much of that 
duty comprehended  in the command,  cc  Honour your 
rrrents,"  but  could  transfer  none  of  it to another. 
Re  that purchased and neglected the child, got by his 
urchase and grant of  the father no title to  duty or 
Konour from the child ; but only he acquired it,  who 
by his  own authority,  performing the office and care of  a father to the forlorn and perishing infant,  made 
himself,  by  paternal  care,  a  title  to proportionable 
degrees of  paternal power.  This will  be  more easily 
admitted, upon consideratioil of the nature of paternal 
power,  for  which  I  refer  my  reader  to the  second 
book. 
$ 101.  To return to the argument in hand; this is 
evident, That paternal power arising only from beget- 
ting, for in that our author places it alone, can neither 
be  transferred  nor  inherited:  and he  that does  not 
beget, can no more have paternal power,  which arises 
from thence, than he can have a right to any thing, who 
performs not the condition, to which only it is annexed. 
If one should ask, by what law has a fidther power over 
his children? it will  be  answered,  no  doubt,  by the 
law of nature, which gives such a power over them to 
him that begets them.  If one should ask likewise, by 
what  law  does  our author's  heir  come  by a right to 
i~herit?  I think it would be answered,  by the law of 
nature too:  for I find  not that our author brings one 
word of Scripture to prove the right of such an heir he 
speaks of.  Why then the law of  nature gives fathers 
paternal power  over  their  children, because they did 
beget them: and the same law of  nature gives the pa- 
ternal power to the heir over his brethren who did not 
beget them:  whence  it follows,  that either the father 
has not his  paternal power by begetting,  or else that 
the heir has it not at all; for it is hard to understand 
how the law of nature, which is the law of reason, can 
give the paternal power to the father over his children, 
for the only reason of begetting ;  and to the first-born 
over his brethren without this only reason, i. e.  for no 
reason at all :  and if the eldest,  by the law of nature, 
can inherit this paternal power,  without the only rea- 
son that gives a title to it, so may the youngest as well 
as he, and a stranger as well as either ;  for where there 
is no reason for  any one,  as there is not, but for him 
that begets,  all have  an equal title.  I  am sure our 
author offers no reason;  and when any body does, we 
shall see whether it will hold or no. 
$109.  In the mean  time it is  as good  sense to say, 
that by the law of  nature a man has right to inherit the 
property of another, because  he is  of kin  to him, and 
IS  known to be of his blood : and therefore, by the same 
law of nature, an utter stranger to his blood has right 
to inherit his estate; as to say that, by  the law of na- 
ture, he that begets them  has paternal power over his 
children, and therefore, by  the law of nature,  the heir 
that begets them not, has this paterllal power over them : 
or supposing the law of the land gave absolute power 
over their children, to such only who nursed them, and 
fed their children themselves, could  any body pretend 
that this law gave any one, who did no such thing, ab- 
solute power over those who were not his children ? 
103.  When  therefore it can be showed that con- 
jugal power can belong to him that is not an husband, 
~t will also I believe be proved, that our autlior's pater- 
nal power, acquired by begetting, may be inherited by 
a son ;  and that a brother, as heir to his father's power, 
may have pternal  power over his brethren, and by the 
same rule conjugal power too :  but till then I think we 
may rest satisfied that the paternal power of Adam, this 
sovereign authority of fatherhood, were there any such, 
could not descend to, nor be inherited by  his next heir. 
Fatherly power, I easily grctnt our author, if it will do 
him any good, can  never be  lost, because it will be as 
long in the world as there are fathers :  but none of'  them 
will have Adam's paternal power, or derive theirs from 
him; but every one will have his own by the same title 
Adam had  his, viz. by  begetting,  but not  by inhcrit- 
ance or succession, no more  than  husbands have their 
conjugal power by  inheritance from Adam.  And thus 
we see, as Adam had no such property, no such pater- 
nal power, as gave him sovereign jurisdiction over man- 
kind;  so likewise his  sovereignty built upon either of 
these titles, ifhe had any such, could not have descended 
to his  heir,  but must  have  ended with  him.  Adam 
therefore, as has-been proved,  being neither monarch, 
nor  his  imaginary  monarchy  hereditable,  the  power 
which  is  now  in  the ~sorld  is  not  that which  was 
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thor's  grounds, either  of  property or  fatherhood, ne- 
cessarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to 
posterity  by inheritance.  In the  next place  we will 
consider whether Adam  had  any such  heir  to inherit 
his power as our author talks of. 
CHAPTER  X. 
Of  the Heir to Adam's  monarchical Power. 
§  104.  OUR  author  tells  us,  0. 253, "  That it is 
a  truth  undeniable,  that there  cannot  be  any  mul- 
titude  of  men  whatsoever,  either  great  or  small, 
though gathered  together  from  the  several  corners 
and remotest  regions  of  the world, but  that  in  the 
same multitude, considered by itself, there is one man 
amongst them that in nature hath  a right  to be king 
of all the rest,  as being  the next heir to Adam, and 
all the other subjects to him : every man  by nature is 
a king or  a  subject."  And  again,  p. 40,  "If Adam 
himself were  still living,  and now  ready  to die,  it is 
certain  that  there  is  one  man,  and  but  one  in  the 
world,  who is next heir."  Let this multitude of men 
be, if our author pleases, all the princes upon the earth, 
there will then be, by our author's rule, ''  one amongst 
them that in nature hath  a right  to be king of all the 
rest, as being  the right  heir  to Adam ;"  an excellent 
way to establish the thrones of princes,  and settle the 
obedience of their subjects, by  setting up an hundred, 
or  perhaps  a  thousand  titles  (if  there  be  so  many 
princes  in the world) against any king now reigning, 
each as good,  upon  our author's grounds, as his  who 
wears  the crown.  If this  right  of  heir  carry  any 
weight with  it, if  it be  the ordinance of God, as our 
author seems to tell us, 0.  244, must not all be subject 
to it, from the highest to the lowest? Can those who 
wear the name of princes, without having the right of 
being heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their sub- 
jects by this  title, and  not  be  bound  to pay it by the 
same law ? Either governments in the world are not to 
be claimed, and held by this title of Adam's  heir ;  and 
then the starting of it is to no purpose, the being or riot 
bein5 Adam's heir signifies  nothing ns  to the title of 
dominion:  or if  it really be,  as  our author says, the 
true title to government and sovereignty; the first thing 
to be done is  to find out this  true heir  of Adam, seat 
him in his throne, and then  all the kings  and princes 
of the world ought to come and resign up their crowns 
and sceptres to him, as things that belong no more to 
them than to any of  their subjects. 
$ 105.  For  either this  right  in  nature  of  Adam's 
heir to  be  king  over  all the race  of men, (for all to- 
gether they make one  multitude) is  a right not neces- 
sary to the making of a lawful king, and so there may be 
lawful kings without it,and then kings' titles and power 
depend not on it ;  or else all the kings in the world but 
one are not lawful kings, and so have no right to obe- 
dience :  either this title of heir to Adam is that where- 
by kings hold  their  crowns, and  have a  right to sub- 
jection  from  their  subjects,  and  then  one  only  can 
have it, and the rest being subjects can require no obe- 
dience from  other  men who  are but  their fellow-sub- 
jects; or else it is not the title whereby kings rule, and 
have a right to obedience from their subjects, and then 
kings are kings without it, and this dream of the natu- 
ral sovereignty of Adam's heir is of no use to obedience 
and government: for if kings have a right to dominion 
and the obedience  of their  subjects who are not,  nor 
can possibly be, heirs to Adam, what use is therc of such 
a  title, when we  are obliged  to obey without  it? If 
kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no right to so- 
vereignty, we are all free, till our author, or any body 
for him, will  show us Adam's  right heir.  If there be 
but one heir of Adam, there can be but one lawful king 
in the world, and nobody in conscience call be obliged 
to obedience till it be resolved  who that is; for it may 
u  2 be any one, who is not known to  be of a younger house, 
and all others have equal titles.  If there be more than 
one heir  of  Adam,  every one is  his heir, and so every 
one has regal  power :  for if two sons can  be heirs to- 
gether, then all the sons  equally are heirs, and so all 
are heirs, being  all sons, or  sons'  sons of Adam.  Be- 
twixt these two the right of  heir cannot stand ;  for by 
it either but one only man, or all men are kings.  Tulre 
which you please, it dissolves the bonds of  government 
and obedience ;  since if all men are heirs, they can owe 
obedience  to  nobody;  if  only  one,  nobody  can  be 
obliged to pay obedience to him till he be known, and 
his title made out. 
CHAPTER  XI. 
Who Heir ? 
$ 106.  THE  great question which  in  all  ages has 
disturbed mankind, and brought on them the greatest 
part of  those  mischiefs which  have  ruined  cities, de- 
populated  countries, and  disordered the peace  of  the 
world,  has been, not whether  there  be  power  in the 
world,  nor whence  it came,  but who  should  have  it. 
The settling of this point being of no smaller moment 
than the security of princes, and the peace and welfare 
of their estates  and kingdoms,  a reformer of politics, 
one  would think, should lay this sure, and be very clear 
in it:  for if this remain disputable, all the rest will be 
to very little purpose ;  and the skill used in dressing up 
p~wer  with all the splendor and temptation absoluteness 
can add to it, without showing who has a right to have 
it, will serve  only to give  a  greater edge to man's  na- 
tural ambition, which of itself is but too keen.  What 
can this do but set men on the more eagerly to scram- 
ble, and so lay a sure and lasting foundation of endless 
contention and disorder, instead of that peace and tran- 
quillity, which is the business  of government, and the 
end of human society ? 
107.  This designation  of the person  our author is 
more than ordinary obliged to take care of, because he 
affirming that '' the assignment of civil power is by di- 
vine institution,"  hath made the conveyance as well as 
the power  itself sacred :  so  that no  consideration, no 
act or art of man, can divert  it from  that person to 
whom, by this divine right, it is assigned ;  no necessity 
or contrivance can substitute another person in his room. 
For if the "  assignment  of  civil power be by divine in- 
stitution,"  and Adam's  heir  be he to whom  it is thus 
assigned, as in the foregoing chapter our author tells us, 
it would be as  much sacrilege for  any one to be king, 
who was not Adam's heir, as it would have been amongst 
the Jews for any one to have been priest who had not 
been of Aaron's  posterity : for not only the priesthood 
in general being by divine  institution, but the assign- 
ment of it"  to the sole  line  and  posterity  of  Aaron, 
made it impossible to be  enjoyed  or exercised by any 
one but those persons who were the offspring of Aaron: 
whose succession therefore was carefully observed, and 
by that the persons who had  a right to the priesthood 
certainly known. 
§ 108.  Let us  see  then  what  care our author has 
taken  to make us  know  who is  bc this  heir,  who  by 
divine institution has a right to be king over all men." 
The first  account  of  him we  meet  with  is  p.  19, in 
these words : "  This suhjection  of children  being the 
fountain  of  all regal  authority, by  the ordination  of 
God  himself;  it follows  that  civil  power,  not  only 
in  general, is  by  divine  institution, but even  the as- 
signment  of  it,  specifically  to  the eldest  parents." 
Matters  of  such  consequence  as  this  is should  be in 
plain words, as little liable  as  might  be  to doubt or 
equivocation;  and I think  if  language be  capable of 
expressing any thing distinctly and clearly, that of kin- 
dred, and the several  degrees  of nearness  of blood, is 
one.  It  were therefore  to be wished that our author 
had used a little more intelligible expressions here, that 
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assignment ofcivil power is made by divine institution ; 
or at least would have told us what he meant by eldest 
parents:  for I  believe  if  land  had  been  assigned  or 
granted to him, and the eldest  parents of his  family, 
he would have thought it had  needed an interpreter ; 
and it would scarce have been known to whom next it 
belonged. 
S 109. In propriety of  speech,  (and  certainly  pro- 
priety of speech is necessary in a  discourse of this na- 
ture) eldest parents signifies either the eldest men and 
women that have had children, or those who have longest 
had issue ;  and then our author's  assertion will be, that 
those fathers and mothers who have been longest in the 
world, or longest  fruitful, have  by divine institution a 
right to civil power.  If there be any absurdity in this, 
our author must answer  for it : and if his meaning be 
different from my explication, he is to be blamed, that 
he would not speak it plainly.  This I am sure, parents 
cannot signify heirs male, nor eldest parents an infant 
child: who yet may sometimes be the true heir, if there 
can be but one.  And we are hereby still as much at a 
loss who civil power  belongs  to,  notwithstanding  this 
"  assignment by divine institution,"  as if there had been 
no such assignment  at all, or our  author had said no- 
thing of it.  This of eldest parents leaving us more in 
the dark, who by divine institution has a right to civil 
power, than those who never heard any thing at all of 
heir or descent, of which  our  author is  so full.  And 
though the chief matter of his writing be to teach obe- 
dience to those who  have  a right to it, which he tells 
us is conveyed by descent ;  yet who those are, to whom 
this right by  descent belongs, he leaves like the philo- 
sopher's stone in  politic!,  out of  the reach of any one 
to discover from his writings. 
9 110. This obscurity cannot be imputed to want of 
language in so great a master of style as sir Robert is, 
when he is  resolved with  himself what  he would say : 
and  therefore,  I  fear,  finding  how  hard  it would  be 
to settle rules of descent by divine institution, and how 
little it would be to his purpose, or conduce to the clear- 
ing and establishing the titles  of princes, if such rules 
of  descent  were  settled, he  chose  rather to content 
himself with doubtful and general terms, which might 
make no ill  sound in  men's  ears who were willing to 
be pleased with them ;  rather than offer any clear rules 
of descent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which men's 
consciences might  be  satisfied  to whom  it descended, 
and know the persons who had a right to regal power, 
and with it to their obedience. 
5 111.  How else is it possible, that laying so much 
stress, as he does, upon descent, and Adam's heir, next 
heir, true heir, he sllould never tell us what heir means, 
nor  the way  to know who  the next  or  true heir  is? 
This I do not  remember he does any where expressly 
handle ; but, where  it  comes  in  his way,  very warily 
and doubtfully touches ;  though it be so necessary, that 
without it all discourses of government and obedience 
upon  his  principles would  be  to no  purpose, and fa- 
therly power, ever so well made  out, will be of no use 
to any body.  Hecce he tells us, 0.  244, "  That not 
only the constitution of power in general, but the limit- 
ation  of  it to one  kind, i. e.  monarchy,  and the de- 
termination of  it to the individual person and line of 
Adam, are all three  ordinances  of God; neither Eve 
nor her  children  could  either  limit Adam's  power, or 
join  others with him ;  and what was  given unto Adam 
was given in his person to his posterity."  Here again 
our author inform  us, that the divine  ordinance hath 
limited  the  descent  of  Adam's  monarchical  power. 
To whom ?  '<  To Adam's line  and posterity," says our 
author.  A notable limitation, a limitation to all man- 
kind :  for if our author can find any one amongst man- 
kind that is not of the line  and posterity of Adam, he 
may perhaps tell him who this next heir of Adam is: but 
for us, I despair how  this  limitation of Adam's  empire 
to his line  and posterity will help us  to find  out one 
heir.  This limitation  indeed of our author will  save 
those the labour who would  look for him ~mongst  the 
race of  brutes, if any such there were ;  but will  very 
little contribute  to  the  discovery  of  one  next heir 
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minstion of the question  about the descent of Adam's 
regal power, by telling us  that the line  and posterity 
of Adam is to have it, that is, in plain English, any one 
may have it, since there is no person  living that hath 
not the title of being of  the line and posterity of Adam ; 
and while it keeps there,  it keeps within our author's 
limitation by God's  ordinance.  Indeed, p.  19, he tells 
us, "  that such heirs  are not only lords of  their  own 
children, but of their brethren ;" whereby, and by the 
words  following,  which  we  shall  consider  anon,  he 
seems to insinuate  that the eldest son is heir ;  but 11e 
nowhere,  that I know,  says it in direct words, but by 
the instances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow, we 
may allow this to be so far his opinion concerning heirs, 
that where there are divers children, the eldest son has 
the right to be heir.  That primogeniture cannot give 
any title to paternal  power, we  have already showed. 
That a father may have a natural right to some kind of 
power over his children, is easily granted; but that an 
elder brother  has  so  over his  brethren, remains to be 
proved :  God or nature has not any where, that I know, 
placed such jurisdiction in the first-born; nor can rea- 
son find any such natural superiority amongst brethren. 
The law of  Moses gave a double portion of  the goods 
and possessions to the eldest; but we find not any where 
that naturally, or  by  God's  institution, superiority or 
dominion  belonged  to  him;  and  the instances  therc 
brought by our autlior are but slender proofs of a right 
to civil power  and dominion  in the first born,  and do 
rather show the contrary. 
$ 112. His words are in the forecited place :  "And 
therefore we  find God  told Cain  of  his brother Abel, 
his desire shall be  subject  unto  thee, and thou  shalt 
rule over him."  To which I answer, 
I. These words  of God to Cain  are by many inter- 
preters, with great reason, understood  in a quite dif- 
ferent sense than what our author uses them in. 
9.  Whatever was meant by them,it could not be that 
Cain, as elder, 11ad a natural dominion over Abel ;  for 
the words  are conditional,  If  thou dost well ;" and 
so personal toCain: and  whatever was signified by them 
did depend on  his  carriage,  and not  follow his birth- 
right ;  and therefore could by no means be an establish- 
ment of dominion in the first-born in general :  for before 
this Abel had his "distinct territories by right of private 
dominion,"  as  our  author  himself  confesses, 0. 210, 
which he could not  have  had  to the prejudice of  the 
heir's  title,  '' if  by  divine  institution"  Cain  as  heir 
were to inherit all his father's  dominion. 
3.  If  this were  intended  by God  as  the charter of 
primogeniture, and the grant of dominion to the elder 
brothers in general as such, by right of inheritance, we 
might expect it should have included all his brethren : 
for we  may well suppose, Adam,  from whom the world 
was to be  peopled,  had  by this time,  that these were 
grown up to be men, more sons than these two: whereas 
Abel himself is not so much as named ;  and the words 
in  the original  can  scarce,  with any  good  construc- 
tion, be applied to him. 
4.  It is too  much  to build  a doctrine of  so mighty 
consequence upon  so  doubtful  and obscure a place of 
Scripture, which may well, nay better, be understood in 
a quite different sense,  and so  can be but an ill proof, 
being  as doubtful as  the  thing  to be  proved  by  it; 
especially when there is nothing  else  in Scripture or 
reason to be found, that favours or supports it. 
§ 113.  It  follows, p.  19,  "  Accordingly when Jacob 
bought  his  brother's  birthright,  Isaac  blessed  him 
thus; Be lord  over  thy brethren,  and  let the sons of 
thy mother  bow  before  thee."  Another  instance,  I 
take it, brought by our author to evince dominion due 
to birthright,  and an  admirable one it is : for it must 
be  no  ordinary  way  of  reasoning  in a  man,  that is 
pleading for the natural power of  kings,  and against 
all compact, to bring, for proof of it, an example, where 
his own account of it founds all the right upon compact, 
and settles empire in the younger brother, unless buying 
and selling  be  no  compact;  for  he tells  us,  "  when 
Jacob bought his  birthright."  But  assing  by that, 
let us  consider  the history itself,  wit  Fl  what  use  our Of  Government.  999 
298  Of  Government. 
author makes  of  it,  and we  shall find  the following 
mistakes about it. 
1. That our author reports this, as if Isaac had given 
Jacob this blessing immediately upon  his  purchasing 
the birthright;  for he says, "  when Jacob bought, Isaac 
blessed him;"  which is plainly otherwise  in the Scrip- 
ture : for it appears,  there was  a distance of time be- 
tween, and if we will take the story in the order it lies, 
it must be no small distance : all Isaac's  sojourning in 
Gerar,  and  transactions with  Abimelech,  Gen.  xxvi. 
coming between;  Rebecca  being  then beautiful,  and 
consequently young: but Isaac,when  he blessed Jacob, 
was  old  and  decrepit:  and Esau also  complains  of 
Jacob, Gen. xxvii. 36, that two times he had supplanted 
him;  "  he took  away  my  birthright,  (says  he)  and 
behold now he hath taken  away my blessing;"  words, 
that I think signify distance of  time and difference of 
action. 
2. Another mistake of  our author's  is,  that he sup- 
poses Isaac  gave Jacob the blessing,  and bid  him be 
6c lord over  his  brethren,"  because  he had the birth- 
right;  for  our  author brings this  example to prove, 
that he that has the birthright, has thereby a right to 
66  be lord over his brethren."  But it is also manifest 
by the text, that Isaac had no coilsideration of Jacob's 
having bought the birthright;  for when he blessed him, 
he considered him not as Jacob, but took him for Esau. 
Nor did Esau understand any such connexion between 
birthright  and  the  blessing;  for he says,  6c  He hath 
supplanted me these two times; he took away my birth- 
right, and behold now he hath taken away my blessing :" 
whereas had the blessing,  which was  to be "lord over 
his brethren,"  belonged to the birthright, Esau could 
not have complained of  this second  as a cheat, Jacob 
having got nothing but what Esau had sold him, when 
he sold  him his  birthright; so  that it is plain, domi- 
nion,  if these words  signify it,  was  not understood  to ' 
belong to the birthright. 
9 114. And that, in those days of the patriarchs, do- 
minion was not understood  to be the right of the heir, 
but  only  a  greater portion  of  goods,  is  plain  from 
Gen. xxi. 10; for Sarah,  taking Isaac to be heir,  says, 
'6 cast out this bondwoman and her son,  for the son of 
this  bondwoman  shall  not  be  heir  with  my  son :" 
whereby could be meant  nothing,  but that he should 
not have a pretence to an equal share of his father's 
estate after his death, but should have his portion pre- 
sently, and be gone.  Accordingly we read,  Gen. xxv. 
5, 6,  ('  That  Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac : 
but unto the sons  of  the concubines which Abraham 
had, Abraham gave gifts,  and  sent them away from 
Isaac his son, while he yet lived."  That is,  Abraham 
having given portions to all his  other sons,  and sent 
them  away, that  which  he  had  reserved,  being the 
greatest part of his substance,  Isaac as heir possessed 
after his death : but by being heir, he had no right to 
be  lord over his children :" for if he had, why should 
Sarah endeavour to rob him of  one of his subjects, or 
lessen  the number  of his  slaves, by  desiring to have 
Ishmael sent away. 
§  115.  Thus,  as under  the  law,  the privilege  of 
birthright was  nothing  but  a double  portion : so we 
see that before  Moses,  'in  the patriarchs'  time,  from 
whence our author pretends  to take his  model,  there 
was no knowledge, no thought,  that birthright  gave 
rule or empire, paternal or kingly authority, to any one 
over his brethren.  If this be  not plain enough in the 
story of  Isaac  and  Ishmael,  he  that will  look  into 
1  Chron. v.  1,  may there read  these words : "  Reuben 
was  the first-born :  but  forasmuch  as he  defiled  his 
father's  bed,  his  birthright was  given  unto the  sons 
of  Joseph,  the  son  of  Israel:  and  the  genealogy is 
riot  to be  reckoned  after  the birthright;  for Judah 
prevailed  above  his  brethren,  and of  him  came  the 
chief ruler;  but the birthright was Joseph's."  What 
this birthright was, Jacob blessing Joseph, Gen, xlviii. 
22, telleth us in these words, "  Moreover I have given 
thee one  portion  above  thy  brethren,  which  I  took 
out  of  the hand  of  the Amorite,  with my sword  and 
with  my bow."  Whereby  it is  not  only  plain  that 
the birthright was  nothing but  a  double portion, but the text in Chronicles is  express  against our autlior's 
doctrine,  and shows that dominion was no part of the 
birthright;  for it tells  us,  that Joseph  had the birth- 
right,  but  Judali  the  dominion.  One  would  think 
our author were very fond of  the very name  of  birth- 
right, when he brings this instance of Jacob and Esau, 
to prove  that dominion  belongs  to the heir  over his 
brethren. 
$ 116.  1. Because it will be  but an ill example to 
prove, that dominion by God's  ordination belonged to 
the eldest son, because Jacob the youngest here had it, 
let him come  by it how he would : for if it prove any 
thing, it can only prove,  against  our author, that the 
" assignment of dominion to the eldest is not by divine 
institution,"  which  would  then  be  unalterable : for 
if  by the law of  God,  or nature,  absolute  power and 
empire belongs to the eldest son and his heirs, so that 
they are supreme monarchs,  and  all  the rest of their 
brethren  slaves,  our  author gives  us reason  to doubt 
whether the eldest son  has a power to part with it, to 
the prejudice of his posterity, since he tells us, 0. 158, 
"  That in grants and gifts that have their original from 
God  or  nature,  no  inferior power of  man can limit, 
or make any law of prescription against them." 
$ 117.  2. Because this place, Gen. xxvii. 09, brought 
by our author, concerns not at all the dominion of one 
brother over the other, nor the subjection  of Esau to 
Jacob : for it is plain  in  history,  that Esau was never 
subject to Jacob, but lived apart in mount Seir, where 
he founded a distinct people  and government, and was 
himself prince over them, as much  as Jacob was in his 
own family.  The text, if considered, can never be un- 
derstood of Esau himself, or  the personal domillion of 
Jacob over him :  for the words brethrer~  and sons of thy 
mother, could not be used literally by Isaac, who knew 
Jacob had only one brother;  and these words are so far 
from bein8 true in a  literal  sense, or establishing any 
dominion In Jacob over Esau, that in the story we find 
the quite contrary; for Gen. xsxii. Jacob several times 
calls Esau lord, and himself his servant; and Gen. xxxiii. 
he bowed himself seven times to the ground to Esau." 
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Whether Esau then were a subject and vassal (nay, as 
our author tells us, all subjects are slaves to Jacob), arid 
Jacob  his  sovereign prince  by birthright,  I leave  the 
reader to judge ; and to believe,  if  he can,  that thcse 
words of' Isaac, " be  lord over  thy brethren,  anti  let 
thy mother's sons bow dowri to thee,"  confirmed Jacob 
in a sovereignty  over  Esau,  upon  the account  of  the 
birthright hc had got from him. 
$ 118.  He that reads tlie story of Jacob and Esau, 
will find there never was any jurisdiction or autl~ority, 
that either of  them  had over the other, after their fa- 
ther's death :  they lived with the friendship and equality 
of brethren, neither lord,  neither slavc to his brother; 
but independent of each other, were both heads of  their 
distinct families, where they received no laws from one 
another, but lived separately, arid were the roots out of 
which sprang two  distinct people  under two distinct 
governments.  This blessing then of Isaac, whereon our 
author would build  the dominion of  tlie elder brcther, 
signifies no more, but what Rebecca had been told from 
God, Gen. xxv. 23,  " Two nations  are in  thy womb, 
aqd two manner of people shall be separated from thy 
bowels ;  and the one people shall be stronger than the 
other people, and the elder shall serve thc younger :" 
and so Jacob blessed Judah, Gen. xlix.,  and gave him 
the  sceptre and dominion;  from  whence  our author 
might have  argued  as well,  that jurisdiction  and do- 
minion belongs to the third son  over  his  brethren,  as 
well as from this blessing of  Isaac, that it belonged to 
Jacob : both  these  places  contain  only predictions of 
what should long after happen to their postcrities, and 
not any decl~ration  of  the right of  inheritance to do- 
minion in either.  And  thus we have our author's two 
great and  only arguments to  prove,  that  66 heirs arc 
lords over their brethren." 
1. Because God tells Cain, Gen. iv. that however sill 
might set upon  him,  he ought or might be inaster of 
it: for  the most  learned interpreters understood  the 
words of sin, and not of Abel, and give so strong reasons 
for it,  that nothing can convincingly be inferred from 
$0 doubtful a text to our author's purpose. 0  f  Government.  SO3 
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2. Because in this of  Gen. xxvii.  Isaac foretels that 
the Israelites,  the posterity of  Jacob,  should have do- 
minion over the Edomites, the posterity of Esau; there- 
fore, says our author,"heirs  are lordsof their brethren :" 
I leave any one to judge of the conclusion. 
§ 119. And now we see our author has provided for 
the descending,  and conveyance down of Adam's mon- 
archical power, or paternal dominion,  to posterity,  by 
the inheritance of his heir, succeeding to all his father's 
authority,  and becoming upon his death as much lord 
as his father was, "  not only over his own children, but 
over his brethren,"  and all descended from his father, 
and so in ininiturn.  But yet who this heir is,  he does 
not once tell us ;  and all the light we have from him in 
this so fundamental a point, is only that in his instance 
of Jacob, by using the word birthright,  as that which 
passed from Esau to Jacob, he leaves us to guess, that 
by heir he means the eldest son ;  though I do not re- 
member he any where  mentions expressly the title of 
the first-born,  but all along keeps himself  under the 
shelter of the indefinite term heir.  But taking it to be 
has meaning, that the eldest son is heir (for if the eldest 
be not,  there will be no pretence why the sons should 
not be all heirs alike) and so by right of  primogeniture 
has dominion  over his  brethren ; this  is  but one step 
towards the settlement of succession, and the difficulties 
remain still as much as ever, till he can show us who is 
meant by right heir, in dl  those cases which may hap- 
pen where the present possessor hath no son.  This he 
silently passes over, and perhaps wisely too:  for what 
can be wiser,  after one has affirmed, that "  the person 
having that power,  as well  as the power and form of 
government,  is the ordinance of  God,  and by divine 
institution,"  vid. 0.254, p. 14, than to be careful, not 
to start any question concerning the person,  the reso- 
lutiol~  whereof will certainly lead him into a confession, 
that God and nature hath determined  nothing about 
him? And if  our author cannot show who by right of 
nature, or a  clear positive  law  of  God,  has the next 
right to inherit the dominion of  this  natural monarch 
he has been at such pains about, when he died without 
a son, he might have  spared his pains in all the rest; 
it being  more  necessary  for  the  settling men's  con- 
sciences,  and  determining  their  subjection  and  alle- 
giance,  to show them who, by original right,  superior 
and antecedent  to the will,  or any act of  men,  hath 
a title to this paternal jurisdiction,  than it is to show 
that by nature there was such a jurisdiction ;  it being 
to no purpose for me to know there is such a paternal 
power,  which  I  ought,  and  am  disposed  to  obey, 
unless where  there are many pretenders, I also know 
the person  that  is  rightfully invested  and endowed 
with it. 
§ 120. For the main matter in  question  being  con- 
cerning the duty of  my obedience,  and the obligation 
of conscience I am  under  to pay it to him  that is  of 
right my lord and ruler, I must know the person  that 
this right of paternal power resides in, and so empowers 
him  to claim  obedience  from me.  For let it be true 
what he says,  p.  12,  '<  That  civil  power  not  only in 
general is by dlvine institution,  but  even  the assign- 
ment  of  it  specially  to  the  eldest  parents ;"  and 
0.854,"  That not only the power or right of govern. 
ment,  but the form of  the power  of  governing,  and 
the person having that power,  are all the ordinance of 
God ;" yet  unless he  show us in all cases who is this 
person  ordained by  God, who  is this  eldest parent: 
all his abstract notions of monarchical power will signify 
just nothing, when they are to be reduced to practice, 
and men  are conscientiously  to pay their  obedience: 
for  paternal  jurisdiction  being  not  the thing  to be 
obeyed, because it cannot conrmand,  but is only that 
which gives one man  a  right which another hath not, 
and if it come by inheritance, another man cannot have, 
to command  and be obeyed; it is ridiculous to say, I 
pay obedience to the paternal power, when I obey him, 
to  whom  paternal  power  gives  no  right  to my obe- 
dience: for  he can  have  no  divine  right  to my  obe- 
dience, who cannot show his divine right to the power 
of ruling over me, as well as that by divine right there 
is  such a power in the world. mi  0  f  Government. 
kj  121.  And  hence  not being able to make out any 
prince's  title to government,  as  heir  to Adam,  which 
therefore is of no use, and had been better let alone, he 
is fain to resolve  all into present possession, and makes 
civil obedience as due to an usurper as to a lawful kinS; 
and thereby the usurper's  title as good.  His words are, 
0. 253,  and  they deserve to be  remembered: "  If an 
usurper  dispossess  the  true  heir,  the  subjects'  obe- 
dience to the fatherly power must go along,  and wait 
upon God's  providence."  But I  shall leave  his  title 
of nsurpers to be examined in its due place, and desire 
my sober  reader to consider what tlianlis princes owe 
such politics as this, which can suppose paternal power, 
i. e.  a right to government in the hands of a Cade or 
a Cromwell; and so a11 obedience being due to paternal 
power,  the obedience of  subjects will be due to them, 
by the same right, and  upon as good grounds, as it is 
to lawful princes ;  and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine 
as it is,  must necessarily follow from making all poli- 
tical power  to be  nothing  else  but Adam's  paternal 
power by right and divine institution, descending from 
him without being able to show to whom it descended, 
or who is heir to it. 
$ 122.  To settle government in  the world,  and to 
lay obligations  to obedience on any man's conscience, it 
is as necessary (supposing with our author that all power 
be nothing but the being  possessed  of  Adam's fathcr- 
hood) to satisfy him,  who  has  a  right to this power, 
this fatherhood, when the possessor dies, without sons 
to succeed immediately to it; as it was to tell him, that 
upon the death of the father, the eldest son had a right 
to it: for it is still to be remembered,  that the great 
question is, (and that which our author ~voold  he thought 
to contend for, if he did not sometimes forget it) what 
persons have a right to be obeyed, and not whether there 
be a  power  in  the world,  which  is  to be  called  pa- 
ternal, without knowing in whom it resides : for so it 
be  a  power,  i.  c.  right  to  govern,  it  matters  not, 
whether it be termed paternal or regal, natural or ac- 
quired ;  rvhether you call it supreme fatherhood, or SU- 
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preme brotherhood, will be all one, provided we know- 
who has it. 
5 123. I go on then  to ask, whether in  the inherit. 
ing of  this paternal  power, this  supreme fatherhood, 
the grandson by  a daughter hath  a right before a ne- 
phew by a brother? Whether the grandson by the eldest 
son, being an infant, before the younger son, a man and 
able ? Whether the daughter before the uncle ? or any 
other man, descended by a male line?  Whcther a grand- 
son, by a younger daughter, before  a  grand-daughter 
by an elder daughter ?  Whether the elder soh by a con- 
cibine, before a younger son by a wife ? From whence 
also will arise many questions of legitimation, and what 
in nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a concu- 
bine ? For as to the municipal or positive laws of men, 
they can signify nothing here.  It  may farther be asked, 
Whether the eldest son, being a fool, shall inherit this 
paternal power, before  the younger, a wise man ?  and 
what degree of folly it must be that shall exclude him? 
and who shall be judge of it?  TVhether the son of a fool, 
excluded for his folly, before the son of his wise brother 
who reigned ?  Who has the paternal power  whilst the 
widow-queen  is with  child  by the deceased king, and 
nobody knows whether it will be a son or a daughter? 
Which shall be heir of the two male twins, who by the 
dissection of  the mother were laid open to the world ? 
Whether a sister  by the half-blood,  before a brother's 
daughter by the whole blood ? 
$ 124.  These, and many  more  such doubts,  might 
be proposed about the titles of succession, and the right 
of inheritance ; and that not. as  idle  speculations, but 
such as in history we shall find have concerned the in- 
heritance  of crowns  and kingdoms ;  and if our's  want 
them, we need not go farther for famous examples of it 
than the other kingdom in this very island, which having 
been fully related by the ingenious and learned author 
of Patriarcha  non Monarchs, I need  say no  more  of. 
Till our author hath resolved  all the doubts that may 
arise  about the next  heir,  and showed  that they are 
plainly determined by the law of nature, or the revealed 
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law of God, all his  suppositions of  a monarchical, ab- 
solute, supreme, paternal power in Adam, and the de- 
scent of that power to his  heirs, would  not be  of the 
least use  to establish the authority, or  make  out the 
title of any one prince now on earth ;  but would rather 
unsettle and bring all into question: for let our author 
tell us as long as he pleases, and let all men believe it 
too, that Adam had  a  paternal, and thereby a monar- 
chical power; that this  (the only power in the world) 
descended to his heirs ;  and that there is no other power 
in the world but this: let this be all as clear demonstra- 
tion, as it is manifest error; yet if it be not past doubt 
to whom this paternal power descends, and whose now 
it is, nobody  can be under any obligation of obedience; 
unless any one will say that I am bound to pay obedi- 
ence to paternal power in a man who has no more pa- 
ternal power than I myself; which is all one as to say, 
I obey a man, because he has  a right to govern ; and 
if I be  asked how I know he has  a  right to govern, 1 
shauld answer it cannot be known  that he has any at 
all : for  that  cannot be  the reason  of my obedience, 
which I know riot to be  so ;  much  less  can that be a 
reason of my obedience, which nobody at all can know 
to be so. 
$ 125. And therefore  all this  ado about Adam's  fa- 
therhood, the greatness of its power, and the necessity 
of its supposal, helps nothing to establish the power of 
those that govern,  or  to determine the obedience  of 
subjects who are to obey, if they cannot tell whom they 
are to obey, or it cannot be known who are to govern, 
and who to obey.  In the state the world is now, it is 
irrecoverably ignorant who  is Adam's  heir.  This fa- 
therhood,  this monarchical  power  of Adam, descend- 
ing to his  heirs,  would  be of  no more  use  to the go- 
vernment of mankind, than it would be to the quieting 
of men's  consciences,  or securing their healths, if our 
author had assured them that Adam had a power to for- 
give sins, or cure diseases, which by  divine  institution 
descended to his heir, whilst this heir is impossible to be 
known.  And should not he do as rationally, who upon 
this assurance of our author went and confessed his sins, 
and expected a  good  absolution ; or took physic with 
expectation of health, from any one who had taken on 
himself the name of priest or physician, or thrust him- 
self into those employments, saying, I acquiesce in the 
absolving power  descending from Adam, or I shall be 
cured by the medicinal power descending from Adam ; 
as he who says, I submit to and obey the paternal power 
descending from Adam, when it is  confessed all these 
powers descend only to his single heir, and that heir is 
unknown ? 
126. It  is true the civil lawyers have pretended to 
determine some of these cases concerning the succession 
of  princes;  but by our  author's  principles  they  have 
meddled in a matter that belongs  not  to them :  for if 
all political power be derived only from Adam, and be 
to descend only to his successive heirs, by the ordinance 
of God and divine institution, this is a right antecedent 
and paramount to all government;  and therefore the 
positive  laws  of  men  cannot  determine that which  is 
itself the foundation of all law and gavernment, and is 
to receive its rule only from the law of God and nature. 
And that being silent in the case, I am apt to  think there 
is no such right to be conveyed this way :  I am sure it 
would be to no purpose if there were, and men would 
be more at  a loss concerning government, and obedience 
to sovernors, than if there were no such right ;  since by 
positive laws and compact, which divine institution (if 
there be any) shuts out, all these endless  inextricable 
doubts can be safely provided against :  but it can never 
be understood how a divine  natural right, and that of 
such moment  as is  all order  and peace  in the world, 
should be conveyed down to  posterity,without any plain 
natural or divine rule concerning it.  And there would 
be an end of all civil government, if the assignment of 
civil power were by divine  institution to the heir, and 
yet by that divine  institution  the person  of  the heir 
could  not be  known.  This paternal regal power be- 
ing by divine right only his,  it leaves  no room for hu- 
man prudence, or consent, to place it any where else ; 
for if only one man hath a divine right to the obedience 
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of  mankind,  nobody can  claim  that obedience  but he 
that can sholrr that right; nor can  men's  consciences 
by any other pretence he obliged to it.  And thus this 
doctrine cuts up all government by the raots. 
$127. Thus we  see how our  author, laying it for a 
sure foundation, that the very person that is to rule is 
the ordinance  of God, and  by divine institution ; tells 
us at large only that this person is the heir, but who 
this heir is  he leaves  us  to guess ; and  so this divine 
institution, which assigns it to a person whom we have 
no rule to  know, is just as good as an assignment to no- 
body at all.  But whatever our author does, divine in- 
stitution makes no such ridiculous assignments :  nor can 
God be supposed to make it a sacred law, that one cer- 
tain person should have rt  right to something, and yet 
not give rules to mark out, and know that person by; 
or give an heir a divine right to power, and yet not point 
out who that heir is.  It  is rather to be thought that an 
heir had no such right by divine institution, than that 
God should give such a right to the heir, but yet leave 
it doubtful and undeterminable who such heir is. 
§  128.  If  C;od  had  given  the  land  of  Canaan  to 
Abraham, and in $.enera1 terms to somebody after him, 
without naming  h~s  seed, whereby it might be known 
who that somebody was ;  it would have  been as good 
and useful an assignment to determine the right to the 
land ofCanaan, as it would be the determining the right 
of crowns, to give  empire to Adam and his successive 
heirs after him,  without telling who his heir is :  for the 
word heir, without  a  rule  to know who it is, signifies 
no more than somebody, I know not whom.  God mak- 
ing it a  divine institution that men should not marry 
those who were of  near kin, thinks  it not  enough to 
say,  none of you shall approach to any that is near of 
kin  to him,  to uncover  their  nakedness;"  but more- 
over gives rdes to know  who are those near of kin, for- 
bidden by divine institution; or else that law would have 
been of  no use ;  it being to no purpose to lay restraint 
or give privileges to men, in such general terms, as the 
particular person concerned cannot be known by.  But 
God not having any where said  the next heir shall in- 
herit all his father's  estate  or dominion, we are not to 
wonder that he hatlr nowhere appointed who that heir 
should be ;  for never  having  intended any such thiqg, 
never designed any heir in that sense, we cannot expect 
he should  any where  nominate  or appoint any pers6n 
to it, as we might, had it been otherwise.  And there- 
fore in Scripture, thou~h  the word heir occur, yet there 
is no such thing as heir in our author's  sbnse, one that 
was by right of nature to inherit all that his father had, 
exclusive of his-brethren.  Hence Sarah suppdses that 
if Ishmael staid in  the house to share  in Abrahatn's 
estate after his death, this son of a bond-woman  might 
be heir with Isaac ;  and therefore, says she,  cast out 
this  bond-womun  and  her  son,  for  the  son  of  this 
bond-woman  shall not be  heir with my son :" but this 
cannot excuse  our  author, who  telling  us  there is, in 
every number  of men, one who  is  right and next heir 
to Adam, ought to have  told  us what the laws of de- 
scent are :  but he having been so sparing to instruct us 
by  rules  how to know who is  heir;  let us  see  in the 
next place what his history out of  Scripture, on which 
he pretends wholly to build  his government, gives  ud 
in this necessary and fundamental point. 
$ 129. Our author, to make  good  the title af his 
book, p. 13, begins his history of the descent of Adam's 
regal  power,  p.  13,  in  these words:  'c  This lordship 
which Adam by command  had  over the whole world, 
and by right descending from  him, the patriarchs did 
ehjoy, was a large," &c.  How does he  prove  that the 
patriarchs by  descent  did  enjoy it  3 for "  dominion of 
life and  death, says he, *e  find Judah the father pro- 
nounced sentence of death against Thnmer hik  daugh- 
ter-in-law  for  playing  the h&rlot," p.  13.  Hbw does 
this prove that Judah had  sbsoluhe  and sovereign 
thority ? ',  he pronounced  sentence of  death."  The 
pronounoing of sentence of death is not a certain mark 
of soveteignty;  but asually the office of infetiot magi 
strates.  The pow& of miking laws of life and death is 
indeed a mark of sovereignty; but pronoufieitlg the sew 
hnce according to those labs may be done by  others, and therefore  this will but ill prove that he had sove- 
reign authority :  as if  one  should  say, judge Jefferies 
pronounced sentence of  death in the late times, there- 
fore judge Jefferies had sovereign authority. But it will 
be said Judah did  it not  by commission from another, 
and therefore did it in his own right.  llrho  knows whe- 
ther he had any right at  all?  Heat ofpassion might carry 
him to do that which he had no authority to do.  "  Ju- 
dah had dominion  of  life and death :" how does  that 
appear ?  He exercised it, he "  pronounced sentence of 
death against Thamar."  Our author thinks it is very 
good proof  that because  he  did it, therefore  he had a 
right to doit.  He lay with her also ;  by the same way 
of proof he had a  right to do that too.  If the conse- 
quence be good  from  doing, to a  right  of doing, Ab- 
salom too may be reckoned amongst our author's  sove- 
reigns; for he  pronounced such a  sentence  of  death 
against his  brother Amnon, and much upon a like oc- 
casion, and had it executed too,  if that be sufficient to 
prove a dominion of life and death. 
But allowing this  all to be  clear demonstration of 
sovereign power, who was  it that had this  '<  lordship 
by right descending to him from Adam, as large and 
ample as the absolutest  domSnion  of  any  monarch ?" 
Judah, says our author, Judah, a younger son of Jacob, 
his father and elder brethren living ;  so that if our au- 
thor's  own proof  be  to be  taken,  a younger  brother 
may, in the life of his  father  and elder brothers,  '<  by 
right  of  descent,  enjoy Adam's  monarchical  power ;" 
and if one so qualified may be  a monarch by descent, 
why may not every man? If Judah, his father and elder 
brethren living, were one of Adam's  heirs, I know not 
who can be excluded 'from this inheritance ;  all men by 
inheritance may be monarchs as well as Judah. 
§ 130. "  Touching war, we see that Abraham com- 
manded  an  army  of  318  soldiers  of  his  own  family, 
and  Esau  met his  brother  Jacob with  400  men  at 
arms : for  matter  of peace, Abraham made  a  league 
with Abimelech,"  &c. p.  13.  Is it not possible  for  a 
man to have 315 men in his fanlily without being heir 
to Adam ? A planter in the West Indies has more, and 
might,  if  he pleased  (who doubts ?)  muster them  up 
and lead them out against the Indians to seek repara- 
tion upon  any injury received from them ;  and all this 
without the "  absolute domiriion of a monarch, descend- 
ing to him  from  Adam."  Would  it not  be  an  ad- 
mirable  argument  to prove, that all  power  by God's 
institution  descended from Adam  by  inheritance, and 
that the very person and power of this planter were the 
ordinance of God, because he had  power  in his family 
over  servants born in  his house,  and bought with  his 
money ?  For this was just Abraham's  case ;  those who 
were  rich in the patriarch's days, as in the West Indies 
now, bought men and maid-servants,  and  by their in- 
crease, as well as purchasing of new, came to have large 
and numerous families, which though they made use of 
in war or peace, can it be thought the power they had 
over them was  an inheritance  descended from Adam, 
when it  was the purchase of their money ?Aman's riding, 
in an  expedition  against an  enemy, his  horse  bought 
in  a  fair, would  be  as  good  a proof that the owner 
enjoyed  the lordship  which  Adam  by  command  had 
over  the  whole  world,  by  right  descending  to him," 
as Abraham's  leading out the servants of his family is, 
that  the patriarchs enjoyed this lordship by descent from 
Adam :  since the title to the power the master had  in 
both cases, whether over slaves or horses, was only from 
his purchase; and the getting a dominion over any thing 
by bargain and money,  is  a  new way of proving  one 
had it by descent and inheritance. 
5 131. "  But making war  and peace  are marks of 
sovereignty."  Let it be  so in  politic  societies : may 
not  therefore  a  man  in  the West Indies,  who  hath 
with him sons of  his  own, friends  or  companions, sol- 
diers under pay; or slaves  bought with money, or per- 
haps a band made up of all these, make war and peace, 
if there should be occasion, and "  ratify the articles too 
with an oath, without  being  a  sovereign, an  absolute 
king over those who went with him? He that says he 
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private planters, to be absolute monarchs, for as much 
as this they have done.  War and peace cannot be made 
for politic societies, but by the supreme power of such 
societies; because war and peace giving a different mo- 
tion to the force of such a politic body, none can make 
war or peace  but that which has  the direction of the 
force of the whole body, and that in politic societies is 
only the supreme power.  In voluntary societies for the 
time, he that has  such a power  by consent may make 
war and peace, and so may a single man for himself, the 
state of war not consisting in the number of  partisans, 
but the enmity of  the parties, where they have no su- 
perior to appeal to. 
5 132.  The actual  making of war  or  peace  is  no 
proof of  any other power, but only of disposing those 
to exercise or cease acts of enmity for whom he makes 
it; and this  power  in  many cases  any one  may have 
without  any  politic  supremacy:  and  therefore  the 
making of war  or peace will not prove that every one 
that does so is a politic ruler, much less a king ;  for then 
commonwealths must be kings too, for they do as cer- 
tainly make war and peace as monarchical government. 
$ 133. But granting this a "  mark of sovereignty in 
Abraham,"  is  it a  proof  of  the  descent  to him of 
Adam's  sovereignty over  the whole world ?  If it be,  it 
will surely be as good a proof of  the descent of Adam's 
lordship to others too.  And  then commonwealths, as 
well as Abraham, will be heirs of Adam, for they make 
war and peace as well as he.  If you say that  the '' lord- 
ship of  Adam"  doth not  by  right  descend  to  com- 
monwealths,though they make war and peace, the same 
say I of Ahraham, and then there is an end of your ar- 
gument :  if you stand to your argument, and say those 
that domake  war and peace, as commonwealt'hs do  with- 
out doubt, "do  inherit Adam's  lordship,"  there is an 
end of  your  monarchy, unless you will  say that eom- 
rnonwealths  '<  by  descent  enjoying  Adam's  lordship" 
are monarchies;  and  that  indeed  wodd be  a  new 
way  of  making  all  the  governments  in  the wmkl 
monarchical. 
tj 134.  To give  our author the honour of  this new 
invention, for I confess it  is not I have first found it out 
by tracing his principles,  and so charged it on him, it 
is fit my readers know that (as absurd as it may seem) 
he teaches it himself, p. 23, where he ingenuously says, 
'' In all  kingdoms and commonwealths  in the world, 
whether the prince be the supreme father of the people, 
or but the true heir to such  a father,  or come to the 
crown by usurpation  or election, or whether some few 
or  a  multitude govern  the commonwealth;  yet still 
the authority that is in any one, or in many,  or in all 
these, is the only right and natural authority of  s  su- 
preme father;"  which  right of  fatherhood,  he often 
tells us,  is " regal  and  royal authority ;" as particu- 
larly p.  18,  the page immediately   receding  this in- 
stance of Abraham.  This regal authority, he says, those 
that govern commonwealths have;  and if  it be true, 
that regal and royal authority be in those that govern 
commonwealths,  it is as true that commonwealths are 
governed by kings ;  for if regal authority be in him that 
governs, he that governs must needs be a king, and so 
all commonwealths  are nothing  but downright  mon- 
archies ; and then what need any more ado about the 
matter? The governments  of  the world  are as they 
should be, there is nothing but monarchy in it.  This, 
without doubt, was the surest way our author could have 
found to turn all other governments,  but monarchical, 
out of the world. 
5 135.  But all this scarce proves Abraham to have 
been a king as heir to Adam.  If by inheritance he had 
been  king,  Lot,  who was  of  the  same  family,  must 
needs have been his subject by that title, before the ser- 
vants in his family ;  but we see they lived as friends and 
equals, 2nd when their herdsmen could not agree, there 
was no pretence of jurisdiction  or superiority between 
them, but they parted by consent, Gen. xiii.  hence he 
is caEld, both by Abraham and by the text, Abraham's 
brother; the name of  friendship and equality,  and not 
of  juri~iction  and autharity, though he were really but 
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was  Adam's  heir,  and a king,  it was  more,  it seems, 
than Abraham himself  knew,  or his  servant whom he 
sent a wooing for his son ;  for when he sets out the ad- 
vantages of  the match, Gen. xxiv. 35,  thereby to pre- 
vail with the young woman  and her friends,  he says, 
" I am Abraham's servant,  and  the Lord hath blessed 
my master greatly,  and he is become great;  and he 
hath given him flocks and herds,  and silver  and gold, 
and men-servants  and maid-servants,  and  camels and 
asses ; and Sarah, my master's wife,  bare a son to my 
master when she was old, and unto him hath he given 
all he hath."  Can one  think  that a discreet servant, 
that was thus particular to set out his master's  great- 
ness, would have omitted the crown Tsaac was to have, 
if he had known of  any such ?  Can it be imagined  he 
should have  neglected  to have  told them, on such an 
occasion as this, that Abraham was a king, a name well 
known at that time, for he had nine of them his neigh- 
bours, if he or his master had thought any such thing, 
the likeliest matter of all the rest,  to make his errand 
successful ? 
$ 136.  But this discovery it seems was reserved for 
our author to make two or 3000  years after,  and let 
him enjoy the credit of  it; only he should have taken 
care that some of  Adam's  land should have descended 
to this  his  heir,  as  well  as  all Adam's  lordship:  for 
though this lordship which Abraham,  (if  we  may be- 
lieve our author) as well as the other patriarchs,  "  by 
right descending to him,  did  enjoy,  was  as large and 
ample  as  the  absolutest  dominion  of  any  monarch 
which hath been  since  the creation;"  yet his  estate, 
his  territories,  his  dominions,  were  very  narrow  and 
scanty ;  for he had not the possession of a foot of land, 
till he bought a field and a cave of the sons of Heth  to 
bury Sarah in. 
$ 137. The instance of Esau joined with this of Abra- 
ham,  to prove  that  the " lordship which Adam had 
over the whole world,  by  right descending  from him, 
the patriarchs did enjoy,"  is  yet mare pleasant  than 
the former.  6c  Esau  met  his  brother Jacob  with  400 
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men  at arms;"  he therefore  was  a  king by  right of 
heir to Adam.  Four hundred armed  men then,  how- 
ever got together,  are enough to prove him that Ieads 
them to be a king, and Adam's heir.  There have been 
Tories in Ireland, (whatever there are in other countries) 
who would have thanked our author for so honourable 
an opinioil of them, especially if there had been nobody 
near with a better title of 500 armed men, to question 
their royal aut,hority of 400.  Tt  is a shame for men to 
trifle so,  to say no worse of  it,  in  so  serious an argu- 
ment.  Here Esau is brought as  a proof  that Adam's 
lordship,  *;  Adam's  absolute dominion,  as large as that 
of any monarch, descended by right to the patriarchs;" 
and in this  very chap. p. 19, Jacob  is  brought as an 
instance of one,  that by  ct  birthright was lord over his 
brethren."  So we  have  here  two  brothers  absolute 
monarchs by the same title, and at the same time heirs 
to Adam ; the eldest,  heir  to Adam,  because  he met 
his brother with 400 men;  and  the youngest  heir  to 
Adam  by  birth right:  " Esau  enjoyed  the  lordship 
which Adam  had  over  the whole  world  by  right de- 
scending to him, in as large and ample manner as the 
absolutest dominion of any monarch ;  and at the same 
time, Jacob lord over him,  by the right heirs have to 
be lords over their brethren."  Riszlrn teneatis ? I never, 
I confess,  met with  any man of  parts so dexterous as 
sir Robert at  this way of  arguing: but it was his mis- 
fortune to light upon an hypothesis that could  not be 
accommodated  to the  nature  of  things,  and  human 
affairs ;  his principles could not be made to agree with 
that constitution and order which God had  settled in 
the world,  and therefore must needs  often  clash with 
common sense and experience. 
§ 138. In the next  section, he tells us, "  This pa- 
triarchal  power  continued not only till the flood,  but 
after it,  as the name patriarch  doth in  part prove." 
The word  patriarch  doth  more  than  in  part  prove, 
that patriarchal power continued in the world as long 
as there were patriarchs;  for  it is  necessary that pa- 
triarchal power should be whilst  there  are patriarchs, 
as it is necessary there should be paternal or conjugal S16  (If Government.  Of Government.  317 
power whilst there are fathers or husbands; but this is 
but playing with names.  That which he would falln- 
ciously insinuate is the thing in questioh to be proved, 
viz.  that  the  lordship  which  Adam  had  over  the 
world,  the supposed  absolute universal  dominion  of 
Adam  by right descending  from  him,  the patriarchs 
did enjoy."  If he  affirms such an absolute monarchy 
continued to the flood in the world, I would be glad to 
know what records he has it from ;  for I confess I can- 
not find  a word  of  it in  my Bible:  if  by patriarchal 
power he means  any thing  else,  it is nothing  to the 
mtter  in hand.  And how the name patriarch in some 
part  proves,  that those who  are called by that name 
had absolute  monarchical  power,  I  confess  I  do not 
see,  and therefore I think needs no answer till the ari 
gument from it be made out a little clearer. 
5  139. "  The  three eons of Noah had the world,"  says 
our author, '' divided amongst them by their father, for 
of them was the whole world overspread,"  p. 14.  The 
world might be overspread by the uffspring  of  Noah's 
sons,  though  he  never  divided  the  world  amongst 
them ; for the earth might be replenished without be- 
ing divided : so  that all our  author's  arghment here 
proves no such division.  However,  I allow it to him, 
and then ask,  the world  being divided amongst them, 
which of  the three was Adam's  heir ?  If Adam's  lord- 
ship, Adam's monarchy, by right descended only to the 
eldest, then the other two could be but his subjects, his 
slaves :  if by right it descended to all three brothers, by 
the same right it will descend to all mankind ;  and then 
it will be impossible what he says,  p. 19, that "  heirs 
are lords of  their  brethren,"  should  be true ; but all 
brothers,  and consequently all men,  will be equal atrd 
independent, all heirs to Adam's monarchy, and conse- 
yuently all monarchs too, one as much as  another.  But 
~t will  be  said,  Noah  their  father divided  the world 
amongst them; so  that our author will allow more to 
Noall  than  he will  to God Almighty,  for 0.  91  1,  he 
thought it hard, that God himself should give the world 
to Noah8 and his sons, to the prejudice of Noah's  birth- 
right.  His words are,"  Noah was  left sole heir to the 
warld:  why  should  it  be  thought  that God would 
disinherit  him  of  his  birthright,  and  make  him,  of 
all men in the world, the only tenant in common with 
his children ?"  and yet he here thinks  it fit that Noah 
should disinherit  Shem of  his  birthright,  and divide 
the world betwixt  him  and his  brethren;  so that his 
birthright,  when  our author pleases,  must,  and when 
he pleases, must not, be sacred and inviolable. 
$ 140.  If Noah  did  divide  the world  between  his 
sons,  and his  assignment of  dominions to them  were 
good,  there is  an end  of  divine  institution;  all  our 
author's  discourse of Adam's  heir, with whatsoever he 
builds on it,  is quite out of doors ;  the natural power 
of  kings  falls  to the ground;  and  then  "  the  form 
of the power  governing,  and the person  having  that 
power,  will  not  be  (as  he  says  they  are, 0. 254), 
the ordinance  of  Gad,  but  they will  be  ordinances 
of man :" for if the right of  the heir be  the ordinance 
of  God,  a  divine  right;  no man, father or not father, 
can  alter  it:  if  it be  not  a  divine  right,  it is  only 
human, depending on the will  of man:  and so where 
human institution  gives  it  not,  the first-born  has no 
right  at all above  his  brethren ;  and  men  may put 
government  into what  hands,  and  under  what  form 
they please. 
$ 141. He goes on, "  most of the civilest nations of 
the earth labour to fetch their original from some of 
the sons  or  nephews  of  Noah,"  p. 14.  How  many 
do  most of the civilest nations amount to? and who are 
they? I fear the Chinese, a very great and civil people, 
as well as several other people of the East, West, North, 
and  South,  trouble  not  themselves  much  about this 
matter.  All that believe the Bible,  which I believe are 
our author's "  most of the civilest nations,"  must neces- 
sarily derive themselves  from  Noah ;  but for the rest 
of the world,  they think little of  his sons or nephews. 
But if the  heralds and antiquaries of all nations, for it is 
these men generaUy that labour to  find out  the originals 
of  nations,  or all the nations themselves, "  should la- 
bour to fetch their original from  some of  the sons or 
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that the "lordship  which  Adam had  over the whole 
world, by a right descended to the patriarchs ?"  Who- 
ever, nations,  or races  of  men,  '<  labour to fetch their 
original  from,"  may be  concluded  to be thought by 
them men of renown, famous to posterity for the great- 
ness  of  their  virtues and actions ; but beyond  these 
they look not, nor consider who they were heirs to, but 
look on them as such as raised themselves by their own 
virtue to a degree that would give lustre to those who 
in future ages could pretend to derive themselves from 
them.  But if  it were Ogyges,  Hercules, Brama. Ta- 
merlain,  Pharamond ;  nay, if Jupiter and Saturn were 
the names,  from  whence  divers  races  of  men,  both 
ancient and modern,  have  laboured  to  derive  their 
original ;  will that prove, that those men 6'  enjoyed the 
.' lordship ofAdam by right descending to them ?"  If 
not, this is but a flourish of our author's to mislead his 
reader, that in itself signifies nothing. 
§ 142. To  as much purpose is what he tells us, p. 15, 
, 
concerning this division of the world, "  That some say 
it was by lot,  and others  that Noah  sailed round the 
Mediterranean  in  ten  years,  and  divided the world 
into Asia,  Afric,  and  Europe, portions  for  his  three 
sons."  America  then,  it  seems,  was  left  to  be  his 
that could catch it.  Why our author takes such pains 
to  prove the division of the world by Noah to his sons, 
and will not leave out an imagination, though no better 
than a dream, that he can find any where to favour it, 
is hard to guess,  since such a division, if it prove any 
thing,  must  necessarily take away the title of Adam's 
heir ;  unless three brothers can all together be heirs of 
Adam ; and therefore the following words, "  howsoever 
the manner  of  this  division  be  uncertain,  yet it is 
most  certain  the division  was  by families from Noah 
and his  children, over  which  the parents were  heads 
and princes,"  p.  13, if  allowed  him  to be  true,  and 
of  any force'to  prove, that all the power in the world 
is nothing but the lordship  of  Adam's  descending by 
right, they will only prove,  that the fathers of the chil- 
dren are all heirs to  this  lordship  of Adam:  for if in 
those days Cham and Japhet, and other parents, besides 
the eldest son, were  heads  and princes  over  their fa- 
milies, and had a right to divide the earth by families, 
what hinders younger brothers,  being fathers of fami- 
lies, from having the same right ?  If Cham and Japhet 
were  princes by right  descending  to them,  notwith- 
standing any  title  of  heir  in  their  eldest  brother, 
younger brothers by the same right descending to them 
are princes now ;  and so all our author's  natural power 
of kings will reach no farther than their own children ; 
and no kingdom, by  this natural right,  can be bigger 
than a family: for either this lordship of Adam over the 
whole world, by right descends  only to the eldest son, 
and then there can be but one heir, as our author says, 
p.19 ;  or else it by right descends to all the sons equally, 
and then every father of a family  will have it, as well as 
the three sons of Noah :  take which you will, it destroys 
the present governments  and kingdoms, that are now 
in the world;  since whoever has this natural power of 
a king, by right descending to him, must have it, either 
as our author tells us Cain had it, and be lord over his 
brethren, and so be alone king of the whole world ; or 
else, as he tells us  here,  Shem, Cham, and Japhet had 
it, three brothers, and so be only prince of his own fa- 
mily, and all families independent  one of another : all 
the world must be only one empire by the right of the 
next heir, or else every family be a distinct government 
of  itself,  by  the  cr  lordship  of  Adam's  descending  to 
parents  of  families."  And  to this only  tend  all the 
proofs  he  here  gives  us  of  the  descent of  Adam's 
lordship : for continuing his story of  this descent,  he 
says, 
§ 143.  In the  dispersion  of  Babel,  we  must  cer- 
tainly find the establishment of  royal power,  through- 
out the kingdoms  of  the world,"  p.  14.  If you must 
find it, pray do,  and you will help us to a new piece of 
history:  but you  must  show it us before we  shall be 
bound to believe,  that  regal power was established in 
the world upon your principles : for,  that regal power 
was  established  '<  in the kingdoms of  the world,"  I 
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kingdolhs in the world,  whose  several  kings enjoyed 
their  crowns,  "  by  right  descending  to  them  from 
6c  Adam,"  that we think not only apocryphal,  but alsa 
utterly iinpossible.  If our author has no better founda- 
tion for his monarchy than a  supposition of what was 
done at  the dispersion of  Babel, the monarchy he erects 
thereon, whose top is to reach to heaven to unite man- 
kind, will serve only to divide and scatter them as that 
tower did ; and, instead  of  establishing  civil  govern- 
ment and order in the world, will produce nothing but 
confusion. 
$144. For he tells us, thc nations they were divided 
into "  were  distinct  families,  which  had  fathers  for 
rulers over them; whereby it appears, that even in the 
confusion,  God  was  careful  to  preserve  the  fatherly 
authority,  by  distributing the diversity  of  languages 
according to the diversity of families,"  p. 14.  It would 
have been  a  hard  matter for  any one but our author 
to have found out so plainly, in the text  he here brings, 
that a11  the nations  in  that dispersion were governed 
by fathers, and that Cc God was careful to preserve the 
fatherly  authority."  The  words  of  the  text  are, 
<'  These  are  the sons  of  Shem  after  their  families, 
after their tonques in their lands,  after their nations ;" 
and the same thing is said of Cham and Japhet, after an 
enumeration of  their posterities:  in all which  there is 
not  one word  said  of  their  governors,  or  forms  of 
government;  of fathers, or fatherly authority.  But our 
author, rvho  is very quick-sighted  to  spy out father- 
hood, where nobody else could see any the leastglimpses 
of it, tells us positively their "  rulers were fathers, and 
God  was  careful te preserve the fatherly authority; 
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and why?  Because those of  the same family spoke the 
he  language, and so of necessity in the division kept 
together.  Just as if one should argue thus : Hannibal 
in his army,  consisting of divers nations,  kept those of 
the same language together;  therefore  fathers were 
captains of each band, and Hannibal was careful of the 
fatherly authority:  or in peopling of Carolina,  the En- 
glish, French, Scotch, and Welsh,  that are there plant 
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themselves together, and by them the country is divided 
"in  their lands after their tongues, after their families, 
after their nations ;" therefore care  was taken  of  the 
fatherly authority : or because, in many parts of Ame: 
rica, every little tribe was 3 distinct people, with a dif 
ferent language,  one should infer that therefore "  God 
was  careful  to  preserve  the fatherly  authority,"  or 
that therefore  their  rulers a  enjoyed Adam's  lordship 
by right  descending  to them,"  though  we  know  not 
who were  their governors, nor what their form of go- 
vernment:  but  only that  they were divided  into little 
independent societies, speaking different languages. 
$ 145.  The Scripture says not a word of their rulers 
or forms  of  government,  but  only  gives  an  account 
how mankind came to be divided into distinct langcages 
and nations ; and therefore it is not to argue from the 
authority of Scripture, to tell us positively fathers were 
their rulers, when the Scripture says no such thing; but 
to set up  fancies  in  one's  own  brain,  when  we  con- 
fidently aver matter of  fact, where records are utterly 
silent.  Upon a like ground, i. e.  none  at all, lle says, 
"  That they were not confused multitudes without heads 
and governors, and at liberty to choose what governors 
or governments they pleased." 
$ 146.  For I demand,  when  mankind were  all yet 
of one language, all congregated in the plain of Shinar, 
were they then all under one monarch, ''  who enjoyed 
the lordship  of  Adam  by right  descending  to him?' 
If they were not,  there  were  then no  thoughts,  it is 
plain, of Adam's  heir,  no right  to government known 
then upon that title ;  no care taken, by God or man, of 
Adam's fatherly authority.  If when mankind were but 
one  people,  dwelt  altogether,  and were  of  one  Inn- 
page;, and were  upon  building  a city together;  and 
when it  is plain they could not but know the right heir; 
for Shem lived till Isaac's  time,  a long while after the 
division at Babel ; if then,  1  say,  they were not under 
the monarchical government of  Adam's fatherhood, by 
right descending to the heir, it is plain there was no re- 
gard had to the fatherhood, no ~nonarcliy  acknowledged 
VOL.  v.  T 392  Of  Government. 
due to Adam's  heir,  no empire of Shem's in Asia, and 
consequently no such division of the world by Noah,  as 
our author has talked  of.  As  far as we  can conclude 
any thing from Scripture in this matter, it seems from 
this place,  that if  they  had  any  government,  it was 
rather a commonwealth than an absolute monarchy :  for 
the Scripture tells  us,  Gen. xi.  " They said :" it was 
not a prince commanded the building of  this city and 
tower, it was not by the command of one monarch, but 
by the consultation  of  many,  a free  people; "  let  us 
build us  a city:"  they built it for themselves  as  free 
men, not as slaves for their lord and master: "  that we 
be not  scattered abroad;"  having  a  city  once  built, 
and fixed habitations to settle our abodes and families. 
This was the consultation and design of a people, that 
were at liberty to part asunder, but desired to keep in 
one body;  and could not have been either necessary or 
likely in men tied together under the government of one 
monarch, who if they had been, as our author tells us, 
all slaves  under the absolute dominion of a monarch, 
needed not have taken such care  to hinder themselves 
from wandering out of  the reach  of his  dominion.  I 
demand whether this be not plainer in Scripture than 
any thing of Adam's heir or fatherly authority? 
$ 147.  But if  being,  as God  says,  Gen. xi. 6,  one 
people, they had one ruler,  one king by natural right, 
absolute and supreme over them, "  what care had God 
to preserve  the  paternal  authority  of  the  supreme 
fatherhood,"  if on  a sudden he suffer 7.2  (for so many 
our author talks of) distinct nations to be erected out of 
it, under distinct governors,  and at once to withdraw 
themselves from the obedience of their sovereign ?  This 
is  to intitle God's  care how,  and to what we please. 
Can it be sense to say, that God was careful to preserve 
the fatherly authority in those who had it not?  For if 
these  were  subjects under  a  supreme  prince,  what 
authority  had they?  Was  it an instance of God's care to 
preserve the fatherly authority, when he took away the 
true  supreme fatherhood of the natural monarch ?  Can 
it be reason to say,  that God,  for the preservation  of 
fatherly authority, lets several  new governments with 
their governors start up, who could not all have fatherly 
authority  ?  And is it not as much reason to say, that God 
is careful to destroy fatherly authority, when he suffers 
one, who is in possession of it,  to have his government 
torn in pieces,  and shared  by several of  his  subjects ? 
Would it not be an  argument just like this, for mon- 
archical  government  to say, when  ally monarchy was 
shattered to pieces,  and divided amongst revolted sub- 
jects,  that God  was  careful to preserve  monarchical 
power, by rending a settled empire into a multitude of 
little governments  ?  If any one will say, that what hap- 
pens in providence  to be preserved,  God is careful to 
preserve as a thing therefore to be esteemed by men as 
necessary or useful ;  it is a peculiar propriety of speech, 
which every one will not think fit to imitate:  but this 
I an;  suye  is  impossible  to be  either  proper  or true 
speaking, that Shem, for example (for he was then alive), 
should have fatherly authority, or sovereignty by right 
of fatherhood, over that one people  at  Babel, and that 
the  next moment,  Shem yet  living,  72  others should 
have  fatherly  authority,  or  sovereignty  by  right  of 
fatherhood, over the same people, divided into so many 
distinct governments : either these 72 fathers actually 
were  rulers,  just  before  the  confusion, and then they 
were not  one people,  but that God himself  says they 
were;  or  else  they were  a commonwealth,  and then 
where  was  monarchy?  or else  these  72 fathers had 
fatherly  authority,  but knew  it  not.  Strange! that 
fatherly authority should be the only original of govern- 
ment amongst men, and yet all mankind not know it ; 
and stranger yet, that the confusion of tongues should 
reveal it to them all of a sudden, that in an instant these 
72 should know that they had fatherly power, and all 
others know that they were  to obey it in them,  and 
every  one  know  that particular  fatherly authority to 
which he was a subject.  He that can think this argu- 
ing from Scripture, may  from  thence make out what 
model  of  an  LJtopia will  best  suit with his  fancy or 
interest;  and tiiis  fatherhood,  thus  disposed  of,  will 
justify both a prince who claims an universal monarchy, 
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and  his  subjects, who,  being fathers of families,  shall 
quit all subjection  to him,  and canton his empire into 
less  governments  for  themselves :  for  it will  always 
remain a doubt in which of these the fatherly authority 
resided, till our author resolves us, whether Shem, who 
was then alive,  or these 72 new  princes, beginning so 
many new empires in  his dominions,  and over his sub- 
jects,  had right  to govern; since  our author tells us, 
that both  one  and the other  had  fatherly, which  is 
supreme authority,  and  are  brought  in  by  him  as 
instances of those who did '6 enjoy the lordships of Adam 
by right descending to them,  which was  as large and 
ample as the  absolutest  dominion  of  any monarch.'' 
This  at  least  is  unavoidable,  that  if  " God  was 
careful  to preserve  the fatherly authority, in the 72 
new-erected nations,"  it necessarily fallows, that he was 
as careful to destroy all pretences of Adam's heir; since 
he took  care, and  therefore  did  preserve the fatherly 
authority in so many, at  least 71, that could not possibly 
be Adam's heirs, when the right heir (if God had ever 
ordained any such inheritance) could not but be known ; 
Shem then living, and they being all one people. 
3 148. Nimrod is his  next instance of  enjoying this 
patriarchal power, p. 16, but I know not for what rea- 
son our author seems a little unkind to him, and says, 
that he "  against right enlarged his empire, by seizinw 
violently  on  the  rights  of  other  lords  of  families?' 
These  lords  of  families here  were  called  fathers of 
families, in his account of the dispersion at  Babel : but 
it matters not how they were called, so we know who 
they are; for this fatherly authority must be in them, 
either as heirs to Adam, and so there could not be 72, 
nor above one at once ;  or else as nat,ural parents over 
their children, and  so  every father will  have paternal 
authority over his children by the same right,  and in as 
large extent as those  72 had,  and so be  independent 
princes over  their own  offspring.  Taking his lords of 
families in this latter sense  (as it is hard to give those 
words any other sense in this place), he gives us a very 
pretty account  of  the original  of  manarchy,  in  these 
follocving words, p.  IG.  .<  And  in this sense he may be 
said to be  the author and founder of  monarchy,"  viz. 
As against right seizing violently on the rights of fathers 
over their children;  which  paternal  authority, if it be 
in them, by right  of  nature (for else how could  those 
72 come by it?) nobody can take  from  them without 
their own consents ;  and  then I desire our author and 
his friends to consider, how far this will concern other 
princes,  and whether it will not,  according to his con- 
clusion of that paragraph,  resolve  all regal power of 
those, whose  dominions  extend  beyond  their families, 
either into tyranny and usurpation, or election and con- 
sent of fathers of  families, which will  differ very little 
from consent of the people. 
149. All his  instances,  in the next  section, p.  17, 
of  the 12  dukes of Edom, the nine kings in a little cor- 
ner of Asia in Abraham's  days, the 31 kings in Canaan 
destroyed by Joshua, and the care he takes to  prove that 
these were all sovereign princes,  and  that every town 
in those  days had  a  king,  are so  many direct proofs 
against him,  that it was not the lordship of Adam by 
right descending to them, that made kings: for if they 
had held their royalties by that title, either there must 
have been but one sovereign over them all, or else every 
father of a family had been  as good a prince, and had 
as good a claim to royalty,  as these:  for if all the sons 
of Esau had each of them,  the youngei. as well as the 
eldest, the right of  fatherhood,  and so were sovereign 
princes after their father's death ; the same right had 
their sotis after them, and so on to all posterity; which 
will limit all the natural power of fatherhood, only to 
be over the issue of their own bodies, and their descen- 
dents ;  which  power of fatherhood  dies with the head 
of each family, and makes way for  the like  power  of 
fatherhood to take place in each of  his sons over their 
respective posterities:  whereby the power of fatherhood 
will be preserved  indeed,  and is  intelligible,  but will 
not be at all to our author's purpose.  None of the in- 
stances he brings are proofs of any power they had, as 
heirs of Adam's paternal authority, by the title  of  his 
fatherhood descending to them ;  no,  nor of any power 
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being over  sll mankind,  it could  desce~d  to b~t 
at once, and  from  him  to his right heir ody, ad  s.~ 
there could by that title be but one kiug in the world 
at a time :  and by right of fatherhood, not descendiog 
from Adam,  it must be only as they themselves were 
fathers, and so could be over none but their own poste- 
rity.  So that if those 12 dukes of Edam ;  if Abraham 
and the nine kings his  neighbours; if Jacob and Esau, 
and the 31 kings in Canaan, the 72  kisgs mutilated by 
Adonibeseck, the 32 kings that came to Benhadad, b 
70 kings of Greece making war at Troy; were,  as our 
author contends, all of  them  sovereign princes.;  it  i~ 
evident that kings derived their power from some other 
original than fatherhood, since some of these had power 
over more than their own  posterity;  and it is demon- 
shration,  they could  not be all heirs  to Adam : for I 
challenge any man to make any pretence to power by 
right of fatherhood either intelligible or possible in any 
one,  otherwise,  than either as Adam's heir, or as prD- 
genitor  over his own descendents, naturally sprungfrom 
him.  And  if  our author could  show that any one of 
these  princes,  of  which  he gives  us here so large a 
catalogue, had his authority by either of these titles, I 
think I might yield him the cause ;  though it is mani- 
fest they are all impertinent,  and directly contrary to 
what he brings them to prove, viz.  'c  That the lordship 
which Adam had over the world by right descended to 
,the patriarchs." 
5 150.  Having told us, p. 16, That 6'  the patriarchal 
government continued  in Abraham,  Isaac, and Jacob, 
until the Egyptian  bondage,"  p. 17, he tells us, '' by 
manifest footsteps we  may trace this paternal govern- 
ment unto the  Israelites  coming  into Egypt,  where 
the exercise  of the supreme patriarchal  government 
was intermitted,  because  they  were  in subjection  to 
a  stronger  prince."  What  these  footsteps  are of 
paternal government, in our author's sense, i. e. of abso- 
lute monarchical power  descending  from Adam,  and 
exercised by right of fatherhood, we have seen; that is, 
for 2390 years no footsteps at all; since in all that time 
he cannot produce any one example of any person who 
claimed or esercised regal authority by right of father- 
hood;  or show any one who being a king was Adam's 
heir : all that his proofs  amount  to is  only this, that 
there were fathers,  patriarchs,  and kings,  in that age 
of the world ;  but that the fathers and patriarchs had 
any absolute arbitrary power,  or  by what titles those 
kings had theirs,  and of  what extent it was, the Scrip- 
ture is wholly silent;  it is manifest by right of  father- 
hood they neither did, nor could claim any title to do- 
minion or empire. 
$ 1.51.  To say,  a That the exercise of  supreme pa- 
triarchal  government  was  intermitted,  because  they 
were in subjection to a stronger prince,"  proves no- 
thing but what I before suspected,  viz.  "  That patri- 
archal jurisdiction or  tgovernrnent"  is  a fallacious ex- 
pression,  and does not in our author signify (what he 
would yet insinuate by it)  paternal  and  regal power, 
such  an  absolute  sovereignty  as he supposes  was  in 
Adam. 
tj 152. For how can he say that patriarchal jurisdic- 
tion was intermitted in Egypt, where there was a king, 
under whose  regal  government  the Israelites were, if 
patriarchal  were absolute monarchical  jurisdiction? And 
if' it were not,  but something else,  why does he make 
such ado about a power not in question, and nothing to 
the purpose ?  The exercise of patriarchal jurisdiction, 
if patriarchal be regal, was not intermitted whilst the 
Israelites were in Egypt.  It is true,  the exercise of 
regal power was not then in the hands of  any of  the 
promised seeds of Abraham,  nor  before neither that I 
know :  but what is that to the intermission of regal au- 
thority,  as descending from Adam ; unless our author 
will h~ve  it,  that this chosen line of Abraham had the 
right of  inheritance to Adam's  lordship ? and then to 
what purpose are his instances of the 72  rulers, in whom 
the fatherly authority was preserved in the confusion at 
Babel ?  Why does  he  bring  the 12 princes  sons of 
Ishmael, and the dukes of  Edom,  and join  them with 
Abraham,  Isaac,  and Jacob,  as examples  of  the ex- 
ercise of true patriarchal government, if the exercise of 
patriarchal jurisdiction were intermitted in the world, 328  04  Government.  Of  Government.  329 
whenever the heirs of Jacob had  not supreme  power ? 
I fear, supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was not only in- 
termitted, but from the time of the Egyptian bondage 
uite lost in the world;  since  it will be hard to find, 
rrom that time downwards, any one who exercised it as 
an inheritance descending to him from the patriarchs, 
Abraham,  Isaac,  and Jacob.  I imagined monarchical 
government would have served his turn in the hands of 
Pharaoh, or any body.  But one cannot easily discover 
in all places what his discourse tends to, as, particularly 
in this place, it is not obvious to guess what he drives 
at, when he says, "  the exercise of  supreme patriarchal 
jurisdiction  in Egypt,"  or how this serves to make out 
the descent of  Adam's  lordship  to the patriarchs,  or 
any body else. 
$ 153. For I thought he had  been giving us out of 
Scripture proofs and examples of  monarchical govern- 
ment, founded on paternal authority,  descending from 
Adam ;  and not an history of the Jews :  amongst whom 
yet me find no kings, till many years after they were a 
people :  and when kings were their rulers, there is not 
the least  mention  or  room  for  a  pretence  that they 
were heirs  to Adam,  or kings by paternal  authority. 
I expected,  talking so much as he does of  Scripture, 
that he would have  produced  thence a  series of  mon- 
archs,  whose  titles were  clear to Adam's  fatherhood, 
and who, as heirs to him, owned and exercised paternal 
jurisdiction  over their  subjects,  and  that this was the 
true patriarchal government: whereas he neither proves 
that the patriarchs were kings,  nor  that either kings 
or patriarchs were heirs to Adam,  or  so much as pre- 
tended to it : and one may as well  prove  that the pa- 
triarchs were  all absolute monarchs;  that the power 
both of  patriarchs and kings u7ns only paternal ;  and 
that this power descended to them from Adam:  I say 
all these propositions may be as well proved by a con- 
fused  account  of  a  multitude  of  little kings  in the 
West-Indies,  out of  Ferdinand0  Soto,  or any  of  our 
late  histories  of  the  Northern  America,  or  by  our 
author's 70 kings of  Greece, out of  Homer,  as by  any 
thing he brings out of Scripture, in that multitude of 
kings he has reckoned up. 
$154. And methinks he should have let Homer and 
his wars of  Troy alone, since his great zeal to truth or 
monarchy  carried  him  to such  a  pitch  of  transport 
against philosophers  and poets,  that he  tells us in his 
preface, that "  there are too many in these days who 
please  themselves  in  running  after  the  opinions  of 
philosophers  and poets,  to find  out such  an original 
of  government  as might  promise  them  some  title to 
liberty, to the great scandal of Christianity and bring- 
ing in  of  atheism."  And  yet  these  heathens,  phi- 
losopher Aristotle, and poet Homer, are not rejected by 
our zealous Christian politician, whenever they offer any 
thing that seems to serve his  turn :  whether "to  the 
great scandal of Christianity and bringing in of athe- 
ism,"  let  him look.  This I cannot but observe in au- 
thors who it is visible write  not for  truth, how ready 
zeal for interest and party is to entitle Christianity to 
their designs, and to charge atheism on those who will 
not, without examining, submit to  their doctrines, and 
blindly swallow their nonsense. 
But  to return to his Scripture  history, our author far- 
ther tells  us,  p.  18, that "  after  the return of  the Is- 
~aelites  out of  bondage, God, out of  a  special care of 
them, chose Moses  and Joshua successively to govern 
as princes  in  the place  and stead of  the supreme fa- 
thers."  If it be  true that  they returned  out of bon- 
dage, it must be in a state of freedom, and must imply, 
that both before and after this bondage they were free; 
unless our author will say that changing of masters is 
returning out of bondage ; or that a slave returns out 
of  bonduge  when he is removed  from one gally to an- 
other.  If then they returned out of bondage, it is plain 
that in those  days, whatever our author in his preface 
says to the contrary, there was a difference between a 
son, a subject, and a slave; and that neither the patri- 
archs before,  nor  their  rulers  after  this  "Egyptian 
bondage,  numbered  their  sons  or  subjects  amongst 
their possessions,"  and disposed  of  them with  as ab- 
iolute a dominion, as they did their other goods. 5 155.  This is evident  in  Jacob to whom  Reuben 
offered his two sons as pledges ;  and Judah was at last 
surety for Benjamin's  safe return out of Egypt: which 
all had been vain, superfluous, and but a sort of mock- 
ery, if Jacob had had the same power  over every one 
of his  family as he had  over  his  ox or  his  ass, as an 
owner over his substance;  and the offers that Reuben 
or Judah made had been such a security for returning 
of Benjamin, as if a man should take two lambs out of 
his lord's  flock, and offer  one  as security that he will 
safely restore the other. 
§ 156. When they were  out  of  this bondage, what 
then ?  6c God  out of  a  special  care  of  them, the Is- 
raelites."  It  is  well  that  once  in liis  book  he will 
allow God to have any care of the people :  for in other 
places he speaks of mankind  as  if God had no care of 
any part of them, but only of their monarchs, and that 
the rest of the people, the societies of men, were made 
as so many herds  of  cattle,  only for  the service, use, 
and pleasure of their princes. 
$157.  Chose Moses and Joshua successively to go- 
vern  as  princes ;" a shrewd argument our author has 
found out to prove God's  care  of  the fatherly autho- 
rity, and Adam's  heirs, that here, as an expression of 
his care of his own people, he chooses those for princes 
over them that had not  the least pretence  to either. 
The persons  chosen were Moses, of  the tribe of Levi, 
and Joshua of  the tribe  of Ephraim, neither of wliich 
had any title of fatherhood.  But, says our author, they 
were in the place and stead of the supreme fathers.  If 
God had  any where as  plainly declared  his  choice of 
such fathers to  be rulers, as he did  of Moses and Jo- 
shua, we might believe Moses and Joshua were in their 
place and stead :  but that being the question in debate, 
till that be better proved, Moses being chosen by God 
to be ruler of his  people, will  no more prove  that go- 
vernment  belonged  to Adam's  heir, or  to the father- 
hod, than God's  choosing Aaron  of  the tribe of Levi 
to be priest, will  prove  that the priesthood  belonged 
to Adam's  heir, or the prime fathers ;  since God would 
choose Aaron to be  priest,  a~ld  Moses  ruler in Israel, 
Of  Government.  331 
though neither of those offices were settled on Adam's 
heir or the fatherhood. 
S 158.  Our author  goes on, "  And after them like- 
wise  for  a time  he  raised  up judges,  to defend  his 
people  in time of peril,"  p.  18.  This proves fatherly 
authority to be  the original of government, and  that 
it descended from Adam to his  heirs just  as well  as 
what went before :  only here our author seems to con- 
fess that these judges,  who were all the governors they 
then had, were  only men  of valour, whom  they made 
their  generals to  defend  them  in time of peril;  and 
cqnnot God raise up such men, unless fatherhood have 
a title to government ? 
$153. But  says  our author, '. when God gave the 
Israelites  kings,  he  re-established  the  ancient  and 
prime  right  of  lineal  succession  to paternal govern- 
ment."  p.  18. 
$  160. How did  God  re-establish  it? by n  law,  a 
positive command ?  We  find  no such thing.  Our au- 
thor means then, that when God gave them a king, in 
giving them a king, he re-established the right, 8c.  To 
re-establish  de  facto  the right of lineal succession to  a-  e  ternal government is to put a man in possession oft at 
government which his fathers did enjoy, and he by li- 
]leal succession had a right to: for, first, if it were an- 
other government than what his ancestor had, it  was not 
succeeding to an  ancient  right, but beginning a new 
one :  for if a prince should give a man,  besides his an- 
cient  patrimony, which  for  some ages his  family had 
been disseised of, an additional estate, never before in 
tlie possession of  his ancestors, he could not be said to 
re-establish  the right  of lineal succession to any more 
than what had been formerly enjoyed by his ancestors. 
If therefore  the power  the kings  of Israel had were 
any thing more than Isaac or Jacob had, it was not the 
re-establishingin them  the rightof succession to apower, 
but giving  them a new  power, however you please to 
call it, paternal or  not : and whether Isaac and Jacob 
had the same power that the kings of Israel had, I de- 
sire any one, by what has been above said, to consider ; 358  Of  Government. 
and 1 do not think he will find  that either Abraham. 
Isaac, or Jacob, had any regal power at all. 
$ 161. Next, there can  be  a no reestablishment of 
the prime and ancient right  of  lineal  succession" ta 
any thing, unless he that is put in possession of  it has 
the right to succeed, and be the true and next heir to 
him he succeeds  to.  Can that be a re-establishment 
which begins  in  a  new family ?  or that the "  re-esta- 
blishment  of  an ancient  right  of  lineal  succession," 
when a crown is given to one who  has no right of  suc- 
cession to it ;  and who, if the lineal succession had gone 
on, had been  out of  all possibility of pretence  to it? 
Saul, the first king God gave the Israelites, was of the 
tribe of Benjamin.  Was  the  ancient and prime right 
of lineal  succession  reestablished"  in him ?  The next 
was David, the youngest son of Jesse, of the posterity of 
Judah, Jacob's third son.  Was the "  ancient and prime 
right of  lineal succession  to paternal government re- 
established in  him ?''  or  in Solomon,  his younger  son 
and successor in the throne ?  or in Jeroboam over  the 
ten tribes ?  or  in Athaliah, a woman who reigned six 
years, an utter stranger to the royal blood ? "  If the 
ancient and prime  right  of  lineal succession to pater- 
nal government were re-established" in any of these or 
their  posterity,  "the  ancient  and prime  right  of li- 
neal  suecession  to paternal government"  belongs  to 
younger brothers as well as elder, and may be re-esta- 
blished in any man living : for whatever younger bro- 
thers, "  by ancient and  prime right  of lineal  succes- 
sion," may have  as well  as the elder, that every man 
living may have  a  right  to by lineal succession,  and 
Sir  Robert as well as any other.  And so what a brave 
right of lineal succession  to his paternal or  regal go- 
vernment our author has re-established, for the securing 
the rights and inheritance  of crowns, where every one 
may have it, let the world consider. 
$ 169. But says our author, however, p. 19, "  When- 
soever God made  choice  of  any special person  to be 
king, he intended that the issue  also should have  be- 
nefit thereof,  as  being  comprehended  sufficiently  in 
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the person of  the father, although the father was only 
named  in  the grant."  This  yet  will  not  help  out 
succession:  for  if,  as our  author says,  the benefit  of 
the grant be intended to the issue of the grantee, this 
will not direct the succession ;  since,  if  God give any 
thing to a man and his issue in general, the claim can- 
not be to any one of that issue in particular ;  every one 
that is of  his race will have  an equal right.  If it he 
said,  our author meant heir,  I believe  our author was 
as willing as  any body to have  used  that word,  if  it 
would have served his  turn : but  Solomon,  who  suc- 
ceeded David in the throne, being no more his heir than 
Jeroboam, who succeeded him in the government of the 
ten tribes, was his issue, our author had reason to avoid 
saying,  that God  intended it to the heirs,  when that 
would not hold  in a succession, which our author could 
not except against ;  and so he has left his succession as 
undetermined,  as if  he had said nothing about it: for 
if  the regal power be given by God to a man and his 
issue,  as the land of  Canaan was to Abraham and his 
seed, must they not all have a title to it, all share in it? 
And one may as well say, that by God's grant to Abra- 
ham and his seed,  the land of  Canaan was to belong 
only to one of  his  seed,  exclusive  of  all others, as by 
God's grant of  dominion to a  man  and his issue,  this 
dominion was to belong in peculiar to one of  his issue 
exclusive of all others. 
Q  163.  But how will our author prove that whenso- 
ever God made choice of any special person to be a king, 
he intended that '' the (I suppose he means his)  issue 
also should have benefit thereof ?"  has he so soon for- 
got Moses and Joshua,  whom  in this very section, he 
says, "  God out of  a  special  care  chose  to govern as 
princes:'  and the judges that God raised up ?  Had not 
these princes,  having  tbe  same  authority  of  the su- 
preme fatherhood, the same power that the kings had ; 
and being specially chosen by  God himself, should not 
their issue have the  benefit  of  that choice,  as wcll as 
David's or Solomon's ?  If these had the paternal autho- 
rity put into their hands immediately by God, why had 
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to this power ?  Or if they had it as Adam's  heirs, why 
did not their heirs enjoy it after them by right descend- 
ing to them ? for they could not be heirs to one another. 
Was the power the same,  and from the same original, 
in Moses, Joshua,  arid the Judges,  as it was in David 
and the kings ;  and was  it inheritable in one  and not 
in the other? If it was  not  paternal  authority,  then 
God's  own  people  were  governed  by those that had 
not paternal  authority,  and those  governors did well 
cnough without it: if  it were paternal authority,  and 
God chose  the persons  that were  to exercise  it,  our 
author's rule fails, that "whensoever  God makes choice 
of  any person  to be snpreme  ruler,"  (for  I suppose 
the name king has no spell in it, it is not the title, but 
the power makes the difference), "  he intends that the 
issue also should have  the benefit  of  it,"  since  from 
their coming out of Egypt to David's time, 400 years, 
the issue was  never "  so sufficiently comprehended in 
the person of the father,"  as that any son, after the death 
of  his  father, succeeded  to  the government  amongst 
all those judges that judged  Israel.  If to avoid this, it 
be said, God always chose the person of  the successor, 
and so,  transferring the fatherly authority to him,  ex- 
cluded his issue from succeeding to it, that is manifestly 
not so in the story of Jephthah, where he articled with 
the people,  and they made him judge over them,  as is 
plain, Judg. xi. 
6  l(i~1~.  It is  in vain  then to say,  that "  whensoever 
Go-d chooses  any special person  to have  the exercise 
of paterilnl authority,"  (for  if  that be not to he king, 
I desire to know the  difference  between  a  king and 
one having the exercise of paternal authority), "he in- 
tends  the issue  also  should  have  thc benefit  of  it," 
since we tind the adthority the judges had ended with 
them,  and  descended  not  to their  issue ; and  if  the 
judges had not paternal authority, I fear it will trouble 
our author, or any of  the friends  to his principles, to 
tell who had then  the paternal authority, that is,  the 
government and supreme power amongst the Israelites : 
and I suspect they must confess that the chosen people 
of God continued 11  peoplc sevcral liiindreds of  years, 
without any knowledge or thought of this paternal au- 
thority, or any appearance of monarchical government 
at all. 
165. To  be satisfied of  this,  he need but read the 
story of  the Levite,  and the war  thereupon with  the 
Benjamites, in the three last chapters of Judges ;  and 
when he finds, that the Levite appeals to the people for 
justice,  that it was the tribes and the congregation that 
debated,  resolved,  and directed all that was  done on 
that occasion ;  he must conclude, either that God was 
not  careful to preserve the fatherly authority"amongst 
his own chosen people ;  or else that the fatherly autho- 
rity may be  preserved  where  there is no monarchical 
government:  if  the latter,  then  it will  follow,  that 
though fatherly authority be ever so well proved, yet it 
will not infer a necessity of  monarchical government ; 
if  the former,  it will  seem very  strange and impro- 
bable, that God should ordain fatherly authority to be 
so sacred amongst the sons of men, that there could be no 
power or government without it, and yet that amongst 
his own people,  even whilst  he is providing a govern- 
ment for them,  and  therein prescribes rules to the se- 
veral states and relations of men, this great and funda- 
mental one, this most material and necessary of  all the 
rest,  should  be  concealed,  and lie  neglected  for 400 
years after. 
$ 166. Before I leave this,  I must ask how our au- 
thor  knows  that " whensoever God makes  choice of 
any special person  to be  king,  he  intends  that  the 
issue should have  the benefit thereof?"  Does God by 
the law of nature or revelation say SO ? By the sarne law 
also he must say, which of his issue must enjoy the crown 
in succession, and so point out the heir, or else leave his 
issue to divide or scramble for  the government:  both 
alike absurd, and such as will destroy the benefit of such 
grant to the issue.  When any such declaration of God's 
intention is produced,  it will  be  our duty to  believe 
God intends it so ;  but till  that be done,  our author 
must show us some better warrant, before we shall be 
obliged  to receive  him  as the  authentic  revealer  of 
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5  167. C6The  issue,"says our a~thor,#~is  comprehended 
sufficiently in  the person of  the father,  although the 
father only was  named  in  the grant :"  and  yet God, 
when  he gave the land of  Canaan to Abraham,  Gen. 
xiii. 15, thought fit to put his seed into the grant too : 
so the priesthood was given to Aaron and his seed ;  and 
the crown God  gave not  only to David,  but his  seed 
also : and however  our author assures us that "  God 
intends  that the issue  should have  the benefit of  it, 
when he chooses  any person to be king,"  yet we  see 
that the kingdom which he gave to Saul, without men- 
tioning his seed  after  him,  never  came  to  any of  his 
issue:  and why,  when God chose a person to be king, 
he should intend that his issue should have the benefit 
of  it,  more  than when  he chose  one  to be judge in 
Israel, I would fain know a reason ;  or why does a grant 
of  fatherly authority to a king more comprehend  the 
issue, than when a like grant is made to a judge ?  Is pa- 
ternal authority by right to descend to the issue of  one, 
and not of the other ?  There will need some reason to 
be shown of  this difference more than the name, when 
the thing given is the same fatherly authority, and the 
manner of  glving it,  God's  choice  of  the person,  the 
same too ; for  I suppose  our  author, when  he  says, 
"  God raised up judges,"  will by no means allow they 
were chosen by the people. 
5 168. But since our author has so confidentIy assured 
us of the care of God to preserve the fatherhood, and 
pretends to build a11  he says upon the authority of the 
Scripture, we may well expect that that people, whose 
law, constitution,  and  history are chiefly contained in 
the Scripture, sliould furnish him with the clearest in- 
stances of  God's care of preserving the fatherly autho- 
rity in that people who it is agreed he had a most  pe- 
culiar care of.  Let us see then what state this paternal 
authority or government was in amongst the Jews from 
their beginning to be a people.  It  was omitted by our 
authos's  confession, from their coming into Egypt, till 
their return out of that bondage, above 200 years :  from 
thence till God gave the Israelites  a king,  about 400 
years more, our author gives but a very slender account 
of it; nor indeed all that time are there the least foot- 
steps of  paternal or regal government amongst them. 
But then,  says  our  author,  "God  re-established  the 
ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal 
government." 
$ 169. What a  "lineal  succession  to paternal go- 
vernment" was then established we have already seen. 
I  only  now  consider  how  long this  lasted, and  that 
was  to their  captivity, about 500 years:  from thence 
to their  destruction by  the Romans, above  650 years 
after, the "ancient  and prime right of  lineal succession 
to paternal government" was again lost, and they con- 
tinued  a  people  in the promised land without it.  So 
that of 1750 years that they were God's peculiar people, 
they had hereditary kingly government amongst them 
not one-third of the time ;  and of that time there is not 
the least footstep of  one moment of "paternal govern- 
ment, nor the re-establishment of the ancient and prime 
right of lineal succession to it,"  whether we suppose it 
to be derived, as from its fountain,  from David, Saul, 
Abraham, or, which upon our author's  principles is the 
only true, from Adam. CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
BOOK  11. 
CHAPTER I. 
5  1. IT  having been shown in the foregoing discourse, 
1. That Adam  had  not,  either  by  natural  right  of 
fatherhood,  or  by  positive  donation  from  God,  any 
such authority over  his  children, or dominion over the 
world, as is pretended : 
2. That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it: 
3.  That if  his  heirs had, there being  no law of  na- 
ture nor positive law of God that determines which  is 
the right heir in  all cases  that may arise, the right of 
succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not 
have been certainly determined : 
4. That if  even  that had been determined, yet  the 
knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam's  poste- 
rity being so long since utterly lost, that in  the races 
of  mankind  and families  of  the world  there remains 
not to one  above another  the least pretence to be the 
eldest house,  and to have the right of inheritance : 
All these premises  having, as  I think, been  clearly 
made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth 
should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow 
of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain 
of all power,  "Adam's  private dominion and paternal 
jurisdiction ;" so that he that will  not give just  occa- 
sion to think that all government in the world  is  the 
product only of  force  and violence, and  that men live 
together  by  no  other  rules but  that of  bcasts,  where 
the  strongest carries  it, and so  lay  n foundatio:l  for 
perpetual disorder and mischief, tumnlt, sedition, and 
rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypotliesis 
so loudly cry out against) must  of  necessity  find  out 
another rise of government, another origiual of political 
power, and another way of designing and knowing. the 
persons that have it, than what sir Robert Filmcr hat11 
taught us. 
$ 2. To this  purpose,  I think it may not be air~iss 
to set down  what I take to be political  power; that 
the  power  of  a  magistrate  over  a  subject  rnny  be 
distinguished from that of a father over his children, a 
master over his servants, a husband over  his wife,  and 
a lord over his slave.  All which  distinct powers  hap- 
pening sometimes together in the same man, if he be 
considered under  these different relations, it may help 
us to distinguish  these  powers one from another, and 
show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, 
n father of a family, and a captain of a galley. 
5 3.  Political  power, then,  I  take to be  a right of 
making laws with penalties of death, and consequently 
all less  penalties, for the regulating and preserving of 
property, and of employing the force of the community, 
in the execution of such laws. and in the defence of the 
commonwealth from foreign injury;  and all this only 
for the public good. 
CHAPTER  11. 
3 4.  To understand  political  power  right, and  de- 
rive  it from its original, we  must considcr wllat  state 
all men are naturally in, and that is, n state of  perkct 
frecdom  to  order  their  acltions  and  tlispose  of  tllcir 
possessioi~s  :~nd  persons,  as they think  fit, within  the 
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bounds of  the law of  nature ; without asking leave, or 
depending up011 the will of any other man. 
A state also  of  equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than an- 
other; there  being  nothing  more  evident  than  that 
creatures of tlie same species and rank, promiscuously 
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use 
of the same faculties, should also be cqual one amongst 
another without subordination or subjection; unless the 
Lord and Master of them all should, by any manifest de- 
claration of his will, set one above another, and confer 
on him, by  an evident and clear  appointment, an un- 
doubted right to dominion arid sovereignty. 
5 5.  This equality of  men  by  nature  the judicious 
Hooker looks upon as so evident  in itself,  and beyond 
all question, that he  makes  it the foundation  of  that 
obligation  to mutual  love amongst  men, on which he 
builds the duties we owe one another, and from whence 
he derives the great maxin~s  of justice and charity.  His 
worcis are, 
" The like natural inducement hath brought men to 
know that it  is no less their duty to love  others than 
themselves ; for seeing  those  things  which  are equal 
must needs all have one measure ; if I cannot but wish 
to receive good, even as much at every man's  hands as 
any  man  can  wish  unto his  own  soul, how  should  I 
look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, un- 
less myself  be careful to satisfy the like desire, which 
is  undoubtedly  in  other  men,  being  of  one  and  the 
same nature?  To have  any thing  offered  them  re- 
pugnant to this desire must needs in all respects grieve 
them  as much  as me; so that, if  I do harm, I must 
look to suffer, there being no reason that others should 
show greater measure of love to me than they have by 
me showed unto them : my desire therefore to be loved 
of my equals in nature, as much as possibly may be, im- 
poseth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward 
fully the like affection :  from which relation of equality 
between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what 
several  rules  and  canons  natural reason  hath drawn, 
for direction of life, no man is ignorant." 
$ 6.  But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not 
a state of  licence : though man in that state have an 
uncontrollable liberty to dispose of  his  person  or pos- 
sessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so 
much as any creature in his possession, b~t  where some 
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.  The 
state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one :  and reason, which is that Inw, teaches 
a11  mankind, who  will  but  consult  it,  that being  all 
equal and independent, no  one ought to harm another 
in  his  life,  health,  liberty,  or  possessions : for  men 
being  all the workmanship of  one omnipotent and in- 
finitely wise ~aker  ; all the servants of  one sovereign 
Master, sent into the world by his order, and about his 
business;  they  are his  property, whose  workmanship 
they are, made to last during his, not  another's  plea- 
sure : and being  furnished with like faculties, sharing 
all in  one  community of  nature, there cannot be sup- 
posed  any such subordination among us that may au- 
thorize us to destroy another, as if  we were made for 
one another's uses, as the inferior ranks cf creatures are 
for ouru.  Every one,  as he is bound to preserve him- 
self, and dot to quit his  station wilfully, so by the like 
reason, when  his  own preservation  comes not in com- 
petition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the 
rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do  justice 
to an offender, take away or impair  the life, or what 
tends  to the preservation  of  life,  the liberty,  health, 
limb, or goods of another. 
§ 7. And  that all men may be  restrained  from in- 
vading others' rights, and from doing hurt to one an- 
other, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth 
the peace and preservation  of  all mankind,  the exe- 
cution of  the law of  nature is, in  that state, put into 
every man's  hands, whereby every one has a  right to 
punish  the transgressors of  that law to such a degree 
as  may  hinder  its violation:  for  the law  of  nature 
would,  as  all  other  laws  that  concern  men  in  this 
world, be  in  vain,  if  there  were  nobody  that in  the 
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thereby preserve  the innocent, and restrain offenders. 
And if any one in the state of  nature niay punish an- 
other for  any evil he has  done, every one  may do so : 
for  in  that state of  perhct equality, where naturally 
there  is  no superiority or jurisdiction  of  one over an- 
other, what  any may  do  in  prosecution  of  that law 
every one must needs have a right to do. 
§ 8.  And  thus,  in  the state of  nature> '<  one  man 
comes by  a power over another ;"  but yet no absolute 
or arbitrary power to use  a criminal, when he has got 
him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or 
boundless extravagancy of his own will ;  but only to re- 
tribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dic- 
tate, what is proportionate to his transgression ; which 
is so niuch  as niay serve  for reparation and restraint : 
for these  two are the only reasons why one man may 
lawfully do harm  to  another,  which  is  that we  call 
punishment.  In transgressing  the law of  nature, the 
offender declares  himself  to live by another  rule than 
that of reason and common equity, which is that mea- 
sure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual 
security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the 
tie, which  is  to secure them from injury and violence, 
being slighted and broken by him : which being a tres- 
pass against the whole species, and the peace and safety 
of  it, provided  for  by  the law  of  nature ; every man 
upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve man- 
kind in general, may restrain, or, where it is necessary, 
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such 
evil  on any one, who  hath  transgressed  that  law,  as 
may  make  him  repent  the doing  of  it,  and  thereby 
deter him, and by his  example others, from doing the 
like mischief.  And in this case, and upon this ground, 
"  every man hath a right to punish  the offender, and 
be executioner of the law of nature." 
$ 9.  1 doubt not but this will  seem a very strange 
doctrine to some men : but, before they condemn it, I 
desire them to resolve me by what right any prince or 
state can put to death or punish an alie~i  for any crime 
he commits in their country.  It is certain their laws, 
by  virtue  of  any  sanction  they  receive  from  the pro- 
mulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger : 
they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to 
hearken to them.  The legislative authority, by which 
they are in  force  over  the subjects of  that common- 
wealth, hath no power over him.  Those who have the 
supreme power of making laws in England, France, or 
Holland,  are to an Indian but  like the rest  of  the 
world, men without authority:  and therefore, if by the 
law of nature every man hath  not a power to punish 
offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to re- 
quire, I see not how the nlagistrates of any community 
can punish  an alien  of  another  co~lntry  ; since, in re- 
ference  to  him,  they  can  have  no  more  power  than 
what every man naturally may have over another. 
$ lo. Besides  the crime which  consists in violating 
the law, and varying  from  the right rule  of  reason, 
whereby  a  man  so  far becomes  degenerate,  and de- 
clares himself  to quit the principles of  human nature, 
and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury 
done to some person or other, and some other man re- 
ceives damage by his  transgression : in which  case he 
who hath received  any damage, has, besides the right 
of punishment common to him with other men,  a par- 
ticular right to seek reparation from him that has done 
it: and any other person, who finds  it just,  may also 
join  with  him  that is  injured,  and  assist  hiin  in  re- 
covering  from  the  offender  so  much  as  may  make 
satisfaction for the harm he has suffered. 
§ 11.  From these two distinct rights, the one of pu- 
nishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like 
offence, which right of punishing is in every body;  the 
other of  taking reparation, which  belongs only to the 
ii~jured  party; comes it to pass that the magistrate, who 
by being magistrate hath the common right of punish- 
ing put into his  hands,  can  often,  where  the public 
goocl demands not the execution of  the law, remit the 
punishment  of  criminal offences by his  own authority, 
but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private 
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suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own 
name, and he alone  can remit:  the damnified  person 
has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or 
service of the offender, by right of self-preservation,  as 
every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent 
its being  committed  again, "  by  the  right he has of 
preserving  all  mankind,"  and  doing  all  reasonable 
things he can in order to that end: and thus it is that 
every man, in the state of  nature, has  a power to kill 
a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like 
injury, which  no  reparation  can  compensate, by  the 
example of the punishment that attends it from every 
body;  and also to secure men  from the attempts of a 
criminal,  who  having renounced  reason,  the common 
rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by 
the unjust violence  and  slaughter he hath committed 
upon one, declared war against all mankind; and there- 
fore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those 
wild savaFe beasts with whom men can have no society 
nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law 
of nature, "  Whoso sheddeth man's  blood, by Inan shall 
his blood be shed."  And Cain was  so fully convinced 
that every one had  a right to destroy such a criminal, 
that,  after  the murder of  his  brother,  he  cries  out, 
"  Every one that findeth me shall slay me ;"  so plain 
was it writ in the hearts of mankind. 
5 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of 
nature punish the lesser breaches of  that law.  It will 
perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each trans- 
gression may be punished  to that degree, and with so 
much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain 
to the offender,  give him  cause to repent, and terrify 
others from doing the like.  Every oflence, that can be 
committed in the state of nature, may in the state of na- 
ture  be also punished equally, and as far forth, as it may 
in a commonwealth: for though it would be beside my 
present purpose to  enter here into the particulars of the 
law of nature, or its measures of  punishment,  yet it is 
certain there is such a law, and that too as intelligible 
and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of  that 
law, as the positive laws of coinmonwealths ;  nay, pos- 
sibly plainer, as much as reason is easier  to be under- 
stood  than the fancies  and intricate  contrivances  of 
men, following contrary and hidden  interests put into 
words ;  for so truly are a great part of  the municipal 
laws of  countries, which are onIy so far right, as they 
are founded on the law of  nature, by which  they  are 
to be regulated and interpreted. 
9 13.  To this  strange doctrine,  viz.  That "  in the 
state of nature every one has the executive power" of 
the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, 
that it is unreasonable for  men to be judges in their 
own cases, that self-love will make men partial to them- 
selves  and their friends : and, on the other side, that 
ill-nature!  passion, and revenge will carry them too far 
in punishing others ;  and hence nothing but confusion 
and disorder will follow : and that therefore God hath 
certainly  appointed  government  to restrain  the par- 
tiality and violence  of  men. 31 easily grant, that civil 
government  is  the  proper  remedy  for  the  inconve- 
niencies  of  the state of  nature, which  must certainly 
be great, where men may be judges in their own case ; 
since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so un- 
just as to  do his  brother  an injury, will  scarce be so 
just  as  to condemn  himself  for  it: but I shall desire 
those who make this objection to remember, that abso- 
lute monarchs  are but men;  and if government is to 
be  the remedy of those evils, which  necessarily follow 
from men's  being judges  in their own cases,  and the 
state of nature is therefore not to be endured ;  I desire 
to know  what  kind of  government  that is,  and how' 
much better  it is than the state of nature, where one 
man,  commanding  a  multitude,  has the liberty to be 
judge in his  own  case, and may  do to all his subjects 
whatever he pleases, without  the least liberty to any 
one to question or control those who execute his  plea- 
sure ?  and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, 
mistake, or passion, must be submitted to  ?  Much better 
it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound 
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,judges, judges amiss  in his own, or any other case, he 
is answerable for it to the rest of mankind. 
$ 14. It is often asked, as a mighty objection, "where 
are or  ever were there any men  in such a state of na- 
ture?"  To which  it may suffice as an answer at pre- 
sent, that since  all  princes  and rulers of  independent 
governments, all through the world, are in  a state of 
nature, it is plain  the world  never was, nor  ever will 
be,  without  numbers  of  men  in  that  state.  I have 
named all governors of independent communities, whe- 
ther they are, or are not, in league with otlierscfor it 
is not every compact that puts an end to the state of 
iiature between  men,  but  only  this  oile  of  agreeing 
together mutually to enter into one  co~nmunity,  and 
make one body politic;  other promises  and  compacts 
men may make on  ith another, and yet still be  in 
the state of nature.  he  promises  and bargains  for 
truck, &c. between 7  t  e two men  in  the desert island, 
mentioned  by Grtrcilasso  de la Vega, in  his history of 
Peru ;  or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods 
ofAmerica ;  are binding to them, though they are per- 
fectly ih a state of nature, in reference to one another : 
for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, 
and not as members of society. 
$ 15. 'I'o  those that say, there were never any men in 
the state of nature, I will not only oppose the authority 
of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where 
he  says, "  'I'lic  laws  which  have  been  hitherto  men- 
tioned,"  i.  e.  the laws  of  nature,  &(  do bind  men  abso- 
lutely, even as they are men,  although they have never 
any  settled  fellowship, never  any  solemn  agreement 
amongst themselves what to do, or not to do :  but for- 
asmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish 
ourselves  with  competent  store of  things, needful for 
such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the 
cligrlity of inan ;  therefore to supply those defects and 
iinpcrfections  which  are in  us,  as  living  singly  and 
solely by  ourselves, we  are naturally induced  to seek 
communion and fellowship with others.  This was the 
cause  of  men's  uniting themselves  at. first  in politic 
societies."  But I moreover  affirm,  that all  men  are 
naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own 
consents they make themselves  members  of  some  po- 
litic society ;  and I doubt not in the sequel of this dis- 
course to make it very clear. 
CHAPTER 111. 
Of the State of  War. 
$ 16.  THE  state of  war is a state of enmity and de- 
struction:  and  therefore declaring by word  or action, 
not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate, settled design 
upon  another man's  life,  puts him in a state of  war 
with  him  against  whom he has declared  such an in- 
tention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power 
to be  taken away by him,  or any one  that joins with 
him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel ;  it being 
reasonable  and justl I should have a  right to destroy 
that which  threatens me with destruction:  for, by the 
fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved 
as much  as  possible,  when  all cannot  be  preserved, 
the safety of the innocent is to be  preferred:  and one 
may  destroy a man who  makes war  upon him, or has 
discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason 
that he may kill  a  wolf  or a lion; because  such men 
are not under  the ties  of  the  comrnon  law  of  reason, 
have no other rule but that of  force and violence, and 
so may be treated  as beasts of  prey,  those dangerous 
iwd noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him 
whenever he falls into their power. 
17. And  hence it is, that lie who attempts to get 
another man into his absolute power, does thereby put 
himself  into a  state of war  with him;  it being to be 
understood  as a declaration of a desig~i  ul)ou his life : 
li)r 1 Ilit~c  reason  to conclude, that lle who would  get 
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as he pleased when  he  got me  there,  and destroy me 
too when  he had  a fancy to it ; for nobody can desire 
to have me in his  absolute power, unless it be to com- 
pel me  by force  to that which  is  against the right of 
my freedom, i. e. make me  a  slave.  To be  free from 
such force is the only security of my preservation ;  and 
reason  bids  me  look  on  him  as an enemy to my pre- 
servation, who would take away that freedom which is 
the fence to it; so that he who  makes an attempt to 
enslave  me,  thereby  puts himself  into a  state of war 
with me.  He that, in the state of nature, would take 
away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, 
must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take 
away every thing else, that freedom being the founda- 
tion of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, 
would  take away the freedom  belonging  to  those  of 
that society or commonwealth,  must  be  supposed to 
design to take away from them every thing else,  and 
so be looked on as in a state of war. 
$ 18.  This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, 
who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any de- 
sign upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, 
so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, 
or what  he  pleases,  from  him;  because  using force, 
where he has no right, to get me  into his  power,  let 
his pretence be what it will, I have  no reason to sup- 
pose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would 
not, when  he had me  in his  power, take away every 
thing else.  And therefore it is  lawful for me to treat 
him as one who has put himself into a state of war with 
me, i.  e. kill him if I can ; for to that hazard does  he 
justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, 
and is aggressor in it. 
5 19. And here we  have  the plain  "difference  be- 
tween the state of nature and the state  of war ;"  which, 
however some men have confounded, are as far distant 
as a  state of peace,  good-will,  mutual assistance and 
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and 
mutual destruction, are one from another.  Men living 
togfther  according to reason, without  a  common  su- 
perior on earth, with authority to judge between them, 
is properly the state of nature.  But force, or 3  declared 
design of force, upon the person of another, where there 
is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, 
is the state of war :  and it is the want of such an appeal 
gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, 
though he be in society, and a fellow-subject.  Thus a 
thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, 
for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when 
he sets on me to rob  me but of my horse or coat; be- 
cause  the law, which  was  made  for  my preservation, 
where it cannot interpose to secure my life from  pre- 
sent force, which, if lost, is  capable  of  no  reparation, 
permits me my own  defence,  and  the right of war,  3 
liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor al- 
lows not time to appeal to our common judge,  nor the 
decision  of  the law,  for  remedy  in  a  case where the 
mischief may be irreparable.  Want of a common judge 
with authority puts all men in a state of nature :  force 
without right, upon  a man's  person, makes a state of 
war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge. 
§ 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of 
war ceases between those that are in society, and are 
equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination 
of the law ;  because then there lies open the remedy of 
appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm : 
but where no such appeal is,  as in the state of nature, 
for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to 
appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues with 
a right to the innocent party to destroy the other when- 
ever he can,  until  the aggressor offers peace, and de- 
sires  reconciliation  on such  terms  as may repair  any 
wrongs he has already done,  and secure the innocent 
for the future;  nay, where an appeal to the law, and 
constituted jhdges,  lies open, but the remedy is denied 
by  a  manifest  perverting  of justice,  and a barefaced 
wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence 
or injuries of  some men,  or party of men ; there it is 
hard  to imagine  any thing  but  a state  of  war:  fbr 
wherever violence is used,  and injury done, though by 
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and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, 
or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and 
redress thc innocent, by  an unbiassed application of it, 
to all ~vho  are under it; wherever that is not bo?zaJde 
clone,  war  is made upon  the sufferers, who having no 
appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only 
remedy in such cases, an appeal to Heaven. 
$ 91.  To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no 
appeal but to Heaven, and wherein every the least dif- 
ference is apt to end, where there is  no  authority to 
decide between the contenders) is one great reason of 
men's  putting  themselves  into society,  and  quitting 
the state of nature:  for where there is an authority, a 
power on earth, from which  relief  can be had  by ap- 
peal,  there the continuance of the state of war is ex- 
cluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. 
Had there  been  any  such  court,  any  superior juris- 
cliction on earth, to determine the right between Jeph- 
thah  and the Ammonites,  they had  never  come  to a 
state of war: but we  see  he was forced  to appeal to 
Heaven : 66 The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this 
day, between the children of Israel and the children of 
Ammon," Judg. xi. 27 ; and then prosecuting,  and re- 
lying on his  appeal, he leads out his army to battle : 
and therefore in such controversies, where the question 
is put, who shall be judge? it cannot be meant, who 
shall decide  the controversy;  every one  knows  what 
dephtllah here tells us, that  4c the Lord the Judge" shall 
judge.  Where there is no ,judge on earth, the appeal 
lies to God in heaven.  That question then cannot mean, 
who shall judge whether another hath put himself in a 
state of  war with me, and whether I may, as Jephthah 
did, appeal to Heaven in it? of  that I myself can only 
be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at 
the great day, to the supreme Judge of all men. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
$ 22. THE  natural liberty of wan is to be free from 
any superior power on earth, and riot to be under the 
will  or legislative autliority of man, but to have only 
the law of nature for his rule.  The liberty of man, in 
society, is to be under no other legislative power, but 
that established, by consent, in the comrnonwealth ;  nor 
under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, 
but what that legislative shall enact, according to the 
trust put in it.  Freedom, then, is not what sir Robert 
Filmer tells us, 0.  A. 55, "  a  liberty for  every  one  to 
do what he lists, to live  as he pleases, and not  to be 
tied by any laws :" but freedom of men under govern- 
ment is, to have a standing rule to live by,  conlmon to 
every one of that society, and made by the legislative 
power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in 
all things, where the rule prescribes not ; and not to 
be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbi- 
trary will of  another man : as freedom of nature is, to 
be under no other restraint but the law of nature. 
§ 23.  This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, 
is so necessary to, and closely joined  with, a man's  pre- 
servation, that he cannot part with it, but by what for- 
feits his preservation and life together : for a man, not 
having  the power of  his own life, cannot, by compact, 
or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put 
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, 
to take away his life when  he pleases.  Nobody  can 
give inore power than he has himself; and he that can- 
not take away his own life, cannot give another power 
over it.  Indeed, having  by his fault forfeited his own 
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has forfeited it,  may (when  he has him in his  power) 
delay to take it, and make use  of him to his  own ser- 
vice,  and he does  him no injury by it :  for, whenever 
he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value 
of  his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his 
master, to draw on himself the death he desires. 
$ $26. This is the perfect condition of  slavery, which 
is nothing  else  but "the  state of  war  continued, be- 
tween a lawful conqueror and a captive :"  for, if once 
compact enter between  them, and make an agreement 
for a limited  power  on the one side, and obedience on 
the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long 
as the compact endures :  for, as has been said, no tnan 
can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he 
hath not in himself, a power over his own life. 
I confess, we find  among the Jews, as well as other 
nations, that men  did sell themselves ; but, it is plain, 
this was only to drudgery, not to slavery : for, it is evi- 
dent, the person sold was not under an absolute,  arbi- 
trary, despotical power :  for the master could not have 
power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, 
he was obliged to let go free out of  his service;  and 
the master of  such a servant was  so  far  from  haviag 
an arbitrary power  over his life, that he could not, at 
(pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, 
or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi. 
CHAPTER V. 
Of Property. 
5  25.  WHETHER  we  consider  natural  reason, 
wnich  tells  us,  that  men,  being  once  born,  have 
n  right  to  their  preservation,  mid  conseqllently  to 
meat  and  drink,  and  such  other  things  as  nature 
affords  for  their  subsistence;  or  revelation,  which 
gives us  an account of  those grants God made of  the 
world to Adam, and to Noah,  and his  sons ;  it is very 
clear,  that God,  as king  David  says,  Psal.  cxv.  16, 
"  has given the earth to the children of men ;" given. 
it to mankind in common,  But this being supposed, it 
seems to some  a  very  great  difficulty  how  any one 
should  ever come to have  a property in any thing : I 
will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult 
to make  out property, upon  a  supposition that God 
gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common, 
it is impossible  that any man, but one universal mon- 
arch,  should  have  any property, upon  a  supposition 
that God gave  the world  to Adam,  and his  heirs  in 
succession,  exclusive  of  all  the rest  of  his  posterity. 
But I shall endeavour  to show how men might come 
to have a property in several parts of  that which God 
gave to manklnd in common, and that without any ex- 
press compact of all the commoners. 
5  26.  God,  who  hath  given  the world  to men  in 
common, hath also given them  reason to make use of 
it to the best advantage of  life and convenience.  The 
earth, and all that is therein, is  given to men for the 
support and  comfort  of  their being.  And though all 
the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, be- 
long to mankind in common, as they are produced by 
the spontaneous hand of  nature ;  and nobody has ori- 
ginally  a  private  dominion,  exclusive  of  the rest  of 
mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their na- 
tural state :  yet being given for the use of men, there 
must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some 
way  ar other before they can be of  any use, or at all 
bexleficial to any particular man.  The fruit, or veni- 
son, which  nourishes  the wild  Indian, who  knows  no 
enclosure,  and is still a  tenant in common,  must  be 
his, and so his, i. e. a part of  him, that another can no 
longer have any right to it, before  it can do him any 
good for the support of  his life. 
$ 27. Though the earth, and  all inferior creatures, 
be common  to all men? yet every man has a property 
in his  own person:  th~s  nobody has any right to but 
himself.  The labour of  his body, and the work of his 
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hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, 
and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined 
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes  it 
his property.  It being by him removed from the com- 
mon  state nature  hath  placed  it in,  it hath by  this 
labour something annexed to it that excludes the com- 
mon  right of  other men.  For  this labour being the 
unquestionable property of  the labourer, no man but 
he can have a right to what that is  once joined to, at 
least where there is enough, and as good, left in com- 
mon for others. 
$ 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked 
up under  an oak, or the apples he gathered from the 
trees in the wood,  has certainly appropriated them to 
himself.  Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. 
I ask then, when  did they begin  to be  his? when he 
digested? or when  he ate? or when he boiled? or when 
he brought them home ?  or when he picked then1 up  ? 
and it is plain, if  the  first  gathering made them not 
his, nothing else could.  That  labour put a distinction 
between them and common : that added something to 
them more than nature, the common mother of all, had 
done;  and so they became his private right.  And will 
any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples 
he thus appropriated, because he had  not the consent 
of  all mankind to make  them his? was it a  robbery 
thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in com- 
mon?  If such a consent as that was  necessary, man 
had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given 
him.  We see in commons, which remain  so by com- 
pact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, 
and removing  it out of  the state nature leaves it in, 
which begins the property; without which the common 
is of no use.  And the taking of this or that part does 
not  depend on the express consent of all the commoners. 
Thus the grass my horse has bit;  the turfs my servant 
has cut ;  and the ore I have digged in any place, where 
I have a right to  them in common with others; become 
my property, without the assignation or consent of any 
body.  The labour that was mine, removing them out 
of that common state they were in, hath fixed my pro- 
perty in them. 
$ 29.  By making an explicit consent of every com- 
moner  necessary to any one's  appropriating to himself 
any part of what is given in common, children  or  ser- 
vants could not cut the meat,which their father  or master 
had provided for them in common, without assigning to  ..  every one his peculiar part.  1  liough the water running 
in the fountair1 be every one's,  yet who  can doubt but 
that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out?  His 
labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where 
it was common, and belonged equally to a11 her children, 
and hath thereby appropriated it to himself. 
9 30.  Thus this law of  reason makes the deer that 
Indian's  who  hath killed  it; it is  allowed  to be  his 
goods who hath bestowed  his  labour  upon it, though 
before  it was  the  common  right  of  every one.  And 
amongst those who  are counted the civilized  part of 
mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws 
to determine property, this original law of  nature, for 
the beginning of property, in what was before common, 
still takes place ; and by virtue thereof, what fish any 
one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining 
common of mankind; or what ambergris any one takes 
up here,  is by the labour that removes  it out of  that 
common state nature left it in made his  property who 
takes that pains about it.  And even  amongst us, the 
hare that any one is hunting is thought his who pur- 
sues her during the chase:  for  being  a beast  that is 
still  looked  upon  as  common,  and no man's  private 
possession;  whoever  has  employed  so  much  labour 
about any of  that kind, as to find and pursue her, has 
thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein 
she waF  common, and hnth begun a property. 
§ 31.  It will  perhaps  be  objected  to this, that "  if 
gathering  the acorns, or  other fruits of  the earth, &c. 
makes  a right to them, then any one  may engross as 
much as he will."  To which  I answer, Not so.  The 
same law  of  nature, that does by this means give us 
property, does also bound that property too.  " God 
has  given  us  all things richly,"  1 Tim. vi. 17, is the 
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voice of reason confirmed by inspiration.  But 110~~~  far 
has he given it us?  To enjoy.  As much as any one 
can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, 
so much he may by his labour fix a property in :  what- 
ever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs 
to others.  Nothing was made by God for man to spoil 
or destroy.  And thus, considering the plenty of natural 
provisions there was a long time in tile world, and the 
few spenders;  and to how  small  a  part of  that pro- 
vision the industry of one man could  extend itself, and 
engross it to the prejudice of  others ;  especially keep- 
ing within  the bounds, set  by  reason,  of  what  might 
serve for  his use;  there could  be then little room for 
quarrels or contentions about property so established. 
34  But the chief matter of  property being now 
not the fruits of  the earth, and the beasts that subsist 
on it, but the earth itself;  as that which takes in, and 
carries with it all the rest ;  1  think it is plain, that pro- 
perty in that too is acquired as the former.  As much 
land as a man tills,  plants,  improves,  cultivates,  and 
can use  the product of, so much is his  propert-y.  HE 
by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the com- 
mon.  Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body 
else: has an equal title to it, and therefore he cannot 
appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of 
all his fellow-commoners,  all mankind.  God, when he 
gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded 
man  also  to labour, and the penury of  his  condition 
required  it of  him.  God and his  reason commanded 
him to subdue the earth, i. e.  improve it for the benefit 
of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was 
lris own, his labour.  He  that, in obedience to this com- 
mand of  God, subdued, tilled,  and sowed  any part of 
it, thereby annexed  to it something that was his pro- 
perty, which another had no title to, nor could without 
injury take from him. 
5 33.  Nor was this  appropriation of  any parcel  of 
land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, 
since there was still enough, and as good left ;  and more 
than the yet unprovided could use.  So that, in effect, 
there was never  the less left for others because of  his 
enclosure for himself:  for he that leaves as much as a- 
other can make use of, does as good as take nothing at 
all.  Nobody could think himself injured by the drink- 
ing of  another  man, though he took  a  good draught, 
who had  a whole river of  the same water  left  him to 
quench his  thirst;  and the case  of  land  and water, 
where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. 
$34.  God gave the world to men in common ;  but 
since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest 
conveniencies of  life they were  cnpable to draw  from 
it, it cannot be  supposed he meant it should  always 
remain common and uncultivated.  He gave it to the 
use of  the industrious and rational (and labour was to 
be his title  to it), not to the fancy or covetousness of 
the  quarrelsome  and  contentious.  He that had  as 
good  left for  his  improvement  as was  already taken 
up,  needed  not  complain,  ought not  to meddle with 
what was already improved by another's labour : if he 
did, it is plain he desired the benefit of  another's pains, 
which  he had  no right to, and not  the ground which 
God had given him in common with others to labour 
on, and whereof there was as good left as that already 
possessed, and more than he kaew what to do with, or 
his industry could reach to. 
$35. It  is true, in land that is common in England, 
or any other country, where there is plenty of  people 
under government, who have money and commerce, no 
one can enclose or  appropriate any part without the 
consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left 
colnmon by compact, i. e. by the law of the land, whiah 
is  not to be violated.  And though it be common, in 
respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind, but is 
the joint  property of this  county, or this parish.  Be- 
sides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be 
as good to  the rest of the commoners as the whole was 
when they could 311  make use of the whole ;  whereas in 
the beginning and first peopling of  the great common 
of the world  it was  quite otherwise.  The law  man 
was under  was  rather for  appropriating.  God com- 
manded, and his  wants  forced  him to labour.  That 
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wherever he had fixed it.  And hence subduing or CUE 
tivating  the earth,  and  having  dominion, we  see  are 
joined  together.  The one gave title to the other.  So 
that God,  by commanding to subdue, .ave authority 
so far  to  appropriate:  and  the condition  of  humail 
life, which  requires labour  and materids to work on, 
necessarily intraduces private possessions. 
5  36. The measure  of property nature has well set 
by the extent of men's  labour and the conveniencies of 
life :  no man's  labour could subdue, or appropriate all ; 
nor could  his  enjoyment consume  rnore  than  a small 
part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, 
to intrench upon  the right of  another, or  acquire to 
himself  a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, 
who would  still have room for as good and as large a 
possession (after the other had taken out his) as before 
it was appropriated.  This measure did confine every 
man's  possession  to a very  moderate proportion, and 
such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury 
to any body, in the first ages of  the world, when men 
were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their 
company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than 
to be straitened for want of room to plant in.  And the 
same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to 
any body, as full as the world seems :  for supposing a 
man, or family,in the state they were at first peopling 
of  the world  by  the children  of  Adam, or Noah; let 
him plant in some inland, vacant places of America, we 
shall find that the possessions  he could  make himself, 
upon the measures we  have given, would not be very 
large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of man- 
kind, or give them reason to complain, or think them- 
selves injured by this man's  encroachment; though the 
race of men have now spread themselves to all the cor- 
ners of  the world, and do infinitely exceed  the small 
number was  at the beginning.  Nay,  the  extent  of 
ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have 
heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a  man  may  be 
permitted  to plough, sow,  and  reap,  without  being 
disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only 
his  making use  of  it.  But, on  the contrary,  the in- 
habitants think  themselves  beholden  to him, who, by 
his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, 
has increased  the stock  of  corn,  which  they  wanted. 
Rut be this as it will, which  I lay no stress on; this I 
dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, viz. 
that every man should have as much as he could make 
use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening 
any body;  since  there is land enough in the world to 
suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of 
money, and the tacit agreement of  men to put a value 
on it, iritroduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a 
right to them ;  which, how it has done, I shall by and 
by  show more at  large. 
$ 37.  This is certain, that in the beginning, before 
the desire of having more than man needed had altered 
the intrinsic value  of  things, which  depends  only  on 
their usefulness to the life of man ;  or had agreed, that 
a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep with- 
out wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of 
flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right 
to appropriate, by their labour, each one to himself, as 
much of the things of nature as he could use :  yet this 
could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where 
the same plenty was still left to those who would use 
the same industry.  To  which let me add, that he who 
appropriates land  to himself  by his  labour,  does  not 
lessen, but increase the comnlon stock of mankind :  for 
the provisions  serving to the support of  human life, 
produced by one acre of  enclosed and cultivated land, 
arc (to speak  much within  compass)  ten  times  more 
than those which  are yielded by an acre of land of an 
equal richness lying wastc in comrnon.  And therefore 
he that encloses land, and has n  greater plenty of the 
conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have 
from an hundred left to nature,  may truly bc said  to 
give ninety acres to mankind : for his labour now sup- 
plies him with provisions out of  ten acres, which were 
by the product of an hundred lying in common.  I have 
here  rated the improved  land very low, in making its 
product but as ten to one, when  it is much nearer an 
hundred to one : for I ask, whether in the wild woods 
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without  any  iinprovement,  tillage,  or  husbandry,  a 
thousand  acres  yield  the  needy  and  wretched  in- 
habitants  as many conveniencies  of  life  as  ten  acres 
equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are 
well cultivated ? 
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as 
much  of  the wild  fruit,  killed,  caught, or tamed, as 
many of the beasts,  as he could ;  he that so employed 
his  pains  about any of  the spontaneous products  of 
nature, as any way to alter them from the state which 
nature put them In,  by placing any of  his  labour  on 
them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them : but if 
they perished, in his possession, without their due use ; 
if the fruits rotted, or the venison  putrefied, before he 
could  spend it; he offended  against the common law 
of  nature, and bas liable to be punished ;  he invaded 
his neighbour's  share, for he had no right, farther than 
his use called for any of them, and they might serve to 
afEord him conveniencies of life. 
$ 38.  The same measures governed the possession of 
land too : whatsoever he tilled and reaped, hid  up and 
rliade  use  of,  before  it spoiled, that was  his  peculiar 
right;  whatsoever  he encIosed,  and  could  feed,  and 
~rlake  use of, the cattle and product was also his.  But 
if either the  grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, 
or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering 
and laying up ;  this part of the earth, notwithstanding 
his enclosure, was  still to be looked  on  as waste, and 
might be the possession of any other.  Thus, at the be- 
ginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could 
till, and make it his own land, and yet leare enough to 
Abel's  sheep to feed on ; a few acres would  serve for 
both their possessions.  But as families increased, and 
industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged 
with the need of them ; but yet it was commonly with- 
out any fixed property in the ground they made use of, 
till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and 
built cities;  and then, by consent, they came in  time 
to set out the bounds of  their distinct territories, and 
agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and 
by laws within themselves settled the properties of those 
of the same society:  fur we aeo that in that part efthe 
world which  was first inhabited, and therefore like to 
be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham's  time, 
diey wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which 
was  their  substance,  freely  up and down;  and  this 
Abraham did, in a  country where he was a stranger. 
Whence it is  plain,  that at least a great part of  the 
land  lay  in common;  that the inhabitants  valued it 
not, nor claimed property in any more than they made 
use of.  But when  there was not room  enough in the 
same place for their herds  to feed  together,  they by 
consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5, separated 
and enlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. 
And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and 
his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6. 
5 39.  And  thus, without supposing any private do- 
ininion  and property in Adam, over all the world,  ex- 
clusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, 
nor any one's  property be made out fro111 it; but sup- 
posing the world  given,  as it was,  to the children of 
men in common, we  see how  labour could  make men 
distinct titles to several parcels  of  it, for their private 
uses;  wherein  there  could be no  doubt of  right,  no 
room for quarrel. 
tj  40.  Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consi- 
deration it may  appear, that the property  of  labour 
should be able to overbalance the community of land : 
for it is labour indeed that put the difference of value 
on every thing ;  and let any one consider what the dif- 
ference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco 
or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the 
same land lying in  common, without  any  husbandry 
upon it, and he will  find, that the improvement of la- 
bour makes the far greater part of the vaiue.  I think 
it will be but a very modest computation to say,  that 
of the products of  the earth useful to the life of man, 
mne-tenths are the effects of  labour:  nay, if  we will 
rightly estimate things as they come  to our use,  and 
cast up the several expenses about them, what in them 
is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall 
find,  that in most of them ninety-nine  hundredths  are 
wholly to be put on the account of labour. 364  Of  Civil Govemzment.  Of  Civil Government.  363 
$  41.  There cannot be  a  clearer  demonstration of 
any thing, than several nations of the Americans are of 
this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the conlforts 
of life ;  whom nature having furnished as liberally as 
any other people  with  the materials of  plenty, i. e. a 
fruitful soil,  apt to produce in abundance what might 
serve for food, raiment, and delight ;  yet, for want of 
improving it by labour, have not  one-huncll.edth  part 
of the conveniencies we  enjoy : and a king of a large 
and fruitful territory there feeds,  lodges,  and is  clad 
worse than a day-labourer in England. 
§ 42.  To make this a little  clear, let us but trace 
some of  the ordinary provisions  of  life, through their 
several progresses, before they come to our use, and see 
how much of  their value they receive from human in- 
dustry.  Bread, wine, and cloth, are things of daily use, 
and great plenty ;  yet notwithstanding, acorns, water, 
and leaves,  or  skins,  must  be  our  bread,  drink,  arid 
clothing,  did  not labour  furnish us  with these  more 
useful commodities :  for whatever bread is more worth 
than acorns, wine  than water,  and  cloth  or silk than 
leaves, skins, or moss,  that is wholly owing to labour 
and industry; the  one  of  these  being  the  food  and 
raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with ;  the 
other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare 
for  us; which,  how  much  they  exceed  the other  in 
value, when any one hath computed, he will then see 
how much labour makes  the far greatest part of  the 
value of things we enjoy in this world :  and the ground 
which produces the materials  is scarce to be reckoned 
in as any, or, at most,  but a very small part of it ;  so 
little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to 
nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, 
or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste;  and  ve 
shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than 
nothing. 
This shows how much numbers of men are to be pre- 
ferred to largeness of dominions ;  and that the increase 
of lands,  and the right of  employing of  them, is  the 
great art of government :  and that prince, who shall be 
so wise  and godlike,  as by established laws of  liberty 
to secure protection and encouragement to the honest 
industry of mankind, against the oppression of power 
and narrowness of party, will  quickly be  too hard for 
his neighbours : but this by the by.  To return to the 
argument in hand. 
$ 43.  An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels 
of wheat, and another in America, which, with the same 
husbandry, would  do the like,  are, without  doubt, of 
the same natural intrinsic value :  but yet the benefit 
mankind receives from  the one in a year is worth 51. 
and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if  all 
the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, 
and sold here ;  at least, I may truly say, not one thou- 
sandth.  It  is labour, then, which puts the greatest part 
of the value upon land, without which it would scarcely 
be worth any thing:  it is to that we owe the greatest 
part of all its useful products ;  for all that the straw, 
bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than 
the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, 
is all the effect of labour :  for it is not barely the plough- 
man's  pains, the reaper's  and  thresher's  toil, and the 
baker's  sweat, is to 3e counted into xhe breaG we eat; 
the labour of those who  broke  the oxen, who  digged 
and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed 
the timber employed  about the plough, mill, oven,  or 
any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite 
to this corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being 
made bread, must all be charged on the account of la- 
bour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the 
earth furnished only the almost worthless materials, as 
in themselves.  It would  be  a  strange "  catalogue of 
things, that industry provided  and made use of,  about 
every loaf of  bread,"  before it came  to our use,  if we 
could  trace them; iron, wood, leather,  bark,  timber, 
stone, brieks,  coals,  lime,  cloth,  dyeing, drugs, pitch, 
tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in 
the ship, that brought any of the commodities used by 
any of  the workmen,  to any part of  the  work:  all 
which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, 
to reckon up. 
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things of  nature  are given  in  common,  yet  man,  by 
being  master  of  himself,  and "proprietor  of  his  own 
person,  and the actions or labour of it, had still in him- 
self the great foundation of property ;" and that which 
made up the greater part of what he  applied  to the 
support or comfort of  his  being, when  invention  and 
arts had improved  the conveniencies  of  life, was  per- 
fectly his  own,  and  did  not  belong  in  common  to 
others. 
$ 45.  Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of 
property wherever any one was  pleased  to employ it 
upon what was common,  which remained a long while 
the far greater part,  and is yet more  than  mankind 
makes  use  of.  Men, at first,  for  the most part, con- 
tented themselves with what unassisted nature offered 
to their necessities:  and though afterwards, in some 
parts of  the world, (where the increase of people  and 
stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and 
so of some value)  the several communities settled the 
bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within 
themselves regulated the properties of the private men 
of  their society,  and so,  by compact  and agreement, 
settled the prokerty which labour and industry began : 
and the leagues that have been made between several 
states and kingdoms,  either expressly  or  tacitly  dis- 
owning all claim and right to the land in the others' 
possession, have, by common consent, given up their pre- 
tences to tlreir natural common right, which origina?ly 
they had  to tlose countries,  and so have, by positive 
qreement, settled a  property amongst themselves, in 
distinct parts and parcels  of the earth; yet there are 
still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the in- 
habitants  thereof  not having joined  with the rest  of 
mankind  in the consent of  the use  of  their  coinmon 
money) lie  waste, and are more than the people who 
dwell on it do or can make use  of, and so still lie in 
common ;  though this can scarce happen amongst that 
part of  mankind  that have  consented  to the use  of 
money. 
§ 46.  The greatest part of  things  really useful  to 
the life of man,  and such as the necessity of subsistins 
made the first coinmoners  of the world look after,  as 
it doth the Americans  now,  are  generally  things  of 
short duration ; such as, if they are not consumed by 
use, will decay and perish of themselves :  gold, silver, 
and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath 
put the value on", more than real use, and the necessary 
support of  life.  Now of  those good things which na- 
ture hatli provided  in eonlmon, every one had a right 
(as Lath been  said) to as much  as he could  use,  and 
property in ;I11  that lie could effect with his labour; all 
that 11;s  industry could  extend  to,  to alter from  the 
statc nature had put it in, was his.  IIe that gntherecl, 
a hundred bnshels  of  acorns or  apples, had thereby a 
property in them ; they wcrc his goods as soon as gn- 
thered.  He was only to look that he used them before 
they  spoiled,  else  he took  more  than his  share,  and 
robbed others.  And indeed it was a  foolish thing, is 
well as dishonest, to hoard up rnore than he could make 
use  of.  If he gave away a part to any body else,  so 
that it perished not uselessly in his possession, these he 
also made use of.  And if he also bartered away plums, 
that ~~ould  have rotted in a week, for nuts that would 
last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; 
he wasted not the comrnon stock ;  destroyed no part of 
the portion  of  the goods that belonged to others,  so 
long as nothing perished uselessly in lris hands.  Again,  , 
if he rvould give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased 
with  its colour ;  or exchange his  sheep  for  shells, or 
wool for  a sparkling pebble  or a  diamond, and keep 
those by him all Iris  life, he invaded  not the right  of 
others; he might heap as much of these durable things 
as he pleased ; the exceeding of the bounds of his just 
property not lying in  tlie  largeness of his possession, 
but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it. 
$ 47. And thus came in the use ofmoney, some last- 
ing thing that men  might keep without spoiling, and 
that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for 
the truly useful,  but perishabk supports of life. 
9 48.  And as different degrees of industry were apt 
to give men possessions in different proportions, so this 
invention of money gave them tlie opportunity to con- 366  Of  Civil Government.  Of Civil Government.  367' 
tinue and enlarge them :  for supposing an island, se- 
parate from all possible commerce with the rest of the 
world, wherein there were but an hundred families, but 
there were sheep,  horses, and cows, with other useful 
animals,  wholesome  fruits,  and land enough for  corn 
for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in 
the island, either because of its commonness, or perish- 
ableness, fit to supply the place of money ;  what reason 
could any one have there to enlarge his possessions be- 
-  yond the use of his family and a plentiful supply to its 
consumption,  either in  what  their own  industry  pro- 
duced, or they could barter for  like perishable, useful 
commodities with others  ?  Where there is not some- 
thing, both lasting and scarce,  and so valuable, to be 
hoarded up,  there men will not be apt to enlarge their 
possessions of land, were it ever so rich, ever so free for 
them to take:  for 1 ask, what would  a man value ten 
thousand,  or an hundred thousand  acres of excellent 
land, ready cultivated, and well  stocked too with cat- 
tle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where 
he had no hopes  of commerce with other parts of  the 
world,  to draw money to him  by the sale of  the pro- 
duct?  It  would not be  worth the enclosing, and we 
should see him  give up again to the wild  common of 
hature, whatever was more than would supply the con- 
veniencies of life to be had there for him and his family. 
5 49.  Thus in the beginning all the world was Ame- 
rica, and more so tllan that is cow ;  for no such thing 
as money was any where known.  Find out something 
that hath the use  and  value  of  money  amongst  his 
neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin pre- 
sently to enlarge his possessions. 
50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to 
the life of  man in proportion to food, raiment, and car- 
riage,  has  its value  only  fro111  the  consent  of  mcn, 
whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure ; 
it is plain, that men have agrced to a disproportionate 
and unequal  possessioll  of the earth; they having, by 
a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how  a 
man may fairly possess more land than he himself can 
use the product of, by receiving,  in exchange for the 
overplus,. gold and  silver, whieh  may  be  hoarded  up 
without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling 
or decaying :In tht: hands of the possessor.  This partage 
04 things in  an inequality of private possessions,  men 
have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and 
without compact ;  only by putting a value on gold and 
silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money :  for in 
governments, the laws regulate the right of property, 
and  the possession  of  land  is determilled  by positive 
constitutions. 
§ 51.  And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, 
c6 how labour could  at 6rst begin a title of property " 
in the common things of nature, and how the spending 
it upon our uses bounded it.  So that there could then 
be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt 
about the largeness of  possession  it gave.  Right and 
conveniency went together; for as a man had a righ 
to all ho could  employ his labour upon, so he had no  4 
temptation to labour for more than he could make use 
of.  This left no room for controversy about the title, 
nor  for  encroachment  on  the  right  of  others; what 
portion a man carved to himself was easily seen:  and 
it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too 
much, or take more than he needed. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
Of p3nternal  Power. 
$ 52. IT  may perhaps be censured as an impertinent 
criticism,  in  a discourse  of  this nature, to find fault 
with words and names that have obtained in tho world : 
and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones 
when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this 
of paternal power probably has done;  which seems so 
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in the father,  as if  the mother  had  no  share in it: 
whereas,  if  we  consult  reason  or revelation,  we  shall 
find she hath an equal title.  This may give one reason 
to ask, whether this might not be more properly called 
parental power ?  for  whatever  obligation nature  and 
the right of  generation lays on children, it must cer- 
tainlycbind them equally to both concurrent causes of 
it.  And  accordingly we  see the positive  law of God 
every where joins  them together, without  distinction, 
when it commands the obedience of children : "  Honour 
thy father and thy mother,"  Exod. xx. 12.  "Whoso- 
ever curseth his father or his mother,"  Lev. xx. 9.  "Ye 
shall fear every man his  mother  and his father,"  Lev. 
xix. 5.  "Children,  obey your parents,"  &c. Eph. vi.  I, 
is the style of the Old and New Testament. 
5 53.  Had but this one thing been well considered, 
without looking any deeper into the matter, it might 
perhaps have kept men from running into those gross 
mistakes they have made, about this power of parents ; 
which, lio~~ever  it might, without any great harshness, 
bear the name of absolute dominion, and regal authority, 
when under the title of paternal power it seemed ap- 
propriated to the father, would yet have  sounded but 
oddly, and in the very name shown the absurdity,  if 
this supposed absolute power  over  children had been 
called parental;  and thereby have discovered, that it 
belonged  to the mother  too:  for  it will  but very ill 
serve the turn of  those  men who contend so much for 
the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as 
they call it,  that the mother should have any share in 
it; and it would have but ill supported the monarchy 
they contend for, when  by the very name it appeared 
that that  fundainental  authority, from  whence  they 
would derive their goveri~ment  of a single person only, 
was not placed in one, but two persons jointly.  Rut 
to let this of names pass. 
S 54.  Though I  have  said  above,  chap. ii. "  That 
dl men  by  nature  are equal,"  I cannot  LC supposed 
to understand all sorts of equality : age or virtue may 
give men a just  precedency:  excellency of parts and 
merit may place others above the common level :  birth 
may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay 
an observance to those whom nature, gratitude, or other 
respects, may have made it due: and yet aH  this con- 
sists with the equality which all men me in, in respect 
of jurisdiction  or dominion one  over  another; tvhich 
was  the equality I there  spoke  of,  as  proper  to the 
business in hand, being that equal right that every mmi 
hath to his  natural freedom, without  being subjected 
to the will or authority of  any other man. 
$ 55. Children, I confess,  are not born in this state 
of equality, though they are born to it.  Their parents 
have  a  sort of  rule and jurisdictiofi  over  them when 
they come  into the  world,  and  for  some time  after; 
but it is but a temporary one.  The bonds of this sub- 
jection are like the swaddling-clothes they are wrapt up 
in, and supported by, in the weakness of  their infancy: 
age and  reason,  as they grow up, loosen them, till at: 
length they drop quite off:, and leave a man at his own 
free disposal. 
$56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and 
mind in full possession of their strength and reason, and 
so was capable from the first instant of his being to pro- 
vide for his own support and preservation, and govern 
his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason 
which God had implanted in him.  From him the world 
is peopled with his  descendants, who  are all born  in- 
fants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or under- 
standing :  but to supply the defects  of this imperfect 
state,  till the improvement  of  growth  and  age hat11 
removed  them,  Adam  and  Eve,  and  after  them  all 
parents wese, by the  law of nature,"  under an obligation 
to preserve,  nourish,  and educate the children"  they 
had begotten;  not as their own workmanship, but  the 
workmanship  of  their  own  mker, the Almighty,  to 
whom they were to be accountable for them. 
5 57.  The law that was  to govern  Adam  was  the 
same  that was to govern  a31  his posterity, the law of 
reason.  But hisoffspring having another way of entrance 
into the world, different from him, by a  natural birth, 
that produced them is  lnorant  and without  thc use  of 
VOL.  v.  l3  U reason, they were  not presently  under  that law ;  for 
nobody can he under a law which is not promulgated to 
him ;  and this law being promulgated or made known 
by reason only, he that  is  not come to the use  of  his 
reason cannot be said to be under this law ;  and Adam's 
children, being not presently as soon as born under this 
law of reason, were not presently frecl : for  law, in  its 
true notion, is  not  so  much  the limitation, as the di- 
rection of a free and intelligent agent to his proper in- 
terest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general 
good of  those under that law : could  they be happier 
witnout it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself 
vanish ;  and that ill deserves the name of  confinement 
which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices.  So 
that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not 
to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge free- 
dom : for in all the states of created beings capable of 
laws, "  where  there is  no law, there  is no freedom;" 
for liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from 
others ;  which cannot be where there is  not  law :  but 
freedom is not, as we are told, '' a liberty for every man 
to do  what he lists :" (for  who  could  be  free,  when 
every other man's  humour might domineer over him ?) 
but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person, 
actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the 
alIowance of those laws under which he is, and therein 
not to be  subject to the arbitrary will of  another, but 
freely follow his own. 
$ 58.  The  power, then, that parents have over their 
children  arises from that duty which  is incumbent on 
them, to take care of  their  offspring  during the im- 
perfect  state of  childhood.  To inform the mind, and 
govern  the  actions  of  their yet ignorant nonage, till 
reason shall take its place, and ease them of that trouble, 
is what the children want, and the parents are bound 
to:  for  God  having given  man  an understanding to 
direct his  actions, has allowed him a freedom of  will, 
and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, 
within the bounds of that law he is under.  But whilst 
he is in  an estate wherein he has not understanding of 
his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of 
his own to follow : he that understands for him, must 
\\rill for him too ;  he must prescribe to liis will, and re- 
plate  his actions;  but when  he comes  to the estate 
that  made his  faather a  freeman,  the  son  is  a  free- 
man too. 
59.  This  holds  in  all  the laws a  man  is  under, 
whether natural or civil.  Is a man under the law of 
nature ?  What made him free of that law ?  what gave 
him  a free disposing of  his property, according to his 
own will, within the compass of that law? I answer, a 
state of maturity, wherein he might be supposed capable 
to know that law,  that so he might keep his  actions 
within the bounds of  it.  When he has acquired that 
state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be 
his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, 
and so comes to have it ;  till then, somebody else must 
guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law 
allows a liberty.  If such a state of reason, such an age of 
discretion made him free, the same  shall make his son 
free too.  Is a man under the law of  England ?  ?Vhat 
made him free of that law ? that is, to have the liberty to 
dispose of  his actions and possessions  according  to his 
own will, within the permission of that law ?  A capacity 
of knowing that law, which is supposed by that law at 
the age of  one-and-twenty  years,  and in some  cases 
sooner.  If this made the father free, it shall make the 
son free too.  Till then we see the law allows the son to 
have no will, but he is to be guided by  thc will of  his 
father or guardian, who is to  understand for him.  And 
if the father die, and hi1 to substitute a deputy in his 
trust; if he hath not  provided  a  tutor  to govern his 
son  during his  minority,  during his  want of under- 
standing, the law takes care to do it; some other must 
govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained 
to a state of freedom, and his  understanding be  fit to 
take the government of his  will.  But after that, the 
father and son  are equally free as much  as tutor and 
pupil after nonage;  equally subjects  of the same law 
together,  without any dominion left in the father over the 
life, liberty, or estate of  his son, whether  they be only 
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in the state and under the law of nature, or under the 
positive laws of an established government. 
60.  But if, through  defects  that may happen  out 
of the ordinary course of nature, any one comes not to 
such a degree of reason wherein he might be supposed 
capable  of  knowing  th2 law, and so living within the 
rules of it, he is never  capable of  being a free man, he 
is never let loose to the disposure of his own will,  (be- 
cause he know:  no bounds to it, has not understanding, 
its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and 
government of  others, all the time his own understand- 
ing is  incapable of  that charge.  And so lunatics and 
idiots  are never set free from the government of their 
parents.  "Children,  who  are not  as yet come  unto 
those  years  whereat  they  may  have ; and innocents 
which  are  excluded  by  a  natural  defect  from  ever 
having ; thirdly, mad men, which for the present  can- 
not  possibly  have  the  use  of  right  reason  to  guide 
themselves,  have  for  their  guide  the  reason  that 
guideth  other  men  which  are  tutors  over  them,  to 
seek and procure their  good for  them,"  says Hooker, 
Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 7.  All which seems no more than 
that duty which God and nature has laid  on  man, as 
well  as  ofher  creatures,  to  preserve  their  offspring 
till they can be able to shift  for  themselves, and will 
scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents' regal 
authority. 
§ 61.  Thus we  are born  free,  as we are born ra- 
tional ; not that we have actually the exercise of either : 
age, that brings one, brings with it the other too.  And 
thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to pa- 
rents may consist together, and are both founded on the 
same principle.  A child is free by his father's title, by 
his  father's  understanding, which is to govern him till 
he hath it of his own.  The  freedom of  s man at years of 
discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, 
whilst yet short of  that age, are so consistent, and so 
distinguishable, that the most  blinded  contenders for 
monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this dif- 
ference ; the most obstinate cannot but allow their con- 
sistency:  for were their doctrine all true, were the right 
heir of  Adam  now known, and by that title settled a 
monnrcll  in  his  throne, invested with all the absolute 
unlimited power sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he should 
die as soon as his heir were born, must  not  the child, 
notwithstanding lie were ever so free, ever so much so- 
vereign,  be in  subjection to his  mother  and nurse, to 
tutors and governors, till  age and education brought 
him  reason  and  ability to govern himself  and others ? 
The necessities  of  his life, the health of  his body, and 
the information of  his mind, would  require  him  to be 
directed by the will of others, and not his own ; and yet 
will  any one  think  that  this  restraint  and subjection 
were inconsistent with, or  spoiled  him  of  that liberty 
or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his em- 
pire  to those who  had  the government of his nonage ? 
This  government  over  him  only  prepared  him  the 
better and sooner for it.  If  any body should  ask me, 
when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just 
when his monarch is-of age to govern.  "But at what 
time,"  says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i.  sect. 
6, "  a man may be said to have attained so far forth the 
use  of  reason,  as  sufficeth  to make  him  capable  of 
those  laws  whereby  he  is  then  bound  to guide his 
actions:  this is  a  great deal  more  easy  for  sense  to 
discern than for any one by  skill and learning to de- 
termine." 
$62. Commonweaiths themselves take notice of, and 
allow, that there is a  time when men are to begin to 
act like freemen, and therefore  till that time  require 
not  oaths  of  fealty  or  allegiance,  or  other  public 
owning of, or submission  to, the government of  their 
countries.  > 
$ 63.  The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting 
according to his own will, is  grounded on  his having 
reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he 
is to govern himself by, and  make him know  how  far 
he is left to the freedom of his own will.  To  turn him 
loose to  an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to 
guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of  his 
nature to be free ;  but to thrust him out amongst brutes, 
and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much 374  Of  Civil Government. 
beneath that of  a man, as  theirs.  This is that which 
puts the authority into the parents' hands to govern the 
minority  of  their  children.  God  hath made  it their 
business  to employ this  care  on  their  offspring,  and 
hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness 
and concern to temper this power,  to apply it, as his 
wisdom designed it, to the children's  good, as long as 
they should need to be under it. 
§ 64.  But what reason can hence advance this care 
of  the parents due to their offspring  into an absolute 
arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power reaches 
no farther than, by such a discipline  as he finds most 
effectual,  to give such strength  and  health to  their bodies, 
such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best 
fit his  children  to be  most  useful  to themselves  and 
others ;  and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make 
them work,  when  they  are able,  for  their  own  sub- 
sistence.  But in this power  the mother  too  has her 
share with the father. 
§ 65.  Nay, this power so little belongs to the father 
by  any  peculiar  right  of  nature,  but  only  as he is 
guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of 
them, he loses his power over them, which goes along 
with their nourishment and education, to which it is in- 
separably  annexed;  and it belongs  as much  to the 
foster-father of an exposed child, as to  the natural father 
of another.  So little power does the bare act of beget- 
ting give a man over his issue, if all his care ends there, 
and this be all the title he hath to the name and autho- 
rity of a father. And what will become of this paternal 
power in that part of the world where one woman hath 
more than one husband at  n time '!  or in those parts of 
America, where, when the husband and wife part, which 
happelis frequently, the children are all left to the mo- 
ther, follow her, and are wholly under her care and pro- 
visim ?  If  the father die whilst the children are young, 
do they not naturally every where owe  the same obe- 
dience to their mother, during their minority, as to  their 
father were he alive ?  and will any one say, that the mo- 
ther hath a legislative power  over  her children ?  that 
she can make standing rules, which shall be ofperpetual 
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obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the con- 
cerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the 
course of  their lives ?  or  can she enforce the observa- 
tion of them with capital punishments ?  for this is the 
proper  power  of  the magistrate, of which  the father 
hnth not so much as tlie shadow.  His command over 
his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life 
or property : it is but a help to the weakness and im- 
perfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their 
education :  and though a father may dispose of his own 
possessions  as he pleases,  when his children are out of 
danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not 
to the lives or goods, which  either their  own industry 
or another's  bounty has made theirs ;  nor  to their  li- 
berty neither, when they are once arrived to the enfran- 
chisement of the years of discretion.  The father's  em- 
pire then ceases, end can from thenceforwards no more 
dispose of the liberty of his son than that of any other 
man : and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual 
jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw himself, 
having  licence from divine authority to "leave father 
and mother, and cleave to his wife." 
§ 66.  But though there be a time when a child comes 
to be as free from subjection to the will and command 
of  his  father, as the father hiqself is free from sub- 
jection  to the will of any body else, and they are each 
under no other restraint but that which is common to 
them both, whether it be the law  of  nature, or muni- 
cipal law  of  their country ;  yet this freedom exempts 
not a son from that honour which he ought, by the law 
of  God  and  nature, to pay his  parents.  God having 
made the parents instruments in his great design of con- 
tinuing the race of  mankind, and the occasions of  life 
to their children ;  as he hath laid  on them an obliga- 
tion to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring ; 
so he has laid on the children a perpetaal obligation of 
honouring  their parents, which containing  in it an in- 
ward esteem and reverence to be shown by all outward 
expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may 
ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happi- 376  Of  Civil Government. 
ness or life of  those from whom  he received  his ;  and 
engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance, 
and comfort of  those by whose means he entered into 
being, and has been  made capable of  any enjoyments 
of life :  from this obligation no state, no freedom, can 
absolve children.  But this is very far from giving pa 
rents a power  of  command over  their children, or au- 
thority to make laws and dispose as they please of their 
lives and liberties.  It  is one thing to owe honour, re- 
spect, gratitude, and assistance ; another to require an 
absolute obedience and submission.  The honour due 
to parents, a monarch in his  throne owes his mother; 
and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him 
to her government. 
$ 67.  The subjection  of  a  minor, places  in  the fa- 
ther  3  temporary government, which  terminates with 
the minority of the child :  and the honour  due from a 
child, places in the parents perpetual right to respect, 
reverence, support, and compliance too, more or less, as 
the father's  care, cost,  and kindness in his  education, 
have been more or less.  This ends not with minority, 
but holds  in all  parts and conditions of a man's  life. 
The want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that 
which  the father hath  in  the  right of  tuition,  dur- 
ing minority,  and  the right  of  honour  all  his  life, 
may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes 
about this matter:  for, to speak properly of them, the 
first of  these is rather the privilege  of children, and 
duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. 
The riourishment  and  education  of  their  children is 
a charge so incumbent on parents for their  children's 
good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care 
of it: and though the power of commanding and chas- 
tising them go along with it, yet God hath woven into 
the principles of human nature such a  tenderness for 
their  offspring,  that there is  little  fear  that parents 
should use their power with too much rigour; the ex- 
cess  is  seldom  on  the severe side, the strong bias  of 
nature drawing the other way.  And therefore God Al- 
alighty, when he would express his gentle dealing with 
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the Israelites, he tells them, that though he chastened 
them, "he chastened them as a man chastens his son," 
Deut.  viii.  5.  i. e. with tenderness  and affection,  and 
kept them under no severer  discipline  than what was 
absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to 
have slackened.  This is that power to which children 
are commanded obedience, that the pains  and care of 
their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded. 
$ 68.  On the other side, honour and support, all that 
which gratitude requires  to return for the benefits re- 
ceived by  and  from them, is the indispensable duty of 
the child, and the proper privilege of the parents.  This 
is intended for the parents' advantage, as the other is for 
the child's ;  though education, the parents' duty, seems 
to have most power, because the ignorance and infirmi- 
ties  of  childhood  stand in need  of  restraint and  cor- 
rection ;  which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind 
of dominion.  And that duty which  is comprehended 
in the word honour requires less obedience, though the 
obligation be stronger on grown than younger children: 
for who can think the command, "  Children obey your 
parents,"  requires in a  man that has children of  his 
own the same submission to his father, as it does in  his 
yet young children to him ;  and that by this precept he 
were bound  to obey all his father's  commands, if, out 
of a conceit of  authority, he should have the indiscre- 
tion to treat him still as a boy? 
§ 69. The first  part then of paternal power, or ra- 
ther duty, which is education, belongs so to,the father, 
that it terminates at  a certain season ;  when the business 
of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also aliena- 
ble before :  for a man may put the tuition of his son 
in other hands;  and he that has made his son an ap- 
prentice  to another, has  discharged  him,  during that 
time,  of a great part of his  obedience both to himself 
and to his mother.  But all the duty of honour, the other 
part, remains nevertheless entire to them ;  nothing can 
cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both,  that 
the father's  authority cannot dispossess the mother of 
this right, nor can any man discharge his son from ho- 
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from a power  to make laws,  and enforcing them with 
penalties that may reach estate, liberty, limbs, and life. 
The power  of  commanding ends  with  nonage;  and 
though after that, honour and respect, support and de- 
fence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, 
for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of, be al- 
ways due from a son to his parents ; yet all this puts no 
sceptre into the  father's  hand, no  sovereign power of 
commanding.  He has no dominion over his son's  pro- 
perty,  or  actions ; nor  any right  that his will  should 
prescribe to his son's  in all things;  however it may be- 
come his son in many  things, not very inconvenient to 
him and his family, to pay  a deference to it. 
§ 70.  A man may owe honour and respect to an an- 
cient  or wise  man ; defence to his child or friend ;  re- 
lief and support to the distressed;  and gratitude to a 
benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can 
do, cannot sufficiently pay it:  but all these give no au- 
thority, no  right to any one, of  making laws over him 
from whom they are owing.  And it is plain, all this is 
due not only to the bare title of father; not only  be- 
cause,  as has been  said, it is owing to the mother too, 
but because these obligations to  parents, and the degrees 
of what is required  of  children,  nlay be varied by the 
different  care  and  kindness,  trouble  and  expense, 
which  are often employed upon one child more than 
another. 
5 71. This shows the reason how  it comes to pass, 
that parents in societies, where they themselves are sub- 
jects,  retain a power  over  their children,  and have as 
much right to their subjection as those who are in the 
state of nature.  Which could not possibly be, if all po- 
litical power were only paternal, and that in truth they 
were  one  and  the same thing:  for  then, all paternal, 
power being in  the prince,  the subject could naturally 
have none of it.  But these two powers, political and 
paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate, are built 
upon so different foundations, and given to so different 
ends, that ever)  subject, that is a father, has as much a 
paternal power over his children as the prince has over 
his:  and  every prince, that has parents, owes them as 
much  filial  duty and obedience as the meanest of  his 
subjects  do to theirs;  and  cannot  therefore contain 
any part or degree of that kind of  dominion which a 
pince or magistrate has over his subjects. 
§ 72.  Though the obligation on the parents to bring 
up thei~  children, and the obligation on children to ho- 
nour their  parents, contain  all the power on the one 
hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to 
this relation, yet there is another power ordinary in the 
father, whereby he has a tie on  the obedience  of  his 
children;  which  though it be common  to him  with 
other men, yet the occasions of showing it almost con- 
stantly happening to fathers in their private  families, 
and the instances of  it elsewhere  being rare, and less 
taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of pa- 
ternal jurisdiction.  And  this is the power men gene- 
rally have to bestow  their estates on those who please 
them best ; the possession  of the father being the ex- 
pectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in 
certain proportions, according to the law  and custom 
of  each  country;  yet it is  commonly  in  the father's 
power  to bestow it  with  a  more  sparing or liberal 
hand, according as the behaviour  of this or that child 
hath comported with his will and humour. 
5 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of  child- 
ren:  and  there being always annexed to the enjoyment 
of land a sublnission to the government of the country, 
of which  that land  is a part; it has been commonly 
supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that 
government,  of  which  he  himself  was  a  subject, and 
that his  compact held them ;  whereas, it being only a 
necessary  condition annexed  to the land, and the in- 
heritance of an estate which is under that gpvernment, 
reaches only those who will take it on that condition, 
and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary 
submission:  for every man%  children being by nature as 
free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, 
whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they 
will join themselves  to, what comnionwealth they will 
put themselves under.  But if they will enjoy the inhe- 380  Of Civil Go~ernnrent.  Of  Civil  Gouernment.  38  1 
ritance of their ancestors, they must take it  on the same 
terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the con- 
ditions annexed to such  a  possession.  By  this power 
indeed  fathers oblige  their children  to obedience  to 
themselves,  even  when  they  are  past  minority,  and 
most commonly  too  subject them to this or that poli- 
tical power :  but neither of these by any peculiar right 
of  fatherhood, but  by  the  reward  they have in their 
hands  to enforce and recompense such a compliance ; 
and is  no more power  than  what  a  Frenchman  has 
over an Englishman, who, by the hopes of an estate he 
will leave him, will  certainly have a strong tie on his 
obedience : and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, 
he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed 
to the possession of land in that country where it lies, 
whether it be France or England. 
§ 74.  To conciude then, though the father's  power 
of commanding extends no farther than the minority of 
his children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline 
and government of that age ;  and though that honour 
and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, 
which they indispensably owe to their parents all their 
lifetime,  and in  all estates,  with all that support and 
defence which is due to them, gives the father no power 
of governing, i.  e. making laws and enacting penalties 
on his children;  though by all this he has no dominion 
over the property or actions of his  son : yet it is ob- 
vious to conceive how  easy it was,  in the first ages of 
the world,  and in places still,  where the thinness of 
people gives fgmilies leave to separate into unpossessed 
quarters, and they have room to remove or plant them- 
selves in yet vacant habitations,  for the father of the 
family to become the prince# of it ;  he had been a ruler 
It is no improbable opinion, therefore, which the arch-philosopher 
was of,  "That  the chief person in every household was always, as it 
were,  a king: so when  numbers  of I~ouseholds  joined  themselves in 
civil societies together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst 
them,  which  is  also,  as  it  seemeth,  the reason  why the name  of 
fathers continued still in them, who,  of fathers, were made rulers;  as 
also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedeck, and being 
from the beginning of the infancy of his children : and 
since without  some government  it would  be hard for 
them to live together, it was likeliest it should, by  the 
express or tacit consent of the children when they were 
grown  up, be  in the 'father,  where it seemed without 
any change barely to continue ;  when indeed nothing 
more was reqhired to it than the permitting the father 
to exercise  alone, in  his  family,  that executive power 
of the law  of  nature, which every free man haturally 
hath, and by that permission resigning up to  him a mon- 
archical power, whilst they remained in it.  But that 
this was not by any paternal right, but only by the con- 
sent  of  his  children,  is  evident  from hence,  that no- 
body doubts,  but if a stranger, whom chance or busi- 
ness had brought to his family, had there killed any of 
his  children,  or  committed  any other  fact,  he might 
condemn  and  put him to death,  OT  otherwise punish 
him, as well  as  any of  his children : which it was im- 
possible he should do by virtue of any paternal autho- 
rity over  one who  was not his  child, but by virtue of 
that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a 
man, he had a right to : and he alone could punish him 
in his family, where the respect of his children had laid 
by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dig- 
nity and authority they were willing should remain in 
him, above the rest of his family. 
5 75.  Thus it  was easy, and almost natural for child- 
ren, by a tacit,  and scarce avoidable consent, to make 
way for the father's  authority and government.  They 
had been  accustomed  in their  childhood to follow his 
direction, and to refer their little  differences to him; 
and when  they  were men,  who  fitter  to rule  them? 
kings,  to exercise the office of  priests, which fathers did at the first, 
ew perhaps  by  the  same occasion.  Howbeit,  this  is not the only 
End of regiment that has been received in the world.  The inconvc- 
niencies  of  one  kind have caused  sundry others to  be  devised;  so 
that, in a  word,  all  public  regiment,  of what  kind  soever,  scemeth 
evidently to have risen from the  deliberate  advice, consultation,  and 
composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful ;  there 
being  no impossibility  in nature considered  by  itself,  but  that  man 
might have  lived without  any public  regiment."  Hooker's Eccl, P. 
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Their little properties, and less covetousness, seldom af- 
forded  greater  controversies;  and  when  any  should 
arise, where  could  they have  a fitter umpire than he, 
by whose care they had every one been sustained and 
brought up,  and who  had a tenderness for  them all l 
It  is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt 
minority and full age; nor looked after one-and-twenty, 
or any other age that might make them  the free dis- 
posers  of  themselves  and  fortunes,  when  they  could 
have no desire to be out of their ~upilage:  the govern- 
ment they had been under during it, continued still to 
be more their protection than restraint : and they could 
nowhere  find  a  greater  security  to their  peace,  li- 
berties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father. 
5 76.  Thus the natural fathers of families by an in- 
sensible  change became the politic monarchs  of  them 
too : and  as they chanced to live long, and leave able 
and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise ; 
so  they laid the foundations of  hereditary, or elective 
kingdoms, under several constitutions and manners, oc- 
cording as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened 
to mould them.  But if princes have their titles in their 
fathers' right, and it  be a sufficient proof of the natural 
right of fathers to political authority, because they eom- 
monly were those in whose hands we find, defncto, the 
exercise  of  government:  I say,  if  this  argument be 
good,  it will  as strongly prove, that all princes,  nay 
princes only, ought to be  priests, since it is as certain, 
that in the beginning, "the  father of  the family was 
priest, as that he was ruler in hiis  own household." 
Of Civil Government. 
CHAPTER VTI. 
Of political  or civil Society. 
$77. GOD  having made man such a creature, that in 
his own judgment it was not good for him to be alone, 
put him under  strong obligations of  necessit,y,  conve- 
nience,  and inclination, to drive him into  society,  as 
well as fitted him with understanding and language to 
continue and enjoy it.  The first  society was between 
man and wife, which  gave beginning to that between 
parents and children ;  to which, in time, that between 
master and servant came to be added:  and though all 
these  might,  and  commonly  did  meet together,  and 
make up but one family, wherein  the master or mis- 
tress of  it had  some sort of rule proper  to a  family; 
each of these,  or  all  together,  came short of  political 
society,  as  we  shall  see,  if  we  consider  the different 
ends, ties, and bounds of each of these. 
5 78.  Conjugal society is made by a voluntary corn-. 
pact between man and woman ; and though it consist 
chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's 
bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation;  yet 
it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a 
communion of  interests too, as necessary not only  to 
unite  their  care and  affection,  but also  necessary  to 
their common  offspring, who have a right to be nou- 
rished and maintained  by them,  till they  are able to 
provide for themselves. 
5 79.  For the end of  conjunction between male and 
female being not barely procreation,  but the continua- 
tion of the species ;  this conjunction betwixt male and 
female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as 
is necessary to the nourishment and support of the  young 
ones, who  are to be sustained by those that got them, 
till they are able to shift and provide  for themselves. 
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the works  of  his hands, we  find the inferior creatures 
steadily obey.  In those viviparous animals which feed 
on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts 
no longer than the very act of copulation;  because the 
teat of the dam being sufficient  to nourish the young, 
till it be  able to feed on grass,  the male only begets, 
but concerns not himself  for  the female  or young,  to 
whose sustenance he can contribute nothing.  But in 
beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the 
dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish 
her numerous offspring by her own prey alone, a more 
laborious,  as well  as more  dangerous  way  of living, 
than by feeding on grass; the assistance of the male is 
necessary to the maintenance of their common  family, 
which cannot subsist ti11 they are able to prey for them- 
selves, but by the joint  care of male and female.  The 
same is to be  observed in  all birds, (except  some do- 
mestic  ones,  where  plenty  of  food  excuses  the cock 
from  feeding,  and taking  care  of  the young brood) 
whose  young needing food  in the nest, the cock and 
hen  continue  mates,  till the  young  are able  to use 
their wing, and provide for themselves. 
$ 80.  And  herein  I think lies the chief,  if  not the 
only reason, "  why the male and female in mankind are 
tied to a longer conjunction" than other creatures, viz. 
because  the female  is  capable of  conceiving,  and de 
facto  is  commonly with  child  again, and brings forth 
too a new birth, long before the former is out of a de- 
pendency for support on his parents'  help, and able to 
shift for  himself, snd  has all the assistance that is due 
to him from his  parents : whereby  the father, who is 
bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an 
obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same 
woman longer than other creatures, whose young being 
able to subsist of themselves before the time of procre- 
ation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, 
and they are at liberty, till Hymen  at his usual anni- 
versary season summons them again to  choose new mates. 
Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great 
Creator,  who  having given  to man  foresight,  and an 
ability to  lay up for the future, as well as to supply the 
present necessity, hath made  it necessary, that society 
of  man and wife  should be more lasting than of male 
and female amongst other creatures ; that so their in- 
dustry might be  encouraged, and their  interest better 
united, to make provision and lay  up goods  for  their 
common issue,  which  uncertain  mixture, or easy  and 
frequent solutions  of  conjugal society, would mightily 
disturb. 
$ 81.  But though these are ties upon mankind, which 
make the conjugal bonds inore firm and lasting in man 
than the other species of  animals;  yet  it would  give 
one reason to inquire, why  this compact, where  yro- 
creation  and  education  are  secnred,  and  inheritance 
taken  care for,  may not be made deterrniaable, either 
by consent,  or at  a certain time, or upon certain  con- 
ditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there 
being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the 
ends of it, that it should always be for life ;  I mean, to 
such  as  are under  no  restraint  of  any  positive  law, 
which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual. 
$ 82.  But the husband and wife,  though they have 
but one common concern,  yet having different under- 
standings, will  unavoidably  sometimes  have  different 
wills too ;  it therefore being necessary that the last de- 
termination, i.  e.  the rule, should be placed somewhere; 
it naturally falls to the man's  share, as  the abler and 
the stronger.  But this reaching but to the things of 
their common interest and property, leaves the wife in 
the full  and  free possession of what by contract is her 
peculiar right, and gives the husband  no  more power 
over  her  life  than  she  has over his ; the power of the 
husband being so far from that of  an absolute monarch, 
that the wife  has in many  cases a liberty to separate 
from him, where natural right or their contract allows 
it ; whether that contract be made by themselves in t$e 
sCate of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country 
they  live  in; and  the  children  upon such separation 
fall to the  father's  or mother's  lot,  as  such  contract 
does determine. 
5 88.  For  all the ends  of marriage being to be ob- 
tained under politic government, as well as in the state 
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of nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right 
or power  of  either naturally  necessary to those ends, 
viz.  procreation  and  mutual  support  and  assistance 
whilst they are together ; but only decides any contro- 
versy that may arise between man and wife about them. 
If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and 
power of life and death naturally belonged to the hus- 
band, and were necessary to the society between man 
and wife, there could  be no matrimony in any of those 
countries where the husband is allowed no such abso- 
lute authority.  But the ends of matrimony requiring 
no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal 
society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary 
to that state.  Conjugal society could subsist and attain 
its ends without it; nay,  community of goods, and the 
power over  them,  mutual assistance and maintenance, 
and other things belonging to conjugal society, might 
be varied and regulated by that contract which unites 
man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with 
procreation  and  the bringing up of  children till they 
could shift for themselves;  nothing being necessary to 
any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which 
it is made. 
$ 84.  The society betwixt parents and children, and 
the distinct rights and powers belonqng respectively 
to them, I have treated of  so largely, in the foregoing 
chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of 
it.  And I think it is plain,  that it  is far different from 
a politic society. 
tj 85.  Master and servant are names as old as history, 
but given to those of far different condition ;  for a free- 
man makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, 
for a certain time, the service he undertakes  to do, in 
exchange for wages he is to receive : and though this 
commonly puts him into the family of his master, and 
under the ordinary discipline thereof:  yet it gives the 
master but a temporary power over him, and no greater 
than what is contained in the contract  between them. 
But there is another sort of  servants, which by a pecu- 
liar name we  call slaves,  who being captives taken in 
a just  war,  are by the right of nature subjected to the 
absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. 
These men having,  as I say,  forfeited  their lives, and 
with it their liberties, and lost their estates ; and being 
in the state of slavery,  not  capable  of  any  property; 
cannot in that state be  considered as any part of civil 
society;  the chief  end  whereof  is the preservation  of 
property. 
5 86.  Let us therefore consider a master of a family 
with  all these  subordinate relations  of wife,  children, 
servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of 
a family ;  which, what resemblance soever it may have 
in its order, offices,  and number too, with a little com- 
monwealth,  yet is very  far from it, both in its consti- 
tution, power, and end :  or if it must be thought a mon- 
archy, and the pater-familias  the absolute monarch in 
it, absolute monarchy  will  have but a  very shattered 
and short power,  when  it is plain, by what has been 
said before, that the master of the family has a very di- 
stinct and differently limited power, both as to time and 
extent, over  those several  persons  that  are in it: for 
excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, 
and his power as pater-familias as great, whether there 
be any slaves in his family or no), he has no legislative 
power of life and death over any of them, and none too 
but what a mistress ofa family may have as well as he. 
And he certainly can have no absolute power over the 
whole family, who has but a very limited one over every 
individual in it.  But how  a family,  or any other so- 
ciety of men, differ from that which is properly political 
society, we shall best see by considering wherein  poli- 
tical society itself consists. 
9 87.  Man being born,  as has been 'proved,  with  a 
title to perfect  freedom, and uncontrolled  enjoyment 
of all the rights and privileges  of  the law of nature, 
equally with any other man,  or number of men in the 
world,  hath by  nature a power, not only to preserve 
his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against 
the injuries  and  attempts of other men ;  but to  judge 
of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he 
is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, 
in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his  opi- 
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nion, requires it.  But because no political society can 
be, nor  subsist, without having in itself the power to 
preserve the property, and, in order thereunto, punish 
the off'inces of all those of that society ;  there, and there 
only  is  political society, where  every one of the mem- 
bers hat11 quitted this natural power, resigned it up into 
the hands of  the community  in  all cases  that exclude 
him not from appealing for protection to the law esta- 
blished by it.  And thus all private judgment of  every 
particular  member  being  excluded,  the  community 
comes to bc umpirc, by settled standing rules, indiffer- 
ent, and  the same  to all parties;  and by men having 
authority from the community, for the execution of those 
rules,  decides  all  the differences that may happen be- 
tween any members of that society concerning any mat- 
ter  of  right;  and  punishes  those  offences which  any 
member hath committed against the society, with such 
penalties as the law has established : whereby it is easy 
to discern who  are,  and who  are not, in  political  so- 
ciety together.  Those who are united  into one body, 
and have a common  established  law  and judicature to 
appeal to,  with  authority to decide  controversies be- 
tween them,  and punish  offenders,  are in civil society 
one with another : but those who have no such common 
appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, 
each being, where  there is no other, judge for himself, 
and executioner:  which is, ixs  I have before showed it, 
the perfect state of nature. 
€j  88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power 
to set down what pmishment shall belong to the several 
transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed 
amongst the  members  of  that  society,  (which is  the 
power of making laws)  as  well as it has  the power to 
punish  any  injury  done  unto any of  its members, by 
any  one  that is not of it, (which is the power  of war 
and peace :) and all this for the preservation of the pro- 
perty of  all the mernbers of  that society,  as  far as  is 
possible.  But though every man who has entered into 
civil society, and is become a member of any common- 
wealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish  offence^ 
against  the law of  nature, in  prosecution  of  his  own 
private judgment ;  yet with  the judgment of offences, 
which he has given  up to the legislative in all cases, 
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a 
right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the 
execution  of  the  judgments  of  the  commonwealth, 
whenever he shall be called to it ;  which indeed are his 
own judgments, they being made by himself, or his re- 
presentative.  And herein  we have the original of the 
legislative  and executive power  of  civil society, which 
is to judge by standing laws, how  far offences are to be 
punished, when committed within the commonwealth ; 
and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded 
on the present ciraumstances of the fact, how far inju- 
ries  from  without  are to be vindicated;  and in  both 
these to employ all the force of all the members, when 
there shall be need. 
89.  Whenever therefore any number of men are so 
united into one society, as to quit every one his execu- 
tive power of the law of nature, ar,d to resign it to the 
public,  there  and there only is a  political or civil so- 
ciety.  And this is done, wherever any number of men, 
in the state of nature, enter into society to make one 
people,  one  body  politic,  under  one  supreme govern- 
ment;  or else when  any one joins  himself to,  and in- 
corporates  with  any  government  already made : for 
hereby he authorizes the society, or, which  is  all one, 
the legislative  thereof,  to  make laws for him,  as the 
public good of the society shall require ;  to the execu- 
tion whereof, his own assistance (as to his own degrees) 
is due.  And this puts men out of a state of nature into 
that of a commonwealth, by setting up a  judge on earth, 
with authority to determine all the controversies, and 
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of 
the commonwealth ; which judge is the legislative, or 
magistrate  appointed  by it.  And  wherever  there are 
any number of men, however  associated, that have  no 
such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in 
the state of nature. 
Cj  90.  Hence  it is evident, that absolute monarchy, 
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the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and 
so can be no form of  civil  government  at all : for the 
end of  civil  society  being to avoid  and  remedy those 
inconveniencies of the state of nature which necessarily 
follow from every man being judge in his own case, by 
setting  up a  known authority, to t~hich  every one of 
that society  may  appeal upon  any  injury received, or 
controversy that may arise, and which every one of  the 
society* ought to obey; wherever any persons are, who 
have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision 
of any difference between them, there those persons are 
still  in  the state of  nature; and so is every absolute 
prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion. 
91.  For he being supposed to have all, both legis- 
lative and executive power in himself alone, there is no 
judge to  be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who 
may  fairly,  and  indifferently, and with authority  de- 
cide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be 
expected  of  any injury or inconveniency, that may be 
suffered from the prince, or by his order:  so that such 
a  man,  however  entitled,  czar,  or  grand seignior,  or 
how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with 
all under his  dominion, as he is with the rest  of man- 
kind:  for  wherever  any  two men  are,  who  have  no 
standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, 
for the determination of controversies of right betwixt 
them, there they are still in the state of nature?, and 
*  cc The  public power of all society is above every soul contained 
in the same society; and the princi  a1 use of that power is, to give 
laws unto all that are under  it,  \P 1  ich laws in such cases we must 
,obey, unless there be reason showed which may necessarily inforce, 
that the law  of  reason,  or of God,  doth  enjoin the contrary."- 
Hook. Eccl. Pol. 1.  i. sect. 16. 
t '*  To  take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs," 
i. e. such as attend  men in the state of nature, "there was no way 
but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst them- 
selves by ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding 
thenlselves subject thereunto,  that unto whom they granted autho- 
rity to rule and govern, by  them the peace, trenquillity, and happy 
state of the rest might be procured.  Men always knew that where 
force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; 
they knew that however men mtty seek their own  commodity, yet  if 
under a11  the inconveniencies of it, with only this wo- 
ful difference to the subject,or rather slave of an abso- 
lute prince :  that whereas in the ordinary state of na- 
ture he has a liberty to judge of his right, and, accord- 
ing to the  best  of  his  power,  to maintain  it; now, 
whenever his property is invaded by the will and order 
of his monarch,  he has not only no appeal, as those in 
society ought to have, but, as if he were degraded from 
the common state of rational creatures, is denied a li- 
berty to judge of,  or to defend his right : and so is ex- 
posed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man 
can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state 
of  nature,  is yet corrupted with flattery,  and armed 
with power. 
$  92.  For he that thinks  absolute  power  purifies 
men's  blood,  and corrects the baseness  of  human na- 
ture, need  read but the history  of  this,  or  any  other 
age, to be  convinced of  the contrary.  He thnt would 
have been insolent and injurious in the woods of Ame- 
rica,  would not probably be  much better in a throne ; 
where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out 
to justify  all that he shall do to his  subjects, and the 
sword presently silence all those that dare question it : 
for what the protection  of absolute monarchy is, what 
kind  of  fathers  of their  countries it makes princes to 
be,  and to what  a  degree of  happiness and security it 
carries civil society,  where  this sort  of government is 
grown to perfection;  he that will look into the late re- 
lation of Ceylon may easily see. 
$ 93.  In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other 
governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal 
this were  done with  injury unto others,  it was not  to be suffered, 
but by all men, and all good means, to be withstood.  Finally, they 
knew that no man might in reason  take upon him to determine his 
own right, and according to his own determination proceed in main- 
tenance thereof,  inasmuch as every  man  is  towards himself,  and 
them whom he greatly affects, partial ; and therefore thnt strifes and 
troubles would be endless, except they gave their comnion consent, 
all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without 
which consent  there would be no reason that one man should take 
upon him to be lord or judge over another."  Hooker's Eccl. Pol. I, i. 
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to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and 
restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the sub- 
jects themselves,  one amongst another.  This every one 
thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought 
a declared enemy to society and mankind who should 
go about to take it away.  But whether this be from a 
true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as 
we all owe one to another, there is reason to doubt: for 
this is  no  more  than what every  man,  who loves his 
own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must 
do, keep those animals from hurting or destroying one 
another, who labour  and drudge only for his pleasure 
and  advantage;  and so  are taken care of, not out of 
any love  the master has for them, but love of himself, 
and the profit  they bring him:  for if it be asked, what 
security, what fence  is  there, in  such  a  state, against 
the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler ?  the 
very question can scarce be borne.  They are ready to 
tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. 
Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must 
be measures, laws,  and judges,  for their mutual peace 
and security:  but as for the ruler,  he ought to be ab- 
solute,  and is above all such circumstances ;  because 
he has  power  to do more hurt and wrong, it is right 
when  he does  it.  To ask  how  you  may  be guarded 
from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest 
hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and re- 
l~ellion:  as if when men quitting the state of nature en- 
tered into society, they agreed that all of them but one 
should  be  under  the restraint  of  laws,  but  that he 
should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, 
increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. 
This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take 
care  to avoid  what  mischiefs  may  be  done them by 
pole-cats,  or foxes ;  but are content, nay think it safety, 
to be devoured by  lions. 
$ 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse peo- 
ple's  understandings, it hinders not men from feeling ; 
and when they perceive that any man, in what station 
soever.  is out of  the bounds  of  the civil society which 
they ore of,  and  that they  have  no appeal on  earth 
against any harm they may receive from him, they are 
apt to think themselves in the state of nature in respect 
of  him whom  they find to be so; and to take care, as 
soon  as they can, to hare that safety and security in 
civil  society for which it was  instituted, and for which 
only they entered into it.  And therefore, though per- 
haps at first (as shall be showed mare at  large hereafter 
in the following part of this discourse), some one good 
and excellent man having got a pre-eminency  amongst 
the rest, had  this  deference  paid  to his goodness and 
virtue, us  to a kind of  natural authority, that the chief 
rule,  with  arbitration  of  their  differences,  by a  tacit 
consent devolved into his hands, without any other cau- 
tion but the assurance they had of his uprightness and 
wisdom ;  yet when time, giving authority, and (as some 
men would persuade  us) sacredness to customs, which 
the negligent  and  unforeseeing  innocence of  the first 
ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp ; 
the people finding their properties not secure under the 
government  as  then  it was  (whereas government  has 
no other end but the preservation of  "property),  could 
never be safe nor at rest, nor  think  themselves  in civil 
society,  till  the legislature  was  placed  in  collective 
bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you 
please.  By which  means  every single  person became 
subject, equally with other the meanest men,  to those 
laws  which he  himself, as  part  of  the legislative, had 
established ; nor  could any one, by his own authority, 
avoid  the force  of  the law when  once made;  nor  by 
any pretence  of  superiority plead  exemption, thereby 
to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his de- 
*  -4t the first, when some  certain  kind  of  regiment was  once 
appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for 
the manner of governing, but  all permitted  unto their  wisdom and 
discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this for 
all  parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised 
for a remedy did indeed but increase the sore which it sllould have 
cured.  They saw that to live by  one man's will became the cause 
of all  men's  misery.  This  constrained  them  to come into  laws, 
wherein all  men might  see their  duty  beforehand,  and know  the 
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pendents.  *'' No man in civil society can be exempted 
from the laws of  it :" for if  any man may do what he 
thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress 
or  security  against  any  harm  he  shall  do; I  ask, 
whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, 
and so can be no part or member of that civil society; 
unless any one  will say the  state of  nature  and  civil 
society are one and the same thing, which I have never 
yet found any one so great a patron of  anarchy as to 
affirm. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
Ofthe Beginning of Political Societies. 
$ 95. MEN being,  as  has  been said,  by  nature all 
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of 
this  estate,  and  subjected  to the  political  power  of 
another,  without  his  own  consent.  The  only  way 
whereby any one divests himself of  his natural liberty, 
and puts on the bonds  of  civil society, is by agreeing 
with other men to join  and unite into a community, 
for  their  comfortable,  safe,  and peaceable  living  one 
amongst  another, in  a  secure enjoyment of their pro- 
perties,  and a  greater  security against  any that are 
not of it.  This any number  of  men  may do, because 
it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as 
they were in the liberty of the state of nature.  When 
any number  of  men  have  so  consented  to make  one 
community or government, they are thereby presently 
incorporated, and make  one  body politic, wherein the 
majority have a right to act and conclude the rest. 
* "  Civil law, being the act of the whole body politic, doth there- 
fore overrule each 'several part of  the same body."  Hookefs Eccl. 
Pol. I. i.  sect. 10. 
$ 96.  For  when  any  number  of  men have,  by the 
consent  of  every individual,  made  a  community, they 
have  thereby made  that community one  body, with a 
power  to act as  one  body, which  is  only by the will 
and determination of the majority ;  for that which acts 
any  community  being  only  the consent  of  the indi- 
viduals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one 
body to move one way ; it is necessary the body should 
move  that way  whither  the  qreater force  carries it, 
which is the consent of  the majority:  or else  it is im- 
possible it should act or continue one body, one com- 
munity,  which  the  consent  of  every  individual  that 
united into it agreed that it should ;  and so every one 
is bound by that consent  to be  concluded by the ma- 
jority.  And  therefore we  see that in assemblies, em- 
powered  to act by  positive laws, where  no number is 
set by that positive law which empowers them, the act 
of  the majority passes for the act of  the whole, and of 
course  determines;  as having,  by  the law of  nature 
and reason,  the power of the whole. 
§ 97.  And thus every man, by consenting with others 
to make one body politic under  one government, puts 
himself under an obligation to every one of that society 
to submit to the determination of  the majority, and to 
be  concluded  by  it;  or  else  this  original  compact, 
whereby he .with others incorporate into one society, 
would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left 
free, and under no other ties than he was in before in 
the state of nature.  For what appearance would there 
be of any compact? what new engagement, if he were 
no farther  tied  by any decrees  of  the society than he 
himself thought fit, and did actually consent to  ?  This 
would  be  still  as  great a  liberty  as he himself  had 
before his compact, or any one else in the state of  nature 
hath, who may submit himself and consent to any acts 
of it if he thinks fit. 
$ 9s.  For if  the consent  of  the majority shall not, 
in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and con- 
clade every individual, nothing but the consent of every 
individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole : 
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if we consider the infirmities  of health, and avocations 
of business, which in a number, though much less than 
that of  a  commonwealth, will  necessarily keep  many 
away from the public assembly.  To which if we  add 
the variety  of  opinions,  and  contrariety  of  interests 
which  unavoidably  happen in  all collections  of  men, 
the coming into society upon such terms would be only 
like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. 
Such a constitution as this would make the rnighty le- 
viathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, 
and not  let it outlast the day it was born in: which 
can~~ot  be  supposed,  till  we  can  think that rational 
creatures should desire and constitute societies only to 
be dissolved : for where  the majority cannot conclude 
the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and con- 
sequently will he immediately dissolved again. 
$ 99.  Whosoever therefore out of  a  state of nature 
unite into a community, must be understood to give up 
all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite 
into society, to the majority of  the cqmunity, unless 
they expressly agreed in any number gieater than the 
majority.  And this is done by barely agreeing to unite 
into one political society, which is all the compact that 
is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into, 
or  make  up a  common~vealth. And thus that which 
begins and actually constitutes any political society, is 
nothing  but the consent  of  any  number  of  freemen 
capable  of a  majority,  to unite  and incorporate  into 
such a society.  And this is that, and that only, which 
did or could give beginning to any lawful government 
in the world. 
5  100.  To  this I find two objections made. 
First, " That there are no instances to be found in 
story, of a company of men independent and equal one 
amongst another, that met together, and in this way 
began and set up a government." 
Secondly,  '<  It  is impossible of right, that men should 
do so, because  all men being born under government, 
they are to submit  to that, and are not  at liberty to 
begin a new one." 
$  101.  To  the  first there  is  this  to answer, that it 
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is not at all to be wondered, that history gives  us  but 
a very little account of  men that lived together in the 
state of nature.  The inconveniencies of that condition, 
and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any 
number of them together, but they presently united and 
incorporated,  if  they designed  to continue together. 
And if we may not suppose  men  ever  to have been in 
the state of nature, because we hear not much of them 
in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of 
Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we \ 
hear little  of  them till they were  men, and embodied 
in armies.  Government is every where antecedent  to 
records, and letters seldom  come in amongst a  people 
till a  long continuation of  civil  society has, by other 
more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, 2nd 
plenty:  and then they begin to look after the history of 
their founders, and search into their original, when they 
have outlived  the memory of  it :  for  ~t is  with  com- 
monwealths as with  particular persons, they are com- 
monly ignorant of their  own births and infancies : and 
if  they know any thing of  their  original, they are be- 
holden for it to the accidental records that-  others have 
kept of it.  And those  that we have  of the beginning 
of any politics in the aorld, excepting that of the Jews, 
where God himself  immediately interposed, and which 
favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain 
instances of  such a beginning as I have mentioned,  or 
at least have manifest footsteps of it. 
$ 102.  He must show a strange inclination to deny 
evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hy- 
pothesis,  who  will  not  allow,  that the  beginnings  of 
Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of  se- 
veral men free and independent one of another, amongst 
whom  there was  no  natural superiority or subjection. 
And if  Josephus Acosta's  word  may be taken, he tells 
us,  that in many parts of Atnerica there was no gorern- 
ment at all.  '' There  are great  and  apparent  con- 
jectures:'  says he, "  that these men, speaking of  those 
of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor common- 
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Florida,  the Cheriquanas,  those  of  Brasil,  and many 
other  nations,  which  have  no  certain  kings,  but  as 
occasion is offered, in peace  or war, they choose their 
captains as they please,"  1.  i.  c. 25.  If it be said that 
every  man  there  was  born  subject to his  father,  or 
the head of  his family ;  that the subjection due from a 
child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting 
into what political society he thought fit, has been al- 
ready proved.  But be that as it will, these men, it is 
evident, were actually free ; and whatever  superiority 
some politicians now would place in any of them, they 
themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, 
till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. 
So  that their politic societies all began from a voluntary 
union, and the mutual agreement of  men freely acting 
in the choice of  their  governors  and forms of govern- 
ment. 
§ 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta 
with Palantus, mentioned  by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4, will  be 
allowed to have been freemen, inde~endent  one of  an- 
other,  and to have  set  up a  government  over  them- 
selves, by their own  consent.  Thus I have given  se- 
veral examples  out of  history, of  people  free  and in 
the state of nature, that  being met together incorporated 
and began a commonwealth.  And if the want of such 
instances be an argument to prove  that governments 
were not, nor could not be so begun, I suppose the con- 
tenders for paternal empire were better let it alone than 
urge it against natural liberty :  for if they can give so 
many instances  out of  history, of governments begun 
upon paternal right, I think (though  at best  an argu- 
ment from what has beon, to what should of right be, 
has  no  great  force)  one  might,  without  any  great 
danger, yield them the cause.  But if  I  might advise 
them in the case, they would  do well not to search too 
much into the original  of  governments, as they have 
begun cle.facto; lest they should find, at the foundation 
of  most  of  them,  something very  little favourable to 
the  design  they  promote,  and such a power  as they 
contend for. 
tj 104. But to conclude, reason  being  plain  on  our 
side, that men are naturally free, and the examples of 
history showing,  that the governments  of  the world, 
that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on 
that foundation, and were made by  the consent of  the 
people;  there  can  be  little  room  for  doubt,  eithcr 
where  the right  is, or what has  been  the opinion  or 
practice  of  mankind  about  the first  erecting  of  go- 
vernments. 
§ 105. I will not deny that if  we  look  back  as far 
as history will direct us, towards the original of  com- 
monwealths, we  shall generally find  them under  the 
government and administration of one man.  And I am 
also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous 
enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire toge- 
ther, without  mixing with others, as it often happens, 
where there is much land and few people, the govern- 
ment  commonly  began  in the father:  for  the father 
having, by the  law of nature, the same power with every 
man  else  to  punish,  as  he thought  fit,  any  offences 
against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing 
children,  evetf  when they were men, and out of their 
pupilage;  and they were very  likely to submit to his 
punishment, and all join  with him against the offender 
in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his 
sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make 
him  the  law-maker  and  governor  over  all that re- 
mained in conjunction wit11 his family.  He mas fittest to 
be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and 
interest under his care ;  and the custom of obeying him 
in  their  childhood,  made  it easier  to submit to him 
rather than to any other.  If, therefore, they must have 
one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided 
amongst Inen that live together, who so likely to be the 
man as he that was their common father, unless negli- 
gence,  cruelty,  or  any other  defect  of  mind  or  body 
made him unfit for it?  But when either the father died, 
and left his  next heir,  for  want of  age, wisdom, cou- 
rage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule, or  where 
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there, it is  not  to be  doubted,  but  they  used  their 
natural freedom to set up him whom they judged  the 
ablest, and most likely to rule well  over  them.  Con- 
formable hereunto, we find the people of America, who 
(living  out of the reach of the conquering  swords and 
spreading domination of the two great empires of  Peru 
and Mexico, enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, 
ceteris puribus, they commonly prefer the heir of their 
deceased king;  yet if  they find him any way weak  or 
incapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and 
bravest man for their ruler. 
§ 106.  Thus, though looking hack  as far as records 
give us any account of peopling the world, and the hi- 
story of nitions, we commonly find the government to 
be in one hand ; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, 
viz.  that the beginning of politic society depends upon 
the consent  of the individuals,  to join into,  and niake 
one  society ; who,  when  they  are thtis incorporated, 
might set up what form of government they thought fit. 
But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and 
think that by nature government was monarchical, and 
belonged to the father ; it may not be amiss here to con- 
sider, why people  in  the beginning  generally pitched 
upon this form : which though perhaps the father's yre- 
eminency might, in  the first  institution  of some com- 
monwealth, give  a  rise  to, and place in the beginning 
the power in one hand ; yet it is plain that the reason 
tliat  continued  the  fbrm  of  government  in  a  single 
person, was not any regard or  respect  to paternal au- 
thority ;  since all petty monarchies, tliat is,  allnost all 
monarchies, near  their  original,  have  been commonly, 
at least upon  occasion, elective. 
5 107.  First  then,  in  the beginning  of  things,  the 
father's government  of  the childhood  of  those  sprung 
from him, having  accustomed them to the rule  of  one 
man, and taught them that where it was exercised with 
care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, 
it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the 
political  happiness  they sought for  in society ;  it was 
no wonder that they should pitch upon,  and naturally 
run into that form  of  government, which  from  their 
infancy they had been all accustomed to ;  and which, by 
experience,  they had  found  both  easy  and  safe.  To 
which,  if  we  add,  tliat monarrliy  being  simple,  and 
most obvious to men, whom neither experience had in- 
structed in forms  of  governnlent, nor the ambition  or 
insolence of  empire had  taught to beware of  the en- 
croachments  of  prerogative, or  the inconveniencies of 
absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt 
to lay claim to, and bring upon them ;  it was not at all 
strange that they should not much trouble themselves 
to think of methods of  restraining any exorbitancies of 
those to whom they had given the authority over them, 
and of balancing the power of government, by placing 
several parts of it in different handsf~he~  had neither 
felt the oppression of  tyrannical dominion, nor did the 
fashion of the age, nor tlieir possessions, or way of living 
(which  afforded  little matter far covetousness or am- 
bition), give them any reason to apprehend or provide 
against it ; and therefore it  is no wonder they put them- 
selves into such a frame of government, as was not only, 
as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited 
to their present state and condition, which stood more 
in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries, 
than of multiplicity of laws.  The  equality of a simple 
poor way of  living, confining their  desires within  the 
narrow  bounds  of  each  man's  small property,  made 
few controversies, and so no need ofmany laws to decide 
them, or variety of  officers to superintend the process, 
or look after the execution of justice,  where there were 
but few trespasses, and few offenders.  Since then those 
who liked one another  so well as to join  into society, 
cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and 
friendship together, and some trust one in another; they 
could not but have greater apprehensions of others than 
of one another :  and  therefore their first care and thought 
cannot but be supposed to be, how  to secure themselves 
agdnst foreign force.  I't  was natural for them to put 
themselves under a frame of government which  might 
best serve to that end, and choose the wisest and bravest 
VOL.  V.  D  D 405  Of  Civil Government.  Of  Civil Government.  403 
man  to conduct, them in  their  wars,  and  lead  them 
out againct their enemies,  and in this chiefly be their 
ruler. 
$  108.  Thus wc  see  that the kings  of  the Indians 
in America, wllich is still a pattern of the first ages in 
Asia  and Europc, whilst  the inhabitants were too few 
for the country, and want  of  people  and money gave 
men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, 
or contest for wider extent of  ground, are little more 
than generals of  their  armies;  and though they com- 
mand  absolutely in war,  yet  at home  and in  time  of 
peace they exercise very little dominio~~,  and have but 
a very moderate sovereignty ; the resolutions of peace 
and war being ordinarily either in  the people,  or in a 
council.  Though the war itself, which  admits not of 
plurality of govcrnors, naturally devolves the commaild 
into the king's sole authority. 
$ 109. And thus, in Israel itself, the chief business 
of  their judges and first kings, seems to have been to 
be captains in war, and leaders of their armies ; which 
(besides what is signified by "  going out and in before 
the people,"  which  was  to march  forth to war,  and 
home again at the heads of their forces) appears plainly 
in  the story of  Jephthah.  The  Ammonites  making 
war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear send to Jephthah, 
a bastard  of  their  family whom  they had cast off: and 
article with him, if he will assist them against the Am- 
monites, to make him  their  ruler; which  they  do  in 
these words, "  And the people made him head and cap- 
tain over  them,"  Judg. xi. 11. which  was, as it seems, 
all  one  as  to  be  judge.  rc And  he  judged  Israel," 
Judg. xii. 7,  that  is,  was  their  captain-general, "  six 
years."  So when  Jotham  upbraids  the Shechemites 
with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been 
their judge  and  ruler,  he  tells  them,  6c He  fought 
for  you,  and  adventured  his  life  far,  and  delivered 
you  out of  the hands  of Midian,"  Judg. ix. 17.  No- 
thing is mentioned of him but what he did as a general : 
and  indeed  that  is  all  is  found in  his  history, or in 
any of  the rest of  the judges.  And Abinelech parti- 
cularly is called king, though at most he was but their 
general.  And when, being weary of the ill conduct of 
Samuel's  sons, the  children of  Israel desired a king, 
"like  all the nations, to judge them, and to go out be- 
fore them,  and to fight  their battles,"  1 Sam. viii. 20, 
God, granting their  desire,  says  to  Samuel, "I will 
send  thee  a  man, and  thou  shalt  anoint  him  to be 
captain over my people  Israel, that he may save my 
people  out of  the hands  of  the  Philistines,"  ix.  16. 
As if the only business of a king had been to lead out 
their armies, and fight in their defence ;  and accordingly 
Samuel, at his inauguration, pouring a vial of oil ~rpoll 
him, declares to Saul, that c4 the Lord had anointed him 
to be  captain  over his inheritance,"  x.  1.  And there- 
fore those who, after Saul's being solemnly chosen and 
saluted king by the tribes of  Mispeh,  were unwilling 
to have him their king,  made no other  objection but 
this,  "How shall this man save us ?"  v.  97;  as if they 
should have  said, this man is unfit to be our king, not 
having skill  and conduct enough in war to be able to 
defend us.  And when God resolved to transfer the go- 
vernment to David, it is in these words, "  But now thy 
kingdom  shall  not  continue:  the  Lord  hath sought 
him  a  man  after  his  own heart,  and the Lord  hath 
commanded  .  .  .  him  to  be  captain  over. his  people," 
xm.  1-4.  As  if  the whole kingly  authority were no- 
thing else  but to be their general : and therefore the 
tribes who had stuck to Saul's family, and opposed Da- 
vid's  reign, when  they came to Hebron with terms of 
submission  to him,  they tell him, amongst other argu- 
ments they had to submit to him as to their king, that 
he was in effect their king in Saul's time, and therefore 
they  had no  reason but to receive him  as their king 
now.  "Also  (say  they) in  time past,  when Saul was 
king  over  us,  thou  wast  he  that  leddest  out  and 
broughtest  in  Israel,  and  the  Lord  said  unto. thee, 
Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a 
captain over Israel." 
$ 110. Thus, whether a family  by degrecs grew up 
into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being 
continued on to the elder son,  every one in his  turn 
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growing up under  it,  tacitly submitted to it ;  and the 
easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every 
one acqaiesced,  till time  seemed to have confirmed it, 
and settled  a  right  of  succession  by  prescription:  or 
whether several  families, or the descendants of several 
families,  whom  chance,  neighbourhood,  or  business 
brought together, uniting into society :  the need of s 
general, whose conduct might defend them against their 
enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence 
and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are 
almost  all those  which begin  governments, that ever 
come  to last in the world) gave men  of  one another, 
made the first beginners of  commonrvealths generally 
put the rule into one man's  hand,  without  any other 
express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of 
the thing and the end of government required :  which- 
ever  of  those  it was that at first put the rule into the 
hands of a single person, certain it is that nobody was- 
intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and 
to those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those 
who had  it,  commonly used  it.  And unless they had 
done so, young societies could not have subsisted; with- 
out  such  nursing  fathers,  tender  and careful  of  the 
public  weal,  all governments would have sunk under 
the weakness and infirmities of  their infancy, and the 
prince and the people had soon perished together. 
$ 111. But though  the golden age (before vain am- 
bition,  and  amor  scekrafus  habendi,  evil  concupi- 
scence, had corrupted men's  minds  into a  mistake of 
true power  and honour)  had more virtue,  and conse- 
quently better  governors, as well  as less  vicious sub- 
jects:  and there was then no stretching prerogative on 
the one side, to oppress the people;  nor consequently 
on the other,  any dispute about privilege, to lessen or 
restrain the power of the magistrate ;  and so no contest 
betwixt rulers any people about governors or govern- 
ment:  yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* 
would retain and increase the power, without doing the 
* "At first,  when some  certain kind  of regiment was  once ap- 
proved, it  may be nothing was then further  thought  upon  for the 
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business for which it was given ;  and, aided by flattery, 
taught princes  to have distinct and separate interests 
from their people ; men found it necessary to examine 
more carefully the original  and rights of government, 
and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitancies, and 
prevent the abuses of that power,  which they  having 
intrusted in another's  hands only for  their own good, 
they found was made use of to hurt them. 
$ 112.  Thus we may  see  how  probable  it is,  that 
people that were naturally free, and by  their own con- 
sent either submitted to the eovernment of their father, 
or united  together out of  different families to make a 
government, should generally put  the  rule into one man's 
hands,  and choose to be under the conduct of a single 
person,  without  so much as by express  conditions  li- 
miting or regulating his power, which they thought safe 
enough in his honesty and prudence: though they never 
dreamed of monarchy being  jure divino, which we never 
heard of  among mankind, till it was revealed to us by 
the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal 
power to have a right to dominion, or to be the founda- 
tion  of  all  government.  And thus much  may suffice 
to show, that, as far as we have any light from history, 
we  have  reason  to conclude,  that all peaceful begin- 
nings of government have been laid in the consent of 
the people.  I say peaceful, because I shall have occa- 
sion in another place to speak of conquest, which some 
esteem a way of beginning of governments. 
The other objection I  find  urged  against  the be- 
ginning  of  politics,  in  the way I have mentioned, is 
this, viz. 
manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom  and dis- 
cretion which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all 
parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for 
a  remedy,  did indeed  but  increase  the  sore which  it ehould have 
cured.  They  saw, that  to  live  by  one  man's  will,  became  the 
cause  of all  nien's  misery.  This constrained them  to corne  unto 
laws wherein  all  men  might see their  duty beforehand, and  know 
the  penalties  of  transgressing  tlwn."  Hooker's  Eccl.  Pol.  1.  i. 
sect. 10. 4uG  Of Ciril Government. 
$113. "  That all men being born under government, 
soine or other, it is impossible any of them should ever 
be free, and at liberty  to unite together, and begin. a 
new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government." 
If this argument be good, I ask, how came so many 
lawful  monarchies into  the world ?  for  if  any body, 
upon this supposition, can show me any one man in any 
age of  the world free to begin  a lawful monarchy,  1 
will  be  bound  to show him  ten other free men at li- 
berty at the same time to unite and begin a new govern- 
ment under a regal, or any  other form; it being  de- 
monstration, that if any one, born under the dominion 
of  another,  may be so free as to have a right to com- 
mand others in a new and distinct empire, every one 
that is born under the dominion of another may be so 
free too,  and may become  a ruler, or subject of a  di- 
stinct separate government.  And so by this their own 
principle,  either all men, however born, are free, or else 
there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government 
in the world.  And then they have nothing 'to do, but 
barely to show us which that  is;  which when they have 
done, I doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to 
pay obedience to him. 
5 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their ob- 
jection,  to show that it involves them in the same diffi- 
culties  that it doth those  they use  it against; yet I 
shall endeavour to discover  the weakness of this argu- 
ment a little farther. 
"All  men,  say  they,  are born under  government, 
and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new 
one.  Every  one  is  born  a  subject to his  father, or 
his  prince,  and is therefore  under  the perpetual  tie 
of  subjection  and  alle~iance."  It is  plain  mankind 
never  owned  nor  considered  any  such natural  sub- 
jection  that they were born in,  to one or to tlie other, 
that tied them, without  their own consents, to a sub- 
jection to them and their heirs. 
$ 115.  For there are no examples so frequent in hi- 
story, both  sacred and profane, as those of men with- 
(lrawing themselves,  and their obedience, from the ju- 
risdiction they were born under, and the family or com- 
munity they were bred up in, and  setting up new go- 
vernments in other places ;  from whence sprailg all that 
number  of  petty corninonwealths in thc beginning  of 
ages, arid which always multiplied as long as there was 
room  enough,  till  the  stronger,  or  more  fortunate, 
s~vallotved  the weaker;  and  those  great ones  again 
breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesscr dominions.  All 
which  are so  many  testinlonies  against paternal  so- 
vereignty, and plainly prove that it was not tlic natural 
right of  the fatlier descending  to his heirs, that made 
governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, 
upon  that  ground, there  slioilld  liave  been  so  many 
little  kiiigcloms;  all  must  have  beer1  but  only  one 
universal  monarchy, if men had not been  at liberty to 
separate themselves frorn their families and tlie govern- 
ment, be it what it will, that was  set up in it, and go 
and  make distinct coi~~rnonwealths  and  other  govern- 
ments, as they tliouglit fit. 
$ 116.  This has been the practice of the world from 
its first beginning to this day ;  nor is it now any more 
hinderance to the  freedom of mankind, that they are born 
under constituted and ancient polities, that liave esta- 
blished laws and set forms of government, than if they 
were born in  the woods, amongst  the unconfined  in- 
habitants that run loose in them : for those who would 
persuade us,  that "  by being born under any govern- 
ment,  we  are naturally  subjects  to it:'  and have  no 
more any title or pretence to the freeciom of  the state 
of nature ;  hare no other reason (bating that of paternal 
power, which we have already answered) to prodnce for 
it, but only because our fathers or progenitors passed 
away their natural liberty, and thercby bound up them- 
selves and their posterity to  a perpetual subjection to the 
government which they tliemselves subnlitted to.  It  is 
true, that wliatevcr co~tlgen~erit  or promises any one has 
made for  himself, lie  1s  under the oblisation of tliem, 
but cnnnot,by any compact ~vliatsoever,bind  his children 
or posterity:  for his son, when a man, being altogether 
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no more give away the liberty of the son,"  than it can 
of  any  body  else:  he  may  indeed  annex such  con- 
ditions to the land he enjoyed as a subject of any com- 
monwealth,  as may  oblige his  son  to be of that com- 
munity, if  he will  enjoy those  possessions which  were 
his father's ;  because that estate being his father's pro- 
perty;  he may dispose or settle it as he pleases. 
$ 117. And this has generally given the occasion to 
mistake in this matter;  because  commonwealths not 
permitting any part of  their dominions to be  dismem- 
bered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their com- 
munity, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions 
of  his father, but under the same terms his father did, 
by becoming a member of the society;  whereby he puts 
himself presently under the government he finds there 
established, as much as any other subject of  that corn- 
monwealth.  And thus "  the consent of freemen, born 
under  government, which  only makes them members 
of  it,"  being  given  separately in their  turns, as each 
comes to be of  age, and not in a  multitude together; 
people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at 
all, or not necessary,conclude they are naturally subjects 
as they are men. 
$ 118. But it is  plain  governments themselves un- 
derstand it otherwise ;  they claim cc no power over the 
son, because  of  that they  had  over  the father ;" nor 
look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers 
being so.  If a subject of England have a  child by an 
English woman  in France,  whose  subject is he  ?  Not 
the king of England's; for he must have leave to be ad- 
mitted to the privileges of it :  nor the king of France's ; 
for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, 
and breed him as he pleases ? and who ever was judged 
as a traitor or deserter, if  he left or warred against a 
country, for being barely born in it of parents that were 
aliens there ?  It  is plain then, by the practice of govern- 
ments themselves,  as well as by the law of right reason, 
that IC  a child is  born  a  subject  of  no country or go- 
vernment."  He is  under hir father's  tuition  and au- 
thority till he comes to age of discretion ;  and then he 
is a  freeman, at liberty what government  he will put 
himself under, what body politic he will unite himself 
to: for if  an Englishman's  son, born in France, be  at 
liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon 
him by his father's being n subject of this kingdom ;  nor 
is he bound up by  any compact ofhis ancestors.  And 
why then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same 
liberty, though he be born any where else ?  Since the 
power that a father hath naturally over his children is 
the  same,  wherever  they  be  born,  and  the  ties  of 
natural  obligations  are not  bounded  by  the positive 
limits of kingdoms and commonwealths. 
$ 119.  Every man being, as has been  showed,  na- 
turally free, and nothing  being  able to put him into 
subjection to any earthly power, but only his own con- 
sent ; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to 
be a  sufficient declaration of a man's  consent, to make 
him subject to the laws of  any government.  There is 
a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, 
which will concern our present case.  Nobody doubts 
but an express  consent  of  any man entering into any 
society, makes him a perfect  of that society, a 
subject of  that government.  is,  what 
ought to  be looked upon as a 
it binds, i.  e.  how far any one shall be looked on to  have 
consented, and thereby submitted to any government, 
where he has made no expressions of it at all.  And to 
this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or 
enjoyment  of  any part of  the dominions  of  any go- 
vernment, doth thereby give his  tacit consent, and is 
as far forth obliged to obedience to  the laws of that gc+ 
vernment, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; 
whether this his possession be of  land, to him and his 
heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a ~veek  ;  or whether 
it be barely travelling freely on the highway ;  and, in 
eeect, it reaches  as far as the very being of  any one 
within the territories of that government. 
§ 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to con- 
sider, that  every man, when he at first incorporates him- 
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thereunto,  annexes  also,  and  submits to the commu- 
nity those  possessions which  he has, or  shall acquire, 
that do not already belong  to any other government: 
for it would be  a  direct contradiction for  any one to 
enter into society with others for the securing and re- 
gulating of property, and yet to suppose his land, whose 
property is to be regulated by the laws of  the society, 
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that govern- 
ment, to which he himself,  the proprietor of  the land, 
is a subject.  By the same act therefore, whereby any 
one unites his person,  which  was  before  free,  to any 
commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, 
which were  before  free, to it also:  and they become, 
both of them, person and possession,  subject to the go- 
vernment and dominion of that commonwealth, as long 
as it hath a being.  Whoever, therefore, from  thence- 
forth,  by inheritance,  purchase,  permission,  or other- 
ways, enjoys  any part of  the land so annexed to, and 
under the government of that commonwealth, must take 
it with the condition it is under;  that is, of submitting 
to the government of the commonwealth, under whose 
jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it. 
$ 121. But since the government has a direct juris- 
diction only over the land, and reaches the possessor  of 
it (before  he has  actually incorporated  himself in the 
society) only as he dwells  upon, and enjoys that; the 
obligation any one  is  under, by virtue of  such enjoy- 
ment, to "  submit to the government, begins and ends 
with  the enjoyment:"  so that  whenever  the owner, 
who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the 
government, will, by donation,  sale, or otherwise, quit 
the said possession, he is at  liberty to go  and incorporate 
himself into any other commonwealth ;  or to  agree with 
others to begin a new one, in vaczsis  locis, in any part 
of the world they can find free and unpossessed: whereas 
he that has once, by actual agreement, and any express 
declaration, given  his  consent  to be of any common- 
wealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, 
and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be 
again in the liberty of  the state of  nature ;  unless, by 
any calamity, the government he was under comes to be 
dissolved, or else by some public act cuts him off from 
being any longer a member of it. 
§ 129.  But submitting to the laws of  any coun!ry, 
living  quietly, and enjoying privileges  and protection 
under them, makes not a man a member of that society: 
this is only a local protection  and homage due to and 
from dl those, who, not being in a  state of war, come 
within the territories belonging to any government, to 
all parts whereof  the force  of  its laws extends.  But 
this no more makes a man a member of that society, a 
perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would 
make a man  a  subject to another, in whose family he 
found it convenient  to abide  for  some time; though, 
whilst he  continued  in it, he were  obliged  to comply 
with the laws, and submit to the government he found 
there.  And thus we see, that foreigners, by living  all 
their lives under another government, and enjoying the 
privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, 
even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as 
far forth as any denison ;  yet do not thereby come to  be 
subjects or members of  that commonwealth.  Nothing 
can make any man so, but his actually entering into it 
by positive engagement, and express promise and com- 
pact.  This  is  that  which  I  think  concerning  the 
beginning of political societies, and that consent which 
makes any one a member of  any commonwealth. 
CHAPTER  IX. 
Of the Ends of  political  Society and Government. 
$ 123. IF man in the state of  nature be so free as 
has been said ;  if he be absolute lord of  his own person 
and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to 
nobody, why will  he part with  his  freedom, why  will 
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dominion and control of  any other power?  To  which 
it is  obvious  to answer, that though  in the state of 
nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is 
very uncertain,  and constantly exposed to the invasion 
of others ; for all being kings as much as he, every man 
his equal, and the greater part no strict observers  of 
equity and justice, the enjoyment of  the property he 
has in this  state is very unsafe, very unsecure.  This 
makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however 
free, is full of fears and continual dangers : and it is not 
without reason that he seeks out, and is willing to join 
in society with others, who are already united, or have 
a mind  to unite, for the mutual preservation  of  their 
lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general 
name property. 
5  124.  The great and chief  end, therefore, of  men's 
uniting  into  commonwealths, and putting themselves 
under government, is  the  preservation  of  their  pro- 
perty.  To  which in the state of nature there are many 
things wanting. 
First, There wants an established,settled, known law, 
received  and  allowed  by common  consent  to be the 
standard of right and wrong, and the common measure 
to decide all controversics between  them :  for  though 
the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational 
creatures ;  yet men being biassed by their interest, as 
well as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to 
allow of it as a law binding to them in the application 
of it to their particular cases. 
fj 125.  Secondly, In the state of nature there wants 
a known  and indifferer~t  judge, with  authority to de- 
termine  all  differences  according  to the  established 
law :  for every one in that state being both judge  and 
executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to 
themselves,  passion  and revenge is very apt to carry 
them too far, and with  too much  heat,  in their  own 
cases ;  as well as negligence  and unconcernedness,  to 
make them too remiss in other men's. 
fj 126.  Thirdly,  In the state of nature there often 
wants powel to back  and support the sentence when 
right, and to give it due execution.  They who by any 
injustice offend, will seldom fail, where they are able, 
by force to make good their injustice ;  such resistance 
many times makes the punishment dangerous, and fre- 
quently destructive to those who attempt it. 
tj 127.  Thus mankind, notwithstanding. all the pri- 
vileges of the state of  nature,  being but in an ill con- 
dition,  while they remain in it, are quickly driven into 
society.  Hence it comes to pass, that we  seldom find 
any num5er of men live any time together in this state. 
The incoweniencies that they are therein exposed to, 
by the ir~egular  and  uncertain  exercise of  the power 
every marl has of punishing the transgressions of others, 
make them take sanctuary under the established laws of 
government, and therein seek the preservation of their 
property.  It is this makes them so willingly give up 
every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised 
by  such  alone  as  shall  be  appointed to it amongst 
them;  and by such rules  as the community,  or those 
authorized  by  them  to that purpose, shall agree on. 
And  in this  we have the original  right of  both  the 
legislative  and  executive  power,  ss well  as  of  the 
governments and societies themselves. 
$ 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty 
he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. 
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the pre- 
servation of  himself  and others within  the permission 
of  the law of  nature :  by which law, common to them 
all, he and all the rest of mankind are one  community, 
make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. 
And, were it not for the corruption  and viciousness of 
degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; 
no  necessity that men should separate from this great 
and natural community,  and  by  positive agreements 
combine into smaller and divided associations. 
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is 
the power to punish the crimes committed against that 
law.  Both these he gives up when he joins in n private, 
if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and in- 
corporates  into any commonwealth, separate from the 
rest of mankind. 
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he thought fit for the preservation of himself'  and the 
rest of  mankind, he gives  up to be regulated by laws 
made by the society, so far forth as,  the preservation of 
himself and the rest of that society shall require ;  which 
laws of  the society in many things confine  the liberty 
he had by the law of  nature. 
$  I 30. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly 
gives  up,  and  engages  his  natural force  (which  he 
might before  employ in the execution of  the law  of 
nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit), 
to assist the executive power of the society, as the law 
thereof shall require: for being  now  in a  new  state, 
wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies,  from  the 
labour, assistance, and society  of  others  jn  the same 
community,  as  well  as  protection  from  its  whole 
strength ; he is to part also with as much of his natural 
liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, 
and safety of  the society shall require;  which  is  not 
only necessary,  but just,  since  the other members  of 
the society do the like. 
tj  131. But though men, when  they  enter into so- 
ciety, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power 
they had in the state of  nature, into the hands of the 
society,  to be so far disposed of by the legislative as 
the good of the society shall require ;  yet it being only 
with  an intention  in every one the better to preserve 
himself,  his  liberty  and  property  (for  no  rational 
creature can be supposed to change his condition with 
an intention to be worse) ;  the power of the society, or 
legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed 
to  extend farther than the common good ;  hut is obliged 
to secure every  one's  pro pert.^,  by providing  against 
those  three  defects  above-mentioned,  that  made  the 
state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.  And so whoever 
has  the legislative or supreme power of  any common- 
wealth,  is  bound  to govern  by  established  standing 
laws, promulgated and known  to the people, and not 
by  extemporary  decrees;  by  indifferent  and upright 
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws ; 
and to  employ the force  of  the community at home, 
only in the execution of  such laws ;  or abroad to pre- 
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vent  or redrcss foreign injuries, and  secure the com- 
munity from inroads and invasion.  And all this to be 
directed  to no  other  end  but the peace,  safety,  and 
public good of the people. 
CHAPTER X. 
Of  the Forms of  a Commonwealtl~. 
$f32+. THE  majority  having,  as has been  showed, 
upon men's  first uniting into society, the whole power 
of  the community  naturally in them,  may employ all 
that power  in making laws for  the community from 
time to time,  and executing those laws by officers of 
their own appointing ; and then the form of the govern- 
ment is  a  perfect  democracy:  or else  may  put the 
power  of making laws into the hands of  a few select 
men, and their  heirs or successors;  and then it is an 
oligarchy :  or else into the hands of one man, and then 
it is a monarchy :  if to him and his heirs, it is an here- 
ditary monarchy :  if to him only for life,  but upon his 
death  the power  only  of  nominating  a  successor  to 
return to them, an elective monarchy.  And so accord- 
ingly of  these  the community may make compounded 
and mixed forms  of  government, as they think  good. 
And if  the legislative power  be  at first  given  by the 
majority to  one or more persons only for their lives, or 
any limited time, and then the supreme power to  revert 
to them again;  when it is so reverted, the comlnunity 
mtty dispose of it again anew into  what hands they  please, 
and so constitute  a new  form  of government :  for the 
form of government depending upon the placing the 
supreme power,  which  is  the legislative (it being im 
poseible to conceive that an inferior power should pre- 
scribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws), Of  Civil Government.  4.17 
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according as the power of making laws is placed,  such 
is the form of the commonwealth. 
$ 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all 
along to mean, not  a  democracy,  or  any form of  go- 
vernment, but any independent community, which  the 
Latines  signified  by  the word  civitas;  to which  the 
word which best answers in our language is cornmon- 
wealth, and most properly expresses such a society of 
men, which community or city in English does not :  for 
there may be subordinate communities in government ; 
and city amongst us has  a quite  different notion from 
commonwealth:  and therefore,  to avoid  ambiguity, I 
crave  leave  to use  the word  commonwealth  in that 
sense, in which I find it used by king James the First; 
and I take it to be its genuine signification ;  which if 
any body dislike, I consent with him to change it hr  a 
better. 
CHAPTER XI. 
Of  tlie Extent of the legislative Poroer. 
$ 134. The great end of men's  entering into society 
being the enjoyment of  their properties in peace and 
safety,  and the great instrument  and  means  of  that 
being  the laws  established  in that society;  the first 
and  fundamental positive  law  of  all commonwealths 
is  the establishing  of  the legislative  power;  as  the 
first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern 
even the legislative  itself,  is  the preservation  of  the 
society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) 
of  every person in it.  This legislative is not only the 
supreme power of  the commonwenlth, but sacred and 
unalterable in  the  hands where the community have 
once placed it ; nor can any edict of  any body else, in 
what form soever conceived, or by what power soever 
backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which 
has  not  its sanction  from  that  legislative which the 
public has chosen and appointed:  for without this the 
law could not have that which is absolutely necessary 
to its being  a  law*,  the consent of the society;  over 
whom nobody can have a power to make laws, but by 
their own consent, and by authority received from them. 
And  therefore all the  obedience,  which  by the  most 
solemn ties  any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately 
terminates in  this  supreme power, and is  directed by 
those laws which it enacts:  nor  can  any oaths to any 
foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate 
power, discharge any member  of  the society from  his 
obedience  to the legislative, acting pursuant to their 
trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the 
laws  so  enacted,  or  farther  than  they  do  allow;  it 
being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately 
to obey any power in the society which is not supreme. 
§ 135.  Though  the legislative,  whether  placed  in 
one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by 
intervals,  though  it be the supreme  power  in  every 
commonwealth ;  yet, 
First,  It is  not,  nor  can  possibly be  absolutely ar- 
bitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people : for it 
being  but  the joint  power  of  every  member  of  the 
society given  up to that person  or  assembly which  is 
legislator ;  it can be no more than those persons had in 
a state of  nature before they entered into society, and 
" "  The lawful  power of making laws to command whole politic 
societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same entire societies, 
thar for any prince or potentate of what  kind soever upon earth,  to 
exercise the same of himself, and not by express comnlission imme- 
diately  and  personally  received  from  God,  or  else  by  authority 
derived  at  the  first from  their  consent, upon  whose  persons they 
impose laws,  it is no better than mere tyranny.  Laws they are not, 
therefore,  which public approbation hath not  made so."  H0oker.s 
Ed.  Pol. I.  i. sect. 10.  Of this point  therefore  we are to note, 
that sith men natural1  have no full and perfect power to command 
whole politic mu1tituL.q of men, therefore  utterly without our con- 
sent, we could in  such sort  be  at no man's  commandment living. 
And  to be commanded we  do consent, when  that  socicty, whereof 
we be a part, hath at any time before  consented, without revoking 
the same bv the likeuniversal agreement. 
"  Laws ;herefore  human,  of ;hat  kind  soever, are  available by 
consent."  Z&j. 
VOL.  V.  E E gave  up to the community:  for  nobody can  transfer 
to another more power than he has in himself;  and no-  ' 
body has an absolute arbitrary power  over himself, or , 
over any other, to destroy his  own  life, or  take away 
the life  or property of  another.  A man, as  has been 
proved, cannot subject himself  to the arbitrary power 
of another;  and  having  in  the state of  nature no ar- 
bitrary  power  over  the life,  liberty,  or  possession  of 
another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him . 
for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind ; 
this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, 
and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative 
can have  no  more  than this.  Their power, in the utd 
most bounds  of  it, is  limited to the public good of the 
society.  It  is a power that hat11 no other end but pre- 
servation,  and  therefore  can  never*  have  a right  to 
destroy, enslave,  or designedly to impoverish the sub- 
jects.  The obligations of the law of nature cease not in 
society, but only in many cases  are drawn closer, and 
have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, 
to enforce their observation.  Thus the law  of nature 
stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well 
as others.  The rules that they make for other men's 
actions  must,  as well  as their  own  and other men's 
actions be conformable  to the law  of  nature,  i.  e.  to 
the will of God, of which that is a declaration ; and the 
"  fundamental law of  nature being the preservation of 
* Two foundations there are which bear up public societies ;  the 
one a natural inclination,  whereby all men desire sociable life and 
fellowship ; the other an order, expressly or secretly agreed upon, 
tpuching the manner of their union in living together:  the latter is 
that which we call the law of  a  commonweal,  the very soul of a 
politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, 
aud set on work  in such actions as the conlmon good requirett~, 
Laws politic,  ordained for  external  order  and  regiment  amongst 
men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will 
of man  to  be  inwardly  obstinate,  rebellious,  and averse from all 
obedience to the sacred laws of his nature ; in a word, unless pre- 
suming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than 
a wild  beast, they do accordingly provide,  notwithstanding, so to 
frame  his'  outward  actions,  th:tt  they  be no  hindrance  unto the 
common good, for which societies  are instituted.  Unless they do 
this, they are not perfect."  Hooker's Eccl. Pol. 1. i.  sect. 10. 
mankind,"  no human  sanction  can  be good  or  valid 
against it." 
136.  Secondly,  *The legislative  or  supreme au- 
thority cannot assume to itself  a power to rule by ex- 
temporary, arbitrary decrees ;  but is bound to dispense 
justice, and to decide the rights of the subject, by pro- 
mulgated, standing laws, and known authorized judges. 
For the law of nature being unwritten, and so nowhere 
to be found, but in the minds of men, they who, through 
passion, or  interest, shall  miscite, or misapply it, can- 
not so easily be convinced of their mistake, where there 
is no eatablished judge : and so it  serves not, as it ought, 
to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those 
that live under it; especially where every one is judge, 
interpreter, and  executioner  of  it too, and  that in his 
own case : and he that has right on his side, having or- 
dinarily  but his  own  single  strength,  hath not force 
enough to defend  himself  from injuries, or  to punish 
delinquents.  To avoid  these  inconveniencies,  which 
disorder men's  properties in the state of  nature, men 
unite  into  societies, that they may ,have  the united 
strength of the whole society to secure and defend their 
properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by 
which every one  may know what is his.  To this end 
it is that men give up all their  natural power  to the 
society which they enter into, and the community put 
the legslative power  into such  hands  as  they  think 
fit; with  this  trust,  that  they  shall be governed  by 
declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property 
will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in  the 
state of nature. 
*  Human laws are memures in respect of men whose actions 
they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their 
higher  rules  to be measured  by,  which  rules  are two, the law of 
God,  and  the law  of  nature; so that laws human must be made 
according to the general laws of nature, and without  contradiction 
to  any positive  law  of  scripture,  otherwise  they are ill made." 
Hooker's Eccl.  Pol.  1.  iii. sect. 9. 
"  To constrain  men to any thing inconvenient  dot11  Reem  un- 
reasonable."  1bid.  1.  i.  sect. 10. 
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137.  Absolute arbitrary power, or governing with- 
out settled standing laws,  can neither of them consist 
with the ends  of society and government, which  men 
would  not quit the freedom  of the state of nature for, 
and tie themselves up under, were it not  to preserve 
their lives,  liberties, and fortunes, and by stated rules 
of right  and property to secure their peace and quiet. 
It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they 
a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an abso- 
lute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and 
put a force into  the magistrate's  hand to execute his 
unlimited will arbitrarily upon them.  This were to put 
themselves  into a  worse  condition  than the state of 
nature,  herein they had a libertv to defend their right 
against the injuries of others, and &ere upon equal terms 
of  force  to maintain it, whether  invaded  by  a  single 
man, or many in combination.  Whereas by supposing 
they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary 
power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed them- 
selves, and armed him, to make a  prey of  them when 
he pleases ; he being in a  much worse condition, who 
is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has 
the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to  the 
arbitrary power of 100,000 single men;  nobody being 
secure that his will, who has such a command, is better 
than that of  other  men,  though his  force be  100,000 
times stronger.  And therefore, whatever forin the com- 
monwealtll is under, the ruling power ought to govern 
by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary 
dictates and undetermined resolutions ;  for then man- 
kind will  be in a far worse condition than in the state 
of  nature, if  they shall have  armed one  or a few men 
with the joint power  of  a multitude, to force them to 
obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited degrees 
of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that 
moment unknown wills, without having any measures 
set down which may  guide  and justify  their  actions : 
for all the power  the government  has  being  only for 
the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary 
and at pleasure, so  it pught  to be  exercised  by  esta- 
blished and promulgated laws; that both the peo  le 
may know  their  duty,  and be  safe  and secure wit lin  f 
the limits of  the law ; and the rulers too kept within 
their bounds, and not  be  tempted, by the power  they 
have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and 
by such measures, as they would not have known, and 
own not willingly. 
$ 138.  Thirdly,  The supreme  power  cannot  take 
from any man part of his property without his own con- 
seat : for the preservation of property being the end of 
government, and that for which men enter into society, 
it necessarily supposes  and  requires,  that the people 
should have property, without which they must he sup- 
posed to lose that, by entering into society, which was 
the end for  which they entered into it; too  gross  an 
absurdity for any man to own.  Men therefore in so- 
ciety having property, they have such right to the goods, 
which  by the law  of  the community  are theirs,  that 
nobody  hath a  right  to take their  substance or  any 
part of it from them, without their own consent : with- 
out this they have no property at all ; for I have truly 
110  property ill  that, which  another can by right take 
from me, when he pleases, against my consent.  Hence 
it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative 
power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and 
dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take 
any part of them at pleasure.  This is not much to be 
feared in  governments where  the legislative  consists, 
wholly  or  in part, in  assemblies  which  are variable, 
whose members, upon the dissolution of  the assembly, 
are subjects under the common laws of  their country, 
equally with the rest.  But in governments where the 
legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, 
or  in  one  man,  as  in  absolute  monarchies,  there  is 
danger still that they will  think themselves  to hav&  a 
distinct interest from the rest of  the community;  and 
SO will be apt to increase their  own riches  ahd power, 
by taking what they think fit  from the people : for  a 
man's property is not at  all secure, though there be good 
and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him 
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subjects  have  power  to take from  any private inan 
what part he pleases of  his property,  and use and dis- 
pose of it as he thinks good. 
5 135. But government, into whatsoever hands it is 
put, being, as I have before showed, entrusted with this 
condition, and for this end, that men might have  and 
secure their properties ; the prince, or senate, however 
it may have power to make laws for the regulating of 
property between the subjects one amongst another, yet 
can never have a power to take to themselves the whole 
or any part of the subject's property without their own 
consent:  for this would  be  in effect  to leave them no 
property at all.  And to let us see, that even absolute 
power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being 
absolute, but is still limited by  that reason,  and con- 
fined to those ends, which required it in some cases to 
be absolute, we need look no farther than the common 
practice of  martial discipline : for the preservation  of 
the  army,  and  in it of  the whole  commonwealth,  re- 
quires an absolute obedience to the command of every 
superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dis- 
pute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them ;  but 
yet we see, that neither  the serjeant, that could  com- 
mand a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, 
or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, 
can command that soldier to give him one penny of his 
money;  nor  the  general,  that can  condemn  him  to 
death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the most 
desperate orders, can yet, with  all his  absolute power 
of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's 
estate, or seize one jot of his goods ; whom yet he can 
eon~mand  any thing,and hang  for the least disohedience; 
because  such  a  blind  obedience is  necessary  to that 
end for which  the commander  has his power, viz. the 
preservation of the rest ;  but the disposing of his goods 
has nothing to do with it. 
5 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported 
without  great charge, and it is  fit every one who en- 
joys his sham of the protection, should pay  out of his 
estate his  proportion  for  the maintenance of it.  But 
still it must be with his own consent, i.  e.  the consent 
of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their 
representatives  chosen  by them: for  if  any one  shall 
claim a power to lay and levy taxes on  the people by 
his  own  authority,  and without  such  consent  of  the 
people,  he  thereby  invades  the  fundamental  law  of 
property,  and  subverts  the  end  of  government:  for 
what property have  I  in  that which  ailother may by 
right take, when he pleases, to himself? 
5 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the 
power of making laws to any other hands : for it being 
but a delegated power from the people, they who have 
it cannot pass it over to others.  The people alone can 
appoint the form  of  the commonwealth, which  is  by 
constituting  the legislative, and  appointing  in  whose 
hands that shall be.  And when  the people have said, 
we will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made 
by such men, and in such forms, nobody else  can say 
other  men  shall make  laws  for  them;  nor  can  the 
people be bound by any laws but such as  are enacted 
by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make 
laws for them.  The power of the legislative being de- 
rived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and 
institution,  can be no  other  than what  that positive 
grant conveyed, which  being  only to make laws, and 
not to make legislators, the  legislative can have no power 
to transfer their authority of making laws and place it 
in other hands. 
$ 149. These are the bounds which the trust that is 
put in them by the society, and the law  of  God  a~d 
nature, have set to the legislative power of every com- 
monwealth, in all forms of government. 
First, They are to govern by promulgated established 
laws, not to be varied in particular  cases, but to have 
one rule for  rich  and poor,  for  the favourite at court, 
and the countryman at plough. 
Secondly,  These laws also ought to be designed for 
no other end ultimately, but the good of the people. 
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property 
of the people, without the consent of the people, given 
by themselves  or  their  deputies.  And  this properly 
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is always in being, or at least where the people  have 
not reserved any part of  the legislative to deputies, to 
be from time to time chosen by themselves. 
Fourthly,  The  legislative  neither .must  nor  can 
transfer  the power  of  making laws to any body else, 
or place it any where, but where the people have. 
CHAPTER  XII. 
Of  the  legislative, executive,  and federative  Power  of 
the Commonwealtlt. 
t$  143.  TIIE  legislative  power  is  that,  which has a 
right  to  direct how  the force  of  the commonwealth 
shall be employed  for  preserving  the community and 
the members of it.  But because those lams which are 
constantly to 5e executed, and whose force is always to 
continue, may be made in a little time, therefore there 
is no  need  that  the  legislative  should  be .always in 
being, not having always business to do.  And because 
it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt 
to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the 
power of making laws, to have also in  their hands the 
power  to execute them;  whereby  they  may  exempt 
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and 
suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their 
own private advantage, and  thereby come  to have  a 
distinct interest from the rest of  the community, con- 
trary to the end of society and government :  therefore 
in well ordered commonwealths, where the good of  the 
whole  is  so  considered,  as it  ought,  the  legislative 
power  is put into the hands  of  divers persons,  who, 
duly assembled,  have  by  themselves,  or jointly  with 
others, a power  to make laws ;  which when they have 
done, being separated again, they are themselves sub- 
ject to the laws they have  made;  which  is a new and 
near tie upon them, to take care that they make them 
fbr the public good. 
$ 144. But because the laws, that are at once,  and 
in a short time made, have n constant and lasting force, 
and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance there- 
unto i  therefore it is necessary there should be a power 
always  in being, which should see to the execution of 
the laws  that  are made,  and  remain in force.  And 
thus the legislative and executive power come often to 
be separated. 
S 145.  There is  another  power  in  every  common- 
wealth, which one may call natural, because it is that 
which  answers to the power  every man naturally had 
before  he  entered  into society:  for though in a com- 
monwealth, the members of it are distinct persons still 
in reference to one another,  and as such are governed 
by the laws of the society;  yet in reference to the rest 
of  mankind,  they make  one  body,  which is,  as every 
member  of  it  before  was,  still in the state of nature 
with the rest of  mankind.  Hence it is,  that the con- 
troversies that happen between any man of the society 
with those that are out of it, are managed by the pub- 
lic ;  and an injury done to a member of their body en- 
gages the whole in the reparation of it.  So that, under 
this consideration, the whole community is one body in 
the state of  nature, in respect of  all other states orper- 
sons out of its community. 
9 146. This therefore contains the power of war and 
peace,  leagues and alliances,  and all the transactions 
with all persons and communities without the common- 
wealth;  and  may  be  called  federative,  if  any  one 
pleases.  So the thing be understood, I am indifferent 
as to the name. 
§ 147.  These two powers, executive and federative, 
though they be  really  distinct in themselves, yet one 
comprehending the execution of  the municipal laws of 
the society within  itself,  upon all that are parts of it; 
the other the management of  the security and interest 
of the public without, with all those that it may receive 
benefit  or  damage from;  yet they are always almost 
united.  And though this federative power in the well 
or  ill  management of  it be of  great moment  to the 
comn~onwealth,  yet  it is much  less  capable  to be di- rected by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the 
executive;  and so must necessarily be left to the pru- 
dence  and wisdom of  those whose hands it is in, to be 
managed  for  the public good : for  the laws that con- 
cern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their 
actions, may well  enough precede them.  But what is 
to be done in reference to foreipers, depending much 
upon  their  actions,  and the var~ation  of  designs,  and 
interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of 
those who  have this power  committed  to them, to be 
managed  by  the best of  their skill, for the advantage 
of the commonwealth. 
$ 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federa- 
tive  power  of  every community be  really  distinct in 
themselves, yet  they  are hardly to be  separated, and 
placed  at the same time in the hands of distinct per- 
sons : for  both of  them requiring  the force of the so- 
ciety  for  their  exercise, it is  almost  impracticable to 
place  the force of  the commonwealth in distinct, and 
not subordinate hands;  or that the executive  and fe- 
derative power should be placed in persons that might 
act separately,  whereby the force of the public would 
be  under  different  commands;  which  would  be  apt 
some time or other to cause disorder and ruin. 
CHAPTER XIII. 
Of the  Subordination  of the Powers  of the  Common- 
wealth. 
$ 149. THOUGH  in  a  constituted  commonwealth, 
standing  upon  its  own  basis,  and  acting  according 
to its own nature, that is,  acting for  the preservation 
of  the  community,  there  can  be  but  one  supreme 
power,  which  is  the  legislative, to which  all the rest 
are and must be subordinate ;  yet the legislative being 
only  a fiduciary  power  to act for  certain ends, there 
remains  still  "in  the people  a  supreme power  to re- 
move  or  alter  the  legislative,"  when  they  find  the 
, 
legislative  act contrary  to the trust reposed in them: 
for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, 
being  limited by  that end:  whenever that end is ma- 
nifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily 
be forfeited,  and the power  devolve into the hands of 
those that gave  it, who may place it anew where they 
shall think best for their safety and security.  And thus 
the conlmunity perpetually retains a supreme power of 
saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any 
body, even of  their  legislators, whenever they shall be 
so foolish, or so wicked,  as to lay and carry on designs 
against the liberties and properties of the subject :  for 
no man, or society of  men,  having  a power to deliver 
up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, 
to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; 
whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such 
a slavish condition, they will always have a right to pre- 
serve what they have not a power to part with ;  and to 
rid themselves  of  those who invade this fundamental, 
sacred,  and  unalterable  law  of  self-preservation,  for 
which  they  entered into society.  And  thus the com- 
munity may be said in this respect to be always the su- 
preme power, but not as considered under any form of 
government, because this power of the people can never 
take place till the government be dissolved. 
$ 150. In all cases,  whilst the government subsists, 
the legislative  is  the supreme power:  for  what  can 
give laws to another,  must  needs  be superior to him ; 
and since  the legislative is no otherwise legislative of 
the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all 
the parts,  and for every member  of  the society, pre- 
scribing  rules to their  actions,  and giving  power  of 
execution, where they are transgressed ;  the legislative 
must needs be the supreme, and all other powers,  in 
any members or parts of  the society, derived from and 
subordinate to it. 
5 151.  In some  commonwealths, where  the legisla- 
tive is not always in being,  and the executive is vested 
in a single person,  who has also a share in the legisla- 
tive;  there that single person in a very tolerable sense 
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all  the supreme power, which is that of law-making ; 
but  because  Ile  has  in  him  the  supreme  execution, 
from whom  all inferior magistrates derive all their se- 
veral subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part 
of  them: having  also  no  legislative superior to him, 
there  being  no law to be  made without  his  consent, 
which cannot  be  expected should ever subject him to 
the other part of  thc legislative, he is properly enough 
in  this  sense supreme.  But yet it is  to be observed, 
that though oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to 
him, it is not  to him  as supreme legislator, but as su- 
preme executor of the law, made by  a joint  power of 
him with others : allegiance being nothing but an obe- 
dience according to  law,  which when  he violates,  he 
has no right to obedience,  nor  can claim it otherwise 
than as the public person  invested  vith the power of 
the law ;  and so is to be considered as the image, phan- 
tom, or representative  of  the commonurealth, acted by 
the will  of  the society, declared in its laws ; and thus 
he has no will,  no power,  but that of  the law.  But 
when he quits this representation, this public will, and 
acts by his own  private will,  he degrades himself,  and 
is but a single private person without power, and with- 
out will, that has no right to obedience ;  the members 
owing no obedience but to the public will  of the so- 
ciety. 
$  152. The executive power, placed any where but 
in a person that has also a share in the legislative,  is vi- 
sibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at 
pleasure changed and displaced ;  so that it  is not the su- 
preme executive power that is exempt from subordina- 
tion:  but the supreme executive power vested in one, 
who having a share in the legislative, has no distinct su- 
perior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, 
farther than he himself shall join  and consent ;  so that 
he is no more  subordinate than he himself shall think 
fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very 
little.  Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in 
a commonwealth we need not speak, they being so mul- 
tiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and 
constitutions of  distinct commonwealths, that it is im- 
possible to give a particular account of them all.  Only 
thus  much, which is necessary to our present purpose, 
we may take notice of concerning them, that they have 
no  manner of authority, any of  them,  beyond  what is 
by positive  grant and commission delegated to them, 
and are all of  them  accountable to some other power 
in the commonwealth. 
$ 153. It  is not  necessary,  no,  nor so much as con- 
venient, that the legislative should be always in being; 
but  absolutely  necessary  that  the  executive  power 
should ;  because there is not always need of  new laws 
to be made,  but always need of execution of the laws 
that are made.  When the legislative hath put the exe- 
cution  of the laws they make  into other hands,  they 
have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when 
they find  cause, and  to punish  for  any male  admini- 
stration against the laws.  The same holds also in re- 
gard  of  the federative power,  that and the executive 
being both ministerial  and subordinate to the legisla- 
tive, which, as has been showed, in a constituted com- 
monwealth is the supreme.  The legislative also in this 
case being supposed  to consist of  several persons, (for 
if  it be  a  single  person,  it cannot but be  always  in 
being, and so  will,  as suprqme, naturally have the su- 
preme executive power,  together with the legislative) 
may  assemble,  and  exercise  their  legislature, at the 
times  that  either  their  original  constitution, or  their 
own  adjournment,  appoints,  or when  they please;  if 
neither  of  these  hath appointed any time, or there be 
no other way prescribed to convoke  them :  for the su- 
preme power being placed in them by the people, it is 
always in them,  and they may exercise  it when they 
please,  unless  by their  original  constitution  they  are 
limited to certain seasons, or by an act of their supreme  * 
power  they  have  adjourned  to  a  certain  time; and 
when that time  comes,  they have  a right to assemble 
and act again. 
$ 154. If  the legislative, or  any part of it, be made 
up of representatives chosen for that time by the pea. 
ple,  which afterwards return into the ordinary state of 
subjects, and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice,  this power of choosing must also be ex- 
ercised by the people, either  at  certain appointed sea- 
sons,  or  else  when they are summoned  to it; and in 
this latter case the power  of convoking the legislative 
is  ordinarily placed  in the executive, and has one  of 
these two limitations in respect of time :  that either the 
original constitution requires their assembling and act- 
ing at certain  intervals, and then the esecutive power 
does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their 
electing  and assembling  according  to due forms;  or 
else  it is  left to his  prudence  to call them  by  new 
elections, when the occasions or exigencies of the public 
require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, 
or  the  redress  or  prevention  of  any inconveniences, 
that lie on, or threaten the people. 
§ 155. It may  be  demanded here,  What if the ex- 
ecutive power, being possessed of the force of the com- 
monwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the 
meeting and acting of  the legislatiw, when the origi- 
nal constitution or the public exigencies  require it? I 
say, using force upon the people without authority, and 
contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is a state 
of war with the people, who have  a  right to reinstate 
their legislative in the exercise of their power :  for hav- 
ing  erected a legislative, with an intent they should ex- 
ercise the power of making laws,  either  at certain set 
times, or when there is need of it ; when they are hin- 
dered by any force from what is so necessary to the so- 
ciety, and wherein the safety and preservation  of  the 
people  consists,  the people  have a  right to remove it 
by  force.  In all states  and  conditions,  the true re- 
medy of  force without  authority is to oppose force to 
it.  The use  of  force without  authority  always puts 
him  that  uscs  it into  a  state  of  war,  as  the  ag- 
gressor,  and  renders  I~im  liable to be treated accord-  -. 
ingly. 
9 156.  The power of assembling and dismissing the 
legislative,  placed  in the executive, gives  not the ex- 
ecutive a  superiority over  it, but is  a  fiduciary  trust 
placed  in him for  the safety of the people,  in a case 
where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs 
could  not bear  a steady fixed rule:  for  it not being 
possible  that  the  first  framers  of  the  government 
should, by any foresight, be so much masters of future 
events as to be able to prefix so just periods of return 
and duration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all 
times to come,  that might exactly answer all the exi- 
gencies of  the commonwealth ; the best remedy could 
be found for  this  defect  was to trust this to the pru- 
dence of one who was always to be present, and whose 
business it was  to watch over the public good.  Con- 
stant frequent  meetings  of  the legislative, and long 
continuations of their assemblies, without necessary oc- 
casion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and 
must  necessarily in  time  produce more dangerous in- 
conveniencies,  and yet the quick turn of affairs might 
be sometimes such as to need  their present help ; any 
delay of their  convening might endanger the public; 
and sometimes too their business might be so great, that 
the limited time of their sitting might be too short for 
their work,  and rob the public of  that benefit which 
could  be  had  only  from  their  mature deliberation. 
What then could be done in this case to prevent  the 
community from beins  exposed  some time or other to 
eminent hazard,  on one  side  or the other, by  fixed 
intervals and periods,  set to the meeting and acting of 
the legislative; but to intrust it to the prudence of 
some, who being present, and acquainted with the state 
of  public  affairs, might make use  of  this prerogative 
for the public good? and  where else could this be so 
well placed as in his hands, ~vho  was intrusted with the 
execution  of  the laws  for  the same end? Thus sup- 
posing the regulation of  times for the assembling and 
sitting of the legislative not settled by the original con- 
stitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the execu- 
tive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good 
pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised 
only for  the public  weal,  as the occurrences of times 
and change of aEcl.irs might require.  Whether settled 
periods of their convening, or a liberty left to  the prince 
for convoking the legislative,  or perhaps a mixture of 
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my  business  here to inquire; but only  to show, that 
though the executive power may have the prerogative 
of  convoking  and  dissolving  such  conventions  of  tlie 
legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to it. 
$ 157.  Things  of  this  ~vorlcl  are in  so  constant  a 
flux,  that  nothing  remains  long  in  the  same  state. 
Thus people, riches, trade, pourer, change their stations, 
flourishing mighty  cities  come  to ruin,  and prove in 
time  neglected  desolate  corners,  whilst  other  unfre- 
quented  places  vow into populous  countries,  filled 
with  wealth and ~nhabitants.  But things not always 
changing equally, and private interest often keeping up 
customs and privileges, when the reasons of them are 
ceased; it often  comes to pass,  that in governments, 
where part of the legislative consists of representatives 
chosen by the people, that in tract of time this  repre- 
sentation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to 
the reasons it was at first established upon.  To what 
gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason 
has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see 
the bare name of  a  town,  of  which  there remains not 
so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as 
a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to 
be found,  sends  as  many representatives to the grand 
assembly of law-makers  as a whole  county, numerous 
in people, and powerful in riches.  This strangers stand 
amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy ; 
though most think it hard to find one ; because the con- 
stitution of  the legislative being  the original and su- 
preme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws 
in it,  and depending wholly on the people, no inferior 
power  can alter it.  And therefore the people,  when 
the legislative is once constituted, having, in such a go- 
vernment as we  have  been  speaking of,  no power  to 
act as long as  the government  stands ;  this  inconve- 
nience is thought incapable of a remedy. 
$  158.  Saltis  populi  suprema  lex,  is  certainly  so 
'ust and fundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely fol- 
lows it, cannot dangerously err.  If therefore the exe- 
cutive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, 
observing rather the true proportion than fashion of re- 
presentation, regulates not by old custom, but true rea- 
son, the number  of  members in all places that have a 
right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the 
pople, however  incorporated,  can pretend  to, but in 
to the assistance which it affords to the pub- 
lic; it cannot be judged  to have set up a new legisla- 
tive, but to have  restoretl  the old  and  true one, and 
to have rectified the disorders which succession of time 
had insensibly, as well  as inevitably introduced ; for it 
being the interest as well as intention of the people,  to 
have a fair and equal representative;  whoever brings it 
nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, and establisher 
of  the government,  and cannot  miss  the consent and 
approbation of  the community : prerogative being no- 
thing but s power in the hands of  the prince, to pro- 
vide for the public good, in such cases, which depend- 
ing upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain 
and  unalterable  laws  could  not  safely  direct;  what- 
soever shall  be  done manifestly  for  the  good  of  the 
people, and the establishing the government  upon its 
true foundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative. 
The power  of  erecting new  corporations,  and there- 
with new  representatives,  carries with it a supposition 
that in time the measures of representation might vary, 
and those  places have  a just  right to be represented 
which before had none ; and by the same reason, those 
cease to have a right, and be too inconsiderable for such 
a  privilege,  which before  had it.  It is not a  change 
from  the present state,  which  perhaps  corruption  or 
decay has introduced, that makes  an inroad upon the 
government;  but the tendency  of  it to injure or op- 
press the people, and to set up one part or party, with 
a  distinction  from,  and an unequal  subjection of  the 
rest.  Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be 
of advantage to the society, and people in general, upon 
just  and  lasting measures,  will  always,  when  done, 
justify  itself;  and  whenever  the people  shall choose 
their  representatives upon just  and undeniably equal 
measures, suitable to the original frame of the govern- 
ment, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act ofthe 
society, whoever permitted or caused them so to do. 
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CHAPTER  XIV. 
OJ  Prerogative. 
$ 1.59. WHERE  the legislative and executive power 
are in distinct  hands,  (as  they are in  all moderated 
monarchies  and  well-framed  governments)  there  the 
good of the society requires, that several things should 
be left to the discretion of him that has the executive 
power:  for  the legislators  not being  able to foresee, 
and provide by laws,  for all that may be useful to the 
community, the executor of the laws having the power 
in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right 
to make use of it for the good of the society, in many 
cases, where the municipal  law has given no direction, 
till  the legislative  can  conveniently  be assembled to 
provide for it.  Many things there are, which the law 
can by no means  provide  for; and those must neces- 
sarily  be  left  to the  discretion  of  him that has the 
executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as 
the public good  and advantage  shall require :  nay, it 
is  fit  that the laws  themselves  should in  some cases 
give  way  to  the executive  power,  or  rather  to this 
fundamental law of nature and government, viz.  That, 
as  much  as may  be,  all the members  of  the society 
are to be  preserved : for  since  many  accidents  may 
happen,  wherein a strict and rigid observation of the 
laws may do harm ; (as not to pull down an innocent 
man's  house  to stop  the fire, when  the next to it is 
burning)  and  a  man  may  come  sometimes  within 
the reach  of  the law,  which makes  no distinction  of 
persons,  by  an  action  that may  deserve reward  and 
pardon;  it is  fit  the  ruler  should  have  a  power,  in 
many  cases,  to mitigate the severity of  the law,  and 
pardon some  offenders:  for  the  end  of  government 
being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even 
the guilty are to be spared, where it call prove  no pre- 
judice to the innocent. 
§ 160.  This power to act according to discretion for 
the public good, without  the  prescription  of  the law, 
and sometimes even  against it, is that which is called 
prerogative : for since in some governments the law- 
making power is not always in being, and is usually too 
numerous, and so too slow for the despatch requisite to 
execution ;  and because also it is impossible to foresee, 
and so by laws to provide for all accidents and neces- 
sities that may concern the public, or to  make such laws 
as will  do no harm,  if they are executed with  an in- 
flexible rigour  on all occasions, and upon  all persons 
that may come in their way ;  therefore there is a lati- 
tude left to the executive power, to do many things of 
choice which the laws do not prescribe. 
$ 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit 
of  the community, and  suitably to the trust and ends 
of  the  government,  is  undoubted  prerogative,  and 
never is questioned ;  for the people are very seldom or 
never scrupulous or nice in the point ; they are far from 
examining  prerogative,  whilst  it  is  in  any tolerable 
degree employed for the use it was meant; that is, for 
the good of the people, and  not manifestly against it : 
but if there comes  to be  a question  between the exe- 
cutive power and the people, about a thing claimed as 
a prerogative, the tendency of  the exercise of such pre- 
rogative to the good or  hurt of  the people will easily 
decide that question. 
§ 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of 
governments, when commonwealths differed little from 
families in  number  of  people, they differed from then1 
too but little in number  of laws:  and the governors 
being as the fathers of  them, watching over  them for 
their good, the government was almost all prerogative. 
A few  established  laws  served  the turn, and  the dis- 
cretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest.  But when 
mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make 
use of this power for private cnds o,ftheir own, and not 
for  the public good, the poopfe were  fain  by express 
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laws  to  get prerogative  determined  in  those  points 
wherein  they  found  disadvantage  from  it: and  thus 
declared limitations of prerogative were by  the people 
found  necessary  in  cases  which  they  and  their  an- 
cestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the wisdom 
of  those princes who made no other but a right use of 
it ; that is, for the good of their people. 
$ 163. And  therefore  thcy have  a very  wrong no- 
tion of government, who say,  that the people have en- 
croached upon the prerogative, when they have got any 
part of it to be defined by positive laws:  for in so doing 
they  have not pulled from the prince  any thing that 
of right  belonged  to  him,  but only declare, that that 
power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors' 
hands, to be  exercised for their good, was not a thing 
which  they intended  him when  he used it otherwise : 
for the end of government being the good of the com- 
munity, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending 
to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, 
since nobody in government can have a right tending to 
any other end :  and those only are encroachments which 
prejudice or hinder the public good.  Those who say 
otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and se- 
parate interest from  the good  of the community, and 
was not  made for it; the root and source from which 
spring almost  all those evils and disorders which hap- 
pen  in  kingly  governments.  And  indeed,  if that be 
so, the people under  his  government are not a society 
of rational creatures, entered into a community for their 
mutual good;  they are not such as have set rulers over 
themselves, to guard and promote that good;  but are 
to be looked  on as an herd of inferior creatures under 
the dominion  of  a master,  who keeps them and works 
them for  his own pleasure  or profit.  If men were so 
void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into society upon 
such terms,  prerogative  might indeed  be,  what  some 
men  would  have  it,  an arbitrary  power  to do things 
hurtful to the people. 
$ 164. But since  a rational creature cannot be sup- 
posed,  when free, to put himself into subjection to an- 
other,  for his  own harm;  (though,  whcre he finds  a 
good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either 
necessary or  useful  to set precise bounds to his power 
in all things) prerogative  can he nothing but the peo- 
ple's  permitting their  rulers to do several  tliings,  of 
their  own free choice, where  the law  was silent, and 
sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for 
the public good ;  and  their  acquiescing in  it when so 
done : for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust 
put into  his hands, and careful of the good of his peo- 
ple, cannot have too much  prerogative, that is, power 
to  do good;  so  a  weak  and  ill prince,  who  would 
claim  that power  which  his  predecessors  exercised 
without the direction  of  the law, as a prerogative be- 
longing  to him  by right  of  his office, which  he may 
exercise at  his pleasure, to make or promote an interest 
distinct from  that of  the public;  gives  the people an 
occasion  to claim  their  right,  and  limit that power, 
which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were 
content should be tacitly allowed. 
§ 165. And therefore he that will  look into the hi- 
story of England, will find, that prerogative was always 
largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes ;  be- 
cause the people, observing the whole tendency of their 
actions to be the public good, contested not what was 
done without law to that end : or, if any huinan frailty 
or mistake  (for princes are but men,  made as others) 
appeared in some  small  declinations  from that  end; 
yet it was visible, the main of their conduct tended to 
nothing but the care of the public.  The people, there- 
fore,  finding  reason  to be satisfied with these princes, 
whenever they acted without, cr contrary to the letter 
of the law,  acquiesced in what they did, and, without 
the least complaint, let them enlarge their prerogative 
as they pleased;  judging rightly, that they did nothing 
herein to the prejudice of  their laws, since they  acted 
conformably to the foundation and end of a11 laws, the 
public good. 
§ 166.  Such  God-like  princes,  indeed,  had  some 
title to arbitrary power by that argument, that would 
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which God  himself  governs  the universe by; because 
such kings partook of his wisdom and goodness.  Upon 
this  is  founded  that saying,  That the reigns  of  good 
princes have been always most dangerous to  the liberties 
of  their people : for when  their  successors, managing 
the government  with  different  thoughts, would  draw 
the actions  of  those  good  rulers into precedent, and 
make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what 
had been done only for the good of  the people was  a 
right in them to do for the harm of the people, if they 
so pleased ;  it has often occasioned contest, and some- 
times public disorders, before the people could recover 
their original right, and get that to be declared not to 
be  prerogative, which  truly was  never  so : since  it is 
impossible that any body in the society should ever have 
a right to do the people harm ;  though it be very pos- 
sible and reasonable that the people should not go about 
to set any bounds  to the prerogative  of  those  kings 
or rulers, who themselves transgressed  not the bounds 
of  the public  good; for "  prekogative is nothing  but 
the power of doing public good without a rule." 
$ 167.  The power  of  calling  parliaments  in  Eng- 
land,  as to precise  time,  p!ace,  and duration,  is cer- 
tainly a prerogative of the king, but still with this trust, 
that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, 
as the exigencies of  the times, and variety  of occasions 
shall require :  for it being  impossible  to foresee which 
shoi~ld  always be the fittest place for thern to assemble 
in, and what the best  season, the choice  of  these was 
left with  the executive power, as might be most sub- 
servient to the public good, and  best  suit the ends of 
parliaments. 
5 168.  The  old question will be asked in this matter 
of  prerogative, "  But who  shall be judge  when  this 
power is made a right use of ?"  I answer:  between an 
executive  power  in  being,  with  such  a  prerogative, 
and a  legislative  that depends upon  his will for their 
convening, there can  be  no  judge  on earth; as  there 
can  be  none  between  the legislative  and the people, 
sllould either the executive or the legislative, when they 
have got the power in their hands, design or  go about 
to enslave or destroy them.  The  people have no other 
remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no 
judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven :  for the rulers, 
in such attempts, exercising a power the people  never 
put into  their  hands (who  can never  be  supposed to 
consent that any body should rule over them for their 
harm), do that which they have not a right to do.  And 
where  the body of  the people, or  any single man,  is 
deprived of their right, or under the exercise of a power 
without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they 
have a liberty to appeal to  heaven, whenever they judge 
the cause of sufficient moment.  And therefore, though 
the people  cannot be judge, so as to have, by the con- 
stitution of  that society, any superior power  to deter- 
mine and give effective sentence in the case ; yet they 
have, by a  law antecedent and paramount  to all po- 
sitive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination 
to themselves  which  belongs  to  all  mankind,  where 
there lies  no appeal on earth, viz.  to judge  whether 
they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven.- 
And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out 
of  a man's  power  so  to submit himself  to another, as 
to give him a liberty to destroy him;  God and nature 
never  allowing  a man  so  to abandon  himself,  as  to 
neglect his own preservation : and since he cannot take 
away his own life, neither can he give another power 
to  take it.  Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual 
foundation for disorder ;  for this operates not till the 
inconveniency is so great that the majority feel it, and 
are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. 
But this  the executive  power, or  wise  princes, never 
need come in the danger of:  and it is the thing, of  all 
others, they have most need to avoid, as of  all others 
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CHAPTER  XV. 
Of  pakrnal, political,  and clespotical Pow,  considered 
together. 
$ 169. THOUGH  I have  had  occasion  to speak of 
these separately before,  yet the great mistakes of late 
about  government  having,  as I suppose,  arisen  from 
confounding  these  distinct  powers  one  with  another, 
it may not,  perhaps, be  amiss to consider them here 
together. 
5 170. First, then, paternal or parental power is no- 
thing but that which parents have over their children, 
to govern  them for the children's  good, till they come 
to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein 
they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, 
whether  it be the law of nature, or the municipal law 
of their country, they are to govern themselves by:  ca- 
pable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who 
live as freemen under that law.  The affection and ten- 
derness which God hath planted in the breast of parents 
towards  their  children,  makes  it evident, that  this is 
not intended to be  a severe arbitrary government, but 
only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their 
offspring.  But happen  it as it will, there is, as I have 
proved, no  reason why it should be thought to extend 
to life and death, at any time, over their children, more 
than over any body else ;  neither can there be any pre- 
tence why  this parental  power  should keep the child, 
when  grown to a man,  in subjection to the will of his 
parents, any farther than having received life and edu- 
cation from his parents, obliges hini to respect, honour, 
gratitude,  assistance, and support, all his  life, to both 
father and mother.  And  thus, it is true, the paternal 
is a natural government, but not at all extending itself 
to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. 
The power of  the father doth not reach at all to the 
property  of  the child,  which  is only  in  his  own  dis- 
posing. 
5 171.  Secondly,  political  power  is  that  power 
which  everv  man having  in the state of  nature, has 
given up iito the handsVof the society, and therein to 
the governors, whom  the society hath set over  itself, 
with  this  express  or tacit  trust, that it shall be  em- 
ployed  for  their  good,  and the preservation of  their 
property:  now  this  power,  which  every  man  has in 
the state of  nature,  and which  he parts with to the 
society in all such cases  where the society can secure 
him, is to use such means for the preserving of his own 
property as  he thinks good,  and nature  allows  him; 
and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, 
so is  (according  to the best of  his  reason) may most 
conduce to the preservation  of  himself  and the rest of 
mankind.  So that the end and measure of this power, 
when  in every  man's  hands  in  the state  of  nature, 
being  the preservation  of  all of  his  society,  that is, 
all mankind  in general,  it can have no  other end  or 
measure, when in the hands of  the magistrate, but to 
preserve  the  members  of  that  society in their lives, 
liberties, and possessions ;  and so cannot be an absolute 
arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are 
as mueh as possible  to be preserved ; but a  power to 
make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may 
tend  to the preservation  of  the  whole, by cutting off 
those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt that 
they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no 
severity  is  lawful.  And  this  power  has its original 
only  from  compact  and  agreement,  and the  mutual 
consent of those who make up the community. 
5 172.  Thirdly,  despotical  power  is  an  absolute, 
arbitrary power  one  man  has  over  another,  to take 
away his  life  whenever  he pleases.  This is a power, 
which  neither  nature gives, for  it has  made  no  such 
distinction between one man and another, nor conlpact 
can  convey;  for  man  not  having  such  an arbitrary 
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a power over it; but it is the effect only of  forfeiture, 
which  the  aggressor  makes  of  his  own life, when he 
puts himself  into the state of  war with  another:  for 
having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the 
rule  betwixt man  and  man,  and  the  common  bond 
whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and 
society, and having renounced the way of peace which 
that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to com- 
pass  his  unjust  ends  upon  another, where  he has  no 
right;  and  so revolting from his  own kind to that of 
beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule 
of  right ; he renders himself  liable to be destroyed by 
the injured person,  and the rest of  mankind, that will 
join with him in the execution of  justice,  as any other 
wild beast, or noxious brute, with  whom  mankind can 
have neither society nor security*.  And thus captives, 
taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are sub- 
ject to a despotical power ; which, as it arises not from 
compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state 
of war continued : for what compact can be made with 
a man that is  not master of his  own life? what con- 
dition can he perform? and if  he be  once  allowed to 
be  master  of  his  own  life,  the  despotical  arbitrary 
power  of  his  master  ceascs.  He that  is master  of 
himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means 
of  preserving it ;  so that, as soon  as  compact  enters, 
slavery ceases, and he so far quits his  absolute power, 
and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into 
conditions with his captive. 
§ 173.  Nature gives  the first of these, viz. paternal 
power,  to  parents  for  the  benefit  of  their  children 
during their  minority,  to supply their want of ability 
and  understanding  how  to inanage  their  property. 
(By  property I must  be  understood here, as in other 
places, to mean that property which men have in their 
persons as well as goods.)  Voluntary  agreement gives 
the second,  viz, political  power  to governors  for  the 
benefit  of  their  subjects,  to secure them  in  the pos- 
* Another copy, corrected by Mr. Lockc,  has it thus, I' Noxio~~s 
bli~te  that is destructive to their being." 
session  and  use  of  their  properties.  And  forfeiture 
gives the third despotical power to lords, for their own 
benefit, over those who are stripped of all property. 
5 174.  He that shall consider  the distinct rise and 
extent, and the different ends of  these  several powers, 
will plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short 
of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it ;  and 
that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from 
being one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent 
with it, as slavery is with property.  Paternal power is 
only  where  minority  makes  the  child  incapable  to 
manage his  property;  political, where  men have pro- 
perty in their own disposal ;  and despotical, over such 
as have no property at all. 
CHAPTER  XVI. 
Of  Conquest. 
§ 175.  THOUGI-I  governments  can  originally  have 
110  other rise than that before-mentioned,  nor  politics 
be  fourided  on  any  thing  but  the  consent  of  the 
people ;  yet such have been the disorders ambition has 
filled the world with,  that in the noise of  war, which 
makes so great a part of  the history  of  mankind, this 
consent is little taken notice  of:  and therefore many 
have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of  the 
people, and reckon conquest as one of  the originals of 
government.  But conquest  is  as far from  setting up 
any government, as demolishing a house is from build- 
ing a new one in the place.  Indeed, it often makes 
way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying 
the former; but,  without  the consent  of  the people, 
can never erect a new one. 
$ 176.  That  the aggressor, who puts himself into the 
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man's  right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to 
have a right over the conquered, will  be  easily agreed 
by all men, who will not think that robbers and pirates 
have  a  right  of  empire  over  whomsoever  they  have 
force enough to master, or that men are bound by pro- 
mises which unlawful force extorts from them.  Should 
a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my 
throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, 
would this give him  any title ?  Just such a title, by his 
sword, has  an unjust  conqueror, who  forces me  into 
submission.  The  injury  and  the  crime  are  equal, 
whether  committed  by  the wearer  of  the  crown  or 
some petty villain.  The title of  the offender, and the 
number  of  his  followers,  make  no  difference  in  the 
offence, unless it be to aggravate it.  The  only difference 
is,  great robbers  punish  little ones,  to keep them in 
their obedience ;  but the great ones are rewarded with 
laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the 
weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power 
in their own possession which  should punish offenders. 
What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into 
my house ?  Appeal to the law for justice.  But perhaps 
justice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir, rob- 
bed and have not the means to do it.  If God has taken 
away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left 
but patience.  But my son,  when  able,  may seek  the 
relief of  the law,  which  I am  denied:  he  or  his  son 
may renew his appeal, till he recover  his  right.  But 
the conquered,  or  their  children,  have  no  court,  no 
arbitrator on earth to appeal to.  Then they may ap- 
peal,  as  Jephthah  did,  to heaven,  and  repeat  their 
appeal till they have recovered the native right of their 
ancestors, which  was, to have  such  a  legislative  over 
them as the majority  should  approve,  and  freely ac- 
quiesce in.  If it be objected, this would cause endless 
trouble; I answer, no  more  than justice  does,  where 
she lies open to all that appeal to her.  He that trou- 
bles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it 
by  the justice of  the court he appeals to ;  and he that 
a  appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side, 
and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the 
appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot  be 
deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one ac- 
cording to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow- 
subjects ; that is, any part of  mankind :  from whence 
it is plain, that he that "  conquers  in  an unjust war, 
can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience 
of the conquered." 
tj 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, 
let us  consider  a  conqueror in a  lawful war, and see 
what power he gets, and over whom. 
First,  It is  plain  he "  gets  no power  by  his  con- 
quest  over  those  that  conquered  with  him."  They 
that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, 
but must at least be  as much freemen  as they  were 
before.  And most commonly they serve upon terms, and 
on conditions to share with  their  leader, and enjoy a 
part of the spoil, and other  advantages  that attended 
the conquering sword;  or at least have a part of  the 
subdued country bestowed upon them.  And "the con- 
quering people  are not, I hope,  to be  slaves by con- 
quest,"  and wear  their  laurels only to show they are 
sacrifices to their leader's  triumph.  They that found 
absolute monarchy upon  the title  of  the sword, make 
their heroes, who are the founders of such monarchies, 
arrant Drawcansirs, and forget they had any officers and 
soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, 
or assisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, 
the countries they mastered.  We  are told by some, that 
the English monarchy is  founded in the Norman  con- 
quest, and that our princcs have thereby a  title to ab- 
solute  dominion:  which  if  it were  true  (as  by  the 
history it appears otherwise),  and that William had a 
right to make war on this island, yet his  dominion by 
conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and 
Britons,  that were  then inhabitants  of  this  country. 
The Normans that came with him, and helped  to con- 
quer, and all descended  from them, are freemen, and 
no subjects by conquest, let that give what dominion 
it will.  And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, 
as derived  from  them, it will  be  very  hard  to prove 
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no distinction between  the one  and the other,  intend^ 
not there should be any difference in  their freedom or 
privileges. 
$ 178. But supposing, which  seldom  happens, that 
the conquerors  and conquered  never  incorporate into 
one people, under  the same laws and freedom;  let us 
see  next  "what  power  a  lawful conqueror has  over 
the  subdued:"  and that  I  say  is  purely  despotical. 
Hc has an absolute power over the lives of  those who 
by an unjust war have forfeited them ;  but not over the 
lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, 
nor over the possessions even of those who were actually 
engaged in it. 
tj  179.  Secondly, I say then the conqueror  gets no 
power but only over those who have  actually assisted, 
concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used 
against  him:  for  the  people  having  given  to  their 
governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to 
make an unjust war (for  they never had such a power 
in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty 
of the violence and injustice that is committed in an un- 
just war, any farther than they actually abet it, no more 
than they are to be thought guilty  of  any violence or 
oppression their governors should use upon the people 
themselves,  or  any part of  their  fellow-subjects,  they 
having empowered them no more to the one than to the 
other.  Conquerors, it is  true, seldom  trouble them- 
selves  to  make  the  distinction,  but  they  willingly 
perinit the confusion of war to sweep all together :  but 
yet this alters not the right ; for the conqueror's  power 
over  the lives  of  the conquered  being  only  because 
they have used force to do, or maintain an injustice, he 
can have  that power  only over  those  who  have  con- 
curred in that force ;  all the rest are innocent ;  and he 
has no more title over the people of that country, who 
have  done him  no injury, and so  have  made no  for- 
feiture of  their lives, than he has over  any other, who, 
without  any injuries  or  provocations, have lived upon 
fair terms with him. 
$ 180.  Thirdly,  The power  a  conqueror gets over 
those he overcomes in a just war, is perfectly despotical: 
he has an absolute power over the lives of  those, who, 
by putting themselves in a state of  war, have forfeited 
them;  but he has  not  thereby  a  right  and title to 
their possessions.  This I doubt not but at first sight 
will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary 
to the practice of the world ;  there being nothing more 
familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries, than 
to  say such an one conquered it; as if  conquest, with- 
out any more ado, conveyed a right of possession.  But 
when we consider, that the practice of  the strong and 
powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the 
rule of  right, however it be one part of  the subjection 
of  the conquered, not  to argue against the conditions 
cut out to them by the conquering sword. 
$ 18  1.  Though in  all war  there be usually a com- 
plication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom 
fails to harm the estate, when he uses force against the 
persons of  those he makes war upon ;  yet it is the use 
of force only that puts a man into the state of  war :  for 
whether by force he begins  the injury, or else having 
quietly, and by fraud, done the injury,  he refuses  to  , 
make  reparation, and  by force  maintains it (which  is 
the same thing, as at first to have done it by force), it 
is the unjust  use of  force that makes the war: for he 
that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out 
of  doors;  or, having peaceably  got in, by force keeps 
me out, does  in effect  the same  thing;  supposing we 
are in such a state that we have no  common judge on 
earth whom  T may  appeal to,  and to whom  we  are 
both obliged  to submit; for of  such I am now speak- 
ing.  It  is the "  unjust use of  force  then, that puts n 
man into the state of  war" with another; and thereby 
he that is guilty of  it makes  a  forfeiture  of  his  life : 
for  quitting reason, which  is the role  given  between 
man and man, and using  force,  the way of  beasts,  he 
becomes  liable to be  dkstroyed  by him  he uses force 
against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous 
to his being. 
$ 182. But  because the miscarriages of the father are 
no faults of the children, and they may be rational and 
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of  the father; the father, by his miscarriages and vio- 
lence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his 
children in his guilt or destruction.  His goods, which 
nature, that willeth the preservation of all mankind as 
much as is possible, hath made to belong to  the children 
to  keep  them  from  perishing,  do  still  continue  to 
belong to his children ; for supposing them not to have 
joined  in the war, either through infancy, absence, or 
choice,  they have  done  nothing to forfeit  them:  nor 
has the conqueror any right to take them away, by.the 
bare title of having subdued him that by force attempted 
his destruction;  though  perhaps  he  may  have  some 
right to them, to repair  the damages he has sustained 
by the war, and the defence  of  his  own right;  which 
how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, 
we shall see by and by.  So that he that by conquest has 
a right over a man's  person to destroy him if he pleases, 
has not thereby a right over  his  estate to possess and 
enjoy it ;  for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used 
that gives his  adversary a right to take away his  life, 
and destroy him, if  he pleases, as a noxious creature ; 
but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to 
another  man's  goods:  for  though I  may  kill  a  thief 
that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which 
seems less) take away his  money and let him go : this 
would be robbery on my side.  His force, and the state 
of  war  he put himself  in,  made him  forfeit  his  life, 
but gave me no title to his goods.  The right then of 
conquest extends only to the lives of  those who joined 
in the war, not to their  estates, but only in order  to 
make  reparation  for  the  damages  received,  and the 
charges  of  the war ; and that too with reservation of 
the right of the innocent wife and children. 
$ 183. Let the conqueror have  as much justice on 
his side as could be supposed, he has no right to seize 
more than the vanquished  could forfeit :  his  life  is  at 
the victor's  mercy ;  and  his service and go~ds  he may 
appropriate to make himself  reparation;  but he caa- 
not take the goods of his wife  and children:  they too 
had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in 
the estate he possessed : for example, I in the state of 
nature (and  all commonwealths are in the state of na- 
ture one with another) have injured another man, and 
refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, 
wherein my defending  by force what I had gotten un- 
justly makes me the aggressor.  I am conquered : 
life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my  wife s 
and children's.  They made not the war,  nor assisted 
in it.  I could not forfeit their lives ;  they were not mine 
to forfeit.  My wife had a  share in my  estate;  that 
neither could I forfeit.  And my  children also, being 
born of  me, had a  right to be maintained  out of my 
labour or substance.  Here then is the case : the con- 
queror has a  title  to reparation for damages received, 
and the children have a title to their father's  estate for 
their subsistence:  for as to  the wife's  share, whether her 
own labour,  or compact,  gave her  a  title to it, it is 
plain  her  husband could  not  forfeit  what  was  hers. 
What must be done in the case? I answer;  the funda- 
mental law of  nature being, that all,  as much as may 
be,  should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not 
enough  fully to satisfy  both,  viz.  for  the conqueror's 
losses, and  children's  maintenance,  he that hath, and 
to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, 
and give  way  to  the ~ressing  and preferable title of 
those who are in dancer to perish without it. 
$ 184.  But supposing  the charge and damages  of 
the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the ut- 
most farthing ;  and that the children of the vanquished, 
spoiled  of  all  their  father's  goods,  are to be  left  to 
starve and perish;  yet the satisfying of what shall, on 
this  score,  be due to the  conqueror, will scarce give 
him  a title to any country  he  shall conquer:  for the 
damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any 
considerable  tract  of land, in  any part of  the world, 
where  all the land is  possessed, and none lies waste. 
And  if  I have  not  taken away  the conqueror's  land, 
whiclr, being vanquished, it isimpossible I should ;  scarce 
any  other  spoil I  have  done  him  can amount to the 
value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an 
extent any way coming near what I had over-run of his. 
The destruction  of  a year's  product or two (for it sel- 
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dom  reaches  four  or  five)  is  the  utmost  spoil  that 
usually can be done:  for as to money, and such riches 
and treasure  taken  away, these  are none  of  nature's 
goods,  they  have  but a  fantastical imaginary  value: 
nature has put no such upon them:  they are of no more 
account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the 
Americans to an European prince,  or the silver money 
of  Europe would have been formerly to an American. 
And five  years product is not worth the perpetual in- 
heritance  of land, where all is possessed, and none re- 
mains waste, to be  taken up by him that is disseized : 
which  will be  easily  granted, if one do but take away 
the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being 
more than between  five  and five hundred ;  though, at 
the  same  time,  half  a year's  product is  more  worth 
than  the  inheritance,  where  there  being  more  land 
than the inhabitants possess  and make use of, any one 
has liberty to make use  of the waste : but there con- 
querors  take little care  to possess  themselves  of  the 
lands of  theivanquished.  No damage,  therefore,  that 
men in the state of nature (as all princes and govern- 
ments are in reference to one another) suffer from one 
another, can give  a  nonqueror power to dispossess the 
posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that 
inheritance, which ought to be  the possession of them 
and  their descendants to  all generations.  The con- 
queror indeed will be apt to think himself master : and 
it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able 
to dispute their  right.  But if that be all, it gives no 
other title than what bare force gives to the stronger 
over  the  weaker:  and,  by  this  reason,  he  that  is 
strongesf  will  have  a  right to whatever he pleases to 
seize on. 
§  185.  Over those then that joined  with him in the 
war, and over  tkose of  the subdued country that op- 
posed  him  not,  and the posterity  even  of  those  that 
did,  the  conqueror,  even  in  a just  war,  hath, by his 
conquest, no right of dominion : they are free from any 
subjection to him,  and if  their former government be 
dissolved, they are at liberty to  begin and erect another 
to themselves. 
§  186.  The conqueror,  it is  true, usually,  by  the 
force he has over them, compels them, with a sword at 
their breasts,  to stoop to his conditions, and submit to 
such  s  government as he pleases to afford them ; but 
the inquiry is,  what  right  he has  to do so? If it be 
said, they submit by their own consent, then this allows 
their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror 
a title to rule over them.  It remains only to be con- 
sidered, whether promises extorted  by  force,  without 
right, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. 
To which  I shall say,  they bind not  at all;  because 
whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain 
the right of, and lie is obliged presently to restore.  He 
that forces my horse  from me, ought presently to re- 
store him,  and I have still a right to retake him.  By 
the same  reason,  he  that  forced  a promise  from me, 
ought presently  to restore  it, i. e.  quit me of the obli- 
gation of it; or I  may resume it myself, i.  e. choose 
whether I will perform it: for  the law of nature lay- 
ing an  obligation  on me  only  by  the rules  she pre- 
scribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: 
such  is  the  extorting  any thing from  me by  force. 
Nor  does it at all alter the case to say, "I gave my 
promise,"  no more than it excuses the force, and passes 
the  right,  when  I put  my  hand  in  my pocket  and 
deliver  my purse myself  to  a  thief,  who  demands it 
with a pistol at my breast. 
$ 187. From all which  it follows,  that the govern- 
ment of  a conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, 
against whom he had  no right of  war, or who joined 
not in the war against him, where he had right, has no 
obligation upon them. 
188.  But let 11s  suppose that all the men of  that 
community,  being  all  members  of  the  same  body 
politic,  may  be  taken  to  have joined  in that unjust 
war wherein  they  are subdued, and so their lives are 
at the mercy of the conqueror. 
189. 1 sayl  this concerns not their  children  who 
are in their  m~nority  : for  since a  father  hat11 not, in 
himself,  a power over  the life or  liberty of  his  child, 
no act of his can possibly forfeit it.  So that the child- 
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ren,  whatever may  have happened  to the fathers, are 
freemen, and the  absolute ~ower  of the conqueror reaches 
no farther than the persons of the men that were sub- 
dued  by  him,  and dies with  them:  and should he go- 
vern theln as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary 
power, he  has  no  such  right or  dominion  over  their 
children.  He can have  no power  over  them  but by 
their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say 
or do; and he has no  lawful authority,  whilst force, 
and not choice, compels them to submission. 
5 190. Every man is born with a double right :  first, 
a right of  freedom to his  person, which  no other man 
has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in him- 
self.  Secondly,  a right, before  any other man, to in- 
herit with his brethren his father's goods. 
S 191. By the first of  these, a man is naturally free 
from subjection to any government, though he be born 
in a place under its jurisdiction;  but if he disclaim the 
lawful government  of  the country he was  born in, he 
must also quit the right that belonged to him  by the 
laws of it, and the possessions there descending to him 
from  his  ancestors, if  it were  a government made by 
their consent. 
5 192.  By the second,  the inhabitants of any coun- 
try,  who  are descended,  and derive  a  title  to  their 
estates from those who are subdued, and had a govern- 
ment forced upon them against their free consents, re- 
tain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though 
they consent not freely to the government, whose hard 
conditions were by force imposed  on the possessors  of 
that country : for, the first conqueror never having had 
a title to the land of that country, the people who are 
the  descendants  of,  or  claim  under  those  who  were 
forced to submit to the yoke of a government by con- 
straint, have  always  a  right to shake it off, apd free 
themselves from the usurpation  or tyranny which  the 
sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put 
them under such a  frame of government as they will- 
ingly and of  choice consent  to.  Who doubts but the 
Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possess- 
ors  of  that country, may  justly  cast  off  the T~wkish 
yoke,  which they have  so long groaned under,  when- 
ever  they have  an  opportunity  to do it? For  no go- 
vernment  can have a right to obedience from a people 
who have  not  freely consented to it ; which they can 
never  be  supposed  to do, till  either they are put in a 
full state of liberty to choose their government and go- 
vernors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to 
which they have by themselves or their representatives 
given their free consent ; and also till they are allowed 
their  due  property,  which  is  so  to be  proprietors  of 
what they have, that nobody can take away any part of 
it without their  own  consent,  without which, men un- 
der  any  government  are not  in the state of freemen, 
but are direct slaves under the force of war. 
5 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war 
has a right to the estates, as well as power over the per- 
sons of  the conquered;  which, it is plain, he hath not: 
nothing of  absolute power  will  follow  from hence,  in 
the continuance  of  the government ; because  the de- 
scendants of these being all freemen, if he grants them 
estates and possessions to inhabit his country, (without 
which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants 
them, they have, so far as it is  granted, property in.- 
The nature  whereof  is,  that "  without  a man's  own 
consent, it cannot be taken from him." 
5 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and 
their properties, be they  more  or  less, are their  own, 
and at their own dispose, and not at his ; or else it is no 
property.  Supposing the conqueror gives to one man 
a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for ever;  to an- 
other he lets a thousand acres for  his life, under  the 
rent of 501.  or 5001. per ann.:  has not the one of these 
a right to his thousand  acres for  ever,  and the other 
during his life, paying the said rent? and hath not the 
tenant for  life  a property in all that he gets over and 
above  his rent, by his  labour  and industry during the 
said term, supposing it to be double the rent ?  Can any 
one say,  the king,  or  conqueror, after his grant, may 
by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the 
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life,  he paying  the rent? or can he take away  from 
either the goods or money they have got upon the said 
land, at his  pleasure? If he can, then all free and vo- 
luntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there 
needs nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power 
enough;  and  all  the  grants  and promises  of  men in 
power are but mockery and collusion : for can there be 
any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you and 
yours this for ever, and that in the surest and most so- 
lemn way of conveyance  can be devised;  and yet it is 
to be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take 
it away from you again to-morrow ? 
§ 195. I will  not dispute now,  whether princes are 
exempt from the laws of their country ;  but this I am 
sure, they owe subjection  to the laws of God and na- 
ture.  Nobody,  no power,  can  exempt them from the 
obligations  of  that eternal law.  Those are so great, 
and  so strong, in the  case of promises,  that omnipo- 
tency  itself  can  be tied  by them.  Grants, promises, 
and oaths, are bonds that hold  the Almighty:  whatever 
some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all to- 
gether,  with  all  their  people  joined  to them,  are ir 
comparison  of  the great God,  but  as  a  drop  of  th 
bucket,  or  a dust on  the balance,  inconsiderable,  no- 
thing. 
§ 196. The short of  the case in conquest is this:  the 
conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right 
over  the persons  of  a11  that actually aided, and con- 
curred in the war against him, and a right to make up 
his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so 
he injure not the right of any other.  Over the rest of 
the people, if there were any that consented not to the 
war,  and over the children of the captives themselves, 
or the possessions  of either, he has no power;  and so 
can have,  by  virtue of  conquest,  no  lawful title  him- 
self to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; 
but  is  an  aggressor,  if  he  attempts upon  their  pro- 
perties,  and  thereby  puts  himself  in  a  state of  war 
against them : and has no better a right of principality, 
he, nor any of  his  successors,  than Hingar, or Hubba, 
the Danes, had here in England ; or Spartacus, had Ile 
conquered Italy,  would  have had;  which  is  to  have 
their  yoke  cast  off,  as  soon  as  God  shall give those 
under their  subjection courage and opportunity to do 
it.  Thus, notwitl~stn~~ding  whatever title the kings of 
Assyria  had  over Judah, by  the sword,  God  assisted 
Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering 
empire.  "And  the  Lord was with  Hezekiah, and he 
prospered ; wherefore  he went forth, and he rebelled 
against  the  king  of  Assyria;  and  served  him  not," 
2  Kings, xviii. 7.  Whence it is plain, that shaking off 
a power, which force,  and not right, hath set over any 
one,  though it hath  the name  of  rebellion, yet  is  no 
offence before  God,  but is that which  he allows  and 
countenances,  though  even  promises  and  covenants, 
when obtained by force, have intervened : for it is very 
probable, to any one that reads  the story of Ahaz and 
Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, 
and deposed him, and made  Hezekiah  king in  his fa- 
ther's  lifetime;  and that Hezekiah by  agreement had 
done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time. 
CHAPTER  XVII. 
( 197.  As  conquest  may  be  called  n  foreign 
usurpation,  so  usurpation  is  a  kind  of  domestic con- 
quest;  with this difference, that an usurper can never 
have  right  on  his  side,  it  being  no  usurpation  but 
where one is  got into the possession of what another 
has right to.  This, so far as it is usurpation, is a change 
only of  persons,  but not  of  the forms and rules of the 
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yond what of  right belonged  to the lawful princes or 
governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to 
usurpation. 
$ 198.  In all lawful governments, the designation of 
the persons, who are to bear rule, is as natural and ne- 
cessary  a part as the form  of the government itself; 
and is that which had its establishment origtnally from 
the people : the anarchy being  much alike to have no 
form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be 
monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the per- 
son that shall have the power, and be the monarch.- 
Hence  all commonwealths, with  the form of  govern- 
ment  established,  have rules  also of  appointing those 
who are to have any share in the public authority, and 
settled methods  of  conveying the right  to them: for 
the anarchy is  much  alike to have no form of govern- 
ment  at all, or  to  agree that it shall be monarchical, 
but to appoint no  way  ta  know or design the person 
that shall have the power, and be the monarch.  Who- 
ever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by 
other ways than what the laws of the community have 
prescribed,  hath  no right  to be  obeyed,  though  the 
form of the commonwealth be still preserved;  since he 
is not the person the laws have  appointed,  and conse- 
quently not  the person  the people have  consented to. 
Nor  can such an usurper,  or any  deriving  from him, 
ever have  a title, till the people are both at liberty to 
consent, and have actually consented to allow, and con- 
firm in him the power he hath till then usurped. 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
Of  Tyranny. 
$199.  As usurpation is the exercise of power, which 
another  hath  a  right to, so  tyranny is  the exercise of 
power  beyond  right, which nobody  can have  a right 
to.  And this is making use of  the power any one has 
in his hands, not for  the good of those who are under 
it, but for his own private, separate advantage.-When 
the governor, however entitled, makes cot the law, but 
his  will, the rule;  and his  commands  and actions  are 
not directed to the preservation of the properties of his 
people,  but the satisfaction  of  his  ow11 ambition, re- 
venge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion. 
5 200.  If one can doubt this to be  truth or  reason, 
because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I 
hope  the authority of  a king will  make  it pass with 
him.  King James the First, in his  speech to the par- 
liament, 1603, tells them thus : "  I will ever prefer the 
weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in 
making  of  good  laws  and constitutions,  to any  par- 
ticular  and private  ends  of  mine;  thinking ever  the 
wealth  and  weal  of  the  commonwealth  to  be  my 
greatest weal  and worldly felicity ; a point wherein a 
lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant:  for I 
do acknowledge,  that the special  and greatest point 
of  difference  that is between  a  rightful king and an 
usurping tyrant is this,  that whereas  the proud and 
ambitious tyrant doth think his  kingdom  and people 
are only  ordained  for  satisfaction  of  hi desires  and 
unreasonable  appetites,  the  righteous  and just  king 
doth, by  the contrary, acknowledge  himself  to be or- 
dained for the procuring  of  the wealth  and property 
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parliament,  1609, lie  hath these  words : "  The king 
binds himself  by a double  oath to the observation of 
the fundamental laws  of  his  kingdom;  tacitly, as  by 
being  a  king,  and  so  bound  to  protect  as  well  the 
people,  as  the laws  of  his  kingdom;  and  expressly, 
by his  oath at his  coronation;  so as every just  king, 
in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction 
made  to his  people  by  his  laws,  in  framing his  go- 
vernment  agreeable  thereunto,  according  to  that 
paction  which  God  made  with  Noah  after  the  de- 
luge : Hereafter, seed-time  and harvest, and cold and 
heat,  and  summer  and  winter,  and  day  and  night, 
shall not cease while the earth remaineth.  And there- 
fore a king governing in a settled  kingdom, leaves  to 
be a king, and  degenerates  into a  tyrant, as soon  as 
he leaves  off  to rule  according  to his  laws."  And a 
little after, "  Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, 
or perjured, will  be  glad to bound  themselves within 
the limits of  their laws ;  and they that persuade them 
the contrary, are vipers, and pests  both  against  them 
and  the  commonwealth."  Thus  that  learned  king, 
who well  understood  the notions of  things, makes the 
difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only 
in  this,  that one  makes  the laws  the bounds  of  his 
power,  and  the good  of  the  public  the  end  of  his 
government;  the other makes a11  give way to his own 
will and appetite. 
5 201. It is a mistake to think this fault is proper 
only to monarchies;  other forms of  government  are 
liable to it,  as well  as that: for wherever  the power, 
that is put in any hands for  the government  of  the 
people,  and the preservation of  their properties, is ap- 
plied  to other  ends, and made  use  of  to-  impoverish, 
harass,  or  subdue them to  the arbitrary and irregular 
commands  of  those  that have  it; there  it presently 
becomes tyranny, whether  those  that thus  use  it are 
one or many.  Thus we read  of  the thirty tyrants at 
Athens,  as  well  as  one  at  Syracuse;  and  the  in- 
tolerable dominion  of  the decemviri at Rome was no- 
thing better. 
$ 202.  Wherever  law  ends,  tyranny  begins,  if  the 
law be transgressed to another's harm ;  and whosoever 
in authority exceeds the power  given him by the law, 
and makes use of  the force he has under his command, 
to compass that upon the subject which the law allows 
not, ceases in that to be a magistrate ;  and, acting with- 
out authority, may be opposed  as  any other man who 
by force invades the right of  another.  This is acknow- 
ledged in subordinate magistrates.  He that hath au- 
thority to seize  my  person  in  the street, may be  op- 
posed as a thief and a robber if he endeavours to break 
into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that 
I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal autho- 
rity as will  impower  him  to arrest me  abroad.  And 
why this should not hold  in the highest, as well  as in 
the most  inferior  magistrate,  I  would  gladly be  in- 
formed.  Is it reasonable that the eldest brother, because 
he has the greatest  part of  his  father's  estate, should 
thereby have a right to take away any of  his  younger 
brother's  portions ?  or that a rich man, who possessed a 
whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, 
when he pleased, the cottage and  garden of  his poor 
neighbour ?  The being  rightfully  possessed  of  great 
power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part 
of  the sons  of  Adam, is so far from being  an excuse, 
much  less  a reason, for  rapine  and oppression, which 
the endamaging another without authority is,  that it is 
a great aggravation of it : for the exceedillg the bounds 
of  authority is  no more  a  right in  a great, than in a 
petty officer;  no more justifiable in a king than a con- 
stable ; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has 
more  trust  put in  him,  has  already a  much  greater 
share than the rest  of  his  brethren, and is  supposed, 
from the advantages of his education, employment, and 
counsellors,  to be  more  knowing  in the measures  of 
right and wrong. 
Q  203.  "  May the  commands  then  of  a  prince  be 
opposed ?  may he be resisted as often as any one shall 
find  himself  aggrieved,  and but  imagine he has  not 
right done him ?  This will  unhinge  and overturn  all Of  Civil Government. 
politics,  and, instead  of  government  and order,  leave 
nothing but anarchy and confusion." 
$204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed 
to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force ;  whoever 
makes any opposition in any other case, draws on him- 
self n  just condemnation both from God and man ; and 
so no such  danger or confusion will follow, as is often 
suggested : for, 
5 205.  First, As,  in  some  countries,  the person  of 
the prince  by the law is sacred; and so, whatever he 
commands  or  does, his  person  is  still  free  from  all 
question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial 
censure or condemnation.  But yet opposition may be 
made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other 
commissioned  by him, unless  he will, by actually put- 
ting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve 
the government, and leave them to that defence which 
belongs to every one in the state of nature : for of such 
things who can tell what the end will be ?  and a neigh- 
bour kingdom has showed the world an odd  example. 
Tn  all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts 
him  from  all  inconveniences,  whereby  he  is  secure, 
whilst  the government  stands,  from  all violence  and 
harm whatsoever;  than which there cannot be a wiser 
constitution : for the harm he can do in his own person 
not  being likely to happen often, nor  to extend  itself 
far; nor being  able by his  single strength to subvert' 
the laws, nor oppress the body of  the people ;  should 
any prince have so much weakness and ill-nature as to 
be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular 
mischiefs  that may happen  sometimes, when a heady 
prince  comes  to the throne, are well recompensed by 
the peace  of  the public,  and security of  the govern- 
ment, in the person  of  the chief  magistrate, thus set 
out of  the reach  of  danger:  it being  safer  for  the 
body, that some few private men should be sometimes 
in danger to suffer, than that the head of  the republic 
should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed. 
5 206.  Secondly,  But this privilege belonging  only 
to the king's  person,  hinders  not;  but they  may  be 
tpestioned, opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, 
though  they  pretend  a  commission  from  him,  which 
the law authorizes not ;  as  is  plain  in the case of him 
that has the king's  writ to arrest a man, which is a full 
commission from the king ; and yet he that has it call- 
not break open a man's house to do it, nor execute this 
command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain 
places,  though this commission have no such exception 
in it; but they are the limitations of  the law, which if 
any one trans&ress, the king's commission excuses him 
not; for the king's  authority being given him only by 
the law, he cannot empower any one to act against the 
law,  or justify  him,  by his  commission,  in  so  doing; 
the commission or  command  of  any magistrate, where 
he has no authority, being  as void  and insignificant  as 
that of  any private  man; the  difference between  the 
one  and the other being  that the magistrate has some 
authority so far, and to such ends, and the private man 
has none at all : for it is  not the commission, but the 
authority, that gives the right  of  acting; and against 
the laws there can be no authority.  But, notwithstand- 
ing such resistance, the king's person and authority are 
still both  secured,  and so  no danger to governor  or 
government. 
Q 207. Thirdly,  Supposing  a  goverllment  wherein 
the person of the chief  magistrate is not thus sacred ; 
yet this doctrine of  the lawfulness  of  resisting  all un- 
lawful exercises of  his power, will not upon every slight 
occasion  endanger  him,  or  embroil  the  government: 
for where the injured  party inay be  relieved,  and his 
damages repaired by  appeal to the law, there can be 
no pretence  for force, which  is only to be used  where 
a man is intercepted  from  appealing to the law:  for 
nothing is to be  account,ed hostile force, but where it 
leaves not the remedy of such an appeal ; and it is such 
fo~cs  alone that puts  him  that  uses  it into a state of 
war, and makes it lawful to resist him.  A man with s 
sword in his hand demands my purse in the highway, 
when perhaps I have  not  twelve-pence  in my pocket : 
this man I may lawfully kill,  To another I deliver 100t. 
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me, when 1 am got up again, but draws his sword to 
defend the possession of  it by force, if I endeavour to 
retake it.  The mischief  this man does me is an hun- 
dred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other 
perhaps intended me (whom I killed  before  he  really 
did me any); and  yet I  might  lawfully kill the one, 
and cannot so much  as hurt the other lawfully.  The 
reason whereof is  plain;  because  the one using  force, 
which threatened my life, I could not have time to ap- 
peal to the law to secure it; and when it was gone, it 
was too late to appeal.  The law could not restore life 
to my dead carcase, the loss mas irreparable : which to 
prevent, the law of  nature gave me a right to destroy 
him, who had put himself into a state of  war with me. 
and threatened my destruction.  But in the other case, 
my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of 
appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 1001. 
that way. 
$ 208. Fourthly,  But if  the unlawful  acts done by 
the magistrate be maintained (by the power he has got), 
and the remedy which  is  due by law be by the same 
power  obstructed,  yet the right of  resisting, even  in 
such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on 
slight occasions, disturb the government : for if it reach 
no farther than some private mens'  cases, though they 
have a right to defend  themselves,  and to recover  by 
force what by unlawful force is taken from them ; yet 
the right to do so will not easily engage them in a con- 
test,  wherein they are sure to perish;  it being as im- 
possible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the 
government, where the body of the people do not think 
themselves  concerned  in  it, as  for  a  raving madman, 
or heady malecontent, to overturn a well-settled state; 
the people  being as little apt to follow the one as the 
other.  - 
$ $209. But if either these illegal acts have extended 
to the majority of  the people, or if  the mischief  and 
oppression has lighted only on some few, but in such 
cases,as the precedent and consequencesseem to  threaten 
all ; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that 
their laws, and with  them their  estates, liberties, and 
lives  are in  danger,  and perhaps  their  religion  too; 
how they will be hindered  from resisting illegal force, 
used  against  them,  I cannot tell.  This is  an incon- 
venience, I confess, that attends all governments what- 
soever,  when  the  gorernors have  brought  it to this 
pass, to be generally suspected of their people ;  the most 
dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves 
in ; wherein they are less to be  pitied, because it is so 
easy to be avoided ;  it being as impossible for a, governor, 
if he really means the good of his people, and the pre- 
servation of them, and their laws together, not to make 
them see  and feel it, as it is for the father of  a  family 
not to let his  children see he loves and takes care  of 
them. 
$ 210.  But if  all the world  shall observe  pretences 
of one kind, and actions of another ; arts used to elude 
the law, and the trust of  prerogative (which is an ar- 
bitrary power in some  things left in  the prince's  hand 
to do good,  not  harm  to the people)  employed  con- 
trary to the end for which  it was  given:  if the people 
shall  find  the ministers  and  subordinate magistrates 
chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, 
proportionably  as  they  promote  or  oppose  them:  if 
they see several experiments made of  arbitrary power, 
and that religion underhand favoured (though publicly 
proclaimed against), which is  readiest to introduce it ; 
and the operators in it supported, as much as may be ; 
and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and 
liked the better:  if  a  long  train  of  actions  show the 
councils all tending that way, how can a man any more 
hinder himself  from being  persuaded in his  own mind 
which way things are going ;  or from casting about how 
to save himself, than he could frorn believing the captain 
of the ship he was in, was ea,rryiiig  him, and the rest of 
the company,  to Algiers, when  he found  him  always 
steering that course, though cross winds,  leaks in his 
ship,  and  want of men  and provisions did often force 
him to turn  his  course  another  way  for  some  cime, 
which  he  steadily  returned  to again,  as soon  as the 
wind, weatlwr, and other circumstances would let him ? Of Civil Gomwunmt. 
CHAPTER  XIX. 
Of  the Dissolution oJGovernment. 
5 211. HE  that will with any clearness speak of the 
dissolution  of  government, ought in the first place to 
distinguish between the dissolution  of  the society and 
the dissolution of the government.  That which makes 
the community, and brings men out of  the loose state 
of  nature  into  one  politic  society,  is the  agreement 
which every one has with the rest  to incorporate, and 
act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. 
The usual,  and almost only way whereby this union is 
dissolved, is the inroad of  foreign force making a con- 
quest upon them : for in that case (not  being  able to 
maintain  and  support  themselves  as  one  entire  and 
independent body),  the union  belonging  to that body 
which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so 
every one return to the state he was in before, with  a 
liberty  to shift  for  himself,  and provide  for his  own 
safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society.  When- 
ever the society is  dissolved, it is  certain  the govern- 
ment of that society cannot remain.  Thus conquerors' 
swords  often  cut  up governments by  the roots,  and 
mangle  societies to pieces, separating the subdued or 
scattered  multitude from  the protection  of,  and  de- 
pendence  on,  that society  which  ought to have  pre- 
served them from violence.  The world is too well in- 
structed  in,  and  too  forward  to allow of,  this way of 
dissolving  of  governments,  to need  any  more  to be 
said  of  it;  and  there  wants  not  much  argument to 
prove, that where the society is dissolved, the govern- 
ment cannot  remain ; that being as impossible, as for 
the frame of  a house to subsist when the materials of 
it  are  scattered  and  dissipated  by  a  whirlwind,  or 
jumbled into a confused heap by  an earthquake. 
Of  Civil Government.  465 
9 212. Besides  this  overturning  from without,  go- 
vernments are dissolved from within. 
First, When the legislative is altered.  Civil society 
being a state  of  peace,  amongst those who  are of  it 
from whom the state of  war  is excluded by the umpi- 
rage, which they have provided in their legislative, for 
the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of 
them ; it is in  their legislative, that the members of  a 
commonwealth are united, and combined together into 
one coherent living body.  This is the soul that gives 
form, life, and unity to the commonwealth :  from hence 
the several members have their mutual influence,  sym- 
pathy, and connerion : and therefore, when  the legis- 
lative is broken or dissolved, dissolution and death fol- 
lows : for, the essence and union of the society consist- 
ing in having one will, the legislative, when once esta- 
blished  by the majority, has  the declaring, and  as  it 
were keeping of that will.  The constitution of the ie- 
gislative is the first  and fundamental  act  of  society, 
whereby provision is made for the continuation of their 
union,  under  the direction  of  persons,  and bonds  of 
laws,  made  by persons  authorized  thereunto,  by the 
consent and appointment of the people ;  without which 
no one  man, or  number  of  men,  amongst  them,  can 
have authority of making laws that shall be binding to 
the rest.  When any one, or more, shall take upon them 
to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so 
to do,  they  make  laws without  authority, which  the 
people are not therefore bound to obey ;  by which means 
they come again to be out of subjection, and may con- 
stitute to themselves  a new  legislative, as  they  think 
best, being in full  liberty to resist the force of  those, 
who  without  authority would impose  any thing upon 
them.  Every one is at the disposure of  his own will, 
when those who had, by thedelegation of the society, the 
declaring of  the public will, are excluded from it, and 
others usurp the place, who have no such authority or 
delegation.^ 
9  213. This being usually brought about by such in 
the commonwealth who misuse the power they have, it 
is hard to consider it aright,  and know  at whose door 
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to lay it, withotlt knowing  the form of  government in  5  (n6. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary Power  which it  Let US suppose then the legislative  the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are  placed  the Concurrence of three distinct persons.  without the  consent, and  contrary to the Common in-  '.  A single hereditary person, having the constant,  terest of the people, there also the legislative is altered : 
suprcme, executive  porrer, and  with  it the power  of  for if  others than those whom  the society hatll autho- 
and dissolving the other two,  certain  riled  thereunto, do choose, or in another way than 
periods of  time.  the society bath prescribed, those chosen are not the le- 
g.  A11  assembly of hereditary nobility.  gislative appointed by the people. 
3. An  assembly of representatives  chosen, pro tern-  § 917. Fourtllly, The delivery also of the people 
pore,  the people.  Such a form of government  the subjection  of a foreign power, either by the prince 
posed, it is evident, 
or by  legislative,  is certainly a change of the legis- 
9  '14.  First,  That when  such  a  single  person,  or  lative, and so a dissolution of the government:  For the 
~rillce,  sets up his  own  arbitrary will in place  of  the  end why people  entered into society being to be Pre- 
which ore the will of the society, declared by the  served one  free, independent society, to be go- 
legislative,  then  the legislative  is  changed:  for  that  verned by its own laws ;  this is lost, whenever they are 
being  in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are  given up into the power of another- 
put in  erecution. and  required  to be  obeyed;  when  218. why, in sucll  a ~o~atitution  as this,  the dis- 
Other  laws are set up,  and other rules pretended, and  solution of  the government in these Cases  is to be im- 
enforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the  puted to the prince, is evident ;  because he, having the 
have e~lacted,  it is plain  that the legislative is  force, treasure, and offices of  the state to employ, and  changed.  Whoever  introduces  new  laws,  not  being  often  persuading himself, or being flattered by others, 
thereullto autllorized by the fundamental appointment  that as supreme  he is uncapable of colltrol; 
society, or subverts the old ;  disowns and over-  he alone  is in a condition to make great advances t~- 
turns the Porver by which they were made, and so sets  .  ward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, 
up a new legislative.  and has it in his hands to terrify Or  suppress oppoSers9 
§ 'I5.  SecolldlJ',  When the prince hinders the legis-  as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government : 
lative from assembling in its due time, or from  whereas no other part of  the legislative, or people is 
Pursuant to those  ends for which it was consti-  capable by themselves to attempt any alteration  the 
tuted, the legislative is altered : for  it is  not a  legislative,  without  open  and  visible  rebellion,  apt 
number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have  enough  to be taken notice of; which, when it prevails, 
a]so freedom of debating; and leisure of perfecting, what  produces  very little different from foreign 
is  for the good of  the society, wherein  the legislative  quest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government 
:  when these are taken away or  so as to  having the power of  dissolving the other parts of  the 
the society of  the due exercise of  their power,  legislative,  and tllereby rendering them private Persons, 
the  legislative is truly altered :  for it is not names that  they can never in opposition to  him, or ~itllout  his con- 
governments,  but  the use  and exercise  of  eurrence,  the legislative  by  a  law,  his 
those  Powers that were intended to accompany them ;  being  necessary to  give any of their decrees that sane- 
*'  that  ]%  who  takes  away  the  freedom, or  hinders  tion.  ~~t yet, so far as  the other parts of the legislil- 
'he  acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect  tive any way contribute to any attempt upon  go- 
takes  the legislative,  and puts an end t~ the p-o- 
\'ernmen t.  rernment, and do  either promote, or not (what lies  in 
them) hinder such designs ;  they are  guilty, and par- 
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take in this, which is certainly the greatest crime men 
can be guilty of one towards another. 
$  919.  There is one way more whereby such  a go- 
vernment may be  dissolved, and that is, when he who 
has the supreme executive power,  neglects and aban- 
dons that charge, so that the laws already made can no 
longer be put in execution.  This is demonstratively to 
reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the 
government : for  laws  not being made for  themselves, 
but to be,  by their execution, the bonds of  the society, 
to keep every part of  the body politic in its due place 
and function ;  when that totally ceases, the government 
visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multi- 
tude, without order or connexion.  Where there is  no 
longer the administration of justice,  for the securing of 
men's  rights, nor any remaining power within  the com- 
munity to direct the force, or provide for the necessities 
of the public;  there  certainly is  no  government  left. 
Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if 
there were no laws ;  and a government without laws is, 
I suppose, a mystery in  politics,  inconceivable  to hu- 
man capacity, and inconsistent with human society. 
1  240. In these and the like cases, when the govern- 
ment is dissolved, the people  are at liberty to provide 
for themselves,  by erecting a  new legislative, differing 
from the other,  by the change of  persons, or form,  or 
both,  as  they shall find  it most  for  their  safety and 
good :  for the society can never, by the fault of another, 
lose the native and original rightit has to  preserve itself; 
which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a 
fair and  impartial execution of  the laws  made  by it. 
But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they 
are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late 
to look for any.  To  tell people  they may provide for 
themselves, by erecting a new legislative, when by op- 
pression, artifice, or  being delivered  over to a foreign 
power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them,  they 
may expect relief  when it is  too late, and the evil is 
past cure.  This is in effect no more than to bid them 
first be slaves, and then to take care of  their liberty ; 
and when their chains  are on, tell  them  they may act 
like  freemen.  This,  if  barely so,  is  rather  mockery 
than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, 
if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly 
under it; and therefore it is, that they have not only a 
right to get out of it, but to prevent it. 
$  821.  There is  therefore, secondly,  another way 
whereby governments are dissolved, and that is,  when 
the legislative,  or the prince, either of  them, act con- 
trary to their trust. 
First, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in 
them, when they endeavour to invade the property of 
the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the 
community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, 
liberties, or fortunes of the people. 
$ 22%  The reason why men  enter into society  is 
the preservation  of  their property ; and  the end why 
they choose  and authorize  a  legislative  is, that there 
may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences 
to the  properties of  all the  members of  the  society : 
to  limit the power, arid moderate the dominion, of  every 
part and member of the society : for since it c3n never 
be supposed to be the will of  the society that the legis- 
lative should have a power to destroy that which every 
one designs to secure by entering into society, and for 
which the people  submitted  themselves  to legislators 
of  their own making ;  whenever the legislators endea- 
vour  to take away  and  destroy  the property  of  the 
people, or  to reduce them to slavery under  arbitrary 
power,  they put themselves  into  a state of  war with 
the people, who are thereupon  absolved  from any far- 
ther  obedience,  and  are left to the  common  refuge, 
which God hath provided for all men, against force and 
violence.  Whensoever therefore the legislative  shall 
transgress this fundamental rule of society ;  and either 
by  ambition,  fear,  folly, or  corruption,  endeavour  to 
grasp themselves. or put into the hands of  any other, 
an absolute power  over the lives, liberties, and estates 
of the people ;  by this breach of  trust they forfeit the 
power the people had put into their  hands for quite 
contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have 
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establishment of  a new  legislative, (such  as they shall 
think  fit)  provide  for  their  own  safety and  security, 
which is the end for which  they are in society.  What 
I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, 
holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who 
having a double trust put in him, both to have a part 
in the legislative, and the supreme execution of  the law, 
acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own 
arbitrary will as the law of  the society.  He acts also 
contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, 
treasure, and offices of the society to corrupt the repre- 
sentatives, and  gain them to his  purposes ; or openly 
pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, 
such, whom  he has, by solicitations, threats, promises, 
or otherwise,  won  to his  designs;  and employs them 
to bring in such, who  have promised beforehand what 
to vote, and what to enact.  Thus to regulate candi- 
dates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, 
what is it but to cut up the government  by the roots, 
and poison  the very fountain  of  public security ?  for 
the people having reserved to themselves the choice of 
their representatives,  as the fence to their  properties, 
could do it for  no other end,  but  that they might al- 
ways be  freely chosen,  and so  chosen, freely act,  and 
advise, as the necessity of  the commonwealth and the 
public good should, upon examination and mature  de- 
bate, be judged to require.  This, those who give their 
votes before  they hear the debate,  and have  weighed 
the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing.  To 
prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set 
up the declared  abettors of  his  own will, for  the true 
representatives  of  the people,  and the law-makers  of 
the society, is certainly as great a breach of  trust, and 
as perfect a declaration of  n design to subvert the go- 
vernment, as is possible to be  met with.  To which if 
one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employ- 
ed to the same end, and all the arts of  perverted law 
made use of, to take off' and destroy all that stand in the 
may of such n design, and will not comply and cansent 
to betray the liberties of  their country, it will  be past 
doubt what is doing.  What power they ought to have 
in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust 
that went along with it in  its first institution, is easy 
to determine;  and  one cannot but see,  that he,  who 
has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any 
longer be trusted. 
§  223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the peo- 
ple being ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the 
foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and 
uncertain humour of  the people, is to expose it to cer- 
tain ruin ;  and no government will be able long to sub- 
sist, if the people  mpy set up n new  legislative, when- 
ever they  take offence at the old one.  To this I an- 
swer, quite the contrary.  People are not so easily got 
out of  their  old  forms,  as  some  are  apt to suggest. 
They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the ac- 
knowledged faults in the frame they have been accus- 
tomed to.  And if there be any original defects, or ad- 
ventitious unes introduced by time, or corruption ; it is 
not  an easy thing to get them changed, even wllen a11 
the world sees there is an opportunity for it.  This slow- 
ness and aversion in the people to quit their old consti- 
tutions, has in the many revolutions, which  have  been 
seen in this kingdom. in this and former ages, still kept 
us to, or,  after some interval of  fruitless attempts, still 
brought us  back again to, our old  legislative of  king, 
lords, and commons : and whatever provocations have 
made the crown be taken  from  some  of  our princes' 
heads, they never carried the people so far as to place 
it in another line. 
$ 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a fer- 
ment for frequent rebellion.  To which 1  answer, 
First, No more than any other hypothesis : for when 
the people are made miserable, and find themselves ex- 
posed to the ill  usage of  arhitrsry power, cry up their 
governors  as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let 
them be  sacred and divine,  descended,  or  authorized 
from  heaven;  give  their1 out for  whom  or what you 
please, the same will happen.  The people  generally 
ill-treated,  and contrary to right, will  be  ready upon 
any occasion  to ease  themselves of  a burden that sits 
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opportunity, wbich in the change, weakness, and  acci- 
dents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. 
He must have lived but a little while in the world, who 
has not seen examples of this in his time ;  and he must 
have read very little, who cannot produce examples of 
it io all sorts of governments in the world. 
$925. Secondly, I answer,  such revolutions happeli 
not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. 
Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and in- 
convenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will 
be born by the people without mutiny or murmur.  But 
if a long train of  abuses,  prevarications, and  artifices, 
a11 tending the same way, make the desigu visible to the 
people, and they cannot  but  feel what they lie under, 
and see whither  they are going ; it is not  to be won- 
dered, that they should then rouse themselves,  and en- 
deavour to put the rule into such hands which may se- 
cure to them the ends for which government was at first 
erected;  and without which,  ancient  names,  and spe- 
cious forms, are so far from being better, that they are 
much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy; 
the inconveniencies, being all as great and as near, but 
the remedy farther off and more difficult. 
5  296. Thirdly,  I  answer,  that this  doctrine  of  a 
power in the people of providing for their safety anew, 
by a new legislative, when their  legislators have acted 
contrary to their trust, by invading  their  property,  is 
the best  fence  against  rebellion,  and  the probablest 
means to hinder it :  for  rebellion being  an opposition, 
not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in 
the constitutions and laws of the government ; those, 
whoever they be, who by  force break through, and by 
force justify their violation of them, are truly and pro- 
perly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and 
civil government, have  excluded force, and introduced 
laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity 
amongst themselves; those who set up force again in op- 
position to the laws, dorebellare, that  is, bring back again 
the state of  war, and are properly rebels:  which  they 
who arein power, (by the pretence they havetoauthority, 
the temptation of  force they have  in  their hands, and 
the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; 
the properest way to prevent the evil is to show them 
the danger and injustice of it, who are under the greatest 
temptation to run into it. 
5 227. In  both the fore-mentioned cases, when either 
the legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary 
to the end for which they were constituted, those who 
are guilty are guilty of  rebellion:  for  if  any one by 
force takes  away the established legislative of  any so- 
ciety, and the laws  by  them  made  pursuant  to their 
trust,  he  thereby takes  away  the  umpirage,  which 
every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of 
all their  controversies, and a  bar  to the state of  war 
amongst them.  They, who  remove, or change the le- 
gislative, take away this decisive power, which nobody 
can have  but by the appointment  and consent of  the 
people;  and  so destroying  the authority which  the 
people did, and nobody else can set up, and introducing 
a  power  which the people hath not  authorized, they 
actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force 
without authority ;  and thus, by removing  the legisla- 
tive established  by the society (in whose  decisions  the 
people acquiesced  and united,  as to that of  their own 
will) they untie the knot, and expose the people  anew 
to the state of  war.  And  if  those, who by force take 
away the legislative, are rebels,  the legislators  them- 
selves, as hds been shown, can be no less esteemed so ; 
when they, who were set up for the protection and pre- 
servation of  the people, their liberties  and properties, 
shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; 
and so they putting themselves into a state of war with 
those  who  made  them the protectors  and guardians 
of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggra- 
vation, rekllantes, rebels. 
§ 228. But if they, who say,  "it lays a foundation 
for rebellion,"  mean that it may occasion  civil  wars, 
or intestine broils, to tell the people  they are absolved 
from obedience  when illegal attempts are made upon 
their liberties or  properties,  and may oppose the un- 
lawful violence  of  those who  were their  magistrates, 
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put in them ; and that therefore this doctrine is not to 
be  allowed, being  so  destructive to the peace  of  the 
world :  they may as well  say, upon the same ground, 
that honest  men  may not  oppose  robbers  or  pirates, 
because this  may occasion  disorder  or  bloodshed.  If 
any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged 
upon him who defends his own right, but on him that 
invades his  neighbour's.  If the innocent  honest  man 
must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who 
will lay violent hands  upon it, I desire it may be con- 
sidered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, 
which consists only in violence and rapine ;  and which 
is to be maintained only for the benefit of  robbers and 
oppressors.  Who would  not  think  it an  admirable 
peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, 
without resistance,  yielded his throat to be torn by the 
imperious wolf?  Polyphemus's  den gives us a perfect 
pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein 
Ulysses  and  his  companions  had  nothing  to do,  but 
quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured.  And  no 
doubt Ulysses,  who  was  a  prudent man, preached up 
passive obedience,  and exhorted them to a quiet sub- 
mission, by representing to them of what concernment 
peace  was  to mankind; and by  showing  the incon- 
veniencies  might happen, if they should offer  to resist 
Polyphemus, who had now the power over them. 
Ej  229.  The end of  government is the good of  man- 
kind :  and  which is best for mankind, that the people 
should be always exposed to the boundless  will of  ty- 
ranny ;  or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to 
be  opposed, when  they grow exorbitant in the use  of 
their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not 
the preservation of the properties of their people ? 
$ 230. Nor  let any one  say, that mischief  can arise 
from hence, as often as it shall please a  busy  head, or 
turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of  the govern- 
ment.  It is  true, such men may stir, whenever  they 
please;  but it will be only to their own just ruin and 
perdition :  for till the mischief  be grown general, and 
the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their at- 
tempts sensible to the greater part, the people,  who are 
more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resist- 
ance, are not apt to stir.  The examples of  particular 
injustice  or oppression, of  here and there an  unfortu- 
nate man,  moves  them  not.  But if  they  universally 
have a  persuasion, grounded upon  manifest  evidence, 
that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and 
the general course and tendency of  things  cannot but 
give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their 
governors, who is to be blamed for it?  Who can help 
it, if  they, who might  avoid  it, bring themselves into 
this suspicion?  Are the people  to be blamed, if  they 
have the sense  of  rational creatures, and can think  of 
things no otherwise than as they find  and  feel them? 
And is it not  rather their  fault,  who put things into 
such a posture, that they would not have them thought 
to be as  they are  ?  I grant, that the pride, ambition, 
and turbulency of  private men have sometimes caused 
great disorders  in commonwealths,  and factions have 
been fatal to states and kingdoms.  But whether  the 
mischief hath oftener begun in the people's  wantonness, 
and a desire to cast off  the lawful  authority of  their 
rulers,  or in the rulers'  insolence,  and  endeavours  to 
get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people; 
whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise 
to the disorder ;  I leave it to impartial history to deter- 
mine.  This I am sure, whoever, either ruler or sub- 
ject,  by force goes about to invade the rights of  either 
prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturn- 
ing the constitution and frame of any just government, 
is highly guilty of  the greatest crime, I think, s man is 
capable of;  being to answer for all those mischiefs  of 
blood,  rapine, and  desolation,  which  the breaking  to 
pieces  of  governments bring  on  a  country.  And he 
who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy 
and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly. 
$ 231.  That subjects  or  foreigners,  attempting by 
force on the properties of  any people, may be  resisted 
with force,  is  agreed  on  all hands.  But that magi- 
strates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath af 
late been denied:  as if  those who had the greatest pri- 
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to break those laws, by  which alone they were set in a 
better place than their brethren : whereas their offence 
is  thereby the greater,  both  as  being  ungrateful  for 
the greater share they have  by the law, and breaking 
also that trust,  which is put into their  hands by their 
brethren. 
$ 23% Whosoever uses force without right, as every 
.one does in society, who does it without law, puts him- 
self into a state of war with those against whom he so 
uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, 
all other rights cease, and every one has a right to de- 
fend  himself, and to resist  the aggressor.  This is so 
evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the 
power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, that 
it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to resist their 
king ; and that too in a chapter, rrherein  he pretends * 
to show, that the divine law  shuts up the people from 
all manner  of  rebellion.  Whereby it is evident, even 
by his own doctrine, that, since they may in some cases 
resist,  all  resisting  of  princes  is  not  rebellion.  His 
words are these.  Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus 
tyrannicae crudelitati et furori jugulum semper prebe- 
bit? Ergone multitudo civitates  suas  fame,  ferro,  et 
flammh vastari, seque, conjuges, et liberos fortunte ludi- 
brio et tyranni libidini expoui, inque omnia vitre peri- 
cula omnesque miserias  et molestias  rege deduci pa- 
tientur ?  Num illis quod  omni  animantium generi est 
?i  naturh tributum, denegari debet, ut sc.  rim vi  repel- 
lant, seseque ab  injuria tueantur  ? Huic breviter respon- 
sum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, qute juris 
naturalis est, neque ultionem  qure practer  naturam est 
adversus regem concedi debere.  Quapropter si rex non 
in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium 
exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublic~,  cujus ipse caput 
est, i. e.  totum populum, vel insignen1 aliquam ejus par- 
tern  immani  et intolerandl srevitib  seu  tyrannide di- 
vexet ;  populo quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se 
ab injuria qotestas cornpetit ;  sed tuendi se tantum, non 
enim in principem invadendi : et restituendse injuriae il- 
late, non recedendi A debit& reverentiP propter accep- 
tam  injuriam.  Yrzsentem  denique  impetum  propul- 
sandi  non  vim pr~teritatn  ulciscendi  jus  habet.  Ho- 
rum enim  alterum  naturk est, ut vitam scilicet cor- 
pusque tuearnur.  Alterum vero contra naturam, ut in- 
ferior de superiori supplicium sumat.  Quod itaque po- 
pulus malum, antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne 
fiat; id postquam factum est, in rcgem authorem sce- 
leris vindicare non potest : populus igitur hoc amplius 
quam privatus quispiam habet :  quod huic, vel ipsis ad- 
versariis  judicibus, esccpto Buchanano, nullum nisi in 
patientia remedium superest.  Ciim ille si intolerabilis 
tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resis- 
tere  cum  reverentiii  possit."  Barclay  contra  Monar- 
chom. 1.  iii. c. 8. 
Tn  English thus : 
5 233. "  But if any one should ask, Must the people 
then  always  lay  themselves  open  to  the cruelty and 
rage of  tyranny? Must they see  their  cities  pillaged 
and laid in ashes, their  wives and children exposed  to 
the tyrant's  lust and fury, and themselves and families 
reduced  by their king to ruin, and all the miseries of 
want and oppression ;  and yet sit still? Must men alone 
be debarred  the common  privilege  of  opposing  force 
with force, which  nature allows  so freely to all other 
creatures for their preservation from injury ?  I answer: 
Self-defence is a part of  the law of  nature ;  nor can it 
be denied  the community, even against  the king him- 
self:  but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no 
means he allowed them ; it being not agreeable to that 
law.  Wherefore if  the king  should show  an hatred, 
not  only to some particular persons, but  sets himself 
against  the body of  the commonwealth, whereof he is 
the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly 
tyrannise over the whole, or a considerable part of the 
people, in this case the people have a right to resist and 
defend  themselves  from  injury:  but it must be  with 
this caution, that they only defend  themselves, but do 
not attack their prince : they may repair the damages 
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bounds of  due reverence  arld respect.  They may re- 
pulse the present  attempt, but must  not revenge past 
violences : for it is  natural for  us  to defend  life  and 
limb ; but that an inferior should punish a superior, is 
against nature.  The mischief which is designed  them 
the people may prevent before  it be  done : I)ut when 
it is done, they must not revenge it on the kine, though 
author of  the villany.  This therefore is the privilege of 
the peo  le in general, above what any private person 
hath; t  g  at particular  men  are allowed by our adver- 
saries themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no 
other remedy but patience ; but the body of the people 
may  with  reverence  resist  intolerable  tyranny;  for, 
when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it." 
$ 239. Thus far that great advocate of  monarchical 
power allows of resistance. 
5  235.  It is true, he has anuesed two limitations to 
it, to no purpose : 
First, He says, it must be with reverence. 
Secondly, It  must be without retribution, or punish- 
ment ; and the reason he gives is, "  Because all inferior 
cannot punish a superior." 
First, How to resist force without striking again, or 
how  to strike with reverence, will need some skill to 
make intelligible.  He that  shall  oppose  an  assault 
only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more 
respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate 
the confidence and force  of  the assailant, will  quickly 
be at an end of  his resistance, and will  find such a de- 
fence serve only to draw on himself  the worse  usage. 
This is  as ridiculous  a  way  of  resisting,  as  Juvenal 
thought it of fighting ; "  ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tan- 
tum."  And the success of the combat will be unavoid- 
ably the same he there describes it : 
-66  Libertns puperis haec est : 
Pulsatur rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat, 
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti." 
This will always be the event of such an imaginary re- 
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sistance, where men  may not strike again.  He there- 
fore who  may resist, must be allowed to strike.  And 
then let our author, or any body else, join  a knock on 
the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence 
and respect  as he  thinks fit.  He that can reconcile 
blows  and reverence,  may, for  aught I know, deserve 
for his pains a civil, respectful cudgelling, wherever he 
can meet with it. 
Secondly,  As  to  his  second,  "An  inferior  cannot 
~unish  a superior ;" that is  true,  generally speaking, 
whilst he is his superior.  But to resist force with force, 
being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all 
former  relation of  reverence, respect, and superiority : 
and then the odds  that remains,  is,  that he, who op- 
poses the unjust aggressor, has this superiority over him, 
that he  has a right, when  he prevails,  to punish  the 
offender, both for the breach  of  the peace, and all the 
evils that followed upon it.  Barclay therefore, in ano- 
ther place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be 
lawful to resist a king in any case.  But he there assigns 
two cases, whereby a king may unking himself.  His 
words are. 
"  Quid ergo,  nulline  casus incidere possunt  quibus 
populo  sese  erigere atque in  regem  impotentius  do- 
Ininantem  arma capere  et invadere  jure  suo  subque 
authoritate  liceat?  Nulli  certe quamdiu  rex  manet. 
Semper enitn  ex  divinis  id  obstat,  Regem  honorifi- 
cato ;  et qui potestati, resistit,  Dei ordinationi  resistit : 
non  alias  igitur  in  eum  poyulo  potestas  est  quam 
si id  committat propter  quod  ipso jure rex esse desi- 
nat.  Tunc enim  se  ipse  principatu  exuit atque  in 
privatis  constituit  liber:  hoc  mod0  populus  et supe- 
rior  efficitur,  reverso  ad  eum  sc. jure  ill0  quod ante 
regem  inauguratum  in interregno habuit.  At  sunt 
paucorum  generum  commissa  ejusmodi  quae  hunc 
effecturn  pariunt.  At ego cum  plurima  animo per- 
lustrem,  duo  tbntam  fnvenio,  duos,  inquam,  casus 
quibus  rex  ips0 facto ex rege  non  regem  se facit et 
omni honore et dignitate regali  atque in  subditos po- 
testate  destituit ; quorum etiam  meminit  Winzerus. 
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durn  de  Nerone  fertur,  quod  is  nempe  senatum pa 
pulumque  Romanum,  atque  adeo urbem  ipsam ferro 
flammaque  vastare,  ac  novas  sibi  sedes  quaerere,  de- 
crevisset.  Et de Caligula,,  quod  palam  denunciari t 
se neque civem neque  principem  seilatui amplius fore, 
inque  animo  habuerit  interempto  utriusque  ordinis 
electissimo  quoque  Alexandriam  commigrare,  ac  ut 
populum  uno  ictu  interimeret,  unam  ei  cerviaem 
optavit.  Talia cum  rex  tlliquis  meditotur et molitur 
serio,  omnem  regnandi  curam  et  animum  ilico  ab- 
jicit,  ac  proinde  imperium  in  subditos  amittit,  ut 
dominus servi pro derelict0 habiti dominium." 
Q 236. "Alter  casus  est,  Si rex  in alicujus cliente- 
lam  se  contulit,  ac  regnum  quod  liberum a majori- 
bus  et  populo  traditum  accepit,  alienae  ditioni  man- 
cipavit.  Nam  tunc quamvis  forte  non  e& mente  id 
agit populo plane  ut  incommodet:  tamen  quia  quod 
prscipuum  est  regiae  dignitatis  amisit,  ut summus 
ecilicet  in regno secundum  Deum sit, et solo Deo .in- 
ferior,  atque  populum  etiam  totum  ignorantem  vel 
invitum,  cujus libertatem sartam et tectam conservare 
debuit, in alterius gentis ditione~n  et potestatem dedidit ; 
hPc  velut  quadam  regni ab alienatione efficit, ut nec 
quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum 
cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat ;  atque ita 
eo facto liberum jam et sue  potestatis populum relinquit, 
cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant." 
Barclay contra Monarchom. 1.  iii. c.  16. 
Which in English runs thus : 
5  937.  "What  then,  can  there  no  case  happen 
wherein  the people  may  of  right,  and  by  their own 
authority, help  themselves,  take arms,  and  set  upon 
their  king,  imperiously  domineering  over  them ? 
None  at all,  whllst he remains  a king.  Honour  the 
king,  and he  that resists the power, resists  the ordi- 
nance of  God,  ere divine  oracles that will never per- 
mit it.  The  people  therefore  can  never  come  b  a 
ower over him, unless he does  something that ma  i  es 
Eim  cease  to be  a king: for then he  divests him~elf 
of  his crown  and dignity,  and returns to the state of 
a private man, and  the people  become free and supe- 
rior,  the power  which  they had  in the interregnum, 
before  they  crowned  him  king,  devolving  to them 
again.  But  there  are  but  few  miscarriages  which 
bring  the matter  to this  state.  After considering it 
well  on  all  sides,  I can  find  but two.  Two  cases 
there are, I say,  whereby a king,  ipso facto, becomes 
no king,  and loses all power ~znd  regal authority over 
his people;  which  are also  taken notice  of  by Win- 
zerus. 
d6 The first is,  If he endeavour  to overturn the go- 
vmnment,  that is,  if  he have a purpose  and  design 
to ruin  the  kingdom  and  commonwealth;  as  it is 
recorded  of  Nero,  that  he  resolved  to  cut  off  the 
senate and people of Rome, lay the city waste with fire 
and sword,  and then  remove  to some other place.- 
And  of  Caligula,  that  he  openly  declared,  that he 
would  be no longer a head  to the people or senate, 
and  that he had  it  in  his  thoughts  to cut off  the 
worthiest men  of  both ranks,  and then retire to Alex- 
andria;  and he wished that the  people had but  one 
neck,  that he  might despatch them  all at a blow.- 
Such designs as these, when any king harbours in his 
thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives 
up all care  and  thought  of  the commonwealth;  and 
consequently forfeits the power of  governing his sub- 
jects,  as  a  master  does  the dominion  over his slaves 
whom he hath abandoned." 
§  258.  The other case  is,  When a  king  makes 
himself  the  dependent  of  another,  and  subjects his 
kingdom which  his  ancestors left him, and the people 
put free into his hands, to the dominion of  another: 
for  however  perhaps  it  may  not  be  his  intention 
to prejudice  the  people,  yet  because he has hereby 
lost the principal  part:  of  regal  dignity,  vic.  to be 
next  and  immediately  under  God  supreme  in  his 
kingdom;  and  also  because  he betrayed  or  forced 
his people,  whose  liberty he ought to have  carefully 
preserved,  into the power and  dominion of  a foreign 
nation.  By  this,  as  it were,  alienation of  his  king- 
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dom  he himself  loses  the power he had  in it before, 
without  transferring  any the least right  to those  on 
whom he would have bestowed  it; and so  by this act 
sets the people  free,  and  leaves  them  at their  own 
disposal.  One example of  this  is to be found  in the 
Scottish AnnaIs." 
$ 239.  In  these cases Barclay, the great champion of 
absolute monarchy, is forced to allow that a king may 
be resisted, and ceases to be a king.  That is, in short, 
not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has  no autho- 
rity,  there he is  no  king,  and may  be  resisted:  for 
wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, 
and becomes like other inen who have no authority - 
And these two cases he instances differ little from those 
above-mentioned  to  be  destructive  to governments, 
only that he has omitted the principle from which his 
doctrine flows ;  and that is,  the breach of trust, in not 
preserving the form of  government agreed on, and in 
not intending the end  of  government  itself,  which is 
the public good and preservation of  property.  When 
a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state 
of war with his  people, what  shall hinder  them from 
prosecuting  him who  is  no  king,  as they would  any 
other man, who has put himself into a state of war with 
them; Barclay and those of his opinion would do well 
to tell us.  This farther I desire may be taken notice of 
out of  Barclay,  that he says,  "  The mischief  that is 
designed  them,  the people  may prevent  before  it be 
done:  whereby he  allows  resislance  when  tyranny is 
but in design.  Such designs  as these  (says he) when 
any king harbours in his  thoughts and seriously pro- 
mcites,  Ile  immediately gives  up all care and thought 
of  the commonwectlth;"  so  that,  according  to  him, 
the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evi- 
dence of such design, or at least  for a sufficient cause 
of resistance.  And the reason of all he  gives in these 
words, '' Because  he  betrayed  or forced  his  people, 
whose liberty lie  ought  carefully  to have  preserved." 
What  he  adds,  into  the  power  and  dominion  of 
a foreign nation,"  signifies  nothing,  the fault and for- 
feiture lying in the loss of their liberty, which he ought 
to have preserved, and not in any distinctio~l  of the per- 
sons to whose  dominion  they  were  subjected.  The 
people's right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, 
whether they are made  slaves to any of their own, or a 
foreign nation;  and in this lies the injury, and against 
this only have they the right of defence.  And there are 
instances to be found in all countries, which  show that 
it is not the change of nations in the persons of their go- 
vernors,  but the change of  government, that gives the 
offence.  Bilson,  a  bishop  of our church, and a great 
stickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, 
if 1 mistake not, in his treatise of Christian subjection, 
acknowledge that princes may forfeit their power, and 
their title to  the obedience of their subjects ;  and if there 
needed  authority in a case where reason is so plain, I 
could  send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue,  and the 
author of  the Mirror, and others, writers that cannot 
be suspected to be  ignorant  of  our  government,  or 
enemies to it.  But I thought Hooker alone might be 
enough to satisfy those men,  who relying on h~m  for 
their ecclesiastical polity,are by a strange  fate carried to 
deny those principles upon which he builds it.  Whether 
they are herein made  the tools  of  cunninger  work- 
men,  to pull  down  their  own  fabric,  they were best 
look.  This I am sure, their civil policy is so new,  so 
dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and peo- 
ple, that as former ages never could bear the broaching 
of  it; so  it may be  hoped those to come,  redeemed 
or-task-  from the  impositions  of  these  Egyptian undY 
masters,  will  abhor the memory of  such  servile  flat- 
terers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved 
all government into absolute tyranny, and would have 
all men born  to,  what their  mean  souls fitted them 
for, slavery. 
$ 0.  Here, it is like,  the common  question  will 
be made,  "Who shall be judge, whether the prince or 
legislative act contrary to their trust?'  This, perhaps, 
ill-affected  and factious men  may spread amongst the 
people, when the prince only makes use of his due pre- 
rogative.  To this  I reply,  The people  shall  be 
judge ;" for  who  shall be judge whether his  trustee 
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or deputy acts well,  and according to the trust reposed 
in him,  but he who deputes him, and must, by having 
deputed him,  have still a power to discard him, when 
he fails in his trust  ?  If this be reasonable in particular 
cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that 
of the greatest moment,  where the welfare of millions 
is  concerned,  and  also  where  the  evil,  if  not  pre- 
vented, is greater, and the redress very difficult,  dear, 
and dangerous ? 
3  141.  But farther,  this question, (.. Who shall be 
judge?")  cannot mean,  that there is no judge at all : 
for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide con- 
troversies amongst men,  God in heaven is judge.  He 
alone, it is true, is judge of the right.  But every man 
is judge  for himself,  as in all other cases,  so in  this, 
whether another hath put himself into a state of war 
with him, and whether he should appeal to  the supreme 
Judge, as Jephthah did. 
$ 249. If a  controversy arise betwixt a prince and 
some of the people, in a matter where the law is silent 
or doubtful, and the thing be  of great consequence, I 
should think the proper umpire, in such a case, shonld 
be the body of the people :  for in cases where the prince 
hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the 
common ordinary rules of  the law ;  there,  if any men 
find themselves  aggrieved,  and think the  prince  acts 
contrary to,  or  beyond  that trust,  who  so  proper to 
judge as the body of the people,  (who, at first, lodged 
that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? 
Hut if the prince, or whoever they be in the administra- 
tion, decline that way of determination, the appeal then 
lies nowhere but to Heaven ; force between either per- 
sons, who have no known superior on earth, or which 
permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly 
a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to Heaven ; 
and in that state the injured party must judge for him- 
self, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, 
and put himself upon it. 
9 243. To  conclude, The  power that every individual 
gave the society, when he entered into it,  can  never 
revert to the individuals again, as long as the society 
lasts,  but will always  remain in the community ;  be- 
cause without this there can be no commu~~ity,  no com- 
monwealth,  which  is  contrary to the original  agree- 
ment :  so also when the society hath   laced the legisla- 
tive in any assembly of  men,  to continue in them and 
their successors, with direction and authority for  pro- 
viding such successors, the legislative can never revert 
to the people whilst  that government  lasts;  because, 
having provided  a legislative with power to continue 
for ever, they have given up their political power to the 
legislative, and cannot resume it.  But if they have, set 
limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this 
supreme power is any person,  or assembly,  only tem- 
porary;  or else, when  by the miscarriages  of  those in 
authority it is  forfeited ;  upon the forfeiture, or at the 
determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, 
and the  people have a right to act as supreme, and con- 
tinue the legislative  in  themselves;  or  erect  a  new 
form, or under the old form place  it in new hands, as 
they  -think good. CONTENTS 
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Abraham, (the patriarch) his war 
proves  not a sovereign power, 
310 
had  no  authority over 
Lot,  313 
Absolute  monarchy,  being  "jure 
divino,"  a new doctrine,  214 
not proved divine from 
Adam's sovereignty by creation, 
222-nor  from his  sovereignty 
by donation,  227 
how  destructive  it is 
to mankind  among  the Turks, 
452  -  Eve's  subjection proves 
it not to beMjure  divino," 244- 
norAda~~'s  fatherhood, 249, &c. 
I-----  it is not  proved divine 
by the command, "  Honour thy 
father,"  257, &c. 
it flows not from father- 
hood and property,  267, &c. 
supposing  cc jure divi- 
no,"  it is necessary to know the 
person invested with it, 275, &c. 
Absolute monarchy, the absurdity 
of  supposing it to descend from 
Adam  by heirship,  290 
no proof of  it from Ja- 
cob,  or other patriarchs,  297, 
&c.-nor  from Noah's sons, 31 7 
nor from the dispersion 
of  Babel,  3  19 
not  enjoyed by  them, 
321,322 
Nimrod had  no  right 
to it,  324 
the dukes of Edom, a~d 
several  kings  mentioned  in 
Scripture, proofs against it, 325 
inconsistent with  civil 
society,  389 
why the subjects of  it 
are kept  from  destroying one 
another,  391, &c. 
how  it came to  be  re- 
strained by laws,  ibid, 
Adam,  no  proof  of  his  absolute 
power  over  his  children,  218 
-220 
-had  no absolute authority by 
creation,  222 490  Index. 
Adamlrad no absoluteauthority by 
God's appointment,  227,  &c.  -  the grant (Gen. i. 28) gave 
him no power over men,  228  -  the same grant was given to 
all men,  233  -  supposing hewas proprietor 
of all things, this proves not his 
sovereignty,  - 
235 
his  absolute dominion  not 
proved by Eve's subjection, 244  -  of the conveyance of his sup- 
posed monarchical power,  273  -  the absurdity  of  supposing 
any  one  heir  of  his  autho- 
rity,  290 
-the  difficulties of discovering 
the true heir,  292, 302, &c. 
Arbitrary government, worse than 
none,  420  --  no right to it from con- 
quest,  443 
Authority (political)  not required 
in the fifth commandment,  261. 
Vid. Political Power. 
Clipped  aioney, the charge of re- 
coining it slioultl  not be borne 
by the public,  20  1 
Coin.  Vid. filoncy. 
Coinage,  paid  for,  by  a  tax  on 
wine,  90.  Costs nothing to tlre 
owner,  ibid.  105  .-Makes  not 
standard silver worth less tl1a11 
before,  122  -  the charge  of  it comput- 
ed,  124  -  ascertirins tlic quantity of 
silver, by a public murk,  143- 
and  so is a security to the re- 
ceiver,  144  -  the art of it should be kept 
secret,  203 
Commodities, thegoodness of them 
does  not  always increase their 
price,  4 1 
theconsumption ofthem 
enhances their value,  ihid. 
how the vendingof then] 
is increased,  43 
Commonwealth,  how  men  come 
under  the  government  of  it, 
and how far,  409.414 
Balance of trade.  Vid.  Trade. 
Bills of  exchange, the only use of 
them,  22 
Birthright, dominion does not na- 
turally belong to it,  302, &c. 
Bullion.  Vid.  Silver. 
Buyers,  plenty  of  them  makes 
things dear,  39 
C;. 
Cl~ildren  not born in a full state of 
equality,  368  -  yet they  are  born  to 
it,  369 
when  they come to be 
free,  371  -  lrow they are said to be 
born free,  372 
Civil  society.  Vid.  Political 
Society. 
Clipped money  should  pass only 
for its weight,  196-.the  great 
misclricf  of  its passing  othcr- 
wise,  200 
-,  --- 
the end of  it is the pre- 
servation of property,  412 
the several forms of  it, 
415,16 
how the word is used by 
the author,  416 
its  highest powercannot 
be absolutely arbitrary,  417 
--  must  be  governed  by 
standing laws,  423 
three  kinds  of  power 
therein,  424 
the subordination of its 
powers,  426 
Community,  how  the  supreme 
power is ultimately therein, 426 
Conjugal society,  how made, 383  -  the cause of  its long con- 
tinuance in mankind,  384 
Conquest givesnot right of govern- 
ing to the aggressor,  443  -  if  unjust,  the conquered 
may appeal to Heaven for jus- 
tice,  444 
Conquest, whenjust, it gives an  ab-  Filmer, (Sir R.) hisreasons against 
solute powerover the  lives of the  native freedom considered, 2 15 
conquered,  446  --  his notions of  fatherly au-  -  yet not over their estates,  thority,  217 
and why,  447,448  --he  affirms kings tobeabove 
Corn, the price of it depends on its  law,  ibid. 
plenty,  170 -  his strange interpretation 
of Scripture,  223 
E.  -  sufficiently  confutes  his 
own schemes,  27  0, 271 
Equality (natural) may be altered  --  says, it matters not how 
by several things,  340, &c.  kings come by their power, 274, 
Esau, his forces proved him not an  --  makes  an usurper  have 
heir to Adam's  dominions, 314,  right to govern,  ibid. 
315  First-born, has no natural right,by 
Exchange  (of  money)  in  several  being so, to dominion,  301 
places, how regulated,  50  Force, when without authority, to 
-when  it is high or low, 149  be opposed with force, 443,444 
&c.-the  reasons of both,  ibid. -  promiees extorted by  it not 
binding,  45  1 
F.  Free,  men are  naturally  so,  213. 
339 
Fathers, Filmer's  account of  their  Freedom,  (natural) men  not de- 
authority,  225,  226  prived  of,  without  their  own 
-have  not an absolute power  consent,  420 
over tlieir children,  263 -  how  men  subject  them-  -  give  not life to their chil-  selves to any government,  409, 
dren,  25  1  414  -  seldom intend to commu-  G. 
nicate life,  and sometimes wish  Gamesters injurious to the public 
the contrary,  252  welfare,  28, 29  --  have no power to expose  God speaks in Scripture so as to be 
their children,  253  understood,  245,246 
-some  fathers have fattened  Gold,  altering  its value  by a law 
and eat their children,  254  in proportion to silver, tends to 
-have  not power to sacrifice  impoverish a nation,  98,  &c. 
their offspring,  256  not  the measure of commerce  -  their authority cannot be  as silver is,  151 
transferred,  more than that of a  -why  it should, notwithstand- 
husband,  286  ing this,  be coined,  ibid.  -  their  power  may be for- -  the  proportion  between  it 
feited,  but not alienated,  287  and silver,  193  -  how they in time  became  Government cannot  naturally de-  .- 
princes,  382  scend by hereditary right,  275 
Fatherhood, Moses and Joshuanot  &c. 
made  governors  by the right of  how it differs from pro-  1 
it,  330  perty,  283  - 
the judges  and kings of  thatwhicli gives right to. 
Israel ruled not by this  title, 33  1  it, inthe  present possessor, must 
Filmer, (Sir Robert) a breviate of  give it  to the successor, 284, &c. 
llis system of government,  215  it is absolutely neces- 
-asserts  that none are born  sary to know who has the right 
free,  ibld.  to it,  275 Index. 
Government,  how  many  ways it  Inheritance,  how  goods  came  to 
may  be  dissolved,  464, kc.  descend  by  it from  parents  to 
what right the commu-  children,  262, 283 
nity have topreserve themselves,  political  government 
under ill management of it, 468  naturally  descends  by  it,  no 
no  great  danger  of  a  more than conjugal,  286 
people's being forwardtochange  Interest (of money) cannot be ef- 
it,  471  fectually limited by  a law,  4 
the end of  it is the good -  the ill consequences  of at- 
of mankind,  412, &c.  tempting to limit it,  5,  6 
Barclay himself allows  -the  difference between ua- 
the people to defend themselves  tural and legal interest,  9 
from  the  tyrannical  abuse of -  what raises the natural in- 
it,  476  terest,  ibid. 
how the abuse of  it may -  can  be  no  more  limited 
be resisted,  478  than the hireof houses and ships, 
when, according to Bar-  10 
clay, governors lose their right -  the mischiefs of  reducing 
to it,  478,481  it low,  11 
who  must bejudgewhen -  the rent of  land, &c, may 
it is forfeited by those who are  as well be limited,  36 
intrusted with it,  483 -  sinking it,  increases not 
Guineas, how raising them impo-  the value of  other commodities, 
verished the nation,  194  but the contrary,  32  -  yet it is fit the law should 
H.  lay some restraint upon it,  and 
whyJ  63 
Heir,  (to government)  none  can -  reasons for  61.  per  cent. 
be  so but by  the laws of the  being the best proportion,  64 
community,  292 -  the  height of  it no preju-  -  controverdes  about  him,  dice to trade,  66 
have  caused great mischief  in -  why  it is low  in Holland, 
nations,  292  66-69 
primogeniture gives no na- -  if  it were  generally low, 
tural right to be so,  301, 302  it would  be  an  advantage to 
Holland, why the interest of  mo-  trade,  69 
ney is low there,  67 -  the lowering of  it would  -  men  may lend  there for as  render it more difficult to bor- 
muoh  interest as they can  get,  row,  76 
ibid.  Judah (the patriarch)had no domi-  -  why  the  merchants of  it  nion of  life and death,  309 
undersell others,  80 
-how  ducatoons came to be 
scarce there,  95  K. 
Hooker, his judgment concerning 
civil government,  346  Kingdom grows rich or prveerfnl, 
just as a farmer does,  19 
I. 
Jacob became not a sovereign by  L. 
getting the birthri  ht,  298  d  James  I.  (king of  ngland)  his  Labour,  much  more  owing to it 
judgluent  of tyranny,  457  than to nature,  3614 
Index. 
Labour first gave right to proper- 
tv.  364 
~ali,  the  yearly rent of  it might 
better  be  limited than the in- 
terest of  money,  36,37  -  the price of  it rises not by 
lowering the interest, 30.-The 
cause of this,  37  -  rises  in  proportion  to  the 
numher of  buyers,  39, 53  -  what increases the sellers of 
it,  53  -  wliat diminishes the number 
of  its purchasers,  5 4 
the  value of it decreases with 
the decay of  trade,  ibid.  -  too much advance of its price 
an injury to the public,  62  -  why  men  pay  taxes for it, 
though mortgaged,  75 
-how  it came at first to be ap- 
propriated,  3  60 
Landholders, want of trade a great 
loss to them,  25, 54, 56 
Laws (human) must  not  be con- 
trary to the law of  nature  or 
Scripture,  419,  note 
Legislative power, how it is bound- 
ed,  423 
Liberty, how men are by nature in 
the state of it,  339  -  wherein it consists,  351  -  restraint by the law of na- 
ture consistent with it,  341  -  how  far it is given up, by 
becoming  members  of  a  com- 
monwealth,  396, &c. 
Lineal succession, not restored in 
the kings of  Israel,  337 
none  observed among 
the rulers of  Israel till David's 
time,  334 
Lowndes (Mr.) propounded to have 
our  money reduced to one-fifth 
less value,  153  --  his  reasons for  lessening 
the value of  money,  answered, 
ibid. 
Monarchy,  how  government,  at 
first, generally came to  be  so, 
400. Vid.  Absolrdte  Monarchy. 
Money due to foreigners cannot al- 
ways be  paid  in  goods or bills 
of  exchange,  17  -  necessity of  a proportion of 
it in  trade,  21  -  want  of  it very injurious to 
landholders,  25  -  lowering the value of  it in- 
creaseth not the value of  other 
things,  30-35  -  it is valued according to the 
plenty or scarcity of  commodi- 
ties,  30, 32,  34, 36,  -  mischievous consequences of 
B scarcity of  it,  47-50  -  want of  it at last falls upon 
land,  73-75  -  how the value of  it may  be 
said to be  raised,  82-46  -  it cannot  be  really  raised, 
unless in proportion to its plenty 
or ~carceness,  82  -  raising  in  denomination, 
tends to impoverish a nation, 
86  -  is  valued  according to the 
quantity of  silver contained in 
it,  89.-How  it  comes  to  be 
otherwise when clipped,  94  -  the  advantage of  it in com- 
merce  above  uncoined  silver, 
88  - -  -  the cause of melting it down, 
90  -  it is better for the public to 
be milled than hammered,  91  -  raising  the  denomination 
will not hinder the exportation 
of  it,  91,  93  -  the value of it should be kept 
as steady as possible,  103 
-the  proportion should always 
be exactly kept between that of 
gold and silver,  97,99 
-constant  equality of its value, 
the interest of every country, ib.  -  making  it  lighter  than  it 
should be is unjust,  109,  -  lowering it, no advantage in 
selling and letting of  land,  112, 
&c.  -  why  so little ie  sometimes 
coined,  119 Money,  it is  really  valuable  ac- 
cording  to its  weight,  139.- 
This  must  be  understood  of 
silver witllout the alloy,  140  -  why  so  much  was  coined 
in queen  Elizabeth's  time,  and 
after,  130 
-howit  answers all'things, 139  -  the denomination  alters not 
the intrinsic value,  ibid.  --  lessening  its  real  value  is 
worse than clipping,  146  -  its being current only for its 
weight, is the most effectual way 
to stop the mischief of clipping, 
147  -  it  isnecessary in proportion to 
the plenty of  it in neighbouring 
nations,  148  -  it will  always  be  of  equal 
value with  the  same weight of 
standard silver,  158  -  what causes the exportation 
of  it,  160  -  it  ought  not to  be  made 
lighter,  though  silver  werc 
grown dearer,  16!  -  lessening it would be a gain 
to money-hoarders,  but aloss to 
others,  - 
166 
by making it one-fifth light- 
er, creditors and landlords lose 
20 per cent.  168  -  and labourers  also lose by 
it,  unless  they have one-fifth 
more wages,  - 
170 
the change of  its name will 
not alter its value,  - 
177 
the insignificancy of  lessen- 
ing, explained by familiar simi- 
litudes,  ibid.  -  if a crown  of  it (e.  g.) be 
called  75 pence,  it will buy no 
mdre  goods than if it be called 
60 pelice,  180  -  lowering  its value will  not 
render  it more  generally  use- 
ful,  ibid.  -  it cannot be of the full price 
of bullion,  because of exporting 
the latter,  164 
-the  true raising it is by  put- 
ting more silver in it.  I 8.5 
Money, how it has beet1 altered in 
former times,  185,-and  the 
most probableoccasion of it, 197  -  how to prevent the melting 
of it down, or exporting it,  199  -  how the use of  it tirst  en- 
larged the extent of  property, 
365-366 
Vid. Interest of Money. 
Nature,  men  are by it in a state 
of  equality,  340 
by it  people haveliberty, 
but not licence,  34  1 
in the state of it, every 
one  llas  right  to  punisl~  the 
breach of its law,  341, 342 
the inconveniencies  of 
it not  greater than of  absolute 
~nonarchy,  345 
independent princes are 
still in the state of  it,  346 
Noah had authority given bin], in 
common with liis sons,  235  -  was  not the sole heir of the 
world,  258  -  had a greater dominion over 
the creatures than Adam,  239  -  none  of  his  sons  heir  to 
Adam, more than the rest, 316 
Par (in  the exchange  of  money) 
what it means,  149 
Parental power, perhaps a more fit 
phrase than (as usual) paternal 
power,  367,368 
how it differs from poli- 
tical,  378 
Parents,  their  power  temporary, 
but the honour due to them per- 
petual,  375  -  the  ground and extent of 
their power over their children, 
370, &c.  -  may give mastersauthority 
to use force upon their children, 
377 
Index. 
Patriarch, this  name denotes  not 
having  sovereign  power  from 
Adam,  315 
Perjury, to be carefully prevented 
by law-makers,  6  -  frequent oaths a great oc- 
casion of  it,  ibid. 
Peru, some of the inhabitants fat- 
tened and eat children,  254 
Political power,  what  it is, 336, 
339  -  though in some cases it is 
c(  absolute,"  yet  not "  arbitra- 
7."  422 
po11tlcaI  societies,  how  framed,  394 
-  how they began,  400, &c. 
-  must be determined by the 
majority, unless they agree on a 
greater number,  395 
--why  we have no historical 
account of  their beginning, 397,  ILTr  -". 
Power,  paternal,  political,  and 
despotical,  440 
Vid.  Supreme. 
Prerogative, wherein it consists,- 
434, &c. 
how and why it is some- 
times limited,  437 
the end of  it is the pub- 
lic good,  ibid. 
who mayjudge concern- 
ing the right  or wrong  use of 
it,  438  -  if  people are injured by 
it, they may appeal to Heaven, 
43  9 
Propert!?,  it was at length settled 
by law,  371  -  cannot  be rightly  taken 
from  any,  without  their  con- 
sent,  422 
Providence,  the bounty  of  it,  in 
making tire  most  useful things 
commonly the cheapest,  41 
Price of things not always propor- 
tionable to their usefulness, 41  -  of  foreign  commodities  ad- 
vances by being taxed,  but that 
of home ones falls,  5  8  -  the reason of  this,  ibid. 
Property, how men come to have 
it.  361.367  - -> -  how it is naturally bound- 
ed,  368, &c. 
-in  land and other things, at 
first acquired  by labour,  ibid.  -  how this is a common ad- 
vantage,  364 
Rebellion,  the word  sometimes 
used for a lawful war, 473,  474 
the best  means to pre- 
vent  it  is  good  government, 
ibid. 
governors may be guilty 
of  it as well  as the governed, 
ibid. 
Rents,  the  advantage  of  paying 
them quarterly, or weekly,  27  -  the causes of their falling, 
69.70 
Representatives of the people, how 
sometimes  very  unequal,  432,  433 
corrupting them, or pre- 
engaging the electors, tends to 
dissolve the government,  470 
Resistance of  tyranny,  when it is 
lawful,  476  --  when  it is lawful to be 
used,  ibid. 
-it  is warrantable to use 
it, for repelling illegal force, 482 
Sellers,  plenty  of  them  makes 
things cheap,  39 
Shem (the patriarch) was no ab- 
solute monarch,  321, &c. 
Silver is ten times  more plentiful 
now  than  two  hundred  years 
ago, and why,  47  -  it is therefore nine parts in 
ten cheaper,  ibid.  -  properly speaking,  none of 
it is finer than other,  140  -  measures the value of other 
things,  140, 141  -  how standard is in England proportioned  with  alloy,  145, 
143 
Silver, the advantages of its being 
mixed with copper,in money, ib.  -  is brought  in by an overba- 
lance of trade,  148, 149  -  is alone the measure of corn- 
n~crce,  and not gold,  151,  152 
-when  it may be said to rise or 
fall in the value of it, 154, 155 
it  is alwavs in value accord- 
ing to its wkight,  if  standard, 
156  -  how  unreasonable  it is  to 
pretend it to be worth more nn- 
coined, than coined,  1713  -  whence nncoined sometimes 
advances in the price of  it, 174 
Slavery, it is hard to suppose any 
one to plead for  it in earnest, 
212  -  wherein it consists,  351 
Slaves, men arenot born such,213, 
&c.  -  the Israelites were not so, 
when returnedoutof Egypt, 329  -  Jacob's  sons  were  not 
such,  as  appears  by  Reuben 
and Judah,  330 
Society, vid. Con$gal  and Politi- 
cal. 
Spain is itself poor, though it fur- 
nishes  all other  nations  with 
gold  and silver,  72 
Supreme power  of  the common- 
wealth, where it lies,  427 
Taxes generally fall  at  last npon 
land,  55-7 
increase the price of fo- 
reign,  but  lessen that of  home 
commodities,  59 
Taxes  though  laid  upon  trade 
in  Holland,  yet  they  chiefly 
impoverish landholders, 60,  6 1 
Trade is hindered by lowering the 
interest of  money,  12  -  enriches a nation mote than 
mines do,  ibid.  -  when it is gainful, or a loss 
to a nation,  18 
-the  general decay of it  lessens 
the value of land,  53, Prc.  -  what  is  the overbalance of 
it,  148 
Tyranny, wherein it consists, 457 
speech  of  king James I. 
concerning it,  ibid.  -  the greatness of  the per- 
sons  exercising  it  aggravates 
the crime,  459 
Usurpation,  wherein  it consists, 
455 
War,  the  state of  it  described, 
347, &c. 
he that seeks the life or 
liberty of  another, is in a state 
of it,  ibid.  -  how it differs  from  the 
state of nature,  348  -  avoiding it,  the design of 
forming society,  350 
West Indies,  some  nations there 
have no supreme governor un- 
less in time of war,  398, 402 
Wheat,  more fit than  most other 
things for  a common  measure 
of trade,  46  -  it is not so useful for ex- 
change as money,  47 